Housden Martyn. Forgotten Pages in Baltic History: Diversity and Inclusion. (On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics) (ENG)

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Valters Ščerbinskis

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their stance is a remark by Gustavs Celmiņš, leader of Pērkonkrusts: “A new

system has been created, and new slogans, albeit stolen ones, have been

announced.”

All the same, Pērkonkrusts had previously been very critical

of Ulmanis’s policies, and the organisation could not accept or endorse them

completely now. Accordingly, in an announcement of 23 May, the leaders of

Pērkonkrusts came out against the coup.

Regardless of the widely differing moods in society subsequently

portrayed in memoirs, it seems that most of society regarded the coup

pragmatically―as a fact that could not be altered. Writer Jānis Veselis

recorded in his memoirs that on the next day he went to his local authority

office to get the newspapers and learned that the Saeima had been dissolved.

“The Socialists together with the Communists had apparently wanted to rise

up; four hundred revolvers had been confiscated from the siseņi (as the

workers’ sports unit was known). “Little Bruno” had been arrested.

The

farmers explained the causes of the coup in this manner: had the Left not

wanted to rebel, then there’d have been no reason to do away with the

Saeima. They did not even consider that Ulmanis might have done it because

of his own greed for power or for some other unimportant reason,” wrote

Veselis on the mood among the people in the Mēmele area.

He added that a

variety of views were expressed on the coup among the writers: some praised

it, some feared the consequences, and some denounced it.

The State Historical Archives of Latvia preserve a large number of

reports from Aizsargi and police officials concerning the mood in the

countryside. Overall, the reports state that people viewed the events

positively, and in many cases with enthusiasm, emphasising their joy that the

age of party promises was over. At the same time, the reports mention

population groups unhappy with the coup: officials dismissed from office and

members of political parties that had been closed down. However, open

expressions of dissatisfaction with the new order were observable hardly

anywhere.

As indicated by the press, on the day after the coup life in Latvia went

on as normal.

In Riga there was almost no indication of the changes that

had taken place. Only an observant passer-by might notice that the police

standing at their posts now had guns and helmets. Early on the morning of 16

May a radio announcement of the developments was made. Telephone

communications were restored only after 8 a.m. In a few hours, the police

and Aizsargi had put up announcements in the towns about the introduction

of a state of war in the country, and later also about the prohibition against

the possession of weapons and the holding of meetings. The newspapers

wrote that people were gathering around these announcements to read them,

but were then peacefully dispersing.

Some of the papers had special issues

giving more detailed reports about the events. On 16 and 17 May, flags were

flown at buildings in the towns and parishes, affirming support for the

changes. However, as the archive documents show, flags did not fly

Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis

197

everywhere, and not all the flags were put up voluntarily. The buildings of

the Social Democrats and other left-wing organisations had already been

seized, and the Houses of the People had been turned into Houses of the

Aizsargi. The police were strictly controlling the trade in alcohol.

Persecutions started when a large number of political activists were

arrested on 16 May and their homes searched. The politicians, taken by

surprise, did not put up any resistance to arrest. Exceptionally, a dramatic

break-in took place at the apartment of V. Bastjānis, deputy of the Social

Democratic faction: here the door had to be forced open.

At the house of

Pauls Kalniņš, the Speaker of the Saeima, police broke in through a window.

Both were arrested, although Pauls Kalniņš was soon set free. Kārlis Pauļuks

and Jāzeps Rancāns, Deputy Speakers of the Saeima, were placed under

house arrest. At the time of their arrest, the Saeima deputies expressed their

consternation at the disregard for constitutional procedure and the violent

changes occurring to the system. During interrogation by the political police,

the Social Democrats pointed out that those who had arrested them were

actually the ones guilty of breaking the law. All those arrested on the first

night were taken to the political police. From there, some were sent to Riga

Central Prison, but the majority were placed in Liepāja Concentration Camp.

Arrests of people regarded as possibly hostile to the new regime

continued for several weeks after the coup. A large number of Social

Democrats, Pērkonkrusts members and a variety of activists from certain

other political parties ended up in temporary places of imprisonment. Also,

more than ten émigré socialists from Austria and Germany were arrested and

expelled from Latvia. During the summer at least 503 members of social

democratic organisations, including members of the Jewish social democratic

organisation Bund, were arrested, along with 126 members of the illegal

Latvian Communist Party and its youth organisation. It should be added that

several of them were incarcerated after being caught participating in illegal

meetings. Large numbers of weapons were discovered in the possession of

the Social Democrats. Some individuals with Communist leanings were also

found to have unregistered weapons.

Ninety seven members of

Pērkonkrusts were arrested at their headquarters on 13 June 1934, followed

by the arrest of a further 14 members on 15 July by the water towers on

Matīsa iela.

Altogether, 128 Pērkonkrusts members were arrested that

summer, along with one member of the Active Nationalist Club. Members of

ethnic minority political organisations were also arrested (15 members of

Jewish organisations, two members of Belorusian groups and one member of

a German organisation), as were members of the right-wing New Farmers’

and Smallholders’ Party (six people), the centrist Democratic Centre (one

person), the populist New Farmers’ Union of Pēteris Leikarts (three people)

and the Labour Party of Kārlis Balodis (one person). Significantly, only six

members of the illegal “Leģions” organisation were arrested: the other

leading members of the group were simply already in prison.

Valters Ščerbinskis

198

After the coup, in the period up to 31 December 1934, when the last

mass dismissals took place, a total of 3983 people were dismissed from state

and municipal institutions. About half the staff of rural municipalities were

dismissed and replaced with new people. In the urban municipalities, the

proportion of staff dismissed was much lower. The dismissals mainly

affected those institutions that had a significant number of members of left-

wing parties. The majority of those dismissed were accused of belonging to

the Latvian Social Democratic Party, or of holding left-wing views.

However, this was not the only reason. Also dismissed, although in much

smaller numbers, were people belonging to other political parties―even

members of Ulmanis’s own party, the Farmers’ Union of Latvia, if they did

not act in accordance with the demands placed on municipal employees after

the coup. In addition to the political grounds, which certainly did

predominate, a fairly large proportion were dismissed for various

professional failings: inability to ensure the collection of taxes, alcoholism or

lack of knowledge of the official language, Latvian. In some cases an

important reason for dismissal was affiliation to a particular ethnic group, but

except in the case of Germans, the ethnic factor was very rarely the sole or

decisive reason.

Only a small number of arrestees ever came to trial. Most attention

was focussed on the trial of the Social Democrats Pauls Kalniņš, Bruno

Kalniņš, Jūlijs Celms and Pēteris Ulpe, who were accused of anti-state

activities and illegal possession of weapons. Already on 13 June 1934 the

Political Police prepared a 14 page long statement giving the grounds for

arresting the Social Democrats and binding them over for trial. On 18

February 1935 in a bogus trial that was absurd in legal terms, Bruno Kalniņš

was sentenced to three years in a house of correction, Jūlijs Celms received a

four month prison sentence, Pēteris Ulpe was given three months in prison,

and Pauls Kalniņš was acquitted. At the trial the Social Democrats pleaded

not guilty.

At the trial on 28 February 1935 against the Pērkonkrusts

members, their leader Gustavs Celmiņš was sentenced to three years in a

house of correction, and a group of other active Pērkonkrusts members

received sentences of between two years and four months in a house of

correction. The Pērkonkrusts members pleaded guilty and considered

themselves punished for their political ideals. Soon after the coup the Liepāja

Concentration Camp (actually an internment camp) was set up, where a total

of 369 people, mostly Social Democrats, were held during the time it was in

operation. Initially it was not at all clear, either to the army leaders or the

Prisons Department, how long the camp would operate. It was planned that

after 11 April 1935 career non-commissioned officers of the army would take

over responsibility for guarding the camp, but the new army commander

Krišjānis Berķis protested against this, emphasising that responsibility and

guarding of such a camp “has nothing do to with the military”.

The

situation was resolved through the abolition of the camp.

The existence of

Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis

199

such an internment camp was yet another sign that the new élite did not have

complete trust in society and wished to isolate potential opposition figures.

After the coup some officers and NCOs were discharged from the

army, and at least two conscripted soldiers were arrested. Six members of the

police force, three customs officials and five officials from the prison service

were dismissed. However, not all the dismissals of officers were politically

motivated: some were dismissed because of poor appraisal results. In early

June the commander of the Vidzeme Division ordered the regimental

commanders to submit, by 6 June, a list of those lieutenant colonels and

captains who had taken part in the War of Independence and had been

assessed as “good” or “very good”, but who could not be kept in military

service for various reasons. Because of the dismissal of officials after the

coup, the military planned to gives these officers civil service posts with a

salary of at least 300–400 Lats, mainly in the police and in municipal

authorities.

There were places in the civil service for discharged officers because

the state and municipal authorities had dismissed officials not trusted by the

new regime. Former members of various parties, mainly left-wing parties,

lost their posts in the capital and outside it, not only on the basis of

investigations by the Political Board, but sometimes also as a result of

denunciation by colleagues and neighbours. Officially, the dismissals took

place in accordance with the Law on the Dismissal of the Staff of State Civil

Institutions and Municipal Authorities during a State of Emergency. These

restrictions served to increase the numbers of those disaffected with the new

regime, but they did help make the state structures more homogenous.

Usually the potentially untrustworthy staff of official bodies were identified

on the basis of a report from the Political Board stating that they were listed

in the board’s records as members of left-wing organisations or other groups

banned after the coup. However, affiliation to a left-wing labour organisation

or the Latvian Social Democratic Party did not always mean dismissal. For

example, after the coup, there were six warders working at Riga Central

Prison who had been members of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’

Party up to 15 May. Only one of them was dismissed. Another was demoted,

and the rest were appraised by the prison administration as competent staff

and kept their jobs, albeit, they were to be “inconspicuously watched and

gradually dismissed from the service in cases of disciplinary

infringements.”

“Gradual” dismissal evidently meant that the regime was

striving not to demonstrate excessive harshness. True, the state institutions

never succeeded in eliminating Pērkonkrusts members. In the second half of

the 1930s, when efforts were made to stamp out their activities, more and

more members of the organisation were discovered among those officials

previously regarded as loyal to the Ulmanis regime.

As part of the suppression following the coup, all 109 political parties

in existence up to that time were closed down. In addition, 46 associations

Valters Ščerbinskis

200

were “presented with a proposal to dissolve themselves”. 37 actually did

cease their activities and 54 organisations had new administrative bodies

appointed and changes made among the leading personnel. It was envisaged

that in 1935 approximately 1,000 more associations would be abolished or

merged.

Publication of several periodicals was prohibited. This included all

the leftist press, most periodicals owned by political parties, and some minor

publications which might somehow have created opposition to the regime.

Even the conservative “Latvis”, which wholeheartedly supported coup, was

closed in September. On 16 May 1934, prior censorship was introduced for

all periodical publications and was changed on 17 November to post-

censorship.

Although there is a view that censorship was liberal, it did give

rise to a reaction. It should be noted that censorship was gradually

introduced: initially, the coup organisers were not able to censor all

publications. For example, as late as 17 May, Jaunais Vōrds, the newspaper

of the Latgale Farmers’ Progressive Association, criticised the Latgallian

politician Turkopols, who advocated dictatorship and was opposed to

political parties.

Immediately after the coup, 50 periodicals were suspended. Under the

Law on a State of War, literature could be taken out of circulation without

court sanction on the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Such bans

were imposed following statements from the Censorship Service of the Press

and Associations Department of the Ministry of the Interior, although in

some cases the prohibition was based on a recommendation or statement

from another ministry. After the coup, publications were impounded or

confiscated. These included newspapers and magazines connected with the

Social Democratic Workers’ Party, the trade unions, other left-wing

organisations, Pērkonkrusts or the National Socialists, as well as publications

deemed “destructive of family life”.

Up to 25 June, a total of 99 press

publications were suspended,

although in two cases suspension was

subsequently annulled.

Virtually the only documented case of active opposition to the

conspirators took place in the village of Eleja. The local postmaster Oto

Ziemelis and his wife Alvīne, who worked as the telephone operator, listened

in to telephone communications during the coup, heard the reports of the

Aizsargi and reported these to the local Social Democrat officials.

course, in some cases people did try to avoid arrest by fleeing or hiding.

During the summer of 1934, administrative punishments of imprisonment for

periods ranging from a few weeks up to six months for voicing dissatisfaction

with the new regime were imposed on at least 238 people who cannot be

identified as affiliated to any party, as well as several dozens of individuals

belonging to various organisations, mainly left-wing groups. These people

were charged with anti-state pronouncements directed against the Aizsargi,

Ulmanis, the existing regime and government, a contemptuous attitude

Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis

201

towards the national flag, resisting the Aizsargi, spreading rumours or

incitement to strike.

In the 16 May issue of Valdības Vēstnesis, the people of Latvia were

informed that a state of war had been introduced in the country. This order,

signed by Prime Minister Kārlis Ulmanis and Minister of War Jānis Balodis,

explained that internal unrest threatened to break out in the country,

constituting a danger to public safety, and that because of this a state of war

was being introduced in the country for a period of six months.

On 18 May

the government issued a declaration stating that, pending the implementation

of a reform of the constitution, from 11 p.m. on 15 May 1934 the functions of

the Saeima had been taken over by the Cabinet of Ministers, and announcing

the composition of the new government. This declaration thereafter served as

the legal basis for legislation. After this, acts of law were passed in order to

create a legal framework for legislation in the new conditions, with no

parliament or elected municipal authorities, and to provide a legal basis for

mass dismissals. Such acts included the Changes to the Procedure of the

Cabinet of Ministers, Amendments to the Law on the State Audit Office, the

Regulations on the Limitation of the Activities of Town Authorities during a

State of Emergency, the Law on the Dismissal of the Staff of Sate Civil

Institutions and Municipal Authorities during a State of Emergency, and

others. On the second day of the coup, instructions were also issued aimed at

limiting possible resistance or unrest: the activities of the parties were

suspended, public gatherings and marches were banned, a variety of public

events and the sale of alcohol were restricted, and censorship was introduced.

This was followed a few days later, on 19 May, by the suspension of the

activities of sickness funds and sickness fund associations, powers to punish

people for spreading rumours or disturbing the peace (with particular

attention to the discovery of illegal weapons), as well as a Law on the

Closure, Abolition and Procedure for Registration of Societies, Associations

and Political Organisations During a State of Emergency.

Immediately after the coup, changes were also made in various state

services. For example, in early June 1934 at a meeting of army divisional

commanders several decisions were taken that directly related to the recent

changes. These decisions involved the strengthening of patriotic education,

the elimination of illegalities and intrigues, and the creation of work teams

for politically untrustworthy soldiers. These decisions also affected people’s

personal lives. Thus, career soldiers were permitted to marry non-Latvian

women only if they had a knowledge of Latvian.

Already on 19 May the

government issued an instruction that all schools that had not already done so

were to hold a meeting to explain the changes that had taken place. A week

later school headmasters were instructed to remove from the walls of school

buildings pictures of people who had been arrested.

Valters Ščerbinskis

202

Discussion

In assessing the technical aspect of the preparations and implementation of

the coup, it has to be admitted that Ulmanis brought off an almost perfect

take over of power. Although we still do not have reliable information about

certain episodes in the preparations for the coup, we can say with confidence

that the technical side had been carefully thought out and prepared.

Such a

coup was impossible to prepare in a short space of time: all the required

people were gradually brought into the ring of conspirators, the plan was

considered and was implemented faultlessly. Although the coup was

unexpected for the public in Latvia, nevertheless, as the newspaper Pēdējā

Brīdī wrote, all the sparrows were twittering about the possibility of such an

event.

And as a result, nobody really believed it any more. The swagger by

the Social Democrat Sport leader B. Kalniņš at the 19th Congress of the

Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in early May that “it is better to

fight and fall than to surrender ignominiously without a fight” turned out to

be empty words.

Ulmanis was familiar with the political élite, was a good

psychologist and was sufficiently able to predict the élite’s reaction. Being an

experienced, but at the same time cautious politician, he was able to avoid

bloodshed, although this is not to say that he would have shirked from

resorting to weapons, had this been necessary.

The events after the coup, first and foremost the widespread

persecution, had to do with the elimination of possible opposition. The course

of this persecution showed very clearly that the new regime had scant respect

for legality. This, in turn, created a large group of people dissatisfied with the

new regime. Evidently, as Ā.Šilde writes, Ulmanis was simply afraid of

opposition, something he had already come up against inside his own party.

Although he concentrated great power in his own hands, he was unable

completely to stamp out opposition, which assumed different forms and went

underground. On 16 May and the days after that, a new government was

formed, which announced the dissolution of the Saeima and restrictions on

political freedoms. This included a ban on the activities of political parties

and the closure of political periodicals.

The participation of quite a wide section of the top army officers

guaranteed the support of the armed forces at least. The senior police officials

had also agreed to the changes. However, the majority of other officers,

enlisted men and lower-ranking police officials learned of the coup only

when it was already underway and submitted to the orders issued by their

superiors. The conspirators expected active involvement on the part of the

army and the police, although apparently it was the Aizsargi who were

entrusted with the main role in the planned scenario. Yet the army was the

main executive force behind the coup and the view that the Aizsargi

organised events was wrong. The large numbers of enthusiastic members of

the Aizsargi organisation demonstrated support and acceptance among the

masses in a way that was necessary for a new regime to obtain legitimacy.

Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis

203

But taking things further, there was a view of the Aizsargi as having played

the leading role in the coup, as can be seen, for example, in the words of a

Pērkonkrusts member to an informer of the Political Board in September

1934: “Now there will be a coup from another quarter, which will be

organised not by the Aizsargi, but by the armed forces. The most trustworthy

Aizsargi units will serve only as ancillary forces.”

Yet Indulis Ronis is right

when he writes that the main instrument behind the coup was the army, not

the Aizsargi.

The masses of enthusiastic Aizsargi members provided a clear

demonstration that, in the words of Alfrēds Bērziņš, the attitude in the

countryside towards the parties and the Saeima was “even more hostile” than

in Riga.

The energetic participation of the Aizsargi in the coup, and

likewise the mobilisation of many thousands of supporters of the Farmers’

Union earlier, in 1931, at the time of a party mass meeting, seemed to

indicate acceptance of the events on the part of one section of the people.

The Aizsargi served as a front. The emphasis on the role of the Aizsargi came

about as a result of the propaganda by the regime of 15 May, thus keeping

alive the view that there had been “mass popular participation”. This is

confirmed by an interview by Lidija Torgani, senior official in the

Aizsardzes, the women’s organisation within the Aizsargi. Characterising the

role of the Aizsargi in the coup, she added that “some kind of popular

backing was required”.

But ultimately the success of the coup was

guaranteed by the active participation of the army and the loyalty of the

police.

On-going events showed that minorities’ involvement in the coup was

passive, with some leftist minorities’ groups subjected to repressions―i.e.

the abolition of political organisations, the closure of some periodicals, and

also the arrest and dismissal of a number of individuals from their positions

in municipal and state institutions. It is generally agreed that one of the

coup’s goals was to eliminate the “minorities’ economic power”. Ulmanis’s

and his government’s rhetoric on Latvianisation left few if any doubts about

the intentions of the authoritarian regime. There were no formal restrictions

on minorities but the primary losers were Germans and Jews, some of whose

large enterprises were later nationalized under the pretext of Latvianization of

the economy. After the coup all ethnic groups (like the Latvians themselves)

were excluded from the decision-making process in Latvia. However, there

were some sections―or rather some individuals―who had special relations

with the authoritarian leader and thus retained some access to the corridors of

power (for instance, the Jewish conservative politician and rabbi Mordehajs

Dubins who was on good terms with Ulmanis: see, for instance Stranga

(2002, pp. 200–01).

But Ulmanis’s coup also resulted in the exclusion from power of

previously influential ethnic Latvian groups, namely most of the earlier

political élite, including his own co-members of the agrarian union and urban

bourgeoisie. During the course of the coup it appeared that a special role

Valters Ščerbinskis

204

might be given to the farmers, that is to say landowners whose primary

political representatives were divided into a few agrarian parties before 1934

and whose representatives actively and visibly participated in the coup as

Aizsargi members. There was an open question about the working class,

particularly in Riga. In spite of social democratic rhetoric about the readiness

to fight back against fascists, neither strikes nor armed resistance took place.

During the coup itself, a general strike was not considered as serious option

at the level of either the party élite or the grassroots. This suggests that the

working class attitude was not simply hostile to the coup, but that there were

also authoritarian and nationalistic sentiments among them which were

touched by Ulmanis’s rhetoric and first steps of the new government. In

general, however, as Nancy Bermeo concluded aptly―ordinary Latvians

played a peripheral role.

After the coup, the new government immediately began working in

two directions. First, the transformation of the country’s administration was

implemented to suit the needs of the authoritarian regime. Secondly,

decisions were taken concerning society which were intended to win broad

public support for the new government. The new order really was welcomed

by a large numbers of people. Police and Aizsargi reports on the mood in the

towns and countryside indicated that the majority of the population had

accepted the changes. However, in spite of this, the widespread persecution

and unlawful seizure of power created bitterness towards the new regime in a

significant section of society. The comments of E. Dunsdorfs, a prominent

researcher on Ulmanis, are most apt for a conclusion: 15 May caused a

deeper rift among the people than any other event in Latvian history.

The

new regime did not resolve the political problems existing before the coup, it

only shelved them. The consequences of Ulmanis’s coup for society, in terms

of its attitude towards democracy and the development of the nation, have

been felt not only under the totalitarian occupation regimes that followed and

within the large exile community in the free world after the war, but even in

the time after independence was regained at the close of the twentieth

century.

Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis

205

Notes

1. Dunsdorfs, 1992, pp. 264–66; Virsis, 1990, pp. 176–85; Stranga, 1998;

Stranga, 2002; Peniķis, 1984, pp. 3–15.

2. Ronis, 1994, pp. 72–112; Andersons, 1982, p. 397; Ţagars, 1988, pp. 52–

69; Zunda, 2001, p. 50.

3. Aizsilnieks, 1968, pp. 582, 600. Aizsilnieks considers as one of the main

reasons for the failed economic policy the effort to maintain the Lat at its

earlier high exchange rate whatever the cost. This resulted in excessive

budget cuts, the collapse of exports and the reduction of foreign currency

reserves to a minimum.

4. Ulmanis,, 1993, pp. 124–25.

5. Stranga , 1998, p. 100.

6. The recollections of K. Lorencs about the coup of 15 May are in the State

Historical Archives of Latvia (Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs─LVVA), 4020.

f., 1. apr., 6. l., 3.–9., 11.–23. lp.

7. Ronis, 1994, pp. 73–75.

8. Cerūzis, 2004, pp. 241–44.

9. LVVA, 3724. f., 1. apr., 11 739. l., b. p. In 1932 there were 10,635

societies in the country, and in 1933 there were 11,123 societies and 120

political organisations.

10. Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 136.

11. Rauch, 1974, p. 147.

12. Linz, 1978, p. 18.

13. Klāns, 1968, pp. 514–15.

14. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell, 2002.

15. Ibid, p. 323.

16. Ibid, pp. 262–263.

17. Lejiņš, 1971, p. 100.

18. Instructions from J. Druva, Secretary General of the Farmers’ Union of

Latvia, on 16, 24 and 29 May 1934 in LVVA, 3283. f., 1. apr., 167. l., 400–

04. lp.

19. Budţe, 1973, 5: 343. Budţe later recollected that a few days later a

Catholic deputy urged him to come to the Riga Curia. There Vladislavs

Rubulis, leader of the Latgale Democratic Farmers’ Party gave a speech in

which he “assessed the events with great confidence”. Budţe considered that

he had been sent by Ulmanis.

20. The recollections of K. Lorencs about the coup of 15 May in LVVA,

4020. f., 1. apr., 6. l., 32.–36. lp.

21. Latvian War Museum, 4465/ 10369–VII.

22. 1937. g. 5. September, LVVA, 3235. f., 3. apr., 118. l., 194. lp.

23. Ibid., 114. l., 1. lp., Paeglis, 1994, p. 101.

24. In fact, “siseņi” was a contemptuous contortion of the initials of the

workers’ sports unit─SSS. It means “locusts”. “Little Bruno”─or Bruno