Black J. World War Two A Military History

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south of Moscow was exploited. The Germans relied on defensive

‘hedgehogs’, based on the main communication nodes, and were

able to prevent major breakthroughs and to hold on to the

Rzhev–Gzhatsk line, from which a new attack could be mounted on

Moscow; but stabilising the front placed an enormous strain on

German resources. Compared to their gains near Moscow, the

Soviets made far smaller inroads at the expense of Army Groups

North and South, although there were advances south-east of

Leningrad and on the Kerch peninsula. By the end of January 1942,

nearly 918,000 German troops had become casualties.

Their heavy loss of manpower in the winter of 1941–2 was a

permanent blow to German capability and one that affected the

Germans in three ways in 1942. First, these losses, which left many

divisions below operational levels, forced the eventual summer

offensive to be concentrated on one front. Secondly, troop levels

were such that diversionary attacks on any scale could not be

mounted elsewhere, although, in late June, a Russian salient south of

Leningrad, the Volkhov front, was destroyed, with the loss of the

surrounded Second Shock Army. Subsequently, German troops were

sent north, after conquering the Crimea, to increase the pressure on

Leningrad. The city, however, famously and successfully, held out

against both blockade and bombardment.

Thirdly, pressure on troop

numbers reduced opportunities for training.

The Soviets also suffered greatly from the strain of the winter

offensive as well as from the attempt to mount a sequel, which,

initially, was optimistically aimed at driving forward towards Kiev.

Stalin ignored the General Staff ’s advice to revert to the defence.

Eventually, a poorly planned and executed Soviet attempt to make a

breakthrough near Kharkov in May 1942, which would drive the

Germans back towards the Dnieper, led, instead, to the encirclement

of the attacking forces.The Soviets lost a quarter of a million troops

in the Barvenkovo salient. This offensive was a major failure that

enabled the Germans subsequently to gain the initiative.The period

of Soviet initiative, begun by their winter counter-offensive, had

been brought to an end.

The superior ability of the Germans to execute encirclement

plans reflected greater command skills and flexibility, but much of

the responsibility was Stalin’s. He failed to heed intelligence reports

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and military advice. Stalin, also, was overly keen on attacks whatever

the situation, and over-estimated the improvement in the Red

Army’s effectiveness. There were still serious deficiencies in equip-

ment, organisation and command training.Although, in the T-34 and

KV-1, the Soviets now had impressive tanks, the Germans proved

more effective in mobile warfare and benefited from superiority in

the air.The Soviets, however, put much of the blame on the Anglo-

American failure to open a Second Front in Western Europe.

The German capture of the Kerch peninsula in the eastern

Crimea on 8–20 May helped clear the southern flank for their

summer offensive, and also demonstrated the deficiencies of Soviet

forces, including a lack of adequate air–land co-operation and of

command skills. These were exploited by the Germans who bene-

fited from effective air support. Heavy Soviet losses here and near

Kharkov prepared the way for the main German offensive.

In June 1942, the Germans launched a fresh offensive against

Soviet forces.To Hitler, gaining Soviet resources was the best prepa-

ration for conflict with the USA, specifically for opposing a Second

Front in Western Europe. Unlike in 1941, the Germans were not

able to attack along their entire front, while the Red Army was,

initially, allowed by Stalin to fall back. Across the entire front

(including Finland) there were 3.5 million German and 1 million

allied troops, but the Soviet forces were considerably larger:

excluding numerous reserves, 5.5 million men were in the field.The

Red Army was also developing armoured units at the level of tank

armies in response to the German armour, although, as yet, their

tank tactics did not match those of the Germans. In particular, the

Soviets placed more of an emphasis on supporting infantry. From

March 1942, Soviet industrial production began to increase.

Furthermore, poor direction by Hitler led to a division of

German resources and, eventually, to an obsession with taking the

Volga crossing-point of Stalingrad, rather than keeping the focus on

the initial plan for Operation Blue. This had called for the destruc-

tion of Soviet forces west of the Don, followed by an advance into

the Caucasus in order to capture the Soviet oilfields and then put

pressure on Allied interests in the Near and Middle East. Cutting

Soviet supply links through Persia (Iran) was seen as important and

there were hopes of winning the support of neutral Turkey. The

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seizure of the oilfields was seen as a preparation for the lengthy

struggle that American entry into the war appeared to make

inevitable, and Hitler expanded the original objective in order to

seize all the oilfields, including Baku. The plan was flawed from the

outset, however, because it was supported by insufficient logistical

preparations, underestimated Soviet strength, and offered a massive

flank in the north open to attack by the Red Army, a problem that

concerned Field Marshal Bock. He was dismissed.

Launched on 28 June 1942, the first section of the plan was

achieved in July, when, in ideal tank conditions, German forces

pushed into the Don bend and the Germans captured Rostov,

although poor planning ensured that the armour necessary to help

clear the river crossings at the eastern end of the Don bend was in

the wrong location, and thus unable to help the attempt to push

through to Stalingrad in late July. ‘The Russian is finished,’ declared

Hitler on 20 July, and this confidence ensured that advice to deal

with Soviet forces on the German flank was ignored as the Germans

advanced. Stalin had anticipated the blow falling on Moscow and

had deployed his reserves accordingly. However, this also enabled

him to benefit from Moscow’s central position in the Soviet rail

network and to move troops to either flank as required. A willing-

ness to withdraw troops ensured that the Germans were deprived of

an encirclement victory in the bend, and, although the retreat hit

morale, Soviet forces gave a good account of themselves in late July

and held onto a bridgehead over the Don at Kletskaya that was to be

important when they counterattacked later in the year.

To the south, the Germans crossed the Don and easily advanced

across the Kuban, supported by other forces that had crossed from

Kerch. Stavropol was captured on 5 August, and the most westerly oil

fields round Maikop were captured on 9 August.The Germans pressed

on into the Caucasus, capturing Mount Elbruz, the highest peak, and

Mozdok, and nearing Grozny, but logistical problems mounted as

supply lines lengthened, while resistance was also a problem.

Stalingrad

To the east, in August, German forces advanced from the Don to the

Volga, which they reached north of Stalingrad on 23 August.

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However, the Red Army was now better able to improvise defensive

positions and deploy reserves than it had been the previous summer,

and Stalin entrusted the city’s defence to commanders who had

proved their quality in the counter-offensive the previous winter.

Taking Stalingrad assumed a great and increasing symbolic

importance for Hitler, substituting a political goal for operational

flexibility. Hitler also hoped that Stalin would commit his forces to

hold the city. With an obsession resembling the bloody Franco-

German conflict at Verdun in 1916, Hitler concentrated military

assets on what, in large part due to German bombing, became a

wrecked urban terrain. This made it very difficult for the German

attackers. Armour and air attack could achieve little in the ruined

terrain, and much of the fighting was at very close range. The

Germans could not utilise their skill at mobile warfare. Both sides

used massive quantities of artillery. As losses mounted, more and

more German forces were sucked into the battle and expended in

repeated attempts to seize individual complexes, especially the

Tractor, Red October and Barricades factories. Already, in June

1942, the Germans had seen the difficulty of capturing a city when

their attack on the Crimean port of Sevastopol had proved far more

difficult than had been anticipated. It had taken longer and cost

more men.As at Stalingrad, hand-to-hand combat became common.

Although it fell, Sevastopol was in a weaker position than Stalingrad

as it was isolated by land, as well as being partially blockaded by sea.

The difficulties the Germans encountered at Stalingrad were

exacerbated by poor command decisions, including a failure both to

drive against the flanks of the Soviet position in the city in an

attempt to cut it off from the river and to focus on the same targets

throughout and, instead, attacks on a broad front and the switching

of targets.

On 14 October, Hitler ordered his forces to take up defensive

positions everywhere except at Stalingrad and in parts of the

Caucasus.The German offensive had largely run its course before the

Soviet counterattack, Operation Uranus. Even had the Germans

succeeded at Stalingrad, the victory would have been of limited

value.The resource base (both German and captured Soviet) required

for further conflict on the Eastern Front and, eventually, against the

Western Allies, would have been attenuated, not strengthened, by the

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struggle.At an operational level, the advances made in 1942 had used

up available German reserves.

German concentration on the city itself, and their more general

failure to give due heed to Soviet capability, helped clear the way for

a skilfully planned and prepared Soviet counterattack that benefited

from gaining a local concentration of strength. German military

intelligence had again underestimated the size of Soviet reserves, and

this affected not only German plans but also their confidence when

the Soviet blow fell.

Launched on 19 November, under heavy artillery cover, the

Soviet attack centred on Romanian forces holding flank positions.

They were swiftly overrun; a defeat that arose from poor German

command decisions that had allocated important positions to these

units and also left them inadequately supported.The Soviets swiftly

exploited their success.The encirclement of the German Sixth Army

in and near Stalingrad (about 330,000 men) was complete four days

later, in part because of a poorly handled response.

German relief attempts failed in December and were overshad-

owed by Operation Little Saturn, in which Soviet forces protected

their encirclement by driving forward against Axis forces that might

otherwise have contributed to Stalingrad’s relief. This led to heavy

Axis casualties in the Don basin.

Despite Göring’s promises, it proved impossible to provide suffi-

cient supplies for Stalingrad by air, although the very attempt to

mount a large-scale airlift testified to the advances made by air

power, while what was transported helped keep the Sixth Army

alive.

The pocket was driven in by Soviet attack, and, by 2 February

1943, the remaining Germans had surrendered. In all, about 110,000

troops surrendered.

The campaign was a triumph for Soviet offensive art, and was far

more successful than the counter-offensive the previous winter,

although the German position was far more exposed than it had

been. The Soviets also benefited greatly from the recovery and

development of their munitions industry, for example in tank

production.The campaign was badly mishandled by the Germans, in

large part due to poor direction from Hitler, who failed to respond

with the necessary flexibility, and exaggerated the potential impact

of his determination to hold out. The deleterious consequences of

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the strengthening of Hitler’s position in the military in the autumn

of 1941 were increasingly apparent, as was the consequent decline of

that of the General Staff. Also the Sixth Army commander, Paulus,

refused to allow a shrinking of the pocket that would have permitted

a concentration of German forces.

As a reminder that it was not only the Germans who made foolish

command decisions, the successful Stalingrad counter-offensive –

Operation Uranus – was matched, in November 1942, by the disas-

trous Operation Mars on the central front west of Moscow. Planned

and directed by Zhukov, Mars failed and was covered up. In subse-

quent years, Zhukov provided a wholly inaccurate and incomplete

account in which he ignored the poor planning and execution of the

operation.The premature commitment of the Soviet armour into too

small a bridgehead prevented the subsequent forward movement of

supporting artillery. As a result, the exploiting forces had to engage a

counterattacking enemy without proper artillery support.

Furthermore, repeated, costly frontal Soviet attacks quickly led to the

combat exhaustion of units. Soviet forces lost about 100,000 killed

and about 235,000 wounded, men forgotten in the Soviet portrayal

of a continuous and heroic drive to victory from late 1942:

‘Operation Mars was analogous to the circumstances Allied military

leaders would have faced should Operation Overlord (the Normandy

landings) have failed.’

The Nazi government, in turn, disseminated a

misleading account of the Stalingrad campaign.

Operation Mars was not the sole Soviet offensive failure in the

second half of 1942. On 24 August, they had launched Operation

Sinyavino, in order to break the siege of Leningrad. Despite heavy

losses in repeated attacks, from both Leningrad and relief forces, the

Red Army was unable to prevail, and on 26 September the orders

were given to retreat to the starting lines.The Germans mounted an

effective defence, although they suffered heavy casualties and were

unable to advance on Leningrad anew. These failures underline the

achievement of Operation Saturn.

Madagascar

Concern about possible Japanese submarine bases in Vichy-run

Madagascar led to its conquest by the British in May–November

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1942. Operations there indicated the potential of amphibious attacks

when they could operate on a broad front, and the value, to the

British, of enjoying carrier-borne air superiority, but also the

problem that, once landed, troops could meet more serious opposi-

tion. The Madagascar campaign provided valuable experience in

mounting amphibious assaults. In May, the port at Diego Suarez was

captured and, in September, a full-scale attempt – both overland and

with fresh landings – was launched to seize control of the rest of the

island. The isolated French put up enough resistance to justify this

major effort. Although this operation was peripheral to the main

campaigns, it lessened the danger that the Allied world would be

fractured by German and Japanese advances.

North Africa

The success of Operation Torch, the Allied conquest of Vichy-run

Morocco and Algeria in November 1942, contrasted with the

German failure earlier that year to overcome Malta, Britain’s air and

naval base in the central Mediterranean. A strong air attack on the

island that spring had been damaging but, despite heavy losses of

German and Italian aircraft, it had not led to Malta’s fall. Plans for an

invasion were seen to be unviable and the airborne troops earmarked

for the operation were anyway transferred to Rommel when he was

checked at El Alamein.

Leaving Malta as a threat to precarious logistical links, Rommel

had advanced into Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), defeating the British at

Gazala and capturing nearby Tobruk on 20–1 June 1942. Rommel

proved an adroit commander, able to outthink his opponents and

better able to direct the battle, although the margin of advantage was

very narrow and luck played an important role.The Axis army was

also superior in fighting quality, and more skilled in tank warfare, not

least at coordination between armour and artillery cover. Rommel

also benefited from control of the air. The Allies lost 33,000 pris-

oners. An Allied over-reliance on defensive boxes had proved

harmful.They enabled Rommel to direct the flow of the battle and,

once heavily attacked, could not be held.

In terms of weaponry, the British lacked an effective anti-tank

gun, while the Crusader tank was mechanically poor. The Select

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Committee on National Expenditure had uncovered serious prob-

lems in tank production and its chairman responded to Tobruk by

moving a censure motion in the House of Commons on 1 July.

Churchill easily survived this mishandled attack, but it reflected

widespread political concern about military failure and his leadership.

As Rommel pressed on to the Egyptian border and then towards

Cairo and the Suez Canal, the entire Mediterranean was threatened

with Axis control. The British Eighth Army, weakened by recent

defeat, fell back, though losing over 7,000 prisoners when units were

encircled at Mersa Matruh on 27–8 June. The retreat continued.

Combined with failure in Malaysia and Burma, this leads to serious

questions about British operational effectiveness, command skills and

fighting quality at this juncture.

In July 1942, however, Rommel came up against the British near

El Alamein, about 60 miles west of Alexandria, and he failed to defeat

them that month and in early September. British operational

command and tactics had now improved and the British had the

advantage of shorter lines of communications. The British benefited

in July from Auchinleck’s readiness to engage in mobile warfare,

making effective strokes in combination with the holding of defen-

sive positions. Heavy losses were inflicted in July, and the dynamic of

Rommel’s success was broken. Indeed, this helped lead to a scholarly

controversy over British generalship, specifically over whether

Auchinleck, rather than General Bernard Montgomery, was the

commander responsible for thwarting the Germans, not least because

his plans were the basis for those used after he had been dismissed as

Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, by an impatient Churchill.

A British attack in late July was checked. In turn, the Germans

renewed their advance on 31 August, in the battle of Alam Halfa,

only to be blocked and to retreat.The British benefited from intelli-

gence information about German plans and from good air support.

The 8

Army, now under Montgomery, then built up their strength

in order to outnumber the Axis forces in the planned counterat-

tack.

This was also an aspect of a more general qualitative

transition in the British army, as it came to be better prepared to take

the offensive against the Germans.

On 23 October–4 November 1942, Rommel was defeated in the

final battle of El Alamein.The British faced positions well defended

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by minefields and anti-tank guns and supported by armour. Skilful

generalship, the availability of deciphered intelligence on German

moves, greater numbers of men, artillery and tanks, effective use of

artillery, air superiority and support, and attacks on Rommel’s vital

petrol supplies from Italy,

broke the German–Italian army,

destroying most of the German tanks and most of the Italian units.

The Axis line was eventually broken on 4 November, leading

Rommel to order a general withdrawal. Montgomery had read the

terrain ably and his sequential blows eventually succeeded, not least

by forcing Rommel to commit his forces, thus facilitating the deci-

sive British blow; although initial progress had been slow and

Montgomery’s ability to read the battlefield should not be exagger-

ated. The shift in tank warfare was shown on 2 November when a

German counterattack led to heavy German losses.

Thanks to the victory, Churchill was able to survive the growing

political crisis of the autumn, which had seen widespread criticism,

intrigues by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal, who wanted to

replace him, and a public call for his resignation from the Labour

MP Aneurin Bevan. After El Alamein, Churchill was able to demote

Cripps, and his political position was far less vulnerable.The victory

also provided an important psychological boost in Britain, although,

had Montgomery failed to break through and rested on the defen-

sive, the Torch landings would anyway have unravelled the German

position in North Africa.

Cautiously pursued by Montgomery, who was no master of

manoeuvre and who failed to encircle the retreating Axis forces on 5

and 6 November, Rommel fell back across Libya to the Mareth Line

in southern Tunisia. Unlike on earlier occasions, the British were to

advance not only into Egypt and across Cyrenaica, where Benghazi

fell on 20 November, but also to drive forward through the German

position near El Agheila across Tripolitania, where a second line was

overcome at Wadi Zemzem. Tripoli, the capital of Libya, was

captured on 23 January 1943, a success that earlier Allied advances

into Libya had not matched.

French North Africa was successfully invaded by Anglo-American

amphibious forces in Operation Torch on 8 November 1942. The

Americans were determined to be seen to act on land in the

European theatre (however indirectly) as soon as possible.

Thanks

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in large part to a careful cultivation of the French military leaders in

North Africa, resistance by far more numerous Vichy forces was

rapidly overcome, although some units, particularly of the navy,

resisted firmly. Negotiations after a general ceasefire ordered on 10

November led the French forces to join the Allies, and they were to

make a major contribution to Allied success in Tunisia the following

spring.The Vichy forces in Dakar also joined the Allies.

The Allied aim was to squeeze the Axis forces in North Africa from

the west and east, as well as to acquire experience in amphibious oper-

ations.The ability to mount the amphibious attacks was a result of the

limited success of the German submarines both as a strategic and as an

operational tool. Thanks to successful Allied disinformation, Axis

submarines were positioned to prevent a reported attack on Dakar.

The Americans landing at Casablanca had sailed directly from

Norfolk, Virginia. Given the difficulties experienced in coping with

the confusions of a landing and in speedily exploiting the situation,

particularly in the Casablanca operation, it was just as well that opposi-

tion there was light. The landings at Oran and Algiers were better

executed, although the entire operation was affected by the limited

time available for preparation and much of the staff work and logistical

support was inadequate.

Despite Allied concerns, Spain, which

controlled a portion of Morocco, did not intervene. Nor did the

Italian surface fleet, which was seriously short of oil.

Against no opposition, Axis forces rapidly occupied Vichy-run

Tunisia from 9 November, moving from Italy by air and sea and

denying the Allies their anticipated rapid success in North Africa.

American and British parachute units were dropped near Bône and

Tebessa in eastern Algiera on 12–16 November, but the Axis proved

better able to exploit the new situation created by the landings.The

refusal of American commanders to include eastern Algeria and

Tunisia among the landing zones is readily understandable in light of

the risk of Axis air attack, but had unfortunate consequences. As a

reminder of the number of largely forgotten campaigns that the war

encompassed, in December 1942 and January 1943, Free French

forces based in Chad overran the Italian-held Fezzan region of

southern Libya before advancing to the Mediterranean at Tripoli.

The operations in North Africa demonstrated the importance of

logistics. In battle, the Germans were tactically adroit, and in

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