Boyle J.A. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
240
asocial
and
a
political.
The atabeg
was
in charge
of
the prince's education.
This
presumably was the object of the appointment of
'Ali
b. Abi
c
Ali
al-Qummi as atabeg to Berk-Yaruq—who was not, contrary to the
usual custom, given an iqta' during the reign of
Malik-Shah.
If a young
malik was assigned a province or district the atabeg attached to him was
responsible for its administration and therefore it was
natural
that
those
appointed to the
office
were almost without exception Turkish amirs.
In its political aspect, one of the objects of the atabegate was to
control the malik and prevent his rebellion in the province assigned to
him. This was probably Berk-Yaruq's dominant motive in appointing
atabegs to his brothers Muhammad and Sanjar. Muhammad, however,
when he felt strong enough to be independent, killed his atabeg, Qut-
lugh-Tegin,
and took possession of Arran. Mahmud b. Muhammad, in
appointing Kun-To
ghdi as atabeg to his brother Toghril in
513/119-20,
had apparently a similar end in
view;
but Kun-Toghdi, although he had
instructions to bring Toghril to Mahmud, instead induced him to rebel.
As
the power of the amirs increased relative to
that
of the sultans, the
atabegate came to be used, not so much to prevent the rebellion of a
Saljuq
prince, as to retain the nominal allegiance of a powerful or
rebellious amir; and such conquests as the latter made were nominally
under
the sultan's ultimate sovereignty. This was the general tendency
from the reign of Muhammad b. Malik-Shah onwards. As it became
more marked, the atabeg was often made the nominal as
well
as the
actual governor of the province, and the malik was sent with him only
as a
matter
of form. Thus in 502/1108-9 Fars was assigned to Chavli
Saqao
and not to his two-year-old ward Chaghri b. Muhammad.
The
career of Chavli Saqao is typical of
that
of the great amirs of the
time, and illustrates the prevailing instability, the mutual jealousies
of
the
amirs, and the growing weakness of the sultan vis-a-vis the amirs.
Chavli
Saqao was a native of the district lying between Ram Hurmuz
and Arrajan, and in due course he established himself on the borders of
Fars and Khuzistan. Muhammad b. Malik-Shah after his accession sent
Maudud b. Altun-Tegin to besiege him, and after seven months Chavli
submitted and came to Muhammad in Isfahan. In 500/1106 he was
assigned Mosul and other districts, which were
then
in the possession
of
Chokermish.
Chavli set out for Mosul and captured Chokermish near
Irbil. The people
of
Mosul
thereupon made Zangi b. Chokermish gover-
nor in his father's stead, and wrote for help to Sadaqa, the Mazyadid,
Qilich-Arslan,
and to Bursuqi, who was
then
shahna of Baghdad.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
Chavli
laid siege to Mosul, but retired to Sinjar on the approach of
Qilich-Arslan.
There he was joined by
Il-Ghazi
b. Artuq and by a number
of
Chokermish's
followers;
later he joined Ridwan and took Rahba. He
then defeated Qilich-Arslan on the Khabur River and returned to
Mosul,
the gates of which were opened to him. Having established him-
self
there
he withdrew his allegiance from Muhammad b. Malik-Shah;
and when Muhammad made preparations to march against Sadaqa in
501/1107-8,
Chavli,
together with Il-Ghazi b. Artuq, sent an offer of
support to Sadaqa. Meanwhile the spoliation of
Chavli's
domains was
proposed by Muhammad to the Bani Bursuq, Maudud b. Altun-Tegin,
and to a number of other amirs.
Chavli,
accordingly having prepared
Mosul
for siege, left his
wife
to defend the city and himself went to
collect
reinforcements. At Nisibin he was joined, somewhat un-
willingly,
by Il-Ghazi b. Artuq, and also by Abu Najm and Abu Kamil
Mansur, the sons of Sadaqa. He agreed to go with them to Hilla and
they decided to make Bektash b. Tutush b. Alp-Arslan their spokes-
man. But the Ispahbud Sabavu, who had subsequently joined them,
advised
Chavli to go again to Syria because the sultan was in or near
Iraq.
Chavli accepted his advice.
Allying
himself to Baldwin of Edessa
and Jocelin, he went to Syria but was defeated by Tancred in 502/1108.
Muhammad b. Malik-Shah meanwhile sent Husain b. Qutlugh-Tegin
to Chavli to win back his
allegiance.
Chavli agreed to submit if the siege
of
Mosul
was raised, and he offered to send his son to the sultan's court
as a hostage. However, Maudud, who was besieging Mosul, refused to
raise the siege, and Mosul
fell
shortly afterwards. Realizing
that
he
could
not hope for success in Syria or the Jazireh, Chavli then deter-
mined to go to Muhammad b. Malik-Shah in the hope
that
Husain b.
Qutlugh-Tegin
would intercede for him. He reached Isfahan, sur-
rendered Bektash b. Tutush to Muhammad, and made his peace with
him. Muhammad then sent Chavli to Fars as atabeg to his son Chaghri.
Fars at the time was in a
state
of disorder and not under the effective
control of the sultan; hence the sultan in sending Chavli to Fars was
not running any immediate risk of renewed rebellion, since Chavli
would
first have to restore obedience in the province. In fact, Chavli
was
largely successful in subduing the Shabankara, who had reduced
the Shapur district of Fars to a
state
of ruin and disorder, and in
bringing back a considerable measure of prosperity to the province.
He died in Fars in
510/1116-17.
As
the political aspect
of
the atabegate began increasingly to dominate
16
241 BCH
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
242
its social aspect, a malik was sometimes entrusted to a succession of
different atabegs, as happened, for example, with Mas'üd b. Muhammad.
Or
an amir was put in charge of a succession of
maliks.
Qasim al-Daula
Aq-Sonqur
Bursuqi is a case in point. He was originally a mamlük of
Bursuq, who was made shahna of Baghdad by To
ghril Beg in 452/
1060-1 and subsequently served Alp-Arslan, Malik-Shäh, and Berk-
Yaruq.
Aq-Sonqur Bursuqi was made shahna
of
Baghdad
by
Muhammad
b.
Malik-Shäh in 498/1105. After the death of Maudüd b. Altun-Taq,
the muqta' of Mosul, he was assigned Mosul and the Jazireh in 508/
1114-15,
appointed atabeg to Mas'üd b. Muhammad, and ordered to
organize a jihäd(holy war) against the Franks in Syria. In
509/1115-16
Muhammad b. Malik-Shäh assigned Mosul to Cha'ush Beg, who also
became atabeg to Mas'üd. Bursuqi retired to Rahba, which he held as
an iqta
c
. Muhammad b. Malik-Shäh died in
511/1117.
In the following
year Bursuqi was appointed shahna of Baghdad by Mahmud b.
Muhammad, but
Mengü-Bars was appointed to the same
office
almost
immediately afterwards. Mas'üd then assigned Marä
gheh to Bursuqi as
an iqtä' in addition to Rahba. Dubais b. Sadaqa the Mazyadid mean-
while
urged Cha'ush Beg to rebel against Mahmud, to seek the kingdom
in the name of Mas'üd, and also to seize Bursuqi. The latter, learning of
this plan, joined Mahmüd. For a brief period the khutba was read
in Äzarbäijän, the Jazireh, and Mosul in the name of Mas'üd.
Battle was joined between him and Mahmüd in
514/1120
and Mas'üd
was
defeated, after which Mahmüd sent Bursuqi to Mas'üd with a
pardon. In
515/1121
Bursuqi was assigned Mosul by Mahmüd and was
ordered to undertake a jihäd against the Franks. The following year
Bursuqi was given Wäsit as an additional iqtä', together with the
office
of
shahna of Baghdad; he was also reappointed atabeg to Mas
c
üd and
married to Mas
c
üd's mother, who had been seized by Mengü-Bars
on the death of Muhammad b. Malik-Shäh in
511/1117
before the
expiry
of her 'idda (the legal period of retirement assigned to a widow
before she may marry again).
1
Seven years later, Bursuqi was dismissed
from the
office
of shahna of Baghdad at the caliph's request. Mahmüd
then made him atabeg to one of his sons, sent him back to Mosul, and
ordered him once again to undertake a
jihäd against the Franks. After
taking Aleppo he
returned
to Mosul, where he was assassinated by a
Bätini in
520/1126.
1
Ibn
al-Athir,
vol.
x,
pp.
380,
391;
Bundäri,
p.
159;
Ibn
al-Athir,
al-Daulat
al-Atabakiyya
Mulüki
7
Mawsil,
in
Receui/
des
historiens
des
croisades,
Sources
Arabes,
vol.
11,
pt.
2,
p.
46.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
While
the sultan thus hoped to retain the nominal allegiance of the
great amirs through the atabegate, they, on the other hand, saw in it a
means to establish their virtual independence. In
view
of the fact
that
sovereignty
was considered inherent in the Saljuq family, it was
important for an amir to secure the person of a Saljuq malik in whose
name he could act. The atabegate provided him with a ready means of
doing
so. Further, in
view
of the jealousies among the amirs, it was
easier for them to establish virtually independent kingdoms under the
guise
of atabegates in the outlying provinces
than
to dominate the
sultanate itself, and there are cases of amirs demanding or taking
forcible
possession of some malik, with the nominal acquiescence of the
sultan, in order to increase their prestige. Thus Mengii-Bars,
1
having
made himself master of Fars in succession to Qaracha al-Saqi (Saljuq-
Shah b. Muhammad's atabeg, whom Sanjar had killed in
526/1132)
wrote to Toghril b. Muhammad and demanded
that
he send his son
Alp-Arslan
to him; if his demand was met, he offered to recognize
Toghril
as sultan. In due course Toghril sent
Alp-Arslan
to
Mengii-Bars.
'Imad al-Din Zangi, who had originally been in the service of
Bursuqi,
was another case in point. He made himself master of Mosul
in
521/1127
on the death of Bursuqi's son 'Izz al-Din. Two Saljuq
maliks
were under his care. One he had captured from Dubais b.
Sadaqa the Mazyadid, to whom the malik had been entrusted.
2
The
other was Alp-Arslan b. Mahmud, who was known as al-Khafaji.
According
to Ibn al-Athir, Zangi pretended to hold the country on
behalf
of the malik Alp-Arslan, in whose name he sent envoys and
answered letters, awaiting the death of Mas'ud b. Muhammad, at
which
time he, Zangi, would assemble an army and seek the sultanate
in the name of al-Khafaji.
3
As it happened Zangi died before he could
put his plan into action. The fact, however,
that
an amir of his power
and virtual independence should be found pursuing such a policy, is
striking evidence of the added prestige which the possession of a
Saljuq
malik gave to an amir. Once an atabeg had firmly established
his power, however, the dependent malik was allowed to
fall
into
obscurity, and the atabeg, acting as a virtually independent ruler,
1
Not to be
confused
with
Mengu-Bars
the shahna of
Baghdad,
mentioned
above,
who
was
killed
in
513/1119-20.
2
There is some
confusion
in the sources
over
the names of
these
two
maliks
and the
events
connected
with
them: cf.
Bundari,
p.
187,
Ibn
Khallikan,
vol.
1,
p.
330,
and Ibn
al-
Athir,
al-Daulat,
pp.
126-7.
The
prince
captured
from
Dubais
was
probably
one
of
Mahmud
b.
Muhammad's
sons,
whom
Dubais
had
seized
in
523/1129
(Ibn
al-Athir,
vol.
x, p.
461).
Al-Daulat)
pp.
126-7.
243
16-2
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
244
transmitted
his province to his descendants. The political atabegate
thus
became a potent factor in the disintegration of the great Saljuq
empire. From the reign of Mas'ud b. Muhammad on, Azarbaijan and
Fars were the scene of various
attempts
by atabegs to establish their
independence, and eventually in both provinces independent dynasties
were
set up.
Although
after the death of Malik-Shah, if not before, most of the
empire was alienated in the form of iqta's from the control of the central
government,
there
were other areas, towns and districts, where a
rather
different arrangement prevailed, for they were under an
official
known
as the shahna. He was in
effect
a military governor appointed by the
sultan or his governor. One of his main functions was to carry out the
decisions
of the qadfs court, when
coercive
force was necessary for this;
and similarly to support other
officials,
such as the
c
dmil (tax-collector),
in the execution of their duties. A muqta' had
full
control of an "ad-
ministrative" iqta', and he exercised by delegation virtually all the
functions of the ruler. But the shahna usually had no power to appoint
district
officials
(apart
from those in his own divan), and he was
concerned merely with the maintenance of order, so
that
the collection
of
taxes and the general administration could be carried on.
1
The
position of the shahna of Isfahan, for example, was clearly
that
of a
military governor only. On her deathbed in 487/1094, Terken Khatun
ordered the shahna of Isfahan to hold the kingdom for her son
Mahmud. Various shahnas of Ray are mentioned in the sources,
including 'Abbas the mamluk of al-Muqarrab
Jauhar.
2
Ray, like
Isfahan, was at one time the Saljuq capital, and, as stated above, was
retained by Sanjar in the possession of his divan. This is not to say,
however,
that
the shahna was to be found only in directly admini-
stered areas.
3
Exercising the functions delegated to him by the ruler,
the holder of an "administrative" iqta' sometimes appointed shahnas;
but generally speaking, although
there
are numerous references to
1
Cf. Diploma
for a
shahna,
Muhammad
b.
'Abd al-Khaliq al-Maihani,
Dastur-i
DabirJ
>
ed.
Adrian Erzi
(Ankara,
1962),
pp.
113-14.
2
See my article, "The Administration
of
Sanjar's Empire
as
illustrated
in the
'Atabat
al-kataba",
in B.S.O.A.S.
(1957),
pp. 380 if.
3
Cf.
also H. Horst, Die
Staatsverwaltung
der
Grosselguqen
und
Hora^msdhs
i
p. 94, n. 2.
Preserved
in the 'Ataba
al-kataba
is
a document issued by Sanjar's divan for one
Saif
al-Din
Yaran-Qush,
for the
office
of
shahna
of
Juvain; this document contains
a
somewhat
puzzling
statement,
to the
effect
that
the
office
of shahna
in
Juvain belonged
to the
divan
of
Sanjar's sister Nur(?)
Bilge,
and was conferred upon
Saif
al-Din
by her divan (by virtue
of
the document issued by Sanjar).
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
245
shahnas in the
north-eastern
provinces in the time of Sanjar, references
to them in the western provinces are less common. The shahna appears
to have been paid by local dues levied in accordance with custom.
There
are occasional references in the sources to revenue farms
{daman). These verged on the "administrative" iqta', but whereas the
muqta' usually had complete control over the general administration of
the district and maintained armed forces which he used, if called upon,
in the service of the sultan, the revenue farmer was concerned only with
the collection of taxes.
Further,
the farmer's contract was for a stipu-
lated period, probably one or
three
years. The number and size of these
farms were
relatively
small.
Most of the references are to the early period
of
Saljuq rule, and to the area in and around
Iraq.
Toghril Beg farmed
Basra
and
Ahvaz
to Hazarasp b. Bankir in 448/1056-7 for
300,000
dinars and
60,000
dinars respectively.
1
In
451/1059
the farmer was
changed,
but in 456/1064 Basra was again in the hands of Hazarasp,
and in 459/1066-7
Alp-Arslan
farmed it to him together with Wasit for
300,000
dinars. In
451/1059
Wasit was farmed by Toghril Beg to a
certain Abu. 'AH b. Fadlan for
200,000
dinars; and in 455/1063 to
another revenue farmer for the same sum. In 452/1060-1 and 45 5/1063
Toghril
Beg farmed Baghdad for
three
years, on the first occasion for
400,000
dinars and on the second (to a different revenue farmer) for
150,000 dinars. Malik-Shah farmed Basra first to a Jew named Ibn
"Allan,
and then in 472/1079-80 to Khumar-Tegin, who gave him
100,000
dinars a year and 100 horses. With Gauhar A'in, the shahna of
Baghdad,
Khumar-Tegin had apparently plotted the
fall
of Ibn
'Allan.
The latter took refuge with Nizam al-Mulk. But Khumar-
Tegin
and Gauhar A'in, since they were personal enemies of Nizam
al-Mulk,
slandered Ibn
'Allan
before the sultan and persuaded him to
have
the man drowned.
2
Alp-Arslan
also farmed Fars to Fadluya, the
Shabankara leader.
For
the most
part
the tribal groups in the Saljuq empire were not
directly
administered by the central government. The Kurds and Arabs,
for
instance, were left mainly under the local rulers or else came under
a muqta'. The question of direct administration did not therefore arise.
The
same is largely
true
of
parts
of Tabaristan. The Shabankara in
1
Ibn
al-Athir,
vol. ix, p. 422;
Fdrs-Ndma,
p.
121.
Ibn al-Jauzi states that
Kunduri
farmed
these
districts
to
Hazarasp
for 300,000
sultdm
dinars
(vol.
VIII,
pp.
168-9).
2
Ibn
al-Athir,
vol.
x, p.
75 bis;
Ibn
al-Jauzi,
vol.
VIII,
p.
323.
Prior to
this,
Ibn
*
Allan
had
farmed
some
of the private domains of the
caliph
and had
defaulted
on his contract
(Ibn
al-Athir,
vol.
ix, p. 454).
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
¿46
Fars were also under their own leaders for much of the period until
they were temporarily subdued by
Chavli
Saqao.
The
most important tribal group as regards both numbers and
influence
was the Turkmen. But because of their numbers and the
Saljuqs'
early relation with them, their control presented a special
problem. Throughout the period they tended to continue moving
in a westerly direction. Alp-Arslan's policy was to employ them
in raids outside the ddr al-hldm, and many of them pushed on into
Syria
and
Asia
Minor. Others, however, remained in the provinces over
which
the sultan maintained control. Some were incorporated into the
service
of the sultan (see p. 218 above), but the majority continued to
follow
a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence, moving from winter to
summer pastures and migrating in search of new pastures. The main
concentrations of Turkmen were to be found in
Iraq,
the Jazireh,
Azarbaijan,
Gurgan, and the neighbourhood of Marv. These concen-
trations
were not necessarily constant throughout the Great Saljuq
period. The power of the sultan held the Turkmen more or less in
check
until the death of
Malik-Shah.
The weakening of the empire after
his death and the dissolution of the kingdom created by Tutush in
Syria
restored their freedom, and within two or
three
years several of
them had formed independent principalities.
1
The fact
that
some of
them had been officers of the sultan—Il-
Ghazi b. Artuq, for example,
was
a shahna of Baghdad on behalf of Muhammad b. Malik-Shah in
495/1101-2—helped
them to transform themselves quickly into small
territorial princes when the sultan's authority declined.
The
Turkmen who remained in Gurgan and the neighbourhood of
Marv
during the reign of Sanjar came under his central divan. The
official
charged with their administration was also known as a shahna.
His functions were primarily to maintain order and prevent the tribes
encroaching on their neighbours, and to collect from them
pasture
dues
and other taxes due to the government. In a diploma issued by Sanjar's
divan,
appointing Inanch
Bilge
Ulugh
Jandar
Beg to the
office
of
shahna of the Turkmen in Gurgan, it is recognized
that
they formed a
special
class. The jandar beg was, among his other duties, to allot
pastures and water to each leader according to the number of his
households and
followers.
2
The
Ghuzz
in the neighbourhood of Marv and on the borders of the
1
See
Gibb,
Damascus
Chronicle,
p.
25.
2
See
"The
Administration
of
Sanjar's
Empire",
p.
382.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
247
empire apparently regarded themselves as the special subjects of the
sultan. They were difficult to control, and relations between them and
Sanjar's divan were marked by a standing opposition between the
settled and semi-settled population. Extortion was practised in the
collection
of the annual
tribute
of sheep, which they paid to the sultan's
kitchen, and eventually they were driven to rebellion. Sanjar was then
induced by his amirs to march against them, and was defeated and
captured by the
Ghuzz
in
548/115
3-4; he remained a prisoner in their
hands for
three
years. Although on this occasion the sultan's
officials
appear to have been at fault, the problem was by no means a simple one,
because the Ghuzz were increasing in numbers and encroaching on the
settled areas; and after the death of Sanjar in
552/1157,
they overran
parts
of Khurasan and Kirman.
In exercising his functions as judge and guardian of public order,
and in delegating these functions in the provinces to the muqta's, the
sultan acted through the dargah. A whole range of other functions,
including in particular the collection of taxes, was exercised by the
sultan through the central divan, the main department of the bureau-
cracy.
In the dargah, which was militarized and composed largely of
Turkish amirs, the sultan was accessible to his subjects for the redress
of
grievances;
in the divan, which was mainly staffed by men who were
not Turks and who had inherited the administrative traditions of the
preceding dynasties, he came into contact with his subjects in a
different way: namely, over the collection of taxes. He delegated his
functions in the divan to the vizier, who at the height of his power
supervised all aspects of the administration, secular and religious, and
was
more
than
just the head of the financial administration. Nizam al-
Mulk
envisaged him as the keystone of the empire. "When the
vizier
is
of good conduct and judgement", he states, "the kingdom flourishes
and the army and subjects are contented, quiet and wealthy, and the
ruler happy at
heart;
but when the
vizier
is
of
evil
conduct, indescribable
confusion
appears in the kingdom, and the ruler is always distressed
and afflicted in mind and the kingdom disturbed."
1
The
relationship between the dargah and the central divan was not
clearly
formulated. The connecting link between them until the decline
of
the vizierate was the
vizier
himself.
'Amid
al-Mulk Kunduri,
Toghril
Beg's
vizier, and Nizam al-Mulk both had direct access to the
sultan; but under the later sultans, as stated above, the amir hajib
1
Siyasat-Ndma,
pp. 18-19.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE OF THE SALJUQ EMPIRE
248
appears to have been to some extent interposed between them. So far
as the vizier conducted the sultan's relations with foreign rulers and
with
the caliphate, he acted in some measure as an official
of
the dargah.
When the caliph gave an audience to Malik-Shah and his amirs in
479/1086-7,
Nizam al-Mulk presented the amirs to the caliph. On the
accession
of a new caliph it was often, though not invariably, the vizier
who
gave the oath of
allegiance
to him on behalf of the sultan. Negotia-
tions for marriage alliances with the caliph were also usually carried out
by
the sultan's vizier. 'Amid al-Mulk Kunduri acted on behalf of
Toghril
Beg when he demanded the
hand
of the caliph's daughter; and
the negotiations for the marriage
of
Malik-Shah's
daughter to the caliph
in 474/1081-2 were carried out by Nizam al-Mulk. Similarly, Kamal
al-Din
Abu'l Barakat al-Darguzini, Mas'ud b. Muhammad's vizier, was
his vakil in the marriage of his sister Fatima to the caliph in
531/1137;
and Diya' al-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizam al-Mulk, who was vizier to
Muhammad b. Malik-Shah from 500/1107 to
504/1110-11,
was
muta-
valli on behalf of the sultan's sister when she was married to the Caliph
al-Mustazhir in 502/1109.
When the vizier deputized for the sultan in the mazalim court, he was
exercising
functions
that
belonged to the dargah
rather
than
to the
divan. Similarly, his supervision of the religious institution was
delegated to him in his capacity as the sultan's deputy, and not specific-
ally
because he was the head of the bureaucracy, except perhaps so far
as the administration
of
auqdf (religious endowments) was concerned. He
had no power to appoint qadis,
muhtasibs^
khatibs or other officials
of
the
religious
institutions, though he may have advised the sultan on the
matter.
The main object of his supervising the religious institutions was
probably to prevent any tendency towards heresy, because this was be-
lieved
to
threaten
political stability. The early sultans, Toghril Beg,
Alp-Arslan,
Malik-Shah, and Muhammad b. Malik-Shah, were strictly
orthodox and Hanafis by rite. The vizier in the early period was usually
a Hanafi or a Shafi'i. Kunduri was a fanatical Hanafi, and instituted the
commination of Shi'is
(rdfidis)
and Ash'aris from the
minbars
of the
mosques. Nizam al-Mulk, who was a Shafi'i, abolished this practice.
Under the later sultans strict orthodoxy was not insisted upon. Anu-
shirvan b. Khalid, who became vizier to Mahmud b. Muhammad in
521/1127
and to Mas'ud b. Muhammad in
529/1134-5,
was a Shi'i; and
Berk-Yaruq's
mustaufi Majd al-Mulk Abu'l Fadl Baravistani Qummi
was,
according to Ibn al-Athir, a secret Shi'i.
INTERNAL
STRUCTURE
OF THE
SALJUQ
EMPIRE
249
The
main function of the
vizier
as head of the divan was a financial
one.
It was his duty to regulate the sources of revenue and to increase
the revenue without causing injury to agricultural prosperity. He was
expected
to keep the finances of the
state
in a healthy condition and to
hold sufficient revenue in reserve to meet emergencies.
The
revenue of the empire derived from ordinary and extraordinary
taxes,
and from various other sources. Ordinary taxes comprised
(a) canonical taxes: namely,
kharaj
(land tax),
pasture
taxes
(mard'z),
and
jkga (poll-tax on members of the protected communities, the dhimmis);
and (b) uncanonical taxes
(mukus),
such as those on merchandise, tolls
and customs, and a variety of dues
(rusum),
including those levied for
the payment of
officials.
Extraordinary taxes consisted of
levies
made
for
specific purposes. These were of two kinds: cesses imposed on
existing
taxes (e.g. for defaulters, arrears, and chipped and broken
coins),
which in the course of time tended to become assimilated to
the original tax; and ad
hoc
levies,
which were often extremely burden-
some.
Because Nizam al-Mulk thought it necessary to
state
in the
Siydsat-Ndma
that
the taxes should not be demanded before harvest
time, it may be inferred
that
they were, in fact, not infrequently
demanded in advance—a practice
that
caused much hardship. Diplomas
issued to
officials
concerned in tax
collection,
i.e.
to
provincial
governors
and others, frequently included instructions
that
the taxes should be
levied
only at the
fixed
rates
and at the proper time. Since, however,
the assessment was sometimes made in one kind of dinar and paid in
currency dinars, by manipulating the conversion
rate
of one dinar to
another it was possible to raise the amount of the tax without actually
raising the nominal
rate
at which it was levied.
The
land tax was assessed in one of
three
ways,
by measurement
{misdhd))
as a proportionate
share
of the crop
{muqdsamd)
y
or at a
fixed
sum {muqdta'd). It was paid in cash and kind.
Alp-Arslan
is said to
have
levied kharaj in two annual instalments. The Akhbdr al-daulat
al-Saljuqiyya records
that
he was satisfied with the original kharaj
{al-khardj aJ-as/t), i.e. the ordinary or original assessment to which
additional taxes had not been added, or which had not been raised by a
manipulation of the conversion rates. Pasture taxes were levied on the
nomadic or semi-nomadic population in one
of
two
ways:
either (i) they
were
based on the
tent
or family or on the number of head of stock
owned,
or (2) the community was assessed at a lump sum. Poll-taxes
did not form an important item of revenue in Saljuq times.
After
Alp-