
52 CHE GUEVARA
the small hospital where he had been working, and that “repression is
coming.” He also noted that “Hilda has changed her address. . . . The top
people in the Guatemalan [Communist] party are seeking asylum [and]
Castillo will enter the city tomorrow.”
How did this turn of events come to pass? Before 1944, Guatemala
had been just another banana republic ruled by a series of dictators who
served the interests of the local landed oligarchy and the United Fruit
Company—the American-owned banana company that controlled vast
landholdings, railways, and ports in Central America, the Caribbean,
Colombia, and Ecuador (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982). But in 1944 the
ruling strongman, the dictator Jorge Ubico, was overthrown by a popu-
lar revolt led by junior army offi cers and students. On the surface, the
revolt appeared to be aimed primarily at discarding Ubico’s oppressive
regime in favor of more democratic rule. But in reality, the groups who
participated in the revolt demanded the complete reform of Guatemala’s
exploitative and highly unequal economic and social order.
Following the overthrow of the Ubico regime, elections were held
and Juan José Arévalo became Guatemala’s fi rst popularly elected presi-
dent. Under Arévalo’s rule a major effort was made to bring Guatemala’s
majority Indian population into the 20th century and a large number
of rural and urban workers were unionized. The revolutionary policies
of Arévalo’s government were continued and in fact accelerated by his
successor, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, who was democratically elected to
the presidency in 1951. By the time Ernesto arrived in Guatemala, in late
1953, the Arbenz regime had distributed thousands of hectares of un-
cultivated land to over 100,000 landless peasants. This land was expro-
priated by the government from the country’s large landed estates, and
included 11,000 hectares of uncultivated land that belonged to the pow-
erful United Fruit Company, which even distributed mail in Guatemala.
The response from the U.S. government was almost immediate. The
U.S. secretary of state at the time, John Foster Dulles, had close ties to the
United Fruit Company, since his law fi rm had represented the company.
Moreover, his brother Allen Dulles was the director of the CIA, and
John Moors Cabot, who was in charge of Inter-American Affairs in the
State Department, had a brother who was the former president of the
United Fruit Company.
At the March 1954 foreign ministers’ meeting of the Organization of
American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State Dulles accused the Ar-