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Part C Final accounts and audit ⏐ 23: Internal and external audit 341
Miscasting of the payroll. This fraud often succeeds due to its simplicity. If there are twenty employees, each to be paid
$100, then the computer program for the payroll could be adjusted so that an extra $50 is added to the total added up
for the amounts to be paid. Thus management approve a payment of $2,050 for the period
's wages, each employee gets
his $100 and the fraudster collects his extra $50. Manual payroll systems can be manipulated in a similar way. When
employees are paid in cash, this type of fraud can be hard to trace and all too easy to perpetrate.
Stealing unclaimed wages is also common. This is effectively confined to wages paid in cash and can occur when an
employee leaves without notice or is away sick. In the case of a subsequent claim for unpaid wages, it could be claimed
that the cash in the original pay packet was paid back into the bank.
Collusion with external parties could involve suppliers, customers or their staff. Possible frauds are overcharging on
purchase invoices, undercharging on sales invoices or the sale of confidential information (eg customer lists, expansion
plans) to a competitor. Management should watch out for unusual discounts or commissions being given or taken, or
for an excessive zeal on the part of an employee to handle all business with a particular company.
Teeming and lading is a
'rolling' fraud rather than a 'one-off' fraud. It occurs when a clerk has the chance to
misappropriate payments from receivables or to payables. Cash received by the company is borrowed by the cashier
rather than being kept as petty cash or banked. (It is also possible, although riskier and more difficult to organise, to
misappropriate cheques made payable to the company.) When the cashier knows that a reconciliation is to be
performed, or audit visit planned, he pays the money back so that everything appears satisfactory at that point, but after
the audit the teeming and lading starts again. Surprise visits by auditors and independent checking of cash balances
should discourage this fraud.
A common fraud arising when one employee has sole control of the sales ledger and recording debtors
' cheques is to
pay cheques into a separate bank account, either by forged endorsement or by opening an account in a name similar to
the employer
's.
The clerk has to allocate cheques or cash received from other receivables against the account of the receivable whose
payment was misappropriated. This prevents other staff from asking why the account is still overdue or from sending
statements etc to the receivables. However, the misallocation has to continue as long as the money is missing. This
fraud, therefore, never really stops. It can be detected by independent verification of receivables balances (eg by writing
to them) and by looking at unallocated payments, if the sales ledger is organised to show this. In addition, sending out
itemised monthly statements to receivables should act as a deterrent, although in a really elaborate fraud the clerk may
be keeping two sets of books, so that the statements show the receivable'
s own analysis of amounts due and paid off in
the month, but do not agree with the books.
Altering cheques and inflating expense claims are self-explanatory.
Using the company
's assets for personal gain and stealing fully depreciated assets are both encountered in practice.
Whether or not the private use of company telephones and photocopiers is a serious matter is up to the company to
judge, but it may still be fraudulent. More serious examples include the sale by employees of unused time on the
computer, which is a growing fraud.
Another way of avoiding detection when cash and cheques received from debtors have been misappropriated is to issue
a credit note which is not sent to the customer (who has paid his account) but is recorded in the books. Again, the issue
of itemised statements monthly should show this up, as the customer would query the credit note. However, any
company with sufficiently lax controls to allow one clerk both to receive and record cash and additionally to authorise
and issue credit notes is unlikely to ensure that someone else issues and follows up statements. A similar tactic is to
write a debt off as bad to cover up the disappearance of the payment.
A very elaborate fraud may be perpetrated in a business with extremely poor controls over sales recording and minimal
segregation of duties. In such circumstances, a dishonest bookkeeper may invoice customers but fail to record the
invoices so that the customer
's payments never have to be recorded and the misappropriation is not missed.
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