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their “Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature 254 (1975), 463–64.
11. The name “Mouse” appeared only once in the literature—in George and
Maynard Smith’s 1973 paper. From then on it was “Dove.”
12. G. A. Parker and E. A. Thompson, “Dung Fly Struggles: A Test of the War of
Attrition,” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 7 (1980), 37–44; John Maynard
Smith laid down the logic of games in evolution in his classic book Evolution and
the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); for a good
explanation of the limits and advantages of game theory for understanding natural
evolution see G. A. Parker and J. Maynard Smith, “Optimality Theory in
Evolutionary Biology,” Nature 348 (1990), 27–33.
13. Amos Twersky, Daniel Kahneman, and Paul Slovic, eds., Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980); Larry Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), provides a technical account of how
theoretical economists have adopted evolutionary ideas; Ran Shpigler, “The
Invisible Hand and Natural Selection,” Odyssey 2 (2009), 45–51 (in Hebrew).
14. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” and Trivers, Natural
Selection and Social Theory, 3–18, 51–55; Robert Axelrod and William
Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 211 (1981), 1390–96.
15. C. Packer, “Reciprocal Altruism in Papio anubis,” Nature 265 (1977),
441–43; G. S. Wilkinson, “Reciprocal Food Sharing in Vampire Bats,” Nature
309 (1984), 181–84; M. Melinski, “Tit for Tat in Sticklebacks and the Evolution
of Cooperation,” Nature 325 (1987), 433–35; H. Godfray, “The Evolution of
Forgiveness,” Nature 355 (1992), 206–7; A. H. Harcourt and F. B. M. de Waal,
eds., Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992); S. Frank, “Mutual Policing and Repression of
Competition in the Evolution of Cooperative Groups,” Nature 377 (1995),
520–22; T. H. Clotton-Brock and G. Parker, “Punishment in Animal Societies,”
Nature 373 (1995), 209–16; Lee Alan Dugatkin, Cooperation Among Animals:
An Evolutionary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); M.
Nowak and K. Sigmund, “Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring,”
Nature 393 (1998), 573–77 and “The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology, 194 (1998), 561–74; G. Roberts and T. Sherratt,
“Development of Cooperative Relationships Through Increasing Investment,”
Nature 394 (1999), 175–79; J. L. Sachs, “The Evolution of Cooperation,”
Quarterly Review of Biology 79 (2004), 135–60; Martin Nowak, “Five Rules for
the Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 314 (2006), 1560–63; S. A. West, A. S.
Griffin, and A. Gardner, “Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutualism,
Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection,” Journal of Evolutionary Biology 20
(2007), 415–32. The above are choice citations.
16. Amotz Zehavi, “Mate Selection—a Selection for a Handicap,” Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 53, 1975, 205–14, and Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi,
The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997). See also Joseph Laporte, “Selection for Handicaps,”
Biology and Philosophy, 16, 2001, 239–49.
17. Michael Ghiselin, The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974), 274.
18. Richard Dawkins, “Twelve Misunderstandings of Kin Selection,” Zeitschrift f
r Tierpsychologie 51 (1979), 184–200, quote on 190.
19. Helena Cronin, The Ant and the Peacock (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 265.
20. For a counterargument based on the rejection of sexual selection in favor of
social selection, see Joan Roughgarden, The Genial Gene: Deconstructing
Darwinian Selfishness (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009).
21. Dawkins made a point of arguing in the 1989 edition of The Selfish Gene that
his language was not merely metaphorical. In his next book, The Extended
Phenotype (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), he even went so far as to
argue for the boundlessness of the individual organism as due to the
all-importance of the gene. For a counterargument see Eva Jablonka, “From
Replicators to Heritably Varying Phenotypic Traits: The Extended Phenotype
Revisited,” Biology and Philosophy 19 (2004), 353–75.
22. Sober and Wilson, Unto Others; Samir Okasha, Evolution and the Levels of
Selection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); David Sloan Wilson and
Kevin M. Kniffin, “Altruism from an Evolutionary Perspective,” in Research on
Altruism and Love: An Annotated Bibliography of Major Studies in Psychology,
Sociology, Evolutionary Biology, and Theology, ed. Stephen G. Post, Byron
Johnson, Michael E. McCullough, and Jeffrey P. Schloss (Philadelphia:
Templeton Foundation Press, 2003), 117–36. It’s important to add that the
exclusive role of genetic inheritance in evolution has been seriously challenged in
the last decade. See in particular Eytan Avital and Eva Jablonka, Animal
Traditions: Behavioural Inheritance in Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb, Evolution in Four
Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the
History of Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), and Scott F. Gilbert and
David Epel, Ecological Developmental Biology: Integrating Epigenetics,
Medicine, and Evolution (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 2008).
23. Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, 332.
24. Actually, the preferred term is “interactors,” since “vehicles” implies being
under the control of the “replicators.” For a clear explanation of the interactor
concept see David Hull, “Individuality and Selection,” Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics 11 (1980), 311–32.
25. For a recent illustration of this principle see Jeffrey A. Fletcher and Michael
Doebeli, “A Simple and General Explanation for the Evolution of Altruism,”
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 276 (2009), 13–19.
26. For a clear explanation of the errors in Maynard Smith’s “Haystack Model,”
see Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, 67–71.
27. W. D. Hamilton, “Innate Social Aptitudes in Man, An Approach from
Evolutionary Genetics,” in Biological Anthropology, ed. Robin Fox (London:
Malaby Press, 1975), 133–53.
28. This is a game in which a pair constitutes a group, but N-person evolutionary
game theory can handle groups comprised of any number. The advantage of
modeling an N-person game, as opposed to a two-person game, is that it more
closely resembles what happens in nature: Whereas in a two-person game
altruism always incurs a cost to the altruist, in a many-player situation where
many altruists are acting, altruism can benefit the group, including the altruists,
which in turn means that it can more easily evolve.
29. For a firsthand description of the vagaries of group selection, see a series of
online, ongoing articles at the Huffington Post by David Sloan Wilson titled,
“Truth and Reconciliation for Group Selection,” beginning December 27, 2008.
30. This is the case whether or not one sees it as a general assault on
“methodological individualism,” both from within biology and from other
disciplines like psychology and sociology.
31. R. K. Colwell, “Group Selection Is Implicated in the Evolution of
Female-Biased Sex Ratio,” Nature 190 (1981), 401–4.
32. R. C. Lewontin, “The Units of Selection,” Annual Review of Ecology and
Systematics 1 (1970), 1–18, quote on 14–15. Lewontin, however, stopped short of
implicating group selection directly.
33. G. C. Williams and R. M. Nesse, “The Dawn of Darwinian Medicine,”
Quarterly Review of Biology 66 (1991), 1–22; Randolph M. Nesse and George C.
Williams, Why We Get Sick: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine (New
York: Times Books, 1994). For more recent appreciations see Wenda R.
Trevathan, E. O. Smith, and James McKenna, Evolutionary Medicine and Health:
New Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), and Stephen C.
Stearns and Jacob C. Koella, Evolution in Health and Disease, 2nd ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
34. J. L. Brown, “Types of Group Selection,” Nature 211 (1966), 870–71; M. J.
Wade, “Group Selection Among Laboratory Populations of Tribolium,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 73 (1976), 4604–7, and “An
Experimental Study of Group Selection,” Evolution 31 (1977), 134–53; D. S.
Wilson, “The Group Selection Controversy: History and Current Status,” Annual
Review of Ecology and Systematics 14 (1983), 159–87; S. W. Rissing, G. B.
Pollock, M. R. Higgins, R. H. Hagen, and D. R. Smith, “Foraging Specialization
Without Relatedness or Dominance Among Co-Founding Ant Queens,” Nature
338 (1989), 420–22; D. C. Queller, “Quantitative Genetics, Kin Selection, and
Group Selection,” American Naturalist 139 (1992), 540–58; Leticia Avilés,
“Interdemic Selection and the Sex-Ration: A Social Spider Perspective,”
American Naturalist 142 (1993), 320–45; W. M. Muir, “Group Selection for
Adaptation to Multiple-Hen Cages: Selection Program and Direct Responses,”
Poultry Science 75 (1995), 447–58; C. J. Goodnight and L. Stevens,
“Experimental Studies of Group Selection: What Do They Tell Us About Group
Selection in Nature?” American Naturalist 150 (1997), 59–79; P. B. Rainey and
K. Rainey, “Evolution of Cooperation and Conflict in Experimental Bacterial
Populations,” Nature 425 (2003), 72–74; P. J. Werfel and Y. Bar-Yam, “The
Evolution of Reproductive Restraint Through Social Communication,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
101 (2004), 11019–20; Benjamin Kerr, Claudia Neuhauser, Brendan Bohannan,
and Antony Dean, “Local Migration Promotes Competitive Restraint in a
Host–Pathogen ‘Tragedy of the Commons,’” Nature 442 (2006), 75–78.
35. Samir Okasha, “Why Won’t the Group Selection Controversy Go Away?”
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001), 25–50; Ayelet Shavit,
“Shifting Values Partly Explain the Debate Over Group Selection,” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2004),
697–720, and One for All? Facts and Values in the Debates Over Group Selection
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008) (in Hebrew).
36. David Sloan Wilson and Edward O. Wilson, “Rethinking the Theoretical
Foundations of Sociobiology,” Quarterly Review of Biology 82 (2007), 327–48.
See also Bert H lldobler and E.O. Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty,
Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect Societies (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).
Wilson, in fact, was never as opposed to group selection as either Dawkins or
Williams—see Segerstr le, Defenders of the Truth, 37–38. H lldobler, on
the other hand, is not as convinced as Wilson of the importance of group
selection. Dawkins, too, has yet to be won over, and the debate remains
acrimonious. See his “The Group Delusion,” from January 10, 2009, at
RichardDawkins.net. Also, see Ayelet Shavit and Roberta L. Millstein, “Group
Selection is Dead! Long Live Group Selection?” BioScience 58 (2008), 574–75.
For an interesting argument for group selection based on the plasticity of
circadian clocks in bees, see Guy Bloch, “Plasticity in the Circadian Clock and the
Temporal Organization of Insect Societies,” in Organization of Insect Societies,
ed. J rgen Gadau and Jennifer Fewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2009), 402–31.
37. Each differs in perspective. See S. A. Frank, “George Price’s Contributions to
Evolutionary Genetics,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 175 (1995), 373–88, and
“The Price Equation, Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem, Kin Selection, and Causal
Analysis,” Evolution 51 (1997), 1712–29; Okasha, “Why Won’t the Group
Selection Controversy Go Away?” A. Grafen, “Developments of the Price
Equation and Natural Selection Under Uncertainty,” Proceedings of the Royal
Society London B, 267 (2000), 1223–27, and “The First Formal Link Between the
Price Equation and an Optimization Program,” Journal of Theoretical Biology
217 (2002), 75–91; but also see I. L. Heisler and J. Damuth, “A Method for
Analyzing Selection in Hierarchically Structured Populations,” American
Naturalist 130 (1987), 582–602, which provides a “contextualized” alternative to
the Price equation.
38. Benjamin Kerr and Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Generalization of the Price
Equation for Evolutionary Change,” Evolution 63, no. 2 (2009), 531–36.
39. The Price equation assumes fixed heritability, and is entirely devoid of
mechanism. Though Frank decomposes it neatly, others are concerned that this
precludes the interactivity inherent in nature, rendering it good exclusively for
border cases. See Okasha, “Why Won’t the Group Selection Controversy Go
Away?” for a thorough discussion of the relative merits of the equation. Also
Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan, Making Sense of Evolution: The
Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Biology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004), especially chapter 4, in which they discuss the relationship
between statistical formalism and causal analysis. I thank Jim Griesemer for
discussions on this point.
40. William B. Langdon, “Evolution of GP Populations: Price’s Selection and
Covariance Theorem,” in Genetic Programming and Data Structures, (Norwell,
MA: Kluwer Academic Press, 1998) 167–208; M. Van Veelen, “On the Use of
the Price Equation,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 237 (2005), 412–26; T. Day,
“Insights from Price’s Equation into Evolutionary Epidemiology,” DIMACS
Series in Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science 71 (2006),
23–43; J. W. Fox, “Using the Price Equation to Partition the Effects of
Biodiversity Loss on Ecosystem Function,” Ecology 87 (2006), 2687–96;
Stephen C. Stearns, “Are We Stalled Part Way Through a Major Evolutionary
Transition from Individual to Group?” Evolution 61 (2007), 2275–80.
41. Darwin, The Origin of Species, 395.
42. Robert Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings,
1985). For a defining volume on what became known as “evolutionary
psychology” see Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds., The
Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B. M. de
Waal, “Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay,” Nature 425 (2003), 297–99. For a recent
wide treatment of animal morality see Mark Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild
Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009).
43. R. Boyd and P. J. Richerson, “Punishment Allows the Evolution of
Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups,” Ethology and Sociobiology
13 (1992), 171–95; E. Fehr and S. Gachter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,”
Nature 415 (2002), 137–40; R. Boyd, H. Gintis, S. Bowles, and P. J. Richerson,
“The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment,” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 100 (2003), 3531–35; E. Fehr and U.
Fischbacher, “The Nature of Human Altruism,” Nature 425 (2003), 785–91, are
challenged by A. Dreber, D. G. Rand, D. Fudenberg, and M. A. Nowak, “Winners
Don’t Punish,” Nature 452 (2008), 348–51.
44. See George Loewenstein, Scott Rick, and Jonathan D. Cohen,
“Neuroeconomics,” Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2007), 647–72 for
examples. Also, for a window into “positive evolutionary psychology,” see
Dacher Keltner’s Born to Be Good: The Science of a Meaningful Life (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2009), as well as new findings on cooperative infant behavior in
Michael Tomassello, Why We Cooperate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
45. Robert H. Frank, Passions Without Reason: The Strategic Role of the
Emotions (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988). For an update of this argument from
the field, see Frans B. M. de Waal, “Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The
Evolution of Empathy,” Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008), 279–300. For
an update from neurophysiology see the work of Joshua D. Green et al., “An
fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293
(2001), 2105–8, and “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in
Moral Judgment,” Neuron 44 (2004), 389–400, showing how emotion and moral
reasoning relate in the brain. For a recent study on the importance of imitation as
an empathy-building mechanism see A. Paukner, S. J. Suomi, E. Visalberghi, and
P. F. Ferrari, “Capuchin Monkeys Display Affiliation Toward Humans Who
Imitate Them,” Science 325 (2009), 880–83.
46. Robert Trivers, “The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception,”
Proceedings of the New York Academy of Science 187 (1999), 111–26.
47. C. Daniel Batson and Laura L. Shaw, “Evidence for Altruism: Toward a
Pluralism of Prosocial Motives,” Psychology Inquiry 2 (1991), 107–22; Lise
Wallach and Michael A. Wallach, “Why Altruism, Even Though It Exists, Cannot
Be Demonstrated by Social Psychological Experiments,” Psychological Inquiry 2
(1991), 153–55; Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, presents the case for pluralism.
48. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex,
selections and commentary by Carl Zimmer (New York: Plume, 2007), 157.
49. Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not By Genes Alone: How Culture
Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
50. Trivers did not mean this as a criticism, but rather as a reflection of how others
had viewed it. See Hamilton, Narrow Roads, 316; for an update of Hamilton’s
argument, see Samuel Bowles, “Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and
the Evolution of Human Altruism,” Science 314 (2006), 1569. Also J. Heirich,
“Cultural Group Selection, Co-evolutionary Processes and Large Scale
Cooperation,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53 (2004), 3–35.
51. Claudia Rutte and Michael Taborsky, “General Reciprocity in Rats,” PloS
Biology 5 (2007), 196.
52. However, see David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion,
and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), for an
argument showing religion functioning as a positive unifying system. From a
neuropsychological angle, see also Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis:
Finding the Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
53. Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981); Christopher Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: The
Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), argues that we are laden with two conflicting evolutionary substrates: the
foundational animal substrate reflecting hierarchy and status, and the overlaying
cultural substrate allowing for genuine altruism. He finds this deeply embedded
ambiguity in human nature both worrisome and hopeful. See also Stearns, “Are
We Stalled Part Way Through a Major Evolutionary Transition from Individual to
Group?” for an argument that humanity is stalled between individual and group
selection.
54. J. Moll, F. Krueger, R. Zahn, M. Pardini, R. de Oliveira-Souza, and J.
Grafman, “Human Fronto-mesolimbic Networks Guide Decisions About
Charitable Donation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103
(2006), 15623–28.
55. Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of
Right and Wrong (New York: Ecco, 2006); S. Anderson, H, Damasio, D. Tranel,
and A. R. Damasio, “Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early
Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex,” Nature Neuroscience 2 (1999), 1032–37.
See also Marco Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy and Mirror Neurons,” Annual
Review of Psychology 60 (2009), 653–70 for a presentation of the ways in which
recent discoveries on the action of “mirror-neurons” complement cognitive
models of imitation and social psychology studies on empathy.
56. Zoe R. Donaldson and Larry J. Young, “Oxytocin, Vasopressin, and the
Neurogenetics of Sociality,” Science 332 (2008), 900–904; S. Israel, E. Lerer, I.
Shalev, F. Uzefovsky, M. Riebold, E. Laiba, R. Bachner-Melman, A. Maril, G.
Bornstein, A. Knafo, and R. Ebstein, “The Oxytocin Receptor (OXTR)
Contributes to Prosocial Fund Allocations in the Dictator Game and the Social
Value Orientations Task,” PloS ONE 4 (2009), e5535.
57. “Academic Appeals to Oxbridge Students for an Egg Donor,” Daily
Telegraph, December 4, 2008.
CHAPTER 14: LAST DAYS
1. Wates, The Battle for Tolmers Square, 9, 64; G. A. Hobbins, St. Pancras
Chronicle, March 24, 1972, quoted in ibid., 65.
2. George Price letter to Kathleen Price, August 28, 1974, GPP.
3. Communications with Sylvia Stevens, February 15 and March 18, 2008, May
11, 2009.
4. On Edison Price see Stanley Abercrombie, “Edison Price: His Name Is No
Accident,” Architecture Plus 1 (August 1973); Jonathan Glancey, “The Century’s
Leading Light,” The Guardian, October 25, 1997; Robert M. Thomas, Jr.,
“Edison A. Price, Lighting Designer, Dies at 79,” New York Times, October 17,
1997.
5. Communication with Sylvia Stevens, March 18, 2008.
6. Henry Noel letter to George Price, August 7, 1974, GPP.
7. George Price letter to Bill Hamilton, August 21, 1974, BLGPC, KPX1_2.5.
8. George Price letter to Miss Sara Smith, August 27, 1974, BLGPC,
BL:KPX1_1.8.
9. Ibid.
10. George Price letter to Kathleen Price, August 28, 1974, GPP.
11. George Price letter to Richard Lewontin, May 17, 1969 and Lewontin’s
response, June 16, 1969. I thank Richard Lewontin for kindly sending me their
correspondence.
12. Richard Lewontin letter to George Price, March 13, 1974.
13. James Crow letter to C. A. B. Smith, October 24, 1974. I thank Jim Crow for
kindly sending me this correspondence.
14. C. A. B. Smith letter to James Crow, November 1, 1974.
15. Ibid.
16. George Price letter to Richard Lewontin, June 13, 1974.
17. Richard Lewontin letter to George Price, August 27, 1974.
18. George Price letter to Joan Jenkins, GPP, June 28, 1974.
19. Communication with Sylvia Stevens, March 18, 2008.
20. George Price letter to Joan Jenkins, October 7, 1974; Jim Schwartz notes.
21. Joan Jenkins letter to George Price, GPP, October 16, 1974; Lewis Florman
letter to George Price, October 11, 1974, GPP.
22. George Price letter to Trevor Russell, November 5, 1974, GPP.
23. Interview with Shmulik Atia, May 4, 2008; interview with Asher Dahan, May
7, 2008; George Price letter to Bill Hamilton, November 20, 1974, GPP.
24. George was referring to Dr. Ronald Ng, whom he had met some months back
in the computer room at UCL: George Price letter to Dr. Ronald Ng, November
26, 1974, GPP.
25. George Price letter to Edison Price, November 25, 1974, BLWHC,
Z1X102_1.1.18; drafts of the letters, GPP.
26. Interviews with Atia and Dahan.
27. George Price letter to Kathleen Price, November 5, 1974, GPP.
28. For two rather interesting appreciations of Thompson see Caoimghghin S.
Breathnach, “Francis Thompson (1859–1907): A Medical Truant and His
Troubled Heart,” Journal of Medical Biography 16, no. 1 (2008), 57–62, and
“Francis Thompson—Student, Addict, Poet,” Journal of the Irish Medical
Association 45 (1959), 98–103.
29. J. R. R. Tolkien, The Book of Lost Tales, part 1, ed. Christopher Tolkien
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), 29.
30. Bernardo and Chrissy letter and note to George Price, November 30 and 31,
1974, GPP.
31. Dr. O. W. Hill letter to George Price, December 2, 1974, GPP; George Price
letter to Bill and Chris Hamilton, December 10, 1974, BLWHC, Z1X102_1.1.19.
32. Communication with Chris Hamilton, November 18, 2007; Bill Hamilton
letter to Edison Price, February 15, 1975, BLWHC, Z1X102_1.1.20; Bill
Hamilton letter to Al Somit, October 16, 1996, BLWHC, Z1X102_1.2.2. 2.
33. The paper was eventually published as “Innate Social Aptitude in Man: An
Approach from Evolutionary Genetics,” in Biosocial Anthropology, ed. Robin
Fox (London: Malaby Press, 1975), and is discussed and printed, respectively, in
Hamilton, Narrow Roads, 315–28 and 329–51. I discuss the paper in chapter 13.
34. Bill Hamilton letter to Dr. Kelly, undated (circa December 19, 1974),
BLWHC, Z1X102_1.1.18.
EPILOGUE
1. Interview with Shmulik Atia, May 4, 2008.
2. Ibid.; interview with Asher Dahan, May 7, 2008.
3. Handwritten notes taken by Hamilton at the inquest, BLWHC,
Z1X102_1.2.3.2.
4. Ibid.; draft of a letter to Sylvia found in George’s papers, GPP.
5. “Jesus Hot Line,” Sennet, January 15, 1975.
6. Bill Hamilton letter to Edison Price, February 15, 1975, BLWHC,
Z1X102_1.1.20. The American Consulate sent what it collected to Kathleen;
what Hamilton found he sent to George’s brother, Edison.
7. Hamilton, Narrow Roads, 174; George had been working on methods of
programming and using a significance test suggested by Warren Ewens in 1972,
and applying them to data on enzyme polymorphisms collected at the Galton.
“Test of the Neutrality Hypothesis,” written on behalf of George R. Price, came
out in the Annals of Human Genetics (care of C. A. B. Smith) 39 (1976), 471–73.
Years later, Steven Frank was responsible for bringing “The Nature of Selection”
to print in the Journal of Theoretical Biology 175 (1995), 389–96.
8. Bill Hamilton letter to Edison Price, February 15, 1975; Hamilton, Narrow
Roads, 321.
9. The posters and pamphlets appear in Wates, The Battle for Tolmers Square,
178–79.
10. A full description of the court proceedings and subsequent events can be
found in ibid., 180–88.
11. Ibid., 183; “A Square Deal for the People,” Hampstead and Highgate Express,
June 6, 1975.
12. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and
B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1974), 6.52, 7.
13. Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved
(Princeton: Prince ton University Press, 2006), 163. See also his new book, The
Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Harmony,
2009).
14. In fact it is very likely that the new, post-neo-Darwinian umbrella paradigm,
being called the “Epigenetic Turn,” which includes all forms of genetic,
epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic inheritance and their interaction with the
broader environment, will necessitate a meaningful reworking of the foundations
of our understanding of the evolution of human behavior.
15. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; reprint, New York:
Modern Library, 1937), 9.
16. Hamilton, too, might have benefited from this insight. An uncompromising
rationalist, he came to believe that there is nothing interesting that man cannot
hope to understand, including his own morality. This led him, among other things,
to support eugenic measures that seemed to many outrageous.
17. See Jonathan Haidt’s essay “Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of
Religion,” posted at The Edge, September 22, 2007, for an interesting argument
about religious/conservative people’s usage of an expanded moral-salience plate
(compared to liberals) to direct their behavior.