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674 Bibliographical Essays
defensa de la constituci
´
on (Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1983); Jorge
Mario Garc
´
ıa Laguardia, La reforma liberal en Guatemala: Vida pol
´
ıtica y orden con-
stitucional (Mexico City, 1980); Luis Mari
˜
nas Otero, Las constituciones de Honduras
(Madrid, 1962); Antonio Esquiva G
´
omez, Las constituciones pol
´
ıticas y sus reformas
en la historia de Nicaragua, 2 vols. (Editorial IHNCA(UCA), 2000).
Theories of public choice and positive political economy have emphasized the
significance of centralism or federalism. For theoretical perspectives, a useful gen-
eral survey is Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “The Political Economy
of Federalism,” in Dennis Mueller, ed., Perspective on Public Choice: A Hand-
book (Cambridge, 1997), 73–105;William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation,
Significance (Boston, 1964); Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism as
a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
11 (1997): 83–92; and Weingast, “Economic Role of Political Institutions” (cited
previously). An insightful historical analysis of the controversy over federalism
in postrevolutionary Argentina is Mir
´
on Burg
´
ın, Economic Aspects of Argentine
Federalism, 1820–1852 (Cambridge, MA, 1946). Other studies of federalism in spe-
cific countries are found in J. Lloyd Mecham, “The Origins of Federalism in
Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 18, 2 (1938), 164–182;Percy Alvin
Martin, “Federalism in Brazil,” Hispanic American Historical Review 18, 2 (1938),
143–163;Marcello Carmagnani, ed., Federalismos latinoamericanos: Mexico, Brasil,
Argentina (Mexico, 1993); William R. Summerhill, “Market Intervention in a Back-
ward Economy: Railway Subsidy in Brazil, 1854–1913,” Economic History Review 51
(1998): 542–68, and “Institutional Determinants of Railroad Subsidy and Regula-
tion in Imperial Brazil, 1866–1934,” in Political Institutions and Economic Growth
in Latin America (cited previously), 21–68.
Indispensable as an introduction to the public policy question of the bureau-
cracy is Hernando de Soto, The Other Path (New York, 1989). Two valuable sur-
veys of the economics and institutionalist theoretical literature are Terry M. Moe,
“The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” and Ronald Wintrobe, “Modern
Bureaucratic Theory,” in Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice: A
Handbook (Cambridge, 1997), 429–54.Important contributions on its application
to Latin American bureaucracies are found in Barbara Geddes, “Building ‘State’
Autonomy in Brazil, 1930–64,” Comparative Politics 22, 1 (January 1990): 217–35;
and Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley, CA,
1994). On the role of twentieth-century corporatism and bureaucracy, see Jeffrey L.
Bortz, “The Legal and Contractual Limits to Private Property Rights in Mexican
Industry During the Revolution,” and Aurora G
´
omez Galvarriato, “Measuring
the Impact of Institutional Change in Capital-Labor Relations in the Mexican
Textile Industry, 1900–1930,” both in Jeffrey L. Bortz and Stephen Haber, eds.,
The Mexican Economy (cited previously), 255–88 and 289–323; and Auroran G
´
omez
Galvarriato, “The Impact of Revolution: Business and Labor in the Mexican Tex-
tile Industry, Orizaba, Veracruz, 1900–1930 (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1999). For examinations of corporatism in international relations, see Robert
H. Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade
(Princeton, NJ, 1997); and Alan Dye and Richard Sicotte, “How Did Brinkmanship
Save Chadbourne?: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931,”