Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)

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During March 1934, the four m ajor FLUs voted to strike u nless r ecognition,

wage, and hiring demands were met. Unsure of the strength of the federal unions

to withstand a strike and the AFL’s own ambivalent stance toward industrial

unions, A FL presi dent William Green urged them to rescind the strike notice.

Deeply concerned that a strike would stir both additional labor strife and d erail

economic recovery efforts, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the National

Labor Board to hear the workers’ grievances, and the FLUs postponed the strike.

On March 25, the board offered a solution, and though hostile to company unions

(permitted under Section 7a), the AFL’s leadership endorsed the settlement. This

action, however, sapped the conﬁdence of FLU members resulting in a decline

from around 32,000 workers to just over 18,000 by the end of the spring of

1934. Moreover, it offered the opportunity for more radical, left-leaning organiz-

ers to take a greater role in union organizing.

Toledo, also known as the “Glass City,” had that industry as its basis, but it also

had the Willys-Overland Motor Company, one of the smaller producers of cars and

trucks, and a number of parts suppliers. FLU Local 18384 was established by local

organizers and did n ot have the level of control impo sed on it as did the other

AFL-afﬁliat ed u nions. It also did no t have one ﬁ rm as its f ocus as did the Buick

and Hudson Motor FLUs. Instead, it had a base in the independently owned Elec-

tric Auto-Lite and three of its local subsidiary companies, giving the union a basis

for ﬁnancial stability. This encouraged militancy among the FLU’s members, and

on February 23, 19 34, the Auto-Lite members began a recognition strike backed

by nearly all workers and, after ﬁve days, won some con cessions. The settlement

agreed to by the AFL in the four largest FLUs at the same time, however, undercut

these efforts and signiﬁcantly eroded worker support.

Auto-Lite president Clem Miniger’s refusal to continue negotiations prompted

Local 18 384 to vote for a second strik e to begin on April 12. The AFL-b acked

Central Labor Council (CLC) formed a subcommittee of the largest area unions

to support the strike, but as only a quarter of Auto-Lite workers joined the picket

lines, the strike effor t faltered. At this point, FLU 18384 began to wor k with the

far-left American Workers Party (AWP) led by A. J. Muste, a minister in the

Reformed Church of Amer ica, with its executive secret ary Louis Budenz as the

local liaison. The Lucas County Unemployed League (LCUL) had already been

operating prior to the strike as the local AWP entity focused on organizing the

unemployed to prevent their participation as strikebreakers.

Once picketing began, Auto-Lite sought court injunct ions to stop picketing in

front of the plant gates and received one limiting the overall number to 25 at any

one time. In deﬁance, the AWP and FLU 18384 placed between 30 and 60 picketers

outside the plant each day w ith dozens arrested and brought before the court on

charges of contempt. The courts, ﬁlled with cheering, singing supporters, released

848 Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (193 4)

picketers after handing down brief sent ences and ﬁnes. Local media and public

relations efforts helped build public support for the strikers.

As the strike dragged on and the courts proved ineffective, the Auto-Lite com-

pany purchased tear gas, hired additional private security personnel, and contacted

the Lucas County sheriff ’s department for special deputies. Company ofﬁcials

requeste d deputies, as they feared that local police, already unhappy with layoffs

and cuts to wages, had started to openly sympathize with the strikers and proved

reluctant to act against them.

Company ofﬁcials also hired 1,500 replacement workers as strikebreakers and

brought many into the plant by May 20. Upon learning of this, the AWP then

engaged in mass p icketing, with Budenz speaking before an estimated crowd of

a thousand strikers and supporters. During the next three days, the number of pick-

eters rose to around 6,0 00 by May 23. A clash t hat day between Lucas C ounty

sheriff’s deputies and the crowds of picketers ended with tear gas and at least 20

injuries, including gunshot wounds. Early on the mornin g of May 2 4, 900 Ohio

National Guardsmen arrived at the plant. Tensions continued to build throughout

the day, and by late that evening, the Guardsmen clashed again with the assembled

throng, producing further tear-gassing and ending with Guardsmen ﬁring into the

crowd. The shots resulted in the deaths of two members of the crowd. By

May 26, rioting died down, and on May 31, the bulk of the Guardsmen ordered

withdrawn. President Roosevelt’s s pecial mediator, Charles Taft, arrived and

facilitated two weeks of negotiations that resulted on June 5 with a compromise

agreement that gave the union recognition and many of its key negotiation

demands.

The Auto-Lite strike helped to move the labor movement away from the AFL’s

traditional reluctance for militancy. The formation of the United Auto Workers

under the umbrella of the Congress of Industrial Organizations would provide

stronger leadership for future efforts. In 1935, Toledo autoworkers would success-

fully strike Chevrolet, leading to the de facto recognition of the union by General

Motors and paving the way for the even more successful Flint Sit-Down Strike of

1936–1937.

—Matthew Daley

See also all entries under Molly Maguires (1870s); Great Railroa d S trikes (1877);

Haymarket Riot (1886); Seattle Riot (1886); Homestead Strike (1892–1893); Pullman

Strike (1894); Lattimer Massacre (1897); Black Patch War (1909); Ludlow Massacre

(1914); Boston Police Strike (1919); Battle of Blair Mountain (1921); Bonus Army

(1932); West C oast Longsh oremen’s Strike (1 934); World Trade Organization Protests

(1999).

Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (1934) 849

Further Reading

Bernstein, Irving. The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941.

Boston: Houghton-Mifﬂin Co., 1970.

Borden, Timothy. “Toledo Is a Good Town for Working People: The Labor Question in

20th-Century America.” PhD diss., Indiana University, 1999.

Fine, Sidney. The Automobile under th e Blue Eagle. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

Press, 1964.

Hall, Roger H. “Sam Pollock and the Natio nal Unemployed League in Tole do, 1932–

1936.” Northwest Ohio Quarterly 65, no.3 (Summer 1993): 103–25.

Korth, Philip A ., a nd Margaret R. Beegle, eds. I Remember Like Today: The Auto-Lite

Strike of 1934. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1988.

Messer-Kruse, Timothy. Banksters, Bosses, and Smart Money: A Social History of the

Great Toledo Bank Crash of 1931. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005.

Miller, Gregory M. “A Social History of Automobile Workers in Toledo, 1907–1935.” MA

thesis, University of Toledo, 2000.

Muste, A. J. “The Battle of Toledo.” Nation, June 6, 1934.

Robinso n, JoAnn. Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste. Philadelphia: Temple

University Press, 1982.

“Two Slain, Score Injured, As National Guard Fires on Toledo Strike Rioters.” New York

Times, May 25, 1934.

“U.S. Seeks Truce as Strikers, Deputies M ass at Auto-Lite.” Toledo News-Bee,May23,

1934.

850 Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (193 4)

American Federation of Labor (AFL)

The American Federation of Labor (AFL) grew out of dissatisﬁed members of the

Knights of Labor during the 1880s. This new union grouping would remain the

largest such organization even a fter the formation of the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO) in 1938. The AFL limited membership to groups and organ-

izations made up of workers and emphasizing the autonomy of each trade union.

To that end, the AFL took on three functions for its afﬁliates. It ﬁrst organized non-

unionized workers, spread information and brought potential leaders together, and

gave ﬁnancial support to newly organized unions. Further, despite the socialist

leanings of Samuel Gompers and other founding members, the AFL adopted a

more conservative “pure and simple” union stance that eschewed politics for

worker-related issues. These included conc ern w ith working conditions and pay

and control over jobs. This form of “business unionism” emphasized worker and

union contribution to business proﬁts and national economic growth, rather than

challenging the structural tenets of capitalism.

Initially, the AFL conducted an open membership policy that drew radical and

socialist workers, semiskilled and unskilled, women, and African Americans as

members. As the only national labor organization after the 1880s, it also permitted

the membership of industrial unions including the United Mine Workers. As an

umbrella organization, the AFL used its position to mediate conﬂicts among mem-

bers. The AFL also encouraged afﬁliates at the local level to form central labor

councils in major urban areas to further organizing efforts. The economic and

social upheavals of the 1890s, however, pushed the AFL to focus more on skilled

workers in craft unions partly made up of white men. All those who did not ﬁt that

category were now viewed as competition and a direct threat to any worker advan-

ces. Employers began to use labor injunctions, as in the Pullman Strike of 1894, to

utilize the power of the courts against strikers. This and other legislation effec-

tively criminalized labor-organizing efforts. While reluctant to engage in the

legislative and political process, the AFL took an active role in the passage of

the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914. The Supreme Court, however, limited its provi-

sions by a series of narrow interpretations.

New Deal labor policies directly beneﬁtted the AFL as it embarked on a series

of organizing efforts. Though it expelled the Committee (later Congress) of Indus-

trial Organizations for their sanctioning of worker militancy in industrial unions,

the AFL’s drive to remain larger than the CIO made it condone just such practices.

Despite the gains made by both union organizations, the AFL could not block

the antiwar Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 nor hal t the most damaging impact of

McCarthyism on left-oriented afﬁliates. As with the CIO, the expulsion of leftist

851

members ended whatever radicalism existed in the AFL and moved the entity

toward the more consumeris t-oriente d policies of postwar liberals. These pres-

sures, the weakened position of the CIO, and the desire for a uniﬁed front

prompted the merger that formed the AFL-CIO. The greater size and ﬁnancial re-

sources of the AFL made the merger not one of equals and left the AFL’s leader-

ship intact.

—Matthew Daley

Further Reading

Galenson, Walter. The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Move-

ment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Greene, Julie. Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political

Activism, 1881–1917. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

McCartin, Joseph A. Lab or’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the

Origins of Modern American Labor Re lations, 1912–1921. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1997.

Battle of Toledo (1934)

The Battle of Toledo refers to a series of protests and violent confrontations

between local police, Ohio National Guardsmen, and strikers outside the main

Electric Auto-Lite Company automobile parts supplier in Toledo, Ohio, from

May 21 to 26, 1934. These clashes took place during the strike against the Auto-

Lite company that had initially started on April 12 after the collapse of negotia-

tions between the American Federation of Labor backed Federal Labor Union

Local 18384, a multiemployer union that drew its members from the Electric

Auto-L ite Company, two of its subsidiaries, and the larger Spicer Ma nufacturing

Company. The decentralized nature of the local permitted a strike against one divi-

sion while others worked, thereby preserving the ﬁnancial stability of the union

unlike those focused on a uniﬁed corporation. Additionally, since Auto-Lite had

independent, local ownership, it c ould not withstand strikes, as could General

Motors making it an ideal if unplanned target.

Throughout the spring of 1934, the union rejected the settlement and attempted

to gain both recognition and better wages for members at Electric Auto-Lite. By

April, negotiations had deadlocked, but the union had gained further public sup-

port and also that of the Marxist American Workers Party (AWP) and its afﬁliate

the Luc as County Unemployed League (LCUL). The inc lusion of these gr oups

852 Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (193 4)

provided the leadership and organizing savvy that the AFL withheld from more

militant locals, giving it the edge it needed during the strike.

Picketing and arrests began in May, but little violence resulted. Upon the threat

of 1,500 strikebreakers, the number of pickete rs grew to an estimated 6,000 by

May 23. A clash that day between Lucas County sheriff’s deputies and the crowds

of picketers ended with tear gas and at least 20 injuries including gunshot wounds.

EarlyonthemorningofMay24,900OhioNationalGuardsmenarrivedatthe

Auto-Lite plant and escorted strikebreaking workers and local deputies out of the

plant. But the atmosphere became increasingly charged, and late that evening,

Guardsmen and the assembled throng clashed. This resulted in further tear-

gassing and guardsmen ﬁring into the crowd ending in the deaths of two m en,

Frank Hubay and Steve Cygon. Neither man was an Auto-Lite worker but had

come to show their support for the striking workers. The rioting had subsided by

May 26, rioting died down and on May 31 the bulk of the guardsmen ordered with-

drawn. The strike ended on June 5 with a compromise agreement that gave the

union recognition and the labor movement the impetus to move away from the

AFL’s traditional hostility to worker militancy.

Though it would face opposition and setbacks, the hard-edged working-class

solidarity forged during the Depression would also begin to push union leadership

to respond more effectively to the issues facing workers. Mobilized workers in

Toledo struck again during 1935 at the Chevrolet transmission plant, winning sig-

niﬁcant concessions, avoiding the violence of the Auto-Lite Strike, and setting the

stage for the formation of the United Auto Workers union and its 1937 triumph in

the Flint Sit-Down Strike.

—Matthew Daley

Further Reading

Borden, Timothy. “Toledo Is a Good Town for Working People: The Labor Question in

20th-Century America.” PhD diss., Indiana University, 1999.

Fine, Sidney. The Autom obile under the Blue Eagle. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

Press, 1964.

Korth, Philip A., and Margaret R. Beegle, eds. I Remember Like Today: The Auto-Lite

Strike of 1934. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1988.

Miller, Gregory M. “A Social History of Automobile Workers in Toledo, 1907–1935.” MA

thesis, University of Toledo, 2000.

Muste, A. J. “The Battle of Toledo.” The Nation, June 6, 1934.

“Two Slain, Score Injured, As National Guard Fires on Toledo Strik e Rioters.” New York

Times, May 25, 1934.

“U.S. Seeks Truce as Strikers, Deputies Mass at Auto-Lite.” Toledo News-Bee,May23,

1934.

Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (1934) 853

National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), P.L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, passed on

June 16, 1933, was one of the most important and far-reaching programs of the

New Deal. The NIRA allowed industries in conjunction with the federal

government to create a series of agreements, or codes, that would help regulate

prices, wages, a nd competition. The NI RA established the Nati onal Recovery

Administration (NRA) to implement these policies. It had as its foundation the

concept that the unrestricted competition and poor credit policies o f the 1920s

had produced the crisis of the Great Depression.

The central elements of the policy included ﬁrst, spreading the available work

among large numbers of employers, and secondly, increasing the purchasing

power of the public as a whole. To promote the ﬁrst part, the government in con-

junction with larger employers would limit the number of hours the already

employed could work and encourage the hiring of new workers from the unem-

ployed. To increase consumption, the NIRA would establish minimum wage rates

and a public works program to directly inject federal funds into the economy. The

legislation of the NIRA stated that codes of fair competition should be developed

through public hearings, and gave the federal government the power to set up vol-

untary agreements with industries.

An additional part of the NIRA, Section 7a, provided the right to collective bar-

gaining and that employers could not require workers to join company unions as a

requirement for employment. The American Federation of Labor moved cau-

tiously to organize and to have a greater role in the formation of ind ustry codes.

The AFL, and later the CIO, would embark on more assertive policies but had only

limited interest in restructuring capitalism. Despite being hostile to both labor

organiz ing and government codes, corporate leaders recognized during the years

of the NIRA that negotiating individually with unions offered a less intrusive

way to manage labor costs than codes. This unintended consequence of the NIRA

contributed signiﬁcantly to the eventual decline in labor conﬂict by the end of the

1930s.

The National Recovery Administration, established to oversee the implementa-

tion o f these policies, relied on cooperation and volunta ry compliance to gain

industry participation. General Hugh S. Johnson, the ﬁrst NRA administrator,

feared that a strictly enforced implementation of these policies would prompt the

courts to ﬁnd the act unconstitutional. To build public support, the NRA utilized

the blue eagle symbol to slow compliance.

The controversial nature of the codes and the growing hostility of small and

medium-sized businesses contributed to the removal of Johnson as the head of NRA.

854 Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (193 4)

In May 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the act’s provision in A.L.A.

Schecter Poultry Corp v. United States, declaring that the enforcement of the codes

was unconstitutional. In its place, Congress ended the efforts of large-scale planning

and replaced the NIRA with smaller, more focused statutes. These placed regulations

and enforcement power within government agencies and continued some parts of the

NIRA’ s original provisions. These statues included the National Labor Relations Act

and Fair Labor Standards Act that extended labor organizing rights and employment

policies, respecti vely.

—Matthew Daley

Further Reading

Gordon, Colin. New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920–1935.New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Hawley, Ellis. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic

Ambivalence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Ohl, John Kennedy. Hugh S. Johnson and the New Deal. DeKalb: Northern Illinois

University, 1985.

Polenberg, Richard. The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945: A Brief History with

Documents. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000.

Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (1934) 855

West Coast Longshoremen’s

Strike (1934)

On May 9, 1934, the West Coast Longshoremen’s Strike, as it is commonly called,

began after workers in the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) voted

to strike again st the largest shipping c ompanies on the West Coast. The strik e

lasted for 83 days and was rife with violence and recriminations against all parties

involved. Though workers did not initially win all of their demands, the strike is

generally seen as a victory for the ranks of labor for having helped establish the

fundamental right of workers to organize themselves into unions.

Longshoremen, or stevedores, worked in one of the most physically demanding

and low-paying jobs in the United States. Wor kers often experienced shifts for a

long as 24 or 48 hours, only to go without work at other times without any consid-

eration of seniority or family need. Facing what was called the “shape up” every

day, workers would gather at the docks hoping to be picked for duty, and they

often expected to pay a “kick back” to the foreman if they were chosen to work.

Cronyism and racial injustice exacerbated these horrible conditions.

Called “wharf rats,” these low-paid (85 cents per hour in 1934) longshoremen

had tried to organize into unions in the years before and after World War I. Workers

in San Francisco had tried to organize against the big shipping companies in the

1920s, only to be met with resistance from court injunctions, arrests, and thug tac-

tics from the various employers and their supporters. In the antilabor climate of the

1920s, even a pro-union town like San Francisco had an open shop, where workers

were not required to join a labor union to work in an industry. Indeed, the shipping

companies implemented a company-controlled union in the 1920s. Call ed “blue

book” unions by the workers, the company unions controlled hiring halls that

favored workers who were not afﬁliated with radicals and labor organizers.

In the 1920s, various labor groups tried to organize dock workers, from the

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to the Communist Party of the United

States (CPUSA). These efforts met with much resistance and little success, but it

did spawn a core of militant leaders including Australian Harry Bridges, who

would become the principal ILA leader during and after the 1934 strike. Bridges

and associates were known as the “Albion Hall” group, and they published a news-

paper called The Waterfront Worker.

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