The TCP/IP Guide - Version 3.0 (Contents) ` 1201 _ © 2001-2005 Charles M. Kozierok. All Rights Reserved.
DHCP Security Issues
DHCP was designed in the early 1990s, when the number of organizations on the Internet
was relatively small. Furthermore, it was based on BOOTP, which was created in the 1980s
when the Internet as we know it today barely even existed. In those days, Internet security
wasn't a big issue, because it was mostly a small group of research and educational organi-
zations using TCP/IP on the Internet. As a result, DHCP, like many protocols of that era,
doesn't do much to address security concerns.
Actually, this is a bit understated. Not only does DHCP run over IP and UDP, which are
inherently insecure, the DHCP protocol itself has in fact no security provisions whatsoever.
This is a fairly serious issue in modern networks, because of the sheer power of DHCP: the
protocol deals with critical configuration information. There are two different classes of
potential security problems related to DHCP:
☯ Unauthorized DHCP Servers: If a malicious person plants a “rogue” DHCP server, it
is possible that this device could respond to client requests and supply them with
spurious configuration information. This could be used to make clients unusable on the
network, or worse, set them up for further abuse later on. For example, a hacker could
exploit a bogus DHCP server to direct a DHCP client to use a router under the
hacker's control, rather than the one the client is supposed to use.
☯ Unauthorized DHCP Clients: A client could be set up that masquerades as a legit-
imate DHCP client and thereby obtain configuration information intended for that
client; this could then be used to compromise the network later on. Alternately, a “bad
guy” could use software to generate lots of bogus DHCP client requests to use up all
the IP addresses in a DHCP server's pool. More simply, this could be used by a thief to
steal an IP address from an organization for his own use.
Adding Security to DHCP
These are obviously serious concerns. The normal recommended solutions to these risks
generally involve providing security at lower layers. For example, one of the most important
techniques for preventing unauthorized servers and clients is careful control over physical
access to the network: layer one security. Security techniques implemented at layer two
may also be of use, for example, in the case of wireless LANs. Since DHCP runs over UDP
and IP, one could use IPSec at layer three to provide authentication.
DHCP Authentication
To try to address some of the more specific security concerns within DHCP itself, in June
2001 the IETF published RFC 3118, Authentication for DHCP Messages. This standard
describes an enhancement that replaces the normal DHCP messages with authenticated
ones. Clients and servers check the authentication information and reject messages that
come from invalid sources. The technology involves the use of a new DHCP option type,
the Authentication option, and operating changes to several of the leasing processes to use
this option.