Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)

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their homes. The name arose because people blamed President Herbert Hoover

for their plight and the failure of government to help them cope with economic

collapse.

Hoovervilles were characterized by shacks and jerry-built structures of what-

ever material was at hand. Would-be residents scavenged for tarpaper, lumber

scraps, tin, cardboard, canvas and whatever else they could ﬁnd. The lucky ones

had carp entry skills and could build reas ona bly solid housing. Masons built 20 -

foot-tall shanties of old bricks and stone. The less skilled combined packing boxes

and other discarded material into primitive shelter. Empty water mains were the

recourse of the most unfortunate.

Central Park in New York City had one of the largest Hoovervilles. Other

Hoovervilles were in Midwest and West Coast cities as well as points in between.

In the Mississippi River Valley, drought brought crop failure and loss of farms and

forced former farmers into Hoovervilles.

As the Depression persisted in the 1930s, homelessness spread as increasing

numbers lost their homes to delinquent taxes and foreclosed mortgages after they

lost their jobs. The alternative was taking to the roads. Between 1929 and 1933,

over 100,000 businesses failed, and Hoover left ofﬁce in 1933 with 13 million

unemployed, nearly a fourth of the total workforce.

838 Bonus Army (1932)

Shantytown outside of Portland, Oregon, in April 1936. When the failing economy did not

respond to President Herbert Hoover's initiatives, the Great Depression worsened, and

Hoover was blamed for the collapse. Hooverville was the name given to shantytowns that

were occupied by those most severely hurt by the economic calamity. (Library of Congress)

Attempts to eliminate Hoovervilles were normally unsuccessful, a nd govern-

ments proved unable to deal with the health issues that shantytowns without sani-

tation created. Cities generally took on New Deal programs o nly reluctantly and

balked at most, particularly efforts to establish city housing authorities and public

housing. Opponents argued that public ho using would depress al ready-low prop-

erty values and smacked of communism. Corrupt government ofﬁcials often took

what assi stance w as availab le before it could reach the needy sick, hungry, and

homeless.

When Seattle’s homele ss established their Hooverville, the health department

had it burned down. The men rebuilt, and again the city destroyed the shantytown.

The third time the Hooverville was dug into the ground, and the city agreed to

allow i t to remain if the residents established adequate sanitation. Other cities

sometimes evicted residents for trespass, but most ignored the Hoovervilles if they

were quiet.

In some of the larger Hoovervilles, the residents organized, chose a mayor, and

established committees to deal with sanitation and other community matters.

Commonly, the more fortunate came to the Hoovervilles to gawk. Usually they

found a resident to serve as guide and point out the various sights. Donations went

into a community chest shared by all Hooverville residents. Other resi dents

resorted to begging. A University of Washington sociology student bought a shack

in the King County Hooverville in 1934 for $15 and wrote a master’s thesis, “Hoo-

verville, a Study of a Community of Homeless Men in Seattle,” based on inter-

views with 650 residents.

There were also Hoover blankets, newspapers serving as blankets; the Hoover

ﬂag, or empty pocket turned inside out; and Hoover leather, cardboard that li ned

shoes and covered holes in soles. A car pulled by horses because the owner could

not afford gasoline was a Hoover wagon; in Canada, a Bennett buggy. With the

beginning of World War II and the end of the Great Depression, shanty eradication

programs destroyed Hoovervilles, which slowly faded from memory.

—John H. Barnhill

Further Reading

“The Great Depression, the 1930s: Hoovervilles.” U-S-History.com. http://www.u-s-history

.com/pages/h1642.html (accessed July 19, 2010).

Lange, Greg. “Hooverville: Shantytown of Seattle’s Great Depression,” HistoryLink,

January 18, 1999. http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&ﬁle

_id=741 (accessed July 19, 2010).

Lometa. “Hooverville,” Everything2.com, April 19, 2000. http://everything2.com/e2node/

Hooverville (accessed July 19, 2010).

Bonus Army (1932) 839

MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964)

Douglas MacArthur, son of General Arthur MacArthur, was born in 1880 in Little

Rock, Arkansas. He had a distinguished military career characterized by rapid

promotion due to competence and connections. He was bold to the point of insub-

ordination. He was ﬁrst in the 1903 class at West Point and received a commission

in the Corps of Engineers. His ﬁrst duty station was in the Philippines, where in

1904, he received the rank of ﬁrst lieutenant. He served with his father and

observed at Tokyo during the Russo-Japanese War until he became aide-de-camp

to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906. He observed at Vera Cruz, made major

at the suggestion of General Leonard Wood, and was a division commander in

World War I, receiving 13 decorations and seven citations for bravery. In 1918,

he became brigadier and subsequently became the youngest division commander

in France, youngest commandant of West Point, and, in 1922 in the Philippines,

the youngest full general. He served as president of the A merican Olympic com-

mittee before becoming the youngest army chief of staff in 1930.

MacArthur was noted through his career as a modernizer, a brave soldier, and a

right-wing zealot. His behavior in 1932 in leading cavalry, infantry, and tanks

against the Bonus Army encampments in Washington, D.C., was characteristic.

In justifying his actions by claiming that he was forestalling a communist revolu-

tion, MacArthur was true to his strong belief that the Bonus March was actually

a c ommunist plot to overthrow the government, not just an effort to get money

from th e government. Not even ge neral staff intelligenc e information that only

three of the BEF leaders had communist ties was able to shake his conviction.

He also disregarded reports that the rank and ﬁle were overwhelmingly anticom-

munist and really were just needy veterans trying to get their bonus early.

When President Herbert Hoover ordered federal troops to cordon off the veterans

who resisted Police Chief Pelham Glassford’s order to evacuate condemned build-

ings on Pennsylvania Avenue, MacArthur sent in Major George Patton and tanks,

infantry, and cavalry with weapons drawn. Gas, bayonets, clubs, and sabers inﬂicted

hundreds of injuries. With the veterans in retreat, Hoover ordered MacArthur to halt.

MacArthur disregarded the order and sent his troops across the Anacostia River,

burning the camp.

American public opinion was overwhelmingly favorable, but press treatment was

not. When the dust settled, Hoover was a former president, Franklin Roosevelt, who

regarded MacArthur as a major menace to U.S. democracy, was in the White House,

and MacArthur was in the Philippines, safely out of the way.

With MacArthur’s reputation in tatters, newspaper writers took on the general.

Political gossip c olumnist Drew Pearson criticized MacArthur and reported that

840 Bonus Army (1932)

MacArthur had become major general due to the efforts of his father-in-law,

Edward T. Stotesbury, MacArthur sued for $1.75 million. When Pearson’s source,

MacArthur’s former wife, refused to testify in court, Pearson convinced MacArthur’s

Philippine mistress to give him love letters from MacArthur. The general dropped

his suit.

In 1935 MacArthur returned to the Philippines to organize the defense of the

island chain. Retired from the army in 1937, he became military advisor to the

Philippines. Recalled to active duty as a major general in 1941, he attempted

unsuccessfully to defend the Philippines and became a hero again in the Paciﬁc

theater. After World War II, he rebuilt Japan on the American model. He com-

manded in Korea (before being relieved by President Truman for insubordination

in rejecting civilian oversight of military. MacArthur was an icon of the right wing

in American politics even after his death in 1964.

—John H. Barnhill

Further Reading

History Learning Site. “Douglas MacArthur.” http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/

douglas_macarthur.htm (accessed September 2008).

Lisio, Donald J. The President and Protest. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 1994.

Manchester, William. American Caesar. New York: Dell, 1983.

“MacArthur.” Sparta cus.s chooln et. http:/ /www.spartacu s.schoolnet.co.uk/USAmacarthur

.htm (accessed September 2008).

Public Broadcasting Service. The American Experience; People & Events. “The Bonus

March (May–July 1932).” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/

pandeAMEX89.html (accessed September 2008).

Veterans’ Rights

Veterans through history have enjoyed political clout and the ability to menace the

incumbent government. Caes ar appeased his veterans. When in 1783, 400 Penn-

sylvania veterans marched on the state house and demanded Congress provide

their back pay, Congress bailed out, the army removed the veterans, and the United

States established a capital protected from its citizens, Washington, D.C.

After World War I about four million veterans returned to ﬁnd that replacement

workers were not willing to step aside and give them their jobs back. To compen-

sate for their wartime pay of a dollar a day, Congress authorized them to receive

bonuses for their wartime and overseas duty. But Wilson and Coolidge

Bonus Army (1932) 841

consistently vetoed bonus bills. In 1924, Congress ﬁnally overrode the veto and

authorized a bonus of approximately $1000 per veteran—payable in 1945. In

effect, veterans had an insurance policy that matured in two decades, what many

of them referred to as their “tombstone bonus” because they expected to be dead

by 1945.

When the Depression struck, veterans were homeless and jobless in large num-

bers, and agitation grew for immediate payment. To Washington, D.C., marched

45,000 World War I veterans in 1932. They established their integrated shanty-

towns and vowed to stay until 1945 if necessary. The Bonus Army attempted to

press Congress to act, and in 1932 the House passed a bill by Wright Patman

authorizing $2.4 billion for veterans cashing in their 1945 certiﬁcates. The Senate

defeated the bill, and the BEF, despite fears it would attack Congress, merely sang

“America,” and left.

Fearing a revolution, Hoover s ent in the troops and evicted the ﬁrst Bonus

Army. The BEF disbanded, but a second formed in 1933 and a third in 1934.

President Roosevelt, as had th e previous four presidents, refused to support the

bonus. Roosevelt had a consistent history of opposing extra privileges for veter-

ans. Instead he sent the veterans to “veterans’ rehabilitation camps” where they

made a dollar a day. When the most severe hurricane on record hit the Florida

Keys on Labor Day 1935, killing over 250 veterans, a shocked Congress overrode

Roosevelt’s veto in 1936 and passed a Patman bill that authorized immediate pay-

ment of the war bonus. In 1936 the post ofﬁce delivered $1.9 billion to 3.5 million

veterans.

In a ﬁreside chat of 1943 on the 11th anniversary of the battle of Anacostia

Flats, Roosevelt promised that never again would the United States mistreat its

veterans. With the liberation of Europe on the horizon in 1944, veterans’ organiza-

tions and Congress began exploring ways of preventing a repeat of the BEF abuse.

The result was the GI Bill of Rights. Some politicians protested a law that would

give black veterans money, and elitist educators worried that veterans with educa-

tional rights would dilute the quality of their universities. Even so, Roosevelt over-

came his bias against veteran privilege and signed the bill into law.

In 1945, less than 5 percent of Americans had college degrees, and less than

40 percent of soldiers were high school graduates. By 1956 the GI Bill had added

450,000 engineers, 238,000 teachers, 91,000 scientists, 67,000 doctors, 22,000

dentists, and over a million other college educated members of the workforce.

Veterans Administration loans built 11 million of the 13 million houses built in

the 1950s. The strong middle class that arose after World Wa r II was the legacy

of the thousands of homeless, jobless World War I veterans who protested and

encamped and demanded veterans’ beneﬁts.

—John H. Barnhill

842 Bonus Army (1932)

Further Reading

Branch, Taylor. “Justice for Warriors.” New York Review of Books 54, no. 6 (April 12,

2007). http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20058 (accessed July 19, 2010).

Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen. The Bonus Army. New York: Walke r & Company,

2004.

. “Vets Owe Debt to WWI’s ‘Bonus Army.’ ” Veterans Day 2004. http://www.military

.com/NewContent/0,13190,111104_BonusArmy,00.html (accessed July 19, 2010).

“March of the Bonus Army.” DAV Mag az ine, May–June 2006. http://ﬁndarticles.com/p/

articles/mi_m0LFT/is_3_48/ai_n16419268 (accessed July 19, 2010).

Waters, Walter W. (1898–1959)

The leader of the Bonus Expeditionary Force, Waters was a 34-year-old former

army sergeant with a histor y of mental illness, possibly war-related, and chronic

unemployment. Walters was “uninspiring” according to the Nation’s Mauritz A.

Hallgren, but to others, he was charismatic and able to i nspire the veterans who

backed him as their leader.

On March 5, 1932, in the depths of the Depression, Waters stood up at a veter-

ans’ meeting in Por tland, Oregon, and suggested that everybody should hop a

freight and head for Washington to lobby for the bonus. Nobody took him up.

On May 11, with a new Patman bill buried in committee, Walters revived his sug-

gestion for a march on Washington, and 250 men signed on.

The BEF was born. The next day, 300 men with combined assets of $30

boarded freight cars still redolent of cow manure. The Oregon group arrived in

Washington, D.C., on May 29. There, they joined earlier arrivals in Anacostia

and 26 smaller sites.

Waters anticipated the BEF would grow to 20,000 members. Waters organized

his hobo band into an army and established checkpoints to block entry into the

camp by anyone without a legitimate bonus certiﬁcate and an honorable discharge.

The police checked the names daily, and the Secret Service was on watch. Waters

arranged sanitation, food, and relations with local ofﬁcials, especially police chief

Pelham Glassford. He established rules: “No panhandling, no liquor, no radical

talk.” Glassford anointed Waters on condition that the leader eliminate the Illinois

communists under John T. Pace.

The BEF consisted of farm workers, factory workers, and other semiskilled

workers as well as mechanics, professionals, and white-collar workers. The lead-

ers were generally middle-class patriots. Many belonged to the American Legion.

Waters’s military police used such force that Glassford ordered Waters to back off,

Bonus Army (1932) 843

provoking Waters to say “To hell with Glassford!” and block distribution of food

to the communists (a move overruled by Glassford). The commu nists refused to

leave. Again, when Waters attemp ted to prevent Pace f rom holdin g a meeting at

a bal l park by the Anacost ia camp, claiming that the loyal veter ans would tear

Pace to pieces, Glassford overruled him.

When th e House passed the Patman bill, the BEF was upbeat. On June 17, the

Senate voted it down, and Waters quelled a potential riot by having the veterans sing

“America.” The mood broken, they dispersed to their camps. After that, many BEF

members headed home, but Walters vowed to stay and ﬁght to 1945 if necessary.

When Glassford wanted the marchers to relocate, Waters responded that all

veterans with homes were headed to them. The remainder had only the shanties

for homes. He was working on an effort to relocate them to Florida. In the mean-

time he was trying to get them productive work and temporary s helter at Camp

Bartlett on the outskirts of the District. He asked only for time to ﬁnd new shelter

for 250 women and children.

Shortly before the Battle of Anacostia Flats, Waters organized the Khaki Shirts,

to some a fascist organization. He later worked in a government job before form-

ing the National Soldiers’ Bonus League of America. In World War II, he served

in the navy. He died in 1959 in Walla Walla, Washington.

—John H. Barnhill

Further Reading

DePastino, Todd. Citizen Hobo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen . The Bonus Army.NewYork:Walker&Company,

2004.

Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen. “Marching on History.” Smithsonian, February 2003.

http://www.thebonusarmy.com/smithsonian.pdf (accessed September 2008).

Marchand, Roland. “The Bonus Army in Washington: A Documentary Problem.” AHistory.

Teacher’s Bag of Tricks. http://marchand.ucdavis.e du/lessons/bonusarmy/bonus_army

.html (accessed September 2008).

Maintaining Order in the District of Columbia: Excerpts

of President Herbert Hoover’s Letter to the District

Commissioner and from His Press Conference (1932)

In response to pressure from World War I veterans groups, Congress enacted a measure in

1924 that gave veterans a certificate enti tling them to a bonus payment of $500 in 1945.

The hardships of the Great Depression led many veterans to call for immediate payment of

the bonus. In 1932, some 20,000 veterans formed the “Bonus Expeditionary Force,” which

mar ched on Washin gton demanding that Congress immediatel y honor the certificates. When

Congress refused to aut horize the bonus payment, but did supply travel f unds for the bonus

844 Bonus Army (1932)

marchers, many returned home. However, a large number still remained in makeshift camps

near the Capitol, where they clashed with District police. Fearing a communist-led insurrection,

President Hoover ordered federal troops to remove the remaining bonus marchers. In late July,

Army chief of staff General Douglas MacArthur ordered an attack on the marchers, which was

led by Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton. The attack dispersed the marchers

but left two veterans and two police officers dead. Reproduced here are excerpts from President

Hoover’s letter to District Commissioner Reichelderfer and from the president’s press conference

outlining his firm intention of maintaining law and order in Washington, even against the bonus

veterans. Note the president’s contention that most of the disorder is not the work of the veter-

ans, but of non-veteran agitators.

White House, Washington

July 29, 1932

Honorable Luther H. Reichelderfer

Commissioner, District of Columbia

My Dear Mr. Commissioner:

In response to your information that the police of the District were overwhelmed by

an organized attack by several thousand men and were unable to maintain law and order,

I complied with your request for aid from the Army to the police. It is a matter of satis-

faction that, after the arrival of this assistance, the mobs which were defying the munici-

pal government were dissolved without the ﬁring of a shot or the loss of life.

I wish to call attention of the District Commissioners to the fact that martial law has

not been declared; that responsibility for order still rests upon your commission and the

police. The civil government of Washington must function uninterrupted. The Commis-

sioners, through their own powers, should now deal with this question decisively.

It is the duty of the authorities of the District to at once ﬁnd the instigators of this

attack on the police and bring them to justice. It is obvious that, after the departure of

the majority of the veterans, subversive inﬂuences obtained control of the men remain-

ing in the District, a large part of whom were not veterans, ...and inaugurated and

organized this attack.

They were undoubtedly led to believe that the civil au thorities could be intimidated

with impunity because of attem pts to conciliate by lax enforcement of city ordinances

and laws in many directions. I shall expect the police to strictly enforce every ordinance

of the District in every part of the city. I wish every violator of the law to be instantly

arrested and prosecuted under due process of law.

I have requested the law enforcement agencies of the Feder al Government to co-

operate with the District authorities to this end.

There is no group, no matter what its origins, that can be allowed either to violate the

laws of this city or to intimidate the Government.

Yours faithfully,

Herbert Hoover

Bonus Army (1932) 845

President Hoover’s Press Conference (July 20, 1932)

The President said:

A Challenge to the authority of the United States Government has been met, swiftly

and ﬁrmly.

After months of patient indulgence, the Government met overt lawlessness as it

always must be met if the cherished processes of self-government are to be preserved.

We cannot tolerate the abuse of Constitution al rights by th ose who would destroy all

government, no matter who they may be. Government cannot be coerced by mob rule.

The Department of Justice is pressing its investigation into the violence which forced

the call for Army detachments, and it is my sincere hope that those agitators who

inspired yesterday’s attack upon the Fe deral authority may be brought speedily to trial

inthecivilcourts.Therecanbenosafeharbor in the United States of America for

violence. ...

The ﬁrst obligation of my ofﬁce is to uphold and defend the Constituti on ...and the

law. This I propose always to do.

Source: W. Myles, ed., The Sta te Papers an d Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover, vol. 2

(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1934), 244–245.

846 Bonus Army (1932)

Toledo Auto-Lite Strike (1934)

The Toledo Auto-Lite Strike was conducted by a federal labor union afﬁliated with

the American Federation of Labor against the Electric Auto-Lite Company of

Toledo, Ohio, from April 12 to June 3, 1934. The strike is considered one of the

three most important labor actions of 1934 that helped ignite the resurgent union

movement during the New Deal. The others included the West Coast Waterfront

Strike at San Francisco and the Minneapolis General Strike. The Auto-Lite strike

also included the violent clash named the “Battle of Toledo” that pitted striking

workers and their supporters against local police and Ohio National Guardsmen.

Henry Ford represented the auto industry’s adherence to the open shop policy

through his famous “Five-Dollar-Day” proﬁt-sharing and labor program that relied

on deskilled work and technology. Additionally, the only strong national labor

grouping, the American Federation of Labor, had its basis in craft unionism, with

little sympathy for unskilled industrial workers. The enormous growth of the auto

industry during the 1920s, the prestige o f Ford and other manuf acturers, and the

continued use of federal court–backed labor injunctions against striking workers

all contributed to the limited scope of organizing. The abortive 1926 campaig n

of the communist-backed Auto Workers Union drew the wrath not only of compa-

nies and courts, but also the AFL’s rejection of militancy.

The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 and the pro-union

provisions of Section 7a offered a new opportunity to the AFL and other labor

organizers. The AFL had traditionally used federal labor unions (FLUs) to organ-

ize workers not afﬁliated with one of the craft-based internationals of the federa-

tion. Once the w orkers were organized, the FLU would then be disbanded, as

members were reafﬁliated with one of the craft unions. Despite the conﬂict over

craft and industrial unionism, the AFL’s leadership recognized that it had t o act

or surrender ground to more militant, communist-backed labor organizers. Begin-

ning in September 1933, the AFL established a number of FLUs, most notably at

General Motors Buick division in Flint, Michigan, two in the Fisher Body division

in Detroit, and one at Hudson Motor Car Compa ny in Detroit. Unlike the FLUs’

setup at the major companies, local organizers created others at the smaller

companies and parts s uppliers such as Electric Auto-Lite and its subsidiaries in

Toledo, Ohio.

847