Boyle J.A. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods
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INTERNAL
STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
260
before military expeditions. Up to the end of the reign of Malik-Shah
the 'arid al-jaish was a member of the bureaucracy. Later the office was
held from time to time by a Turkish amir.
Through the divan-i 'ard the vizier exercised, in theory at least,
supervision over the fiscal value of "military" iqta's; but he did not in
practice control their allocation. It seems unlikely
that
the "adminis-
trative" iqta's went through this
department
except exceptionally; and
unlikely
that
the vizier, through the 'arid al-jaish, controlled their
allocation, though at the height of his power Nizam al-Mulk no doubt
exercised
considerable influence over these grants. Occasionally other
viziers
exercised similar control. For example, 'Izz al-Mulk Tahir b.
Muhammad al-Bumjirdi, vizier to Mas'ud b. Muhammad, was alleged
to have assigned the provinces independently of Mas'ud; and Kamal
al-Dln
Muhammad b. al-Husain, who made an abortive
attempt
to
reform the financial administration (see p. 256 above), gave iqta's and
allowances
to the amirs in strict accordance with the numbers of their
armies. Nizam al-Mulk recommended
that
the muqta's and also the tax
collectors
(^ummdl)
should be changed every two or
three
years so
that
they would not establish themselves in a strong local position. The
divan, however, was seldom strong enough to act upon this advice.
Often
the heads of the various
departments
of the divan had deputies,
who
acted on their behalf in their absence on campaigns or missions for
the sultan. Abu'l Qasim Anasabadi Darguzini, whom Sanjar appointed
vizier
to Toghril b. Muhammad in
526/1132,
was at the same time made
Sanjar's vizier; he remained in
Iraq
with Toghril and appointed a
deputy to act for him at Sanjar's court. This was an exceptional case.
Plurality of
office,
however, against which Nizam al-Mulk inveighs in
the
Siydsat-Ndma,
was not uncommon. There was also a series of sub-
ordinate officials and scribes
(kuttdb)
in the different
departments
of the
divan. The choice of departmental heads
of
the divan and of subordinate
officials
was in practice often in the
hands
of the vizier, whose fall
would
frequently entail the dismissal of his supporters and clients also.
After
the death of Nizam al-Mulk the prestige and influence of the
vizierate
declined, and the sultan tended to deal directly with the heads
of
the different departments. Berk-Yaruq's mustaufi, Majd al-Mulk
Abu'l
Fadl Baravistani, dominated the
Vizier
Fakhr al-Mulk
b.
Nizam al-
Mulk,
and became the most powerful official in the bureaucracy (see
below,
p. 267).
Although
the vizier was the head of the bureaucracy and his functions
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mainly administrative, he was nevertheless expected to accompany the
sultan on military expeditions. Thus Nizam al-Mulk was present with
Alp-Arslan
on most of his campaigns; and in 464/1071-2 Alp-Arslan
sent him at the head of a large force to Fars, where he defeated Fadluya,
the Shabankara leader. When vizier to Muhammad b. Malik-
Shah,
Khatir
al-Mulk Abu Mansur Maibudi was
entrusted
with the defence
of
one of the gates of Isfahan during its siege by Berk-Yaruq in 495/
1102;
but he deserted his post and went to Maibud. On some occasions
it appears to have been the vizier and not the sultan who dispatched
military expeditions. For example, Nizam al-Mulk sent an army to
besiege
Alamut in
48
5
/1092
after hearing
that
Hasan-i Sabbah had taken
it; and Sanjar's vizier, Mukhtass al-Mulk Abu Nasr Ahmad Kashi, sent
an army against the Isma'ilis of Turshiz and Baihaq in
520/1126.
The
vizier was probably paid mainly by iqta's. Ibn al-Khallikan
alleges
that
one-tenth of the produce of the soil was usually granted as
an iqta' to the viziers in the Great Saljuq period.
1
If so, this type of
iqta' was clearly something
rather
different from the "administrative"
or the "military" iqta'. When Nizam al-Mulk was accused by
Abu'l
Mahasin b. Kamal al-Daula, deputy-head of the divan-i rasa'il, and by
others before Malik-
Shah of misappropriating the revenue, he admitted
to taking one-tenth of Malik-Shah's wealth, which he alleged to have
spent on the standing army, on alms,
gifts,
and auqaf. This story
may
be the foundation for Ibn Khallikan's
statement.
If, in fact, such an
allocation
was made to the vizier, it was probably not so much in lieu
of
salary as to enable him to meet the expenses of his
office,
such as the
giving
of alms and presents and the provision of allowances for the
religious
classes and others. It must also be remembered
that
the area
under
the direct administration of the central government was probably
never
the majority of the empire, and therefore the sum involved was
not as large as might appear at first sight.
Most
viziers also held assignments of land, but whether this was
granted to them as personal estates or in lieu of salary is not
always
clear.
In either case such assignments differed from the "military" and
"administrative" assignments, for the holder was not
under
obligation
to furnish the sultan with troops; and,
further,
he did not
live
on his
iqta'. Nevertheless, since the maintenance of private armies by in-
fluential people was the general rule, the produce of these assignments
was
probably largely spent on the upkeep of troops.
1
Vol.
in, p. 297.
261
INTERNAL
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Another source of wealth for the vizier was confiscation and fines.
Further,
since he was one of the most influential men in the empire,
those who desired
office,
whether at the centre or in the provinces, and
those who feared they had incurred the sultan's displeasure endeavoured
to buy the vizier's support. 'Amid al-Mulk Kunduri, after his abortive
attempt
to place Sulaiman b. Chaghri on the throne, and knowing
that
Nizam
al-Mulk's jealousy had been aroused and
that
he had schemed for
his
arrest,
sought to make his peace with Nizam al-Mulk. In Muharram
456/December 1063-January 1064, Kunduri went to Nizam al-Mulk
and left with him 500 dinars tied up in a handkerchief. This availed him
nothing and he was killed shortly afterwards. When Malik-Shah seized
and blinded Abu'l Mahasin b. Kamal al-Daula in 476/1083-4 after his
failure to encompass the fall of Nizam al-Mulk, Kamal al-Daula gave
Nizam
al-Mulk
200,000
dinars.
1
This suggests
that
there
had been a
significant increase in the amount of money changing hands in this way.
When the Bani
Jahir,
who had been in the caliph's vizierate, were
disgraced in 493/1099-1100, their possessions were sold and the pro-
ceeds went to Mu'ayyid al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk, Muhammad b.
Malik-Shah's
vizier. When the latter was killed by Berk-Yaruq, his
possessions were taken by Berk-Yaruq's vizier, al-'Izz Abu'l Mahasin
Dihistani. When the latter was murdered in
495/1101-2
his wealth
was
shared between his successor in the vizierate, Khatir al-Mulk Abu
Mansur Maibudi, and the sultan. One of the most active viziers in
respect to confiscation was Kamal al-Dln Abu'l Barakat Darguzlnl.
Shams al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk, who was vizier to Mahmud b. Malik-
Shah in
516/1122-3,
is also alleged to have oppressed and fined the
people, and consequently to have been hated by them.
The vizier was himself obliged to spend large sums of money to
retain the favour of the sultan, and, if possible, to forestall the intrigues
of
rivals. On one occasion Nizam al-Mulk sent a certain Ashtar to
accompany Alp-Arslan's envoy on a
return
mission to Shams al-Mulk,
the ruler of Transoxiana, and to report what had transpired. It so
happened
that
Shams al-Mulk's envoy mentioned
that
Nizam al-Mulk
was
a rdfidi (i.e. a Shi'i). Ashtar at once informed Nizam al-Mulk. The
vizier
was much perturbed at this and spent, according to his own
account,
30,000
gold dinars to prevent the report—false though it was—
reaching the sultan's ears.
2
1
Ibn
al-Athir,
vol.
x, p.
85.
According
to
Bundari,
Kamal
al-Daula
gave
300,000 dinars
to
the sultan's treasury
(p.
57).
2
Siyasat-Ndma,
pp. 88-90.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
263
The
expenses of a vizier's establishment were considerable. His court
was
the refuge of innumerable persons who sought redress,
office,
or
some other favour. When Nizam al-Mulk came to Baghdad with
Malik-Shah
in 480/1087-8 many beggars and others came to his court;
and none (to quote Hindu-Shah,
author
of the Tajdrib al-salaf) went
away
disappointed. When he left Baghdad he ordered the gifts he had
made to be counted: they amounted to 140,000 dinars. The second time
he came to Baghdad he did not at first give any presents, but after a
member of the religious classes remonstrated with him, he resumed his
former practice. Taj al-Mulk Abu'l Ghana'im—Terken Khatun's
vizier,
who, with Majd al-Mulk Baravistani, the mustaufi, and with
Abu'l
Ma'ali Sadid al-Mulk, the 'arid al-jaish, plotted for the downfall of
Nizam
al-Mulk—accused him of spending
300,000
dinars annually on
thefuqahd(jurists) and Sufis. According to al-Tuturshi, Nizam al-Mulk
spent double
that
sum annually on madrasas, ribdts (hospices), and
pensions for the pious and the poor. Indeed the vizier, like the sultan,
was
expected to keep an open table and to show generosity to the poor
and the religious classes, and since these obligations arose in
part
from
his official position, it is not unlikely
that
the money spent on pensions
and madrasas was derived, partly at least, from the
state
revenue.
The
vizier in some cases had his own "private" army; and
that
of
Nizam
al-Mulk was of considerable size. His mamluks were known as
the ^izamiyya mamluks, and after his death they played an important
part
in securing the accession of
Berk-Yaruq;
then, in revenge for the
death of their former master, they killed Taj al-Mulk Abu'l
Ghana'im,
who
had been designated to succeed him as vizier to Malik-Shah but
had not formally assumed office before Malik-
Shah died.
It was usual for the vizier to rise to his office through the subordinate
ranks of the divan. Many held the office of mustaufi, 'arid al-jaish, or
tu
ghra'i before becoming vizier. Some entered the divan-i a'la after
being employed in the provinces or in the divan of an amir or a Saljuq
princess. Transfer from the divan of one Saljuq malik to another was
also not uncommon. Thus viziers and departmental heads of the divan
enjoyed
a common background and training. There was, however,
occasionally
recruitment to the bureaucracy from other classes; and an
able man, if he was prepared to accept patronage and adopt the various
devices
which led to success in official
life,
could rise to the top. Abu'l
Qasim
Anasabadi Darguzini was the son of a peasant of Anasabad near
Hamadan. He came to Isfahan as a child and subsequently entered the
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
264
services
of Kamal al-Mulk Simirumi, acting as vizier to Guhar Khatun,
Muhammad b. Malik-Shah's
wife.
He
then
became vizier to the amir
hajib,
'AH
b. 'Umar, at which time he laid the foundations of his fortune
(see p. 251 above). He ultimately became vizier to Sanjar and Toghril
b.
Muhammad, and was executed by the latter in
527/1133.
Kamal
al-Mulk
Simirumi himself was the son of a man who farmed Simirum,
which
belonged to Guhar Khatun's divan. He entered the service of
Guhar
Khatun's divan and in due course her vizier, when he went to
Baghdad,
made Kamal al-Mulk his deputy. Kamal al-Mulk rehabili-
tated
Guhar Khatun's divan and succeeded in ingratiating himself with
her; and on the death of the vizier he became the head of her divan.
She
recommended him to the sultan, who made him mushrif al-mamalik,
and
then
mustaufi. Finally he became vizier to Mahmud b. Muhammad
in
512/1118-19.
Muhammad b. Sulaiman Kashghari, who became
Sanjar's vizier, was previously a merchant. He was not a popular or
successful
vizier. Trade, it seems, was not a suitable training for the
bureaucracy. Zaki, whose incompetence, as stated above, had contri-
buted to the replacement
of
the
vakil-i
dar by the amir hajib, was a rich
Qazvini
merchant.
The
most famous
of
all
the Saljuq viziers was Nizam al-Mulk. Five of
his sons, two of his grandsons, and one great-grandson held the office
of
vizier
to one or other of the sultans or maliks after him, though none
of
them achieved his eminence. He was the son of a man who had been
made the tax-collector and revenue farmer
(bunddr)
of Tus, by the
Ghaznavid
'amid
of
Khurasan. At the beginning
of
the Saljuq expansion
the country was in a
state
of disorder and the taxes were not being
collected.
The 'amid of Khurasan demanded from Abu'l Hasan, Nizam
al-Mulk's.
father, the
arrears
of Tus, which he was unable to pay in full.
In the prevailing confusion the administration began to disintegrate and
many of the Ghaznavid officials dispersed. Abu'l Hasan eventually
found his way to Ghazna, with his son Nizam al-Mulk, who was still
a child. In due course the latter entered Ghaznavid service, but
after Balkh
fell
to the Saljuqs in
43
2/1040-1
he attached himself to the
'amid of
Balkh,
Ibn Shadan. His experiences with Ibn Shadan were not
altogether happy. It is related—perhaps apocryphally—that whenever
the 'amid thought Nizam al-Mulk had accumulated any wealth, he
would
say, " O Hasan, you have grown fat" and mulct him. When this
had happened several times Nizam al-Mulk fled to Marv.
1
There, by
1
Muhammad Muffd,
Jdmi
(
-i
Mufidi,
ed.
Iraj
Afshar (Tehran,
1342/1963),
vol.
1,
p. 54.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
265
some means or other, he joined the service of
Alp-Arslan.
Kunduri,
who
had been Toghril
Beg's
vizier, was dismissed by Alp-Arslan
shortly after his accession, and Nizam al-Mulk became vizier, which
office
he also held
under
Malik-Shah. Ghazali, who was Nizam al-
Mulk's
contemporary, compared him to the Barmakids; and he appears
to have enjoyed a great reputation among all classes of the population,
including the army. Such was his prestige
that
the caliph allowed him to
be seated in his presence. On the occasion of the betrothal of Malik-
Shah's daughter to the caliph in
474/1081-2,
when the sultan's
retinue
went to the caliph's court, Nizam al-Mulk, at the caliph's command,
rode while everyone else walked; and when they reached the caliph's
audience Nizam al-Mulk was seated on a
throne
(masnad)
and given a
robe of honour with a border
(fard^)
on it, inscribed: " In the name of
the just and perfect vizier, Nizam al-Mulk,
radi
amiriHmu'minin."
1
To
what extent Nizam al-Mulk's reputation for justice was merited is
difficult
to judge. His lavish expenditure on pensions, allowances to the
religious
classes, and the building of madrasas contributed to his fame
and popularity. In a letter to Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk, Ghazali
tells him of his father's ambition not to be surpassed by anyone in good
works.
2
He appears on the whole to have counselled moderation and
tolerance, though in his early career, at least, he was not above ridding
himself
of rivals by intrigue, as he did in the case of 'Amid al-Mulk
Kunduri. He was undoubtedly an able and competent administrator,
and not without skill in military affairs—a fact which no doubt was of
great help to him in his relations with the amirs, and which enabled him
to maintain the prestige of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the military. He
appears to have been a good judge of character, an essential
attribute
of
a vizier when power was personal
rather
than
institutional. Bundari
states
that
he selected each man for the work for which he was best
suited and appointed him to office accordingly. The fact
that
many of
his relatives held office
under
him increased his power though it also
aroused the sultan's jealousy.
The
office of vizier was potentially, and
under
Nizam al-Mulk
actually,
one
of
great power, but it also involved its holder in great risks.
He had no security of
tenure
and could be dismissed at
will
and without
cause by the sultan. The power he exercised was delegated to him
entirely as a
matter
of
grace:
he was the servant, not of the state, but of
the sultan, and consequently it was essential for him to retain the
1
Ibn
al-Khallikan,
vol.
1,
p.
413.
2
See
Fadd'i/
al-andm,
p. 30.
INTERNAL
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SALJUQ
EMPIRE
266
satisfaction of the sultan, who, because of the arbitrary
nature
of power
in the medieval Persian state, was inevitably jealous of any influence the
vizier
obtained. The latter often faced a conflict between his duty
towards the people, whether seen in terms of Islam or common justice,
and political practice.
Ghazali indeed took the
view
that
the vizier
because of his
office
inevitably became involved in corruption and
disobedience to the laws of God.
1
Another story, also perhaps apo-
cryphal,
illustrates this point. Nizam al-Mulk complained to the Imam
al-Haramain of
Alp-Arslan's
secret
ill-feeling
towards him in spite
of
his
almost superhuman efforts in the interests of the state. The Imam al-
Haramain replied
that
since the wealth and property of the sultan were
in the hands of Nizam al-Mulk, inevitably the sultan suspected him of
corruption. He also pointed out
that
some of the demands sultans made
upon their viziers were impossible to
fulfil.
The
vizier was also likely to incur the dissatisfaction of other
members of the sultan's family, who, if their desires were opposed or
they were prevented from interfering in affairs, were likely to
attribute
this to the vizier's opposition; and the vizier's rivals, desirous of self-
advancement, would encourage them in this. No vizier who made any
serious effort to establish an effective administration was immune from
the jealousy and intrigues of his
fellows.
Nizam al-Mulk, the strongest
and most influential
of
all
the Saljuq
viziers,
was no exception, and many
of
his contemporaries
attributed
his murder—generally thought to have
been committed by an emissary of Hasan-i Sabbah—to Malik-Shah and
Taj
al-Mulk
Abu'l
Ghana'im, Terken Khatun's vizier, who had sup-
ported her in her efforts to persuade the sultan to declare her son
Mahmud as vali
c
ahd.
The
bureaucracy had no traditions of integrity and independence:
the vizier could not expect loyalty from his colleagues, and con-
sequently self-preservation demanded
that
he should
fill
key places as
far as possible with his relatives and clients, the former because he
could
in some measure control them and the latter because their hope of
advancement would be at least temporarily bound up with his. But by
the
nature
of the case he fought a losing battle. He had to share with
his supporters the benefits and spoils of
office;
and as they rose from
poverty
to riches, from weakness to power, and insignificance to fame,
they were likely to scheme with others to encompass his destruction.
The
prevention of corruption in subordinate officials was an ex-
1
Cf.
Fada'il
al-anam,
p.
61.
INTERNAL
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OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
tremely difficult problem for the vizier, and one which, however dealt
with,
made many enemies for him. There was no adequate system of
control or supervision. The
band,
which in earlier times had been used
for
the transmission of messages between government agents in the
provinces and the capital, and whose officers kept watch over and
reported on events taking place in various
parts
of the empire, had
been abolished. Alp-Arslan's alleged reasons for objecting to it were
sound: namely,
that
those who were loyal would pay no attention to the
sahib khabar (the postmaster) and see no need to bribe him, while his
enemies would make friends with the sahib khabar and
give
him money,
with
the result
that
he would report favourably on them and un-
favourably
on those who were
loyal.
1
But in the absence of any effective
checks
and controls in the administrative system,
there
could be, as
Nizam
al-Mulk recognized, no security for the ruler against rebellion,
injustice, or extortion by his
officials.
Hence Nizam al-Mulk advocated
an efficient system
of
espionage backed by an armed force strong enough
to overpower all opposition. In his
view,
the sultan should have in-
formers and spies throughout the empire and among all classes of the
people,
including the qadis. He probably had his own agents in the
country, but in spite of his advice, the barid was not re-established.
Perhaps the most delicate problem of all for the vizier was his
relationship with the amirs. His
official
business constantly brought him
into contact with them. Friendship with them individually attracted
the enmity of those excluded from the friendship and aroused the
suspicion of the sultan. Up to the death of Nizam al-Mulk the vizier's
influence was greater
than
that
of the amirs, but after his death they
gradually deprived the bureaucracy of all effective power. None after
Nizam
al-Mulk really succeeded in reimposing control over the amirs,
and those who tried came to an untimely end. The first and most
striking case is
that
of the mustaufi Majd al-Mulk Baravistani, who,
having
succeeded in getting Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk appointed
to Berk-Yaruq's vizierate in 488/1095, made his own influence domi-
nant
in the divan. He appears to have attempted to keep a tight hold
on the amirs, but in 492/1098-9 Oner rebelled and offered Berk-Yaruq
his renewed obedience on condition
that
Majd al-Mulk was surrendered
to him. But before any action could occur, Oner was assassinated. The
opposition to Majd al-Mulk was not thereby ended, and later in the
same year a number of prominent amirs demanded
that
the sultan
1
Siydsat-Ndma,
p. 65.
267
INTERNAL
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EMPIRE
268
should hand Majd al-Mulk over to them. Berk-Yaruq refused to
surrender him. The rebellious amirs thereupon entered the sultan's
tent,
dragged out the mustaufi, and killed him.
1
This incident is signifi-
cant of the changing relationships between the vizierate ana the amirs;
and by the time of Mas'ud b. Muhammad, the amirs began to appoint
their own nominees to the
office.
As stated above, Qara-Sonqur made
his own vizier, 'Izz al-Mulk Tahir b. Muhammad Bumjirdi, the vizier
to Mas'ud b. Muhammad in
533/1139.
After the death of Qara-Sonqur,
a group of amirs led by 'Abd al-Rahman b. Tughrayarak persuaded
Mas'ud to seize 'Izz al-Mulk in
5
39/1144-5
and in the following year
(or in
541/1146-7)
Boz-Aba,
who had become one of the most powerful
amirs in the empire, succeeded in appointing his own vizier, Taj al-
Din
Abu'l Fath b. Darast, to the sultan's vizierate. He held office for
only
a few months, however, before returning to
Boz-Aba's
service in
Fars. Ibn al-Athir states
that
he preferred
Boz-Aba's
service to the
sultan's, whereas Bundari states
that
Mas'ud allowed him to
return
to
Boz-Aba
in the hope
that
he would restrain
Boz-Aba
from rebellion.
Whichever
account is nearer to the
truth,
it is clear
that
there
had been
a sharp decline in the power of the sultan's vizierate, as
well
as a major
change in the relations between vizier and amirs.
The
position of the vizier and of government officials in general was
extremely insecure. After the death of Nizam al-Mulk, viziers suc-
ceeded one another with great rapidity. This was perhaps partly due
to the prevailing financial stringency; the dismissal of a vizier and the
confiscation
of his wealth by the sultan was a means of temporarily
relieving
this stringency. After the death of Malik-Shah the number of
viziers
who escaped being murdered, imprisoned, or having their
wealth confiscated is small. The readiness with which the later sultans
listened to intrigues against their viziers contrasts strongly with the
conduct of
Alp-Arslan,
who, on one occasion when he received a letter
accusing
Nizam al-Mulk of malpractices, is alleged to have given it to
him and said, " If they are right in what they have written, repair your
nature
and mend your
ways;
and if they lied then forgive them their
slip".
2
But it is also
true
that
since
there
were no effective controls or
checks
against corruption within the bureaucratic system itself, then
1
Ravandi, pp.
145-7.
I°
N
al-Athir's account differs slightly, in
that
he states
that
Berk-
Yaruq
finally agreed to surrender Majd al-Mulk but made the amirs promise to spare his
life.
When he
was
handed over by the sultan, some soldiers killed him before he reached the
amirs
(vol.
x, pp.
196-7).
2
Ibn al-Athir, vol. x, p. 51.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
269
once
there was a relaxation in the power of the sultan, intrigue and
corruption grew and fed upon each other.
The
sultan exercised "administrative" justice in the mazalim court,
personally or through his agents. He delegated his function as judge
according
to the ideal system of the shari'a to the qadi. In the mazalim
court the administration of justice was exercised on the basis of custom,
equity,
and governmental regulations; whereas the qadi in his court
applied the shari'a according to certain formal rules of evidence and
procedure.
1
This court sat in the mosque, in the qadi's residence, or
some other duly appointed place. It was concerned primarily with the
settlement of litigation, the execution of testaments and matters of
inheritance, escheat, transfers of property, administration of the affairs
of
orphans,
widows,
and of those
legally
incapacitated, and the appoint-
ment of umand (trustees) for this purpose. The qadi normally applied
the sharfa according to the rite to which most people in the area under
his jurisdiction belonged. Among the qualifications demanded of the
qadi was
that
he should be a Muslim, free, and versed in the principles
of
the law (usul al-fiqh).
In spite of the fact
that
by Saljuq times the jurisdiction of the
mazalim
court tended to overlap with and to supersede
that
of the
qadi's court, the qadi still played an extremely important role in the
life
of the Saljuq empire. He acted as a link both between the political
and the religious institution, and between the sultan and his people; and
he maintained and transmitted the traditions of Islamic civilization.
From the new relationship between the caliph and the sultan, and from
the renewed association of the political and the religious institution,
there
followed
a reappraisal of the position of the religious classes in
general and of the qadi in particular. Nizam al-Mulk states the qadis
were
the deputies (nd'ibdn) of the ruler, upon whom their support was
incumbent. Full respect and dignity were to be accorded to them
because they were the deputies of the caliph (nd'ibdn-i khalifa), upon
whom
his mantle (shi'dr) had devolved. At the same time, they were
also
appointed by the secular ruler and did his work.
2
Similarly in
contemporary documents the 'ulama are sometimes referred to as the
"heirs of the Prophet" and the qadis as the officers of the shari'a and
"the umand of God in the execution of decrees, the termination of
disputes, and in obtaining the rights of the weak".
3
The position of the
1
See
further
J. Schacht, An
Introduction
to
Islamic
'Law
(Oxford,
1964),
pp. 49
fT.
2
Sijasat-Nama,
pp. 40-1.
3
Cf.
Quis
Cusfodiet,
Stadia
Islamica,
fasc. v, p. 132.