Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)

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possible in order to gain additional insights into the problems which had caused the riots and

those which had grown from them. Although these meetings proved highly productive, they

did not lead me to any simple conclusions with respect to the problems which Detroit must

meet and overcome; they convinced me anew of the tangled economic, sociological, and

psychological origins of the riots and of the enormity of the related tasks to be performed.

At 0935 on Wednesday, 2 August, General Throckmorton and I held a ﬁnal press

conference in the Police Headquarters press roo m. At that time we announced th at

“law and order have been restored to Detroit ...responsibility for maintaining law and

order in Detroit will be returned at noon to state authorities.”

At 2110 I departed from Detroit, arriving in Washington with my mission completed at

2310. A more detailed chronology of the events relating to this narrative is at Appendix G.

First is the account given to us at the initial conference at about 1625 by General Sim-

mons, the Commander of the 46th National Guard Infantry Division. His report stated that

approximately half of the Guard units were not deployed at that time. Governor Romney

stated that these deployments were being held up pending arrival of the Federal troops.

Second is the report given to Colonel Elder by Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the

46th National Guard Infantry Division, at about 1915. According to this account, the divi-

sion had about 7000 troops then in the Detroit area with another 700 (2 tank battalions

and a Signal unit) enroute from Camp Grayling. Of the 7000 in Detroit, 2240 were in the

Central High School area and 1810 were in the Southeast High School area; 85% of both

groups were reported deployed. Of the approximately 2950 remaining, 300 were begin-

ning to be sent out to a ccompany t he ﬁr e department to p rovide security and the

remainder were overhead, in reserve, resting or feeding.

Other accounts are based on a reconstruction of events after t he fact. One was

developed between the staffs of Task Force Detroit and the 46th Division on 31 July

and 1 August through a detailed survey of journals, morning reports and other available

documents. According to this account, there where 2725 troops deployed under the

2d Bde, 4 6th Div (headquarters at Central High School), 1319 deployed under the 3d

Bde, 46th Div (headqu arters at Cent ral Hig h School), 905 allocated or functi oning , as

guards to accompany ﬁre trucks, 392 involved in command and support tasks, 1900 in

reserve or being prepared for commitment, 713 in rear detachments at Camp Grayling,

and 243 enroute (at Flint). (See Appendix D).

It is clear from the above accounts that at 1630 on 24 July there were between 2,000

and 3,000 additional Army Nation Guard troops available for deployment into Detroit’s

streets. In addition, none of the Air National Guard units were being used to control the

riots. The total strength of the Michigan Air National Guard was 2137 of which 660 were

deployed after the National Guard was federalized.

Source: Final Report of Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Concerning

the Detroit Riots, July 23 through August 2, 1967, 1–2 7, http ://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/

johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Vance-C/DetroitReport.asp (accessed July 22,

2010).

1008 Detroit Riots (1967)

Chicago Riots (1968)

The 1968 Democratic Party National Convention convened from August 26

to August 29 at the International Amphitheatre in Chicago, Illinois. The

proceedin gs were marred by violence on the streets of Chicago as approximately

10,000 protesters clashed with police in what would later be termed by the Walker

Commission as a “police riot.” The Chicago confrontation between the forces of

law a nd order and demonstrators challenging the legitimacy of the American

political process and military presence in Vietnam was the culmination of a violent

year, which exposed the polarization of American society and culture.

The year began with the Tet Offensive on January 30 as North Vietnamese and

Vietcong troops launched an assault upon the cites of South Vietnam garrisoned by

the Untied States and the South Vietnamese Army. After initially being caught off

guard, counterattacks by the American forces and their South Vietnamese allies

regained control of these urban areas, inﬂicting heavy casualties upon the enemy.

While the Tet Offensive resulted in a battle ﬁeld victory for the United States, the

ﬁerce ﬁghting in Southeast Asia during the early months of 1968 fueled antiwar senti-

ment on the American home front. Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy, running on

an antiwar platform, challenged President L y ndon Johnson for the Democratic presi-

dential nomination. After McCarthy’s strong showing in the Ne w Hampshire primary,

New York senator Robert F. Kennedy also entered the race as a candidate opposed to

American policy in Vietnam. Johnson responded to the gro win g opposition within his

own party by announcing on March 31 that he would not seek reelection. McCarthy

and Kennedy began a grueling primary campaign across the country, while the party

establishment rallied behind Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

Martin Luther King Jr. was le ading a strike of sanitation work ers in Memphis,

Tennessee, when he was assassinated on April 4. King’s murder ushered in urban

unrest throughout the nation, and National Guard units were dispatched to restore

order in many of the nation’s largest cities; including Chicago, where King had

clashed with Mayor Richard J. Daley over open housing in 1966. Only eight weeks

after King’s death, Robert Kennedy was also assassinated after winning the

California primary over Senator McCarthy. Against this background of violence,

the leading Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, and Alabama governor George

Wallace of the American Independent Party emphasized the issues of law and

order against the forces of discontent unleashed in the land.

1009

Those who sought to expose the hypocrisy of American democracy as fostering

racism,poverty,andanimperialistwarinVietnammadeplansformassive

demonstrations at the nominating convention of the nation’s ruling political party.

These anties tablishment groups included cultural rebels as well as the growing

antiwar movement. The cultural rebels were best represented by the Youth

International Party (Yippies) founded by radical activists Abbie Hoffman and

Jerry Rubin, who began making plans for Chicago at Hoffman’s New York City

apartment on New Year’s Eve in 1967. The Yip pies emphasized an uninhibited

lifestyle and employed street theater to draw the ire of mainstream America.

Accordingly, Rubin and Hoffman announced that the Yippies would sponsor a

Festival of Life featuring youth, music, and theater. In the initial call for the festi-

val, the Yippies proclaimed, “Come all you rebels, youth spirits, rock minstrels,

truth-seekers, peacock-freaks, poets, barricade-jumpers, dancers, lovers, and

artists!” The Yippies proclaimed that they would celebrate life in contrast with

the Democratic Party Convention of death. Rubin asserted that the Yippies would

mock the Democrats by nominat ing a pig, Pigasus the Immortal, fo r president.

Chicago authorities also took seriously Yippie claims that they would lace the city

water supply with hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD and challenge conventional

morality with public fornication. Hoffman would later insist that the Yippie asser-

tions about spiking the water supply and storming the convention were simply part

of street theater and having some fun at the expense of the uptight political

establishment.

More politically oriented radicals were drawn to the demonstration plans of the

National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam (Mobe). Formed in 1966, the

Mobe organized protest rallies a gainst the war and racism which drew over

100,000 demonstrators to New York Ci ty and San Francisco in April 1967. On

October 21, 1967, the Mobe sponsored a march on the Pen tagon in which

150,000 protesters confronted the “War Makers.” Seeking to maximize the number

of demonstrators, the Mobe favored a loose coalition of antiwar groups, including

the Black Panthers and Stud ents for a Democratic So ciety (SDS), who fou nd the

Mobe’s focus upon opposing the war to be narrow.

In March 1968, Mobe organizers met in Chicago to discuss protest strategies

for the Democratic Convention. Among the approaches considered were mass

disruption of t he convention, unifying behind a peace candidate such as Eugene

McCarthy, and large-scale demonstrations and teach-ins against the war.

Mobe leaders Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden favored the latter strategy as

did Mobe’s national coordinator David Dellinger, a paciﬁst who stressed nonvio-

lence. Mobe’s original plans called for two long marches with a ﬁnal rally sched-

uled for Soldier Field. Workshops and movement centers would be established in

10 city parks, many of them in predominantly black areas.

1010 Chicago Riots (1968)

The administration of Chicago mayor Richard Daley angrily asserted that the

streets of Chicago would not be surrendered to outside agitators. Daley, who had

served as mayor of the city since 1955, took great pride in urban renewal and

transportation projects, which prevented Chicago from suffered the urban blight

that characterized many oth er Midwestern industrial cities during the 1960s. The

mayor perceived the Democratic National Convention as an opportunity to show-

case the city for a national audience. Daley did not want this civic occasion marred

by protest activities, and he also feared that demonstrators might ignite unrest

among Chicago’s black population. African Americans were a key constituency

of the Daley patronage machine, but relations between the black community and

Dal ey administration deteriorated following the city’s failure to enforce a n open

housing agreement negotiated in 1966 with Martin Luther King Jr. Then, during

the violence following King’s assassination, Daley antagonized many in the black

community with his order that Chicago police “shoot to kill” arsonists.

Accordingly, the Daley administration stalled and resented efforts by the Yip-

pies and Mobe to obtain permits for city marches during the convention. The city

also refused t o set aside local ordinances that closed city parks at 11:00 p.m.

Mayor Daley rema rked on August 22, “We don’t permit our own peo ple to sleep

in the park, so why should we let anyone from outside the city sleep in the park.

We don’t permit our own people to march at night, so why should we let a lot of

people do snake dances at night thru the neighborhoods.” This statement, however,

ignored the fact that the city extended the privilege of camping in the parks to the

Boy Scouts and National Guard. But the Daley administration was not going to

extend this privilege to protesters intent upon disrupting public order.

The delaying tactics of the Daley regime, however, were successful in limiting

the number of demonstrators heading to Chicago. Instead of the 100,000 protesters

expected by Mobe and the Yippies, only about 10,000 demonstrators were present

to question the legitimacy of the American political system in the streets of

Chicago. In response to the hundreds of thousands who were anticipated, the city

of Chicago requested 6,000 National Guardsmen, whi le city police were placed

on 12-hour shifts, contributing to exhaustion and stress for a force soon to be

tested by angry demonstrators.

On Friday, August 23, Jerry Rubin and a group of Yippies gained media atten-

tion when they arrived at the Civic Center Plaza with Pigasus the Pig and

attempted to formally nominate him as the presidential candidate of the Yippie

Party. Authorities quickly arrested Rubin and conﬁscated Pigasus, but the Yippies

had their media event. L ater that day, a federal district judge denied Mobe’s

request for an injunction that would have prevented the city from enforcing the

11:00 p.m. park curfew. Abbie Hoffman urged demonstrators to defy the court

order, and on the evening of August 24, police and protesters clashed. More

Chicago Riots (1968) 1011

serious violence, however, was avoided when poet Allen Ginsberg led a chanting

crowd out of Lincoln Park.

August 25 was the Yippie Festival of Life. The only rock band to appear was the

Detroit-based MC5, but the logistics for staging a rock concert provoked confron-

tation with police when Hoffman att empted to move a ﬂatbed truck into Lincoln

Park to serve as a stage. After several skirmishes, Hoffman declared that the police

had prevented t he musical festival. M eanwhil e, a projected ma rch scheduled by

Mobe for the Conrad Hilton Hotel, where many of the Democratic delegates were

staying, was only able to garner approximately 300 participants. The police, how-

ever, still halted the march at Grant Park near the hotel. The da y concluded w ith

violent confrontations as the police employed tear gas and batons to clear the

parks after curfew, with the ﬁghting carrying over into nearby neighborhoods

and streets. Forced out of Lincoln Park, protesters congregated at the intersection

of Clark and LaSalle streets, where they taunted police. Ordere d to clear Clark

Street and keep trafﬁc ﬂowing, the police used batons to beat the de monstrators,

who responded with acts of vandalism.

The following evening of August 26, the violence escalated as the police

attacked approximately 3,000 demonstrators, who at the urging of Hoffman

refused to vacate Lincoln Park. Despite Hoffman’s exhortations, t he police suc-

cessfully forced the crowd out of the park and into the streets, where skirmishes

continued for much of the ni ght. Mobe leader Tom Hayden, who coauthored the

SDS manifesto Th e Port Huron Statement, was arr ested for allegedly letting the

air out of the tires on a police vehicle.

Protesters were back in Lincoln Park at sunrise on August 27 for chants, pray-

ers, and meditation led by Allen Ginsberg. Later that day, Black Panther leader

Bobby Seale addressed the crowd and urged resistance to the Chicago police.

Meanwhile, Mobe leaders clashed with Hoffman, who argued for the abandon-

ment of nonviolence in light of the tactics used by the Chicago police. Peace, how-

ever, remained the theme at the Chicago Coliseum , where approximately 4,000

people listed to David Dellinger, folksinger Phil Ochs, novelist William Bur-

roughs, and other representatives of the antiwar movement. Meanwhile, the

nightly ritual of the police closing Lincoln Park continued unabated.

The crescendo of convention violence was reached on Wedn esday, August 28,

as the Democrats nominated Hubert Humphrey for president and Senator Edmund

Muskie of Maine for vice president. Hoffman was arrested that morning for public

indecency as he had written the word “fuck” on his forehead. According to the

Yippie leader, he w as attempting to discourage the media from photographing

him. In the afternoon, Dellinger, Davis, Seale, and Hayden addressed a la rge

crowd at Grant Park, near the convention headquarters hotel, the Conrad Hilton.

Hayd en impl ored the crowd to take their protest to the streets. At approximately

1012 Chicago Riots (1968)

3:00 p.m., a shirtless young man climbed the ﬂagpole and attempted to lower the

American ﬂag at Grant Park. The police responded by retrieving the ﬂag and

atta cking the y oung man. The crowd, in turn, began to pelt the police wit h rocks

and chunks of concrete. As tear gas engulfed the park and ﬁghting spread to

nearby streets, a full-scale riot was underway. As protesters chanted, “The whole

world is watching, the whole world is watching,” police assaulted them in front

of the Hilton Hotel as television cameras recorded the action. Angry and frustrated

police began to indiscriminately beat both protesters and bystanders who seemed

to sympathize with the demonstrators. The police also t urned their wrath upon

the media, whose presence the police believed was encouraging the antics of the

protesters. Reporters and cameramen were beaten as the streets of Chicago

descended into chaos. Rennie Davis was clubbed unconscious by the police and

sent to a hospital for treatment. When police entered the hospital to arr est Davis,

his friends allegedly placed a white sheet over him, moving him from room to

room in an effort to elude the authorities.

Meanwhile, tempers were ﬂaring on the ﬂoor of the convention, with Daley

security forces “roughing up” CBS News reporter Dan Rather. In a nominating

speech for antiwar candidate and South Dakota senator George McGovern, Co n-

necticut senator Abraham Ribicoff asserted, “With George McGovern we

wouldn’t have Gestapo tactics on the streets of Chicago.” Television cameras cap-

tured a furious D aley responding to Ribicoff with what appeared to be an ethnic

slur and vulgar language, which the mayor later denied using. But neither ﬁghting

on the convention ﬂoor nor the streets of Chicago failed to halt the Humphrey

nomination.

Of course, the protesters had no illusions that their actions would alter the nom-

inating process; rather, they sought to expose the failures of the political establish-

ment, which resorted to police violence while nominating Humphrey, who secured

the support of Democratic Party ofﬁcials while failing to enter any state primaries.

Radicals hoped that anti war supporters of the McCarthy candidacy would real ize

the futility of working within the system. Following the violence of Wednesday

night, McCarthy met with demonstrators on Thursday and denounced the Daley

machine while vowing to sit out the 1968 election. According to the mayor’s

ofﬁce, over 150 ofﬁcers were injured in the Wednesday evening clashes with pro-

testers. The number of demonstrators and bystanders injured is difﬁcult to esti-

mate; however, duri ng convention wee k at least 100 civilians were treated in

area hospitals due to wounds inﬂicted by the police. Despite the considerable vio-

lence in the parks and streets of Chicago, no one was killed in the melee. On the

eve of the convention, however, a 17-year old boy, Dean Johnson was shot and

killed on August 22 by police when he allegedly attempted to draw a weapon after

he was stopped for a curfew violation. Johnson was apparently in the city to

Chicago Riots (1968) 1013

partake in the protests, but in the buildup to the convention, his death was largely

unreported by the national media.

While the Yippies and Mobe believed that the violence on the streets of Chicago

offered ample proof regarding the fascist nature of the American political system,

many other observers perceived the Chicago riot differently. Republican nominee

Richard Nixon made consi derable use of the Chicago convention in his political

campaign, arguing that Americans’ rights to “domestic tranquility” were threat-

ened by protesters defying the legally constituted authority of the Chicago police.

Appe aling to the so-called “silent majority” of middle-class Americans appalled

by the counterculture and political radicals, Nixon ran on a platform of law and

order, which some critics insisted were simply code words of an anti-black back-

lash in the country. Nixon, nevertheless, was able to steal some of George Walla-

ce’s thunder and narrowly edge Humphrey, whose candidacy remained haunted

by the violence in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention.

In response to the ﬁghting in the streets of Chicago, attorney Daniel Walker,

who later served as governor of Illinois, was appointed to su bmit a report on the

violence to the National Commission on the Ca uses and Prevention of Violence.

Entitled Rights in Conﬂict, the report was publicly released on December 1,

1969, and was based upon 20,000 pages of statements from over 3,000 eyewit-

nesses and participants as well as analysis of ﬁlm and photographic evidence.

The report concluded that the Chicago police were severely provoked by the words

and deeds of the demonstrators. Furthermore, the police were exhausted by

12-hour shifts and on edge due to reports of threats to disrupt the city and conven-

tion. Despite such provocation, the report argues that the police responded in an

unprofessional manner by launching a “police riot” in which demonstrators, pho-

tographers, reporters, and innocent bystanders were indiscriminately assaulted by

authorities. Acknowledging that the media sometimes refused to comply with

legitimate orders to disperse and also exacerbated the situation, t he commission

asserted that Chicago police failed to respect freedom of the press during conven-

tion week. By terming the actions of Wednesday night in front of the Hilton Hotel

a police riot, Rights in Conﬂict maintained, “[t]hat some policemen lost control of

themselves under exceedingly provocative circumstances can be understood, but

not condoned. If no action is taken against them, the effect can only be to discour-

age the majority of policemen who acted responsibly, and further weaken the bond

between police and community.”

The ﬁndings of the Walker Commission were rejected by the Daley

administration, which challenged the conclu sion that “the vast majority of the

demonstrators were intent on expressing by peaceful means their disse nt either

from the society generally or fr om the administration’s policies in Vietnam.”

Daley believed that his police department had successfully defended the city

1014 Chicago Riots (1968)

against revolutionary outside agitators intent upon taking over the streets and

parks of the city. Although the Justice Department under Attorney General

Ramsey Clark was reluctant to pursue indictments under the 1968 Civil Rights

Act, which made it a federal crime to cross state lines for the purpose of inciting a

riot, on March 20, 1969, a Chicago grand jury returned indictments against eight

demonstration leaders balanced by the indictment of eight police ofﬁcers. The

policemen were acquitted by a Chicago jury, and most national media attentio n

was focused upon the prosecution of the so-called Chicago Eight—a cased encour-

aged by the incoming Nixon administration and new attorney general John Mitchell.

The eight defendants included Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, David Delli nger,

Tom Hayden, Rennie Davis, John Froines, Lee Weiner, and Bobby Seale. The trial

began September 24, 1969, in the court room of Judge Juliu s Hoffm an. The

defense was headed by attorneys William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass, who

proposed that the cultural divide in America be addressed by a series of questions

to potential jurors as to whether they could ide ntify such rock musicians as Janis

Joplin and Jimi Hendrix. Judge Hoffman rejected the cultural questions, and a

middle-aged jury of 2 white males and 10 women, 8 white and 2 black, was seated.

The defense was divided over strategy and tactics. Hayden preferred a more tra-

ditional defense, which would also address political issues such as American par-

ticipation in the Vietnam War, although Judge Hoffman resisted efforts to raise

political questions during the proceedings. On the other hand, Abbie Hoffman

and Rubin preferred to take th e Yippie style of stre et theater into t he courtroom.

The Yippies mocked the proceedings by blowing kisses to the jurors, refusing to

stand when Judge Hoffman entered the courtroom, placing the National Liberation

Front ﬂag on the defense table, and donning such attire as American ﬂags and judi-

cial robes. These antics antagonized Judge Hoffman, who responded with numer-

ous contempt citations.

The judge was also antagonized by the outbursts of defendant Bobby Seale,

who insisted that the trial be delayed until his counsel Charles Garry recovered

from gall bladd er surgery. Judge H offman refused Seale’s motion or to let the

Black Panther leader serve as his own counsel, provoking angry retorts from the

defendant who called the judge a racist and fascist. When Seale refused to be silent

and continued to voice his objections, Hoffman ordered the black defendant

brought to the courtroom bound and gagged. The judge eventually severed Seale’s

case from that of the other defend ants, sentencing him to four years in prison for

contempt and reducing the Chicago Eight to the Chicago Seven.

Chicago district attorney Thomas Foran and his assistant Richard Schultz

headed the prosecution. The case for the prosecution was based primarily upon

the testimony of undercover agents who inﬁltrated various radical organizat ions.

Robert Pierson served as a “bodyguard” for Rubin, while Irwin Bock and William

Chicago Riots (1968) 1015

Frappolly maneuvered t hemselves into leadership positions with Vets for Peace

and SDS, respectively. According to the prosecution witnesses, the defendants

planned to disrupt trafﬁc, obstruct the convention, and pursue “hit-and-run guerilla

tactics” on the streets of Chicago, although much of the prosecution evidence did

not relate directly to the Chicago riots.

The defense asserted that the defendants were responding to the escalating vio-

lence of the Chicago police, while city authorities were guilty of taking Yippie the-

ater, such as lacing the city water supply with LSD, as realistic threats. Defense

witnesses included such prominent individuals as writers Allen Ginsberg and Nor-

man Mailer; drug guru and former Harvard professor Timothy Leary, and folksi-

ngers Phil Ochs, Judy Collins, Arlo Guthrie, and Pete Seeger. Perh aps Mailer

best expressed the difﬁculties of proving a conspiracy case by remarking, “Left-

wingers are incapable of conspiracy because they are all egomaniacs.” Defendant

Abbie Hoffman concluded, “Conspiracy? Hell, we couldn’t agree on lunch.”

The jury agreed, acquitting all the defendants on conspiracy charges. Froines

and Weiner were found not guilty on all counts, but the other ﬁve defendants were

found guilty of crossing state lines to incite a riot. Judge Hoffman sentenced each

of the convicted defendants to ﬁve years in prison and $5,000 ﬁnes. The judge also

inﬂicted severe contempt sentences upon the defendants and their attorneys for

159 acts of criminal contempt. The defendants maintained a degree of levity

throughout the sentencing process, with Abbie H offman recommending that the

judge try some LSD.

On November 21, 1972, the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the convictions

of the Chicago Seven on the grounds that the defense was not allowed to examine

the potential biases of jurors. Judge Hoffman was also censured for “a deprecatory

and often antagonistic attitude” toward the defense. The Appeals Court also noted

that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the knowledge and complicity of

Judge H offman and the prosecuti on, interfered wi th client-attorney privilege by

bugging the ofﬁces of defense attorneys. The contempt citations were also over-

turned as the Appeals Court ruled that contempt sentences longer than six months

required jury trials.

The defendants and many on the political left perceived the trial as a great vic-

tory for exposing the prejudices of Judge Hoffman and the prosecution. On the

other hand, the overturning of th e Chicago Seven convictions provided evidence

that the judicial system was capable of providing even radical elements with a fair

trial. The Yippie and Mobe leaders who called for political demonstrations in the

streets of Chicago during the Democratic National Convention believed that media

coverage of the event would demonstrate the fascist and militaristic tendencies of

the political establishment and radicalize many elements of the American popula-

tion. They had seemingly achieved this purpose by provoking what was ofﬁcially

1016 Chicago Riots (1968)

labeled “a pol ice riot” by the Walker Commission. But rather than being radical-

ized by the events in Chicago, many mainstream Americans rallied behind

Richard Nixon’s call for law and order. Hubert Humphrey’s candidacy never

recovered from the Chicago convention. Despite Nixon’s c riticis ms of Johnson’s

policies in Vietnam, the war continued. The political left was increasingly margin-

alized, with some elements, s uch as the Weather Underground, abandoning n on-

violence. Mayor Daley and the forces of order had seemingly won the symbolic

battle of Chicago. As for the Democratic Party, they would not return to Chicago

until 1996 and the re-nomination of President Bill Clinton.

—Ron Briley

See also all en tries under Stamp Act Protests (1765); Boston Massacre (1770); Regulator

Movement (1771); Pine Tree Riot (1772); Boston Tea Party (1773); Shays’ Rebellion (1787);

Whiskey Rebellion (1794); Brooks-Baxter War (1874); Green Corn Rebellion (1917); Battle

of Athens (1946); Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s); Sagebrush Rebellion (1979–1981);

World Trade Organization Protests (1999); Day without an Immigrant (2006).