Black J. World War Two A Military History
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especially aircraft and armoured cars.With four divisions, Iraqi forces
were larger, but, after the Iraqis began the conflict by blockading the
British airbase at Habbaniyah, west of Baghdad, on 29–30 April, they
lost the initiative.
From 2 May 1941, the British launched air attacks on Iraqi posi-
tions near the base, gaining control of the air, and supporting ground
action. Other British forces moved into Iraq from Jordan and from
the Persian Gulf. The former, a mobile flying column, crossed the
desert, linked up with the Habbaniyah garrison. The subsequent
advance on Baghdad was more difficult as the marshy ground and
dykes of the Euphrates and Tigris valleys and the land in between
made for difficult terrain, which was exacerbated by deliberate
flooding and the demolition of bridges.Well-entrenched Iraqi posi-
tions supported by machine guns and artillery delayed the British
advance, but the fall of the government under Rashid Ali, demor-
alised by British success, led to an armistice and the installation of a
favourable ministry. The campaign had shown the importance of
engineers, especially in bridging waterways so that motorised forces
could cross.
Concern about the Luftwaffe using airbases in Syria led the British
to decide to intervene there.This would prevent the Germans from
opening a new flank from which to attack Egypt and would give the
British valuable strategic depth if they were defeated in North
Africa.
Attacked on 8 June, the Vichy French forces in Syria and Lebanon
put up a fiercer resistance than the Iraqis: they were more numerous
than their British attackers, were well trained, had good artillery,
tanks and armoured cars, and a determined leadership, and benefited
from the terrain. The British found it necessary to blast Vichy
defenders out of positions, and also had to face effective counterat-
tacks. However, the initial axes of invasion – from Palestine and
Jordan – were supported, from late June, by advances from Iraq.The
Vichy forces had already lost Damascus on 21 June. Palmyra fell on 3
July to a force from Iraq that pressed on toward Homs, while in
Lebanon, backed by naval support, Allied forces advanced to Beirut.
The Vichy commander asked for terms on 10 July, and signed an
armistice four days later. Most of the French troops chose to be
returned to Vichy France and not to join de Gaulle. He, in turn, was
THE WAR WIDENS
104
angry about the British role in the conquered territories after the
armistice.
24
On 25 August 1941, British and Soviet troops had entered Persia
(Iran), rapidly gaining control of the state and forcing the pro-Axis
shah to abdicate in favour of his son. The Allies thus gained control
of supply routes across Persia, including those by which the Soviet
Union could be supplied, as well as strategic oilfields, and won addi-
tional depth in the event of German gains in the Middle East.They
remained in occupation of Persia until 1945, and benefited from the
increase in its oil production during the war.
‘Germany First’
Hitler followed up Pearl Harbor by declaring war on the USA on 11
December 1941 (as did Mussolini), in accordance, he said, with
German obligations under the Tripartite Treaty (with Italy and
Japan), although, strictly, the terms of the treaty did not require it.
This was a crucial step that prevented any chance of the USA
fighting only Japan. Germany had planned for war with the USA
since 1937, but Hitler’s motives in 1941 are unclear, although he was
angered by American co-operation with the British against German
submarine operations in the Atlantic. He claimed that his decision
was in response to American ‘provocations’ in the Atlantic, although
there is no sign that there was any informed analysis of the likely
trajectory of war between Japan and the USA or of the conse-
quences for Germany of war with America. There appears to have
been confidence that the U-boats would weaken the USA and there
was a failure to appreciate the impact of American entry in World
War One. Hitler may also have hoped that a grateful Japan would
attack the Soviet Union.
Hitler’s declaration let Roosevelt off the hook, since he agreed
with Churchill that Hitler was a greater menace than the Japanese,
although not all American opinion shared this view. One of the
many counterfactuals that the war readily lends itself to is that of
what would have occurred had Germany not declared war. Such
counterfactuals are not invalid, not least because many relate to the
issues that concerned leaders and planners at the time. Furthermore,
the consideration of counterfactuals helps undermine the air of
THE WAR WIDENS
105
inevitability and determinism that can underlie discussion when the
course of events is well known.
Hitler’s declaration led to the ‘Germany First’ strategy, which was
to see the bulk of American land and air assets allocated to preparing
for an invasion of Europe, although such a strategy had already been
outlined in the Rainbow 5 war plan and the Anglo-
American–Canadian ABC-1 Plan talks in early 1941, which had
envisaged a defensive strategy in the Pacific in the event of war with
the three Axis powers. Roosevelt had supported this because of
concern that Britain might collapse. This strategy led the American
army manoeuvres in 1941 to focus on preparing for European-
theatre conflict, and was confirmed by the Washington Conference
that began on 22 December 1941. The conference led to the
creation of an Anglo-American planning mechanism based on the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed both that American
forces should be moved to Northern Ireland, to prepare for opera-
tions in Europe, and that the Americans should plan an invasion of
Morocco.The preparation for the fight-back had begun.
As the Soviet Union, then in a non-aggression pact with
Germany, and Japan, which had not been informed of Hitler’s forth-
coming attack, had signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941, all
the conflicts in the world were not linked, but all major powers
were, from December 1941, at war. The character of the war had
been transformed.
‘Germany First’ had consequences throughout the world. An
emphasis on fighting Germany helped the Soviet Union by
diverting German resources to resist American attacks, while a focus
on Japan would not have had these consequences. Conversely, an
emphasis on the latter might have assisted China, and have ensured
that the Japanese were not able to mount offensives there and against
India in 1944. However, military assets are not transferable and
usable in the simple fashion that such remarks might suggest. There
were major problems, particularly, but not solely, logistical, associated
with the allocation of units and resources; and the capacity of the
Pacific to take, and employ effectively, more troops in 1942 and 1943
was limited.
The question of emphasis did not address the problem of timing.
The Japanese successes in early 1942, combined with those of the
THE WAR WIDENS
106
Germans against the Soviets that summer, led to American pressure
for swifter action than the British envisaged. The latter were
concerned about the risks of a premature invasion of France, in large
part because they were aware that resources alone could not coun-
teract German fighting quality. Nevertheless, in April 1942, it was
agreed that France would be invaded in 1943 and the pace of the
movement of American forces to Britain stepped up. Thus, as the
Japanese raided the Indian Ocean and planned an advance on Port
Moresby in New Guinea, the Allies were already debating how best
to destroy the power of the Axis.
NOTES
1 D.M. Glantz (ed.), The Initial Phase of the War on the Eastern Front, 22
June–August 1941 (1993).
2 S. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini (New York, 2001), p. 236.
3 R.A. Doughty, ‘Myth of the Blitzkrieg’, in L.J. Matthews (ed.),
Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can
America be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1998), pp. 57–79.
4 J. Barber and M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945: A Social
and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (1991), p. 130; G.K.
Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York, 1971), p. 266; R.W.
Thurston and B. Bonwetsch (eds), The People’s War: Responses to World
War II in the Soviet Union (Urbana, Illinois, 2000).
5 D.M. Glantz, Barbarossa. Hitler’s Invasion of Russia 1941 (Stroud, 2001); B.
Fugate, Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941
(Novato, California, 1984); K. Reinhardt, Moscow,The Turning Point: The
Failure of Hitler’s Military Strategy in the Winter of 1941–1942
(Providence, Rhode Island, 1992).
6 C.R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final
Solution in Poland (New York, 1993).
7 M.J. Whitley, Destroyers of World War Two. An International Encyclopedia
(2002), p. 227.
8 D.M. Goldstein and K.V. Dillon (eds), The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the
Japanese Plans (1993).
9 W.A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State. The American Encounter
with the World since 1776 (New York, 1997), p. 151.
10 R.Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor:Warning and Decision (Stanford, 1962); H.L.
Trefouse, Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy (Malabar, Florida,
1982).
11 H.P. Willmott, Pearl Harbor (2001); H. Conroy and H.Wray (eds), Pearl
Harbor Revisited: Prologue to the Pacific War (Honolulu, 1990); R.W. Love
(ed.), Pearl Harbor Revisited (Basingstoke, 1995).
THE WAR WIDENS
107
12 R.B. Meixsel, ‘Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the
Philippine Army, 1940–1941’, Journal of Military History, 59 (1995), p.
324.
13 L. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953); J. Toland, But
Not in Shame: The Six Months after Pearl Harbor (New York, 1961); W.
Rutherford, Fall of the Philippines (New York, 1971); R.H. Firth, A
Matter of Time.Why the Philippines Fell:The Japanese Invasion, 1941–1942
(2nd edn, Walnut, California, 1981); J.W. Whitman, Bataan Our Last
Ditch:The Bataan Campaign, 1942 (New York, 1990).
14 G.J.W. Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island (Lincoln,
Nebraska, 1997).
15 For a recent study, see C.M. Bell, ‘The “Singapore Strategy” and the
Deterrence of Japan:Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch
of Force Z’, English Historical Review, 116 (2001), pp. 604–34, esp. p. 633.
16 M.Tsuji, Singapore 1941–42:The Japanese Version of the Malaya Campaign
of World War II (Oxford, 1988).
17 D. Knox, Death March:The Survivors of Bataan (New York, 1981).
18 R. Callahan, The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore (1977); A. Warren,
Singapore 1942. Britain’s Greatest Defeat (2002), p. 279.
19 I.L. Grant and K. Tamayama, Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion. Both
Sides Tell the Story of a Savage Jungle War (Chichester, 1999).
20 M.J. Grove,‘The Development of Japanese Amphibious Warfare, 1874 to
1942’, in G. Till, T. Farrell and M.J. Grove, Amphibious Operations
(Camberley, 1997), p. 23.
21 D.J. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II (Ann Arbor, 1967).
22 G.K. Goodman (ed.), Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during
World War Two (Basingstoke, 1991).
23 A.D. Harvey, ‘Army Air Force and Navy Air Force: Japanese Aviation
and the Opening Phase of the War in the Far East’, War in History,6
(1999), pp. 174–204, esp. pp. 177–80.
24 G. Warner, Iraq and Syria, 1941 (1974); A. Mockler, Our Enemies the
French: Being an Account of the War fought between the French and the British,
Syria 1941 (1976);A.B. Gaunson, The Anglo-French Clash in Lebanon and
Syria, 1940–1945 (Basingstoke, 1997).
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In 1942, the Japanese found it impossible to sustain their offensive,
the Germans returned to the attack in Russia, ultimately disastrously,
and the Allies finally won lasting success in North Africa.
War in the Pacific
Having conquered the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, the
Japanese planned to press on to fix and strengthen the defensive
shield with which they wished to hold the western Pacific against
American attacks, although they were now over-extended, especially
in light of the continuation of the war in China. Furthermore, their
initial successes led to interest in a more extensive perimeter. The
Naval General Staff pressed for an attack on Australia or for opera-
tions against India and Sri Lanka, but the army was unprepared to
commit the troops required, and, instead, favoured a more modest
attempt to isolate Australia.
Having seized Rabaul on New Britain on 23 January, the
Japanese had decided to press on to seize Port Moresby in New
Guinea, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa in order to isolate Australia.
On 8 March, they landed at Lae and Salamaua in eastern New
Guinea, and established bases from which to make further gains on
the island.Tulagi, the capital of the Solomon Islands, fell on 3 May.
Australia was indeed vulnerable.The Australians had major commit-
ments in the Middle East and had lost troops in Singapore, and there
were only seven militia divisions available for home defence. As a
result, there were plans to abandon northern Australia and to focus
on defending a line north of Brisbane.
109
CHAPTER FOUR
Attacks held, 1942
However, the Japanese attempt to seize Port Moresby by sea,
which would have protected their positions in New Guinea and
New Britain, and increased the threat of an attack on Australia, was
thwarted as a result of the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7–8 May.This,
the first battle entirely between carrier groups in which the ships did
not make visual contact, indicated the failure of the Pearl Harbor
attack to wreck American naval power. The Americans had inter-
cepted and decoded Japanese messages, and were waiting in the
Coral Sea for the Japanese invasion fleet. The Americans suffered
serious losses in the battle, particularly the carrier Lexington, but the
Japanese also suffered, not least with the loss of planes, and they
failed to persist with the operation.
The Japanese had not handled the operation or the battle as well
as their earlier successes in the war might suggest. They failed to
achieve the necessary concentration of force, a characteristic they
were also later to show in other naval battles.
1
Coral Sea also
demonstrated a serious problem with naval warfare in the period:
the difficulty of accurate surveillance. All too often during the war
there were to be mistaken estimates of opposing strength, location
and direction. Coupled with this, the capability of naval air power in
this period should not be exaggerated.
Already, on 17 March, American fighters had arrived at Darwin,
providing protection for northern Australia. By the end of June, the
Allies were clearly in command of the air in the region. Port
Moresby was also protected, and Japanese bases were being
attacked. The build-up of air support was important in lessening
Australia’s vulnerability. The situation was eased by the return of
Australian troops from the Middle East and by the arrival of
American units, although many were support forces. Christmas
Island, to the north-west of Australia, was occupied by American
forces.
The battle of the Coral Sea ensured that the Japanese would try
to attack Port Moresby overland. Advancing through the jungle of
the difficult Owen Stanley Range, they were affected by disease and
supply problems and, in September, stopped by successful Australian
jungle fighting. A supporting amphibious landing in Milne Bay was
defeated by the Australians. Combined with eventual American
success at Guadalcanal, this indicated that the Japanese were far from
ATTACKS HELD, 1942
110
invincible on land.The Japanese were driven back to defensive posi-
tions on the north coast of New Guinea.
2
Rather than focusing on Australia and the south-west Pacific,
Admiral Yamamoto preferred a decisive naval battle aimed at
destroying American carriers, and, to that end, proposed to seize
Midway and other islands that could serve as support bases for an
invasion of Hawaii, which, he thought, would lead to the battle. He
hoped to lure the American carriers to destruction under the guns
of his battleships. A symbolic American air raid on Tokyo on 18
April, mounted from carriers, named, after its commander, the
Doolittle raid, led, in May, to a Japanese decision to seize Midway, as
well as positions in the Aleutian Islands that appeared to threaten
Japan in the northern Pacific.
The continued capacity of the American navy, however, was
shown clearly, on 4 June, with the American victory over the
Japanese fleet seeking to capture Midway Island and to engage the
Americans in a decisive battle.This was a battle in which the ability
to locate opposing ships proved crucial. Furthermore, as with
combined arms operations on land, the combination of fighter
support with carriers (in defence) and bombers (in attack) was
important in order to minimise losses.The Americans encountered
serious difficulties on both counts. Their strike from the Hornet
failed because the fighters and dive-bombers were unable to find
the carriers, while, lacking fighter support, the torpedo-bombers
from the Hornet and the Enterprise suffered very heavy casualties;
with heavily outnumbered fighter support, those from the Yorktown
suffered comparable losses. However, the result of these attacks was
that the Japanese fighters were unable to respond, not least because
they were at a low altitude, to the arrival of the American dive-
bombers. In only a few minutes, three carriers were wrecked. A
fourth, the Hiryu, successfully took evasive action. She later
launched a wave of planes that inflicted heavy damage on the
Yorktown, before being caught and crippled by American dive-
bombers. The Americans then prudently retired to avoid the
approach of the Japanese battleships, which, deprived of their target,
retired on 5 June.
The sinking of all four heavy Japanese carriers to American air
attack, and the loss of many aircraft and pilots, shifted the naval
ATTACKS HELD, 1942
111
balance in the Pacific to the Americans. Both the initiative and the
arithmetic of carrier power moved against the Japanese. The loss of
pilots was particularly serious as the Japanese had stressed the value
of training and had produced an élite force of aviators. Once lost,
they proved difficult to replace.
3
The very extent of Japanese conquests strained the capacity of their
military to increase, or hold, them, but, in addition, in the Midway
operation, the Japanese had been seriously hit by flawed planning and
preparation.This contrasted with American preparation, including the
more effective repair effort that, after Coral Sea, had returned the
damaged American carrier Yorktown to service. The Americans also
had the ability to intercept and decipher coded Japanese radio
messages, enabling them to outthink their opponents: the intelligence
failure of Pearl Harbor was more than rectified. Furthermore, the
Japanese had underestimated American strength, while their deploy-
ment in pursuit of an overly complex plan and their tactical
judgement were poor. Yamamoto’s inflexible conviction of the value
of battleships in any battle with the Americans had served him ill.
4
Defeat at Midway derailed Japanese schemes, thwarting their plan to
invade Hawaii, which, had it been successful, would have made it very
difficult for the Americans to recapture the western Pacific. The
Japanese had lost their offensive capacity, and that at a time when the
Germans were still taking the initiative in Russia and North Africa.
In addition, the rallying of much Indian opinion behind Britain,
especially the increase of the Indian army to become 1 million
strong in 1942, the largest volunteer army in history, helped ensure
that the Japanese were held in South Asia.The Quit India movement
of that year was a serious crisis for British rule, with a series of rural
rebellions, mainly in eastern India. The British responded by
arresting senior Congress leaders, after which the movement became
more violent, hindering the operation of British authority. However,
the Quit India agitation did not encompass all of India and was
nationalist rather than pro-Japanese.
The fall of Burma was not followed by that of India. Nevertheless,
the first British Arakan offensive, an attempt to make limited gains on
the Burmese coast, failed in December 1942. The Japanese proved
superior at jungle warfare, the British were handicapped by difficult
supply lines, and the poorly conceived campaign was mishandled.
ATTACKS HELD, 1942
112
In geopolitical terms, the loss of Japanese offensive capability
made thoughts of joint action with the Germans against the British
in South-West Asia even more implausible. Germany and Japan
were unable to create a military partnership, or to provide mutual
economic assistance that in any way matched that of the Allies.
Their ineffectual attempts at naval co-operation, which included
the dispatch of German technology, indicated that, even where co-
operation was possible, it did not achieve much.
For the Germans, the naval opportunities presented by American
entry into the war came not from co-operation with Japan, but from
the poorly defended nature of American waters. Due, in part, to a
reluctance to learn from earlier experience, it took time for convoys
to be introduced in these waters, and there were very heavy losses to
German submarine attacks in the first half of 1942, although, in May
1942, the situation improved considerably as effective convoying was
introduced. This led the U-boats, from July, to focus anew on the
mid-Atlantic.
Germany versus the Soviet Union
In Europe, the major clashes were again on the Eastern Front. The
Soviet counter-offensive, launched in December 1941, had revealed
the extent to which the Germans were not trained for defence and
found it difficult to fight well in that role.
5
However, at the begin-
ning of 1942, the impact of the Soviet winter counter-offensive was
lessened, in part because Stalin focused on a wide-front attack,
including attacks near Leningrad and an advance south-east of
Kharkov in late January, which could not be sustained; while Hitler
issued a ‘stand or die’ order to his forward forces. Commanders, such
as Guderian, who advocated withdrawal were ignored, even
dismissed. In total, thirty-five generals were removed.
Stalin’s wish to translate early successes into an offensive along the
entire front that would destroy all the German armies proved singu-
larly inappropriate. He hoped to prevent the Germans from being in
a shape to mount a renewed offensive later in 1942, but his policy
deprived the Soviet forces in the centre of the reinforcements neces-
sary for them to encircle Army Group Centre, a goal that had
seemed possible as the defeat of the German pincers north-west and
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