Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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such as freeways that connected the city to the suburbs. Usually, the affected areas
were black neighborhoods.
Another contributing factor was the economic inequalit y between blacks and
white s in Detroit. African Americans were especially ha rd hit by changes occur-
ring in the automobile industry, the backbone of the city’s economy. Automation
and outsourcing led to a reduction in the number of jobs available in Detroit’s
automobile factories. Due to the fact t hat African Americans generally h ad less
seniority and held lower-level positions, they were most affected by these changes.
Young black males with no postsecondary education were most severely hurt, as
the entry-level jobs that existed in the 1940s and 1950s disappeared. The sub-
sequent difficulty in finding employment led to an atmosphere of anger and
despair amon g the African American community. This situation was made worse
by the obvious gap in income, employment, and edu cation between blacks and
whites in the city. Such inequalities led to a growth of black militancy in Detroit.
Detroit mayor Jerome Cavanaugh was a liberal Democrat who had appointed a
number of African Americ ans to important posts in city government. The mayor
also enjoyed a good relationship with the mainstream civil rights movement. How-
ever, a number of young black leaders in Detroit increasingly viewed the civil
rights movement as a failure. Due to a perceived lack of genuine change, these
young African Americans became more militant in their approach to race rela-
tions. For example, Reverend Albert Cleage called for self-determination and
separatism for African Americans because Detroit’s white population seemed to
be unwilling to share power.
Demographic changes in Detroit also contributed to the tense racial atmosphere
in which the ri ots occurred. During the 1950s, white flight be came a significa nt
issue for the city, as the city’s white population declined by 23 percent. At the same
time, Detroit’s nonwhite population increased by 13 percent, as the African Ameri-
can population grew from 303,000 to 487,000. This trend continued during the
1960s, and by the time of the riots i n 1967, the city’s black population stood at
40 percent. The 12th Street neighborhood, where the rioting began, was particularly
affected by the demographic changes. As more blacks began to move into the area
after World War II, many whites began to move out. At first, middle-class African
Americans relocated to the neighborhood. Later, poorer and indigent residents
moved into the area. As the white population left, many commercial establishments
also closed down, to be replaced by pool halls, liquor stores, bars, and pawn shops.
The neighborhood also became densely packed, with six to eight families living in
subdivided housing that formerly held two families. With a population density of
more than 21,300 people per square mile, the 12th Street neighborhood was twice
as crowded as the city average. When combined with the other factors, people
living in such close quarters created a situation ready for a social explosion.
988 Detroit Riots (1967)
The Riots
In the ea rly morning hou rs of Su nday, July 23, 1967, me mbers of the Detr oit
Police raided a “blind pig,” or an illegal, after-hours bar located on Twelfth Street
in a predominantly African American area of the city. The police expected to find
perhaps two dozen patrons in such an establish ment. However, inside , 82 people
celebrated the return of two Vietnam War veterans. The police proceeded to arrest
everyone in the bar and took them all outside to await transportation to police sta-
tions. Soon, a large crowd gathered as word spread through the neighborhood that
the police had used excessive force during the operation. When all of the police
had finally left the scene, some people in the crowd began to loot nearby stores.
The local news media consciously sought to avoid reporting on the escalating dis-
order to avoid copycat reactions. However, looting, arson, and sniper fire soon
spread across Detroit.
Reluctant to be se en as overreacting wi th too much force, the Detroit police
allowed the riot to escalate. Arsonists began t o set buildings on fire, first white-
owned stores, but they later burned black-owned businesses also. While fire-
fighters controlled some of the fires, sniper fire prevented them from effectively
combating the growing numbers of blazes. Along with the fires, looting, gunfights,
and knife fights on the streets of Detroit increased.
Mayor Cavanaugh imposed a curfew o n the city. He also requ ested the aid of
the National Guard to quell the growing disorder. Michigan governor George
Romney declared a state of emergency. At first, authorities relied on the Michigan
National Guard to aid the Detroit police. However, as the violence continued to
grow, on July 2 4, Romney requested help from federal troops. Pr esident Lyndon
Johnson authorized sending paratroopers to a base near Detroit should such aid
become necessa ry. Johnson also sent Deputy Secretar y of D efense Cyrus Vance
to survey the situation in Detroi t. When Vance toured the city, much of the vio-
lence and many of the fires had subsided, so he did not immediately recommen d
the use of federal troops.
In the meantime, some prominent people attempted to calm angry Detroiters.
U.S. representative John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat, stood on the hood of a
car and urged residents to stop the violence. Rioters ignored the pleas of the
congressman and threw rocks and bottles at his car. Likewise, Detroit Tigers
player Willie Horton, a black Detroit resident who grew up in the city, tried to
sooth a crowd after a game while still in his baseball uniform. Like Conyers, Hor-
ton failed to end the violence.
After Vance’s tour of Detroit, on the night of July 24, sniper fire in the city had
resumed, leading President Johnson to au thorize the use of federal troops j ust
before midnight. At about 1:30 a.m. on July 25, 8,000 federalized National Guard
troops arrived to combat the violence in Detroit. The guardsmen were later joined
Detroit Riots (1967) 989
by 4,700 U.S. Army paratroopers and 360 members of the Michigan State Police.
The newly arrived troops used tanks and machine guns to quell the violence in the
city. Many observers claimed that the arrival of the federal troops contributed to
even more violence in the short term, as the troops and snipers fired on each other.
Since most of the National Guard troops were white, their presence often fueled a
violent reaction among black Detroiters. In contrast, many of the Army troops
were African Americans. Furthermore, the federal troops had been ordered to only
load their weapons when given the dir ect order to do so by their officers. Indeed,
the U.S. Army soldiers present during the disturbance killed only one person.
The actions of the National Guard troops, however, were called into question in
a report that Cyrus Vance prepared after the riot.
Perha ps the most controversial incident of the Detroit riots occurred when the
police killed three African Americans at the Algiers Motel and Manor House in
the early hours of July 26. After receiving a telephone report of sniping, a group
of Detro it police officers and Na tional guardsmen arrived at the motel. For an
hour, the police brutally interrogated a group of unarmed black men and two white
women . When the police left the scene, three of the men had been shot to dea th,
and the other detainees had all bee n severely beaten. All of this occurred despite
the fact that the reports of sniping proved to be false and that there were no weap-
ons on the premises. The incident seemed to prove to African Americans that
police brutality was a serious problem in Detroit. In his well-known chronicle of
the event, The Algiers Motel Incident, author John Hersey concluded t hat the
police had murdered the black men “for being thought to be pimps, for being con-
sidered punks, for making out with white girls ...for being, all in all, black young
men and part of the black rage of the time.” However, none of the police officers
involved in the killings were convicted for their role in the incident.
By July 27, order had largely returned to the city. On that day, ammunition was
taken from the National Guard troops, and officials ordered them to sheath their
bayonets. The last fire of the riot occurred on July 28, the same day that the with-
drawal of troops began. The last troops left Detroit on July 29.
The Aftermath of the Riots
When the riots finally ended on July 27, 43 people had died in the violence. Of the
dead, 33 were African Americans. Police and soldiers had killed 27 of those who
died during the rioting. In addition to the dead, 1,189 people suffered injuries.
Law enforcement detained more than 7,200 people and charged more than 4,000
with crimes. Twenty-seven people were charged with sniping during the disorder,
although three of them went to court. Firefighters faced nearly 1,700 fires during
the riots. T he fires and looting amounted to some $50 million in damages in
Detroit.
990 Detroit Riots (1967)
In the aftermath of the riots, city officials along with prominent Detroiters
formed the New Detroit Committee, which sought to identify and solve those
problems that had resulted in the 1967 riots. Also, in March 1968, Focus: HOPE
was created in re sponse to the causes of the riots . The n ondenomination al, non-
profit organization hoped to create a more harmonious community in which
diverse peoples could live together. To this day, Focus: HOPE attempts to over-
come racism and poverty through education and training for minorities.
The riots hurt the strength of political liberals in Detroit who had administered
the federal antipoverty programs in the city throughout the 1960s. Also, in 1974,
Detroiters elected Coleman Young as the city’s firs t African American mayor.
African Americans have held the mayor’s office ever since.
Most business owners did not rebuild in the city after the riots. Instead, much of
Detroit’s affluent population left for the suburbs. In 1968, some 80,000 people mov ed
out of the city. Those who left included much of the white popu lation. In 1967, the city
still had a majority white population, but by the early 1970s, Afric an American s made
up the bulk of Detroit’s population. Four decades after the riots in 2007, Detroit’s
white population stood at a mere 11 percent. In addition, many middle-class blacks
also left the city, ma king Detro it a sh rinking city with a population c onsisting of
mainly poor African Americans. In the 2000 census, Detroit recorded fewer than
one million people for the first ti me sin ce 1910. As evidenc e of the flight from the city,
decades after the riots, many buildings still stood empty and the city was dotted with
vacant lots. Worse yet, the city suf fered from high crime rates and poor public schools.
Asof2010,cityofficialsstillstruggledtorestore Detroit’s economy and reputation.
—Ronald Young
See also all entri es under Stono Rebellion (1739) ; N ew York S lave Insurrecti on (1741);
Antebellum Suppressed Slave Revolts (1800s–1850s); Nat Turner’s Rebellion (1831); New
Orleans Riot (1866); New Orleans Race Riot (1900); Atlanta Race Riot (1906); Springfield
Race Riot (1908); Houston Riot (1917); Red Summer (19 19); Tulsa Race Rio t (1921);
Civil Rights Movement (1953–1968); Watts Riot (1965); Los Angeles Uprising (1992).
Further Reading
Belknap, Michael R., ed. Civil Rights, the White House, and the Justice Department,
1945–1967: Urban Race Riots. New York: Garland Publishing, 1991.
Fine, Sidney. Violence in the Model City. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989.
Gordon, Leonard. A City in Racial Crisis: The Case of Detroit Pre- and Post- the 1967
Riot. Dubuque, IA: W. C. Brown, Company, 1971.
Hersey, John. The Algiers Motel Incident. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1998.
Locke, Hubert G. The Detroit Riot of 1967. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969.
Detroit Riots (1967) 991
Rutgers University. “The Detroit Riots of 1967.” http://www.67riots.rutgers.edu/
d_index.htm (accessed November 2, 2008).
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the U rban Crisis: Race and Inequa lity in Po stwar
Detroit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Sul livan, Will. “Summer i n the City: Detr oit and Newar k A re Still Recovering from the
Violence That Erupted 40 Years Ago.” U.S. News and World Report 143, no.3 (July 23,
2007): 34.
992 Detroit Riots (1967)
Excessive Force
Excessive force on the part of the police was among the major causes of the 1967
Detroit riots. In a Detroit Free Press survey in the aftermath of the riots, residents
identified police harassment and brutality as the number one problem that they
faced in the period preceding the events of 1967. During the 1960s, the so-called
“Big Four” or “Tac Squads” operated on the streets of Detroit. The elite, four-
man units developed a reputation among black Detroiters for treating African
American residents unfairly and even violently. The police frequently stopped
young black s and demanded to see identification. Often, these stops resulte d ver-
bal abuse, with the police calling young black men “boy” or “nigger.” While most
encounters did not proceed beyond this humiliating verbal abuse, if an African
American could not produce proper identification, the stop could result in an arrest
or even police violence. In some extreme cases, such police brutality resulted in
injury or even death of those detained. For example, in 1962, when a black prosti-
tute named Shirley Scott attempted to flee from the back of a patrol car, Detroit
police shot her in the back. Among the other notable case of police brutality in
the years leading up to the riots were the severe beating of another prostitute,
Barbara Jackson, in 1964, and the beating of Howard King, a black teenager, for
allegedly disturbing the peace.
African Americans in Detroit also resented police raids on the after-hours
drink ing clubs known as blind pigs. These establishments had been an important
part of African American social life in Detroit for decades, dating backed to the
Prohibi tion period. In addition, these clubs were a response to the fact tha t many
Detroit restaurants and bars discriminated against African Americans.
Many blacks in Detroit also resented the aggressive and sometimes violent way
in which the police handled the issue of prostitution in the city’s African American
ghetto. African American leaders had complained that the police did little to pre-
vent white male clients from exploiting black femal e prostitutes. However, in the
weeks leading up to the riots, police launched an aggressive campaign to limit
prostitution in the area where the riots erupted. When a prostitute was killed o n
July 1, rumors circulated that the police had killed her. The police in turn claimed
that local pimps had killed the woman.
There were some unsuccessful attempts to reform the Detroit police before the
riots. Police commissioner George Edwards did try to recruit and promote African
American police officers. However, he refused to establish a civilian police review
board, which upset the African American population. At the same time, by work-
ing to actively discipline police officers guilty of brutality, Edwards often lost the
support of many on his force and incurred the wrath of many white Detroiters who
993
came to view him as too soft on crime. Outside groups also found that despite such
attempts at reform, the Detroit police was indeed a racist organization. The Mich-
igan Civil Rights Commission conducted a study in 1965 that the Detroit police
recruited “bigots” and reinforced racial discrimination through its value system.
Furthermor e, President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration concluded that 45 percent of Detroit police officers working in
predominately African American neighborhoods were “extremely anti-Negro.”
—Ronald Young
Further Reading
Fine, Sidney. Violence in the Model City. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989.
Rutgers University. “The Detroit Riots of 1967.” http://www.67riots.rutgers.edu/
d_index.htm (accessed August 8, 2009).
Housing
A lack of affordable, quality housing was a major concern for black Detroiters. In
its survey c onduct ed after th e riots, t he Detroit F ree Press found that residents
listed housing as the second-most important cause of the 1967 disturbances. Only
police brutality outranked housing as a contributing factor to the riots. The city
had a long history of housing discrimination that dated back to the turn of the cen-
tury when black migrants fi rst began to arrive in Detroit. Problems arose when
middle-class African-Americans began to attempt to integrate tradi tionally white
neighborhoods. By the 1940s and 1950s, white Detroiters tried through both legal
and extralegal means to p revent such integration. I n one notor ious example, a
developer built a six-foot-high wall along Eight Mile Road to clearly divide areas
meant for blacks and whites. By the 1960s, bla cks had expanded their residential
areas, but racial segregation had become even more pronounced, with many invis-
ible walls along with the real ones dividing black and white Detroit.
Both quality and the cost of housing were key problems for African Americans
in 1960s Detroit. I n general, the homes owned by blacks were older, of poorer
quality, and less valuable than those owned by whites. The median value of homes
owned b y nonwhites was $10,200, while those owned by whites averaged
$12,600. Among white-owned homes in Detroit, about 10 percent were considered
deteriorating or dilapidated, compared with 28 percent of those owned by non-
whites. A significantly greater percentage of white residents owned homes
compared to the African American population. About 65 percent of whites owned
their own home, while only 39 percent of nonwhites did. Rents were ab out the
994 Detroit Riots (1967)
same for all racial groups, with whites paying $77 per month compared to $76 for
nonwhites. However, since whites had much higher average incomes, th ey paid
about 20 percent of their monthly income for rent, while nonwhites paid 29 percent
of their income for their monthly rent.
Those African Americans who could not afford home ownership lived pre-
dominantly in public housing projects. These projects were densely packed with
residents and highly segregated. The concentration of blacks in public housing
only served to reinforce the racial and class isolation of Detroit’s African Ameri-
can population. Furthermore, there was not enough public housing available to
meet demand, resulting in overcrowding. This trend was strengthened by the
city’s urban renewa l projects. Urban renewal often resulted in the destruction
of areas considered to be “slums.” In Detroit, as elsewhere, entire neighborhoods
were sometimes destroyed to build freeways to the suburbs and other urban
renewal projects. This destruction generally affected black areas of the city. Such
was the case of Black Bottom, Detroit’s oldest African American enclave, which
served as the commercial and cultural heart of the black community. The area
was bulldozed and buried under concrete to build Interstate 75. This action
angered many in the city’s African American community. I t also forced many
black residents to move to other areas of the city. Many of them moved into
the 12th Street are a, where the riots erupted in 1967. This movement into new
areas often led to overcrowding and decay, which in turn contributed to the out-
break of the riots.
—Ronald Young
Further Reading
Farley, Reynolds, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer. Detroit Divided. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2000.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Kerner Commission (1967–1968)
On July 27, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the creation of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which became more commonly known
as the Kerner Commission. The president established the commission in the after-
math of the 1967 race riots in Newark and Detroit. The commission , c haired by
Illinois governor Otto Kerner, consis ted of 11 members, including politicians as
well as representatives from the civil rights movement, la bor, business, and law
Detroit Riots (1967) 995
enforcement. The other members of the commission included Roy Wilkins, exec-
utive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York; Senator Edward W. Brooke of Massachu-
setts; Iorwith Wilbur “I. W.” Abel, president of the United Steelworkers ; Charles
Thornton, president and chairman of the board of Litton Industries; Senator Fred
Harris of Oklahoma; Representative William M. McCulloch of Ohio;
Representative Jame s C. Corman of California; Katherine Graham Peden, com-
merce commissioner of the state of Kentucky; and Herbert Jenkins, chief of police
of Atlanta , Georgia. Upon sign ing the order estab lishing the commission ,
President Johnson charged the members with finding the answers to three basic
questions about the riots: “What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done
to prevent it happening again and again?”
After stu dying the 1967 riots, the Kerner Commission re leased its report in
early 1968. The final report, officially known as the Report of the National Advi-
sory Commission on Civil Disorders, is best remembered for the conclu sion that
“[o]ur nation is moving toward two separate societies, one black, one white—
separate and u nequal.” The Kerner Report contained a number of sections in
which the memb ers sought t o answer Johnson’s questions. The rep ort examined
the causes of the race riots in 1967 and looked into whether each riot f ollowed a
distinct pattern. It explored whether there was planning or organization in the riots
and outlined the history of the African American protest in the United States. The
report also studied the factors that allowed for the persistence of African American
ghettos and examined the problems of unemployment, family structure, and social
disorganization in the urban ghettos. The Kerner Report also explained how the
community’s response to t hese factors would cause or prevent riots. In addition,
it considered police responses that wou ld serve to diffuse crises, recommended a
plan by which only experienced police would cover ghetto areas, and proposed
the creation of an emergency justice system to handle arrests during riots or simi-
lar crises. The r eport further traced the f ed eral government’s role in cleaning up
the affected areas and praised the media for a balanced and factual handling of
the 1967 riots. The commission described its vision of the future of American
cities if no reforms were taken and also made recommendations for national
action.
In 1988, 20 years after the original commission issued its report, the U.S. House
of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights created a
follow-up commission to conduct a new survey of r acism in America and the
impact made by the original Kerner Commission. This new commission presented
its findings to the House subcommittee on May 25, 1988.
—Ronald Young
996 Detroit Riots (1967)
Further Reading
Barnhart, William E., and Eugene P. Schlickman. Kerner: The Conflict of Intangible
Rights. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999.
Rutgers University. “The Detroit Riots of 1967.” http ://www.67riots.rutgers.edu/
d_index.htm (accessed August 8, 2009).
Excerpts from Cyrus R. Vance’s Report on the Riots
in Detroit (1967)
Cyrus R. Vance, then a special assistant to the secretary of defense, was sent to Detroit by the
Johnson Administration in July 1967 to coordinate the federal response to the riots in the city
with state and local authorities. The following excerpt s from Vance’s official report on his activ-
ities desc ribes the actions taken by authorities to quell the disorders; it is not a descrip tio n of
the disorders themselves or an attempt to determin e the cau ses of the riot. After three years
of what would be known as the “Long Hot Summer” riots (1965–1967), Vance’s purpose was
to gather information that could help the government respond more effectively to similar urban
disorders in the future.
I. Introduction
This report covers the Federal activities connected with the riots in Detroit, Michigan,
during the period 23 July through 2 August 1967. Its purpose is to recount the sequence
of events, to summarize the experience gained, and to focus upon the problems encoun-
tered, both resolved and unresolved, for consideration in planning for or conducting
future operations of a simil ar nature. Thi s report does not treat with the underlying
causes of the loss of law and order in Detroit, which required Federal intervention.
My participation commenced shortly afte r 1100 on Monday, 24 July. The facts with
respect to the period prior to my participation have been taken from the records of
the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense.
II. Narrative of Events
The first contact between city and state officials in Detroit and Attorney General Clark
occurred Sunday night, 23 July at 2355. Mayor Cavanagh, who was with Governor
Romney at the time, called the Attorney General at his home and said a very dangerous
situation existed in the city. The Attorney General promptly relayed this information to
Secretary of the Army Resor.
At 0240 on Monday, Governor Romney called the Attorney General at his home and
said he thought he might need Army troops to quell the rioting. Mr. Clark said he would
begin the alert so that the Army could make preparations and be ready promptly if
needed. Imm ediately upon the completion of this conversation, the Attorney General
again called Secretary Resor to inform him of the situation and of the need for the Army
to commence preparations.
Detroit Riots (1967) 997