Fleet K. The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 1, Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453
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p
´
al fodor
Supply and transport
Very little information survives about the provisions of the army and the
transportation of ammunition. It is highly probable that, in a similar way to
later practices, a well-organised camp folk accompanied the sultan’s army
including a whole range of craftsmen from food merchants to blacksmiths.
120
A considerable proportion of the food, fodder and ammunition was deliv-
ered by subjects in exchange for tax exemption or as extraordinary war tax
(avarız-i divani) introduced in the latter half of the fourteenth century.
121
At
the same time, producers were also expected to sell their surplus produce to
the soldiers at fixed prices.
122
A part of the timariot army was supplied by the
equipment (kitchen, saddlery) brought along by the officers. The court troops
were provided for by the central treasury.
In most of the period under discussion the Ottomans hardly, if at all, used
carts for transportation. Towards the mid-fifteenth century, however, the big
siege-guns would be forwarded to their destination on wagons drawn by oxen.
The main transporting vehicles were the camel, the mule and the draught
horse; they were provided partly by the common subjects and the dignitaries,
and partly loaned by merchants. The sultan’s treasury, the military band, the
food and arms of the court troops were loaded on the many hundred camels
and mules of the ruler’s stable.
123
The camels were used to barricade the camp
or the centre and to disorganise the lines of the enemy (see below). In the
latter case, they were employed with caution because the frightened animals
could easily become uncontrollable.
124
The conduct of war
Field battles
By the end of the fourteenth century, the Ottomans had developed a special
Ottoman mani
`
ere de combattre based on the co-operation of the light-armoured
cavalry using the traditional nomadic tactic, and the infantry whose discipline
however, that in a list of armaments of the Ottoman court salaried troops marching to
Hungary (the Moh
´
acs campaign) in 1526, more than 40 per cent of the various armours
were of European origins; Feridun M. Emecen, ‘A csata, amely a “Nagy T
¨
or
¨
ok” el
¨
ott
megnyitotta a Magyar Alf
¨
oldet’, in Moh
´
acs, ed. J
´
anos B. Szab
´
o (Budapest, 2006), p. 428.
120 Nes¸ri, Kitab-ı Cih
ˆ
an-n
¨
um
ˆ
a, i,pp.258–9; Iacopo de Promontorio, Die Aufzeichnungen,
pp. 45–6.
121 Fodor, ‘The Way of a Seljuq Institution’, 374–8.
122 Konstantin Mihajlovi
´
c, Memoirs,p.189.
123 Bertrandon de la Broqui
`
ere, Voyage ,p.186; Konstantin Mihajlovi
´
c, Memoirs,p.163.
124 Nes¸ri, Kitab-ı Cih
ˆ
an-n
¨
um
ˆ
a, i,pp.278–85.
220
Ottoman warfare, 1300–1453
was unparalleled in the age.
125
This battle array was aimed primarily at guar-
anteeing the personal safety of the sultan, hence it was basically defensive.
126
The ruler was always situated in the centre, in front of the camp, flanked on the
right and left by his court cavalry, clad partly in heavy armour. In front of him
were the janissaries, the yayas and the azabs arranged in several ‘layers’ (kat),
of which there were seven at the battle of Varna for example, to make their
ranks impenetrable. When field artillery appeared, the guns were placed here,
before the janissaries and behind the azabs. An entrenchment was created (first
attested to as early as in 1396) around the centre crowned by a line of densely
placed wooden stakes and pavises, the janissaries shooting their arrows, and
later their bullets, from behind this blindage. In the second battle of Kosovo
in 1448 they fortified the entrenchment with wagons (Wagenburg). The sipahi
cavalry of the two provinces and the akıncı troops were lined up on the right
and left wings, reinforced sometimes with foot azabs and militiamen as well
as cerehors.
The battle process was usually as follows. With feigned attacks and retreats
the sipahi cavalry disrupted the mounted troops of the enemy, also dis-
turbed by the incessant shooting of arrows and by burning camels, and
led them towards the Ottoman infantry. When the attackers reached the
latter’s ranks, they parted suddenly to give way, then closed behind them.
The Ottoman foot soldiers then systematically killed the enemy horses with
their thrusting and cutting weapons, and annihilated the immobilised sol-
diers in close combat. Those who were not thus trapped were encircled
and destroyed by the returning cavalry that had in the meantime restored
its order. In the 1440s, the Christian soldiers surviving the massacre usually
retreated into their camp, strengthened with a wagon fortress. The Ottoman
infantry either made an assault on it, or, if it was equipped with superior
firepower, encircled it and forced those inside to surrender by starving them
out.
125 For the nomadic heritage, see Peter B. Golden, ‘War and Warfare in the Pre-
ˇ
Cinggisid
Western Steppes of Eurasia’, in Warfare in Inner Asian History, 500–1800, ed. Nicola Di
Cosmo (Leiden, 2002), pp. 105–72.
126 The following is in the main based on Bertrandon de la Broqui
`
ere, Voyage,pp.216–31;
˙
Inalcık and O
ˇ
guz, Gazav
ˆ
at-ı Sult
ˆ
an Mur
ˆ
ad,pp.12–69; Enveri, Fatih Devri Kaynaklarından
D
¨
ust
ˆ
urn
ˆ
ame,pp.31–3; Konstantin Mihajlovi
´
c, Memoirs,pp.165–9; cf. V. J. Parry, ‘La
mani
`
ere de combattre’, in Parry and Yapp, War, Technology and Society,pp.218–21;
Stephen Christensen, ‘The Heathen Order of Battle’, in Violence and the Absolutist State:
Studies in European and Ottoman History, ed. Stephen Christensen (Copenhagen, 1990),
pp. 75–132; Emanuel Constantin Antoche, ‘Les expeditions de Nicopolis (1396)etde
Va r na ( 1444): une comparaison’, Mediaevalia Transilvanica 4, 1–2 (2000), 28–74;T
am
´
as
P
´
alosfalvi, Nik
´
apolyt
´
ol Moh
´
acsig 1396–1526 (Budapest, 2005), particularly pp. 48, 54, 94,
103, 105.
221
p
´
al fodor
The Ottoman army owed its successive victories first of all to the infantry
and the court troops, as well as to good co-operation between various units.
Communication was ensured by the sophisticated military music and the
corp of the c¸avus¸es who rapidly forwarded the sultan’s orders to the dif-
ferent companies. The most prominent commanders of enemy armies and
observers such as the Hungarian Michael Szil
´
agyi and Georgius de Hun-
garia recognised the decisive role of the infantry and the court troops.
127
However, as long as their opponents insisted on a battle tactic based pri-
marily on the attacks of the heavy (in the west) or the light (in the east)
cavalry and were short of an efficient infantry, they usually left the battlefields
defeated.
128
Siege warfare
In the latter half of the fourteenth century, the Ottomans made great progress
not only in field battles but also in formal siege warfare, adopting all its most
up-to-date elements. At the turn of the century they used various siege engines
(mangonels and siege towers) and mantelets, and within a decade or two, and
certainly by 1422, they had learnt the use of mining to weaken the walls and
protect the besiegers.
129
Cannons were also used for the first time around this
date, growing in significance from the 1440s in the assaults on fortresses. In
the siege of Constantinople in 1453 nearly all these elements were present,
including multi-level siege towers, but it was the cannons and mines which
proved to be the most efficient weapons.
130
In the first phase of a siege the besiegers encircled the fortress, dug trenches
and shot holes in the walls with the siege engines and field-pieces. Having
caused enough damage to the fortifications, the troops were commanded via
criers to launch a general assault. On the eve of the attack – as we read in the
evocative description of Konstantin Mihajlovi
´
c–
127 Georgius de Hungaria, ‘Incipit’,p.74.
128 The need for an effective infantry was also felt by the Ilkhanids of Persia, but they failed
‘to field a force of heavy cavalry and supporting infantry that was at least equal in size
to that of the Mamluks’; A. P. Martinez, ‘Some Notes on the
¯
Il-X
¯
anid Army’, Archivum
Eurasiae Medii Aevi 6 (1985 [1987]), 179.
129 Imber, The Structure of Power,pp.254–5. As Kantakouzenos mentions briefly in his
chronicle (Geschichte, ii.p.89) the forces of Orhan used siege engines at Nicomedia
(
˙
Izmit) as early as in 1333.
130 H
¨
useyin Da
˘
gtekin, ‘
˙
Istanbul’un Fethinde Kullanılan Y
¨
ur
¨
urkuleler’, in Fetihten
¨
Once,
Fetihten Sonra (Istanbul, 2003), pp. 45–65; Emecen,
˙
Istanbul’un Fethi Olayı,p.14; on later
developments, see Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: the Fortress inthe Early Modern World
1494–1 660 (London and New York, 1979), esp. pp. 191–219.
222
Ottoman warfare, 1300–1453
lighted tallow candles [are] raised profusely throughout the army so that it
looksasifthestarsareshining...abovetheclouds
131
...Andatnighttheygo
toward the city from all sides silently, slowing approaching the fosse, carrying
before them barricades woven of branches and also strongly-built ladders so
that they can climb up and down both sides of the ladder. The Janissaries
then in this fashion go to the place where the wall is breached and having
approached the breached place, they wait until day begins to appear. Then
first the gunners fire from all the cannon . . . [and after that] the Janissaries
quickly scale the wall, for at this moment the Christians are retreating before
the cannon, and when they see that the Janissaries are on the walls, having
turned about suddenly, they begin to fight bravely on both sides. And here
the Janissaries, urging one another, climb up. And in addition the shot from
bows comes very thick, for they continually bring and replenish their shot,
and besides [there is] a great tumult from drums and human outcry. Thus the
battle lasts an hour or at most two.
132
This piece of information sheds light on the crucial role of the janissaries
once again: while they played a basically defensive role in field battles, they
also constituted the most efficient offensive formation of the Ottoman army
in siege warfare. It is hardly accidental that the defences were first broken
through by janissary units during the siege of Constantinople.
Naval and river fleets
For an empire possessing large dominions in both Asia Minor and Europe
it was essential to secure the continuity of communication and transfer of
forces between the two continents. This could not be achieved without effec-
tive control of the Straits, a task which, in turn, could not be fulfilled with-
out a naval fleet, especially as long as Byzantium existed in the heart of the
empire.
133
However, lacking any seafaring experience, the Ottomans were forced to
turn for help to various Turkish forces who practised piracy on the Aegean.
A Venetian report suggests that they had a smaller fleet of their own as
early as 1374.
134
After the conquest of the maritime principalities of Aydın and
Mentes¸e several skilled men and experts came into Ottoman service, giving
a great impetus to the development of the navy. The Ottomans also used and
131 On this practice, see also Emecen,
˙
Istanbul’un Fethi Olayı,p.24, 92–3.
132 Konstantin Mihajlovi
´
c, Memoirs,pp.186–7.
133 Kate Fleet, ‘Early Turkish Naval Activities’, in The Ottomans and the Sea, ed. Kate Fleet,
Oriente Moderno 20 (81), 1 (2001), 129–38; Colin Imber, ‘Before the Kapudan Pasha: Sea
Power and the Emergence of the Ottoman Empire’, in Kapudan Pasha: his Office and his
Domain, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), pp. 49–59.
134 Fleet, ‘Early Turkish Naval Activities’, p. 133.
223
p
´
al fodor
integrated Byzantino-Greek traditions and manpower, just as they were ready
to learn from, and accept the help of, the Latins, especially the Genoese, in the
Levant. It was the Genoese who undertook several times to ship the Ottoman
troops across the sea. In shipbuilding and dockyard technology, they were most
strongly influenced by the Venetians.
135
This openness and multi-directional
acculturation is reflected by the Ottoman nautical vocabulary which abounds
in Greek and Latin/Italian words.
During Bayezid I’s reign, the Ottoman fleet had a mere seventeen vessels,
whereas around 1402 a traveller reported forty to sixty ships. The first marine
base and main crossing point of the Ottomans was Gelibolu (Gallipoli), ear-
lier the centre of the Byzantine fleet. The Byzantine historiographer Doukas
recorded that Sultan Bayezid had it considerably rebuilt and fortified with
towers to make it suitable for shipbuilding and the accommodation of large
galleys, and to enable its naval forces to control the commercial traffic through
the Straits and to levy duties on it. The harbour consisted of an outer and an
inner pool separated by a bridge fortified by a three-storey tower. The mouth
of the harbour was closed by a chain in case of necessity. By 1422, further forti-
fications (walls and towers) had been built, necessitated by the enemy attacks
of the previous years.
The Gelibolu base had irritated the Venetians from the beginning, since they
were worried that the strengthening Ottoman naval forces would threaten the
freedom of their trade. The first open sea battle between the two powers took
place on 29 May 1416, after the Ottoman fleet, consisting of thirty vessels and
led by Admiral C¸ alı, had plundered the Venetian islands. The Venetians scored
a crushing victory, seizing twelve, fourteen or twenty-seven ships, according
to different sources. In the course of the Venetian–Ottoman war of 1423–30
the Venetians broke into the inner harbour of Gelibolu but in the end failed
to keep the docks.
136
By the middle of the century the size of the Ottoman fleet, which con-
sisted mainly of oared galleys with single masts and lateen sails (kadırga),
had increased considerably. According to a Venetian eye-witness account, the
Ottoman fleet blockading Constantinople in 1453 comprised 145 ships: 12 gal-
leys, 70 to 80 large galiots (fusta/kalyata), 20 to 25 parandaria and other ships,
including pirate vessels.
137
In addition to the warships, the Ottomans probably
from an early date used larger ships for transporting men, horses, ammunition
135
˙
Idris Bostan, K
¨
urekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri (Istanbul, 2005), p. 25.
136 Halil
˙
Inalcık, ‘Gelibolu’, in EI2, ii,p.984.
137 Fleet, ‘Early Turkish Naval Activities’, p. 134.
224
Ottoman warfare, 1300–1453
and, later, ordnance.
138
The fleet admiral’s post was probably filled by the dis-
trict governor of Gelibolu, although the first evidence to verify this assumption
dates from 1453.
139
The Ottoman fleet was for a long period deployed around the Straits, its
activity being restricted to covering the crossings, as well as attacking enemy
ships and shores. In the late 1420s, it ventured into the Aegean and, in support
of the land troops, took part in combined attacks, for example in the sieges
of Thessalonike (1430) and Constantinople (1453). The role of the navy in both
cases was to complete the blockade of the city on the side facing the sea and
deprive the defenders of the possibility of obtaining external help. Although it
was a great step forward, the Ottoman warships were still far from standing
their ground in an open formal battle with the more heavily built, better-
equipped western fleets. The fact, however, that apart from the Venetians and
the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, only the Ottomans had a regular navy,
considerably increased the political weight of their state.
140
When the Ottomans reached the Danube and encountered the Hungarian
ships laden with artillery, they quicklyrecognised the importance of river fleets.
Apparently, they already had river forces on the Danube and on the Morava
in Serbia during Murad II’s reign. Hungarian sources inform us that when
King Sigismund laid siege to the fortress of Galamb
´
oc (Golubac, G
¨
u
˘
gercinlik)
on the Danube in 1428, the Ottomans tried unsuccessfully to break through
the Hungarian blockade with ships sent up the Morava.
141
In 1433, Bertrandon
de la Broqui
`
ere noted that the sultan kept eighty to a hundred fustas (galiots,
small oared warships) at the confluence of the Serbian rivers, the western and
southern Morava, for the crossing of horses and troops, and that the ships were
guarded by 300 men, replaced every two months. He found another hundred
fustas at Galamb
´
oc, also used to transport soldiers across to Hungary.
142
It
has been suggested that the Ottomans may have used some sort of ordnance
aboard these ships because their Hungarian counterparts were also equipped
with small cannons.
143
On the basis of this information and these suggestions, it
can be concluded that river flotillas must have been employed for the transport
138 For the Ottoman types of ships, see Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye,pp.83–97; Bostan, K
¨
urekli
ve Yelkenli,pp.169–281.
139 Cf. Elizabeth Zachariadou, ‘Notes on the Subas¸ıs and the Early Sancakbeyis of Gelibolu’,
in Zachariadou, Kapudan Pasha,pp.61–3.
140
´
Agoston, Guns for the Sultan,p.49. 141 P
´
alosfalvi, Nik
´
apolyt
´
ol Moh
´
acsig,p.62.
142 Bertrandon de la Broqui
`
ere, Voyage,pp.207, 215; cf. Colin Heywood, ‘Notes on the Pro-
duction of Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Cannon’, in Colin Heywood, Writing Ottoman
History: Documents and Interpretations (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 8–9.
143
´
Agoston, Guns for the Sultan,p.18.
225
p
´
al fodor
of troops and animals as well as for the siege of riverside fortresses in a variety
of ways: taking troops to the shore, blockading a fortress and shooting at the
fortress wall from the cannons aboard.
Concluding remarks
During a century and a half, the Ottomans developed one of the best war
machines of the age. This was due to a variety of factors.
144
The first was their
possession of a large standing army before their enemies started to create
similar forces; the composition of this army was well balanced and could
be mobilised and deployed with an unparalleled rapidity. Second, they had a
numerical superiority and an abundance of manpower supply which enabled
them to replace their losses in a short time. Third, they benefited from having
plenty of raw materials and victuals which allowed them to provide the army
with armament and provisions relatively easily. Fourth, they had the necessary
ability and readiness to accommodate foreign technologies and experts and
to take an active part in the international trade and transfer of knowledge
and weapons. Based on these factors, they developed tactical elements which,
being far ahead of the age, eventually ensured the Ottomans repeated victories.
144 On some of these, see Virginia Aksan, ‘Ottoman War and Warfare 1453–1812’, in Black,
War and the World,pp.147–75;
´
Agoston, ‘Ottoman Warfare’; G
´
abor
´
Agoston, ‘“The Most
Powerful Empire”: Ottoman Flexibility and Military Might’, in Empires and Superpowers:
Their Rise and Fall, ed. George Zimmar and David Hicks (Washington, DC, 2005),
pp. 127–66.
226
7
The Turkish economy, 1071–1453
kate fleet
It has been an often accepted axiom that Turks and economy were not good
bedfellows. Presaged by the clouds of an army on the march, the arrival of
the Turk was synonymous with economic disaster. For many historians of the
nineteenth century, the imprint of the Turkish horse left eternal destruction
and economic ruin. Even if modified and toned down in the later twentieth
century, this view of the Turk as an economically destructive presence has,
like the Turk’s horse, left its mark on thinking about the Ottomans and has
coloured much scholarship on the empire.
While later historians regarded the Turks as lacking economic motivation
or acumen, contemporary Byzantines did not. Indeed, for Doukas, a well-
informed observer of the Turks who knew Turkish and who worked for the
Genoese, first in New Phokaea and then in Lesbos, the Turkish ‘nation’ was
‘a lover of money’.
1
Writing much earlier, Kinnamos, too, noted the Turks’
concern with financial matters, commenting that nothing distressed them
more than economic loss.
2
The Genoese, those quintessential merchants and
entrepreneurs, likewise viewed the Ottomans not as mere military men but
as economic partners. It was to money and his constant use of it that the
Ottoman sultan Mehmed II owed his ascendancy in the estimation of the
Genoese merchant Iacopo de Promontorio, active for many years in Ottoman
territory during the reigns of both Mehmed and his father Murad II.
3
Putting to one side, therefore, the concept of the economically destructive
Turk, one can proceed to consider the economy of the period 1071 to 1453,
from the battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt) which removed effective Byzantine
1 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, tr. and ed. H. J. Magoulias
(Detroit, 1975), pp. 224–5.
2 Kinnamos, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus, tr. Charles M. Brand (New York, 1976),
p. 148.
3 Iacopo de Promontorio, Die Aufzeichnungen des Genuesen Iacopo de Promontorio-de Campis
¨
uber den Osmanenstaat um 1475, ed. Franz Babinger (M
¨
unchen, 1957), p. 84.
227
kate fleet
ability to stem the flow of the Turks into Anatolia, to the fall of the Byzantine
capital to Mehmed II and the end of the Byzantine Empire, and ask what kind
of economy it was and whether there was what might be termed a Turkish
economic approach.
4
Beforedoing so,however, one needs to acknowledgetwo
major problems: sources and the considerable length of the period examined.
Any in-depth understanding of the early Turkish economy is severely ham-
pered by lack of sources, and the observation of Mehmed Fuad K
¨
opr
¨
ul
¨
u that
‘the political and social history of the Turks of Anatolia from the eleventh to
the fifteenth century has still not been saved from the darkness which covers it’
still applies.
5
There is an almost total absence of Turkish data before 1453. Apart
from coins, monuments and inscriptions, only a few Seljuk vakıfnames (deeds
of trust of pious foundations), the majority of which are Ottoman copies, and a
few tahrirs (land surveys) for the fifteenth century are extant. There are Persian
sources – the works of Ibn Bibi, Eflaki, Aqsara’i and Mustaufi – Arabic sources –
in particular al-‘Umari and Ibn Battuta for the fourteenth century – and the
Greek histories of Choniates, Doukas, Pachymeres, Gregoras, Kinnamos, and
Kantakuzenos. To these may be added some travel literature, such as the
accounts by Marco Polo and Bertrandon de la Broqui
`
ere. The majority of the
material which has survived and which is particularly relevant for economic
history, however, comes from the trading states in the west, in particular the
city-states of Genoa and Venice. These data include notary deeds (particu-
larly important for trade between merchants, commodities and locations),
merchant letters, commune account books, state discussions over trade rela-
tions, and treaties, in essence trade agreements, with Turkish states. Other
western material includes the merchant manual of Pegolotti, the account by
the Cretan merchant Piloti and the account book of the Venetian merchant
Badoer. The inevitable result of this level of Latin material is that the image
of economic activity becomes dominated by Turkish–Latin commercial rela-
tions. This dominance may in fact represent the reality of the period, but it is
essential to bear in mind that this may well not be the case.
6
Trade relations
with the Mamluks, with Iran and the east, and with the northern regions
4 I use Turkish economic approaches here to mean those implemented in Turkish-ruled
states.
5 M. Fuad K
¨
opr
¨
ul
¨
u, ‘Anadolu Selc¸ukluları Tarihinin Yerli Kaynakları I’, Belleten 27 (1943),
379.
6 Philip Remler has argued, for example, on the basis of his study of the silver coinage of
the beyliks of the Ottomans, Eretna and the
˙
Isfendiyaro
˘
gulları in the fourteenth century
that the western beyliks were dependent on the trade from the east and remained in that
economic sphere; P. N. Remler, ‘Ottoman, Isfendiyarid, and Eretnid Coinage: a Currency
Community in Fourteenth-Century Anatolia’, American Numismatic Society Museum Notes
25 (1980), 186.
228
The Turkish economy, 1071–1453
across the Black Sea were clearly significant and their absence from many of
the sources does not necessarily reflect their lesser importance in comparison
with western trade, but could well be related to the absence of the sources
themselves. This absence could be due to either the destruction of data or
the absence of such data in the first place. It is certainly the case that Latin
merchants employed notaries to record every transaction. This was not the
case among Ottoman merchants in later centuries whose transactions were
verbal not written, and it would be reasonable to presume that such a practice
existed also in the earlier period. That documents such as letters or treaties
between Turkish states and their neighbours in the east or south have not
survived can easily be accounted for by the general political turmoil of the
period in which there was a quick succession of states rising and falling in a
region often ravaged by warfare.
Much of the non-Latin material we do have is often difficult to interpret.
For example, the figures given by Hamd Allah Mustaufi Qazvini, writing
around 1340, for the tribute received from Anatolia by the Mongols present
problems and while it has been argued that it is possible to accept the overall
totals (3.3 million dinars under the Mongols, as opposed to 15 million under
the Seljuks), the data in general should be treated with caution.
7
The same
applies to many of the economic data from al-‘Umari which are very difficult to
interpret. According to al-‘Umari all foodstuffs sold in Anatolia for moderate
prices because of various factors: the low level of taxation, the abundance of
free pasturage, the expansion of commerce and the proximity of the sea.
8
Ibn
Battuta, too, commented on the modest prices in Kastamonu, so low he noted
that he had never in any country seen a city where prices were lower.
9
But as
Cahen notes, this, if true, does not necessarily mean prosperity and could be
an indication of either wealth or poverty.
10
Currency values are not clear, and
nor are those of the weights and measures used. The exact workings of the
market remain obscure.
Taking a period of nearly four centuries and attempting to consider it as
one is, needless to say, a risky undertaking. Inherent in such an approach is the
7 Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: a General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture
and History c.1071–1330, tr. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), pp. 334–5. For the difficulty
of working with Ilkhanid economic data see Philip Remler, ‘New Light on Economic
History from Ilkhanid Accounting Manuals’, Studia Iranica 14, 2 (1985), 157–77.
8 Al-‘Umari, ‘Notice de l’ouvrage qui a pour titre Masalek alabsar fi memalek alamsar,
Voyages des yeux dans les royaumes des diff
´
erentes contr
´
ees (ms. arabe 583)’, tr. E.
Quatrem
`
ere, in Notices et extraits des mss. de la Biblioth
`
eque du Roi, vol. XIII (Paris, 1838),
p. 336.
9 Ibn Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, ed. and tr. H. A. R. Gibb (London, 1962), p. 461.
10 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey,p.171.
229