Black J. From Louis XIV to Napoleon The Fate of a Great Power
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and Spain. The belated erection in 1763 of a statue in Paris to commemorate Louis XV’s
glorious role in the War of the Austrian Succession was greeted with derision.
126
A more
painful loss was that suffered by the French population of Acadia (Nova Scotia), deported
by the British as a security risk in 1755, to be followed, after its conquest, by the population
of Île Royale, renamed Cape Breton Island. The population of Pondicherry was ordered to
leave in 1761. The French in the St Lawrence Valley and Louisiana had to accept foreign rule.
Chandernagore was totally destroyed by the British in 1757, as in 1761 was most of
Pondicherry including the churches and the public buildings as well as the fortifications. The
conquerors took the loot: pillars and other loot taken from Madras to Pondicherry in 1746
were returned in 1761 when it fell to the British.
War with Prussia was ended by the Treaty of Hubertusberg of 15 February 1763. This
brought peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, a major humiliation for the Austro-
French alliance. The failure to crush Prussia underscored the sense of humiliation felt in
French army circles over failure at Rossbach. It also provided the backdrop for the
developments to come. Prussia played a major role in the Partitions of Poland (1772–95) and
the development of the ‘Eastern Question’, neither of which were welcome to the French
government.
The alliance with Austria reviewed
Failure in the war helped to ensure that this diplomatic strategy was not thereafter seen as a
success, although there had been criticisms even before the defeats of the Seven Years’ War.
On 31 January 1757 Starhemberg reported that French public opinion was strongly against
Austria and the Austrian alliance,
127
and some French diplomats did not hesitate to criticize
the direction of policy. Valory, who did so, also told the Prussian minister Podewils that he,
Belle Isle and Nivernais had not been consulted. Choiseul voiced his concern to the Sardinian
foreign minister, and even Bernis agreed with the Saxon envoy that France and Austria would
clash.
128
Policy was not set by the public, but the problems that affected the alliance with Austria
during the war and concern about post-war developments led to consideration of new
options both during the conflict and at its close. At the close of 1759 there was anxiety that
the peace would entail a British-arranged reconciliation between Austria and Prussia that
would destroy French influence in Germany and Scandinavia. Far from seeking a powerful
Austria as a desirable part of the peace settlement, it was argued that Austrian policy might
change under Joseph II, that – having destroyed Prussia – Austria could turn to Britain and
against France, and that a strong Prussia would be useful in Germany and Italy. A continuation
and widening of the Anglo-Bourbon maritime struggle would, it was feared, leave Austria
overly powerful in Europe.
129
Belle Isle also argued against the destruction of Prussia.
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These themes were to be repeated by French ministers and commentators for the remainder
of the century. More particularly, they captured the ambivalence that increasingly affected
France’s war effort, and the extent to which the Diplomatic Revolution was not seen as a
fixed part of the international firmament; indeed, it was specifically contrasted with the
Family Compact that linked France and Spain.
130
However, after the war successive French governments essentially maintained the alliance
structure with which France had ended the war. Despite thoughts of turning to Britain,
Prussia or Russia, there appeared no better alternative, not least because Frederick was
distrusted and Britain seen as overly dominant at sea. Russian plans in Eastern Europe were
regarded as hostile. As more generally with bilateral relations, the choice of alliance partners
was not simply a matter of policy by and towards France. The improvement in Austro-
Spanish relations from 1752 was also very important in helping maintain good relations
between France and both Austria and Spain.
This system was not to survive the Revolution, but it is worth noting, as an important
aspect of the frequently overlooked successes of the ancien régime monarchy. France’s
influence over her allies, especially Austria, was limited, but she was neither isolated nor
essentially reliant on the second-rate and vulnerable, as had been the case for much of the
period 1674–1756. British hopes that the Austro-French alliance would disintegrate proved
misplaced and, whatever the tensions between the two powers, Austria was unwilling to co-
operate with Britain against France until the era of the French Revolution. Diplomatically,
France was better prepared to confront Britain; and the absence of continental distractions
during the War of American Independence, in which France participated in 1778–83, was an
aspect of the success of the Diplomatic Revolution.
Tension with Britain, 1763–74
There was considerable concern in Paris about the policies of Russia and, to a lesser extent,
Austria and Prussia in Eastern Europe. This led to occasional suggestions about co-operation
between Britain and France, but they were less important than the continued reality of
distrust and competition. There was no equivalent to Puysieulx’s attempts to improve
relations, and France’s position was greatly assisted by the continuation of her alliance with
Spain, again a contrast to the situation from 1748. Although there were differences, Franco-
Spanish relations were largely harmonious and the Spanish foreign minister, Grimaldi,
maintained close links with Choiseul.
In both Britain and France it was assumed that the Peace of Paris would not last. Choiseul
had begun considering a future war with Britain even before the close of the Seven Years’
War.
131
In April 1763 the French began to gather information that might help in an invasion.
132
Choiseul dominated foreign policy in the 1760s, although in 1761–6 it was his cousin, the
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Duke of Choiseul-Praslin, who was foreign minister, while Choiseul himself was minister of
the marine. Choiseul was determined to prepare for a war of revenge, and for him naval
reconstruction and diplomacy were both sides of the same coin. Thus, while his cousin was
foreign minister, Choiseul remained responsible for relations with Spain, the essential ally in
any future struggle with Britain.
133
In the Seven Years’ War, the British had benefited greatly
from defeating the French navy and capturing many of her colonies before Spain entered the
war. Spain’s help in any future war was even more necessary because of France’s recent
colonial losses.
Whereas the Spanish colonies were to a great extent able to sustain their defence from
their own resources, the French lacked this capability. This had been true even before the
loss of Canada. The warships launched there between 1729 and 1759 were far less numerous
and effective than those launched by the Spaniards in Havana.
134
The colonies also depended
on troops from France. The situation was even more difficult after 1763, not least as many
of the remaining French colonies first had to recover from British occupation.
The British used intimidatory gunboat diplomacy in 1764–5 to defend their position
successfully in colonial disputes in West Africa and the West Indies,
135
and Choiseul warned
the Spaniards in March 1766 that France could not provide the necessary support for a
successful war against Britain for another three years. The French were more successful in
thwarting British hostility to their annexation of Corsica in 1768. Charles Emmanuel III of
Sardinia had long tried to stir up the British to oppose this step, but Choiseul’s decisive
actions pre-empted effective opposition.
136
Two years later, France came to the brink of war, in large part as a consequence of her
alliance system. Britain threatened war when Spain expelled a settlement from the Falklands,
which was seen as a staging post to the Pacific, an area of Spanish commercial monopoly that
the British were increasingly keen to penetrate. Concerned about Russian strength in Eastern
Europe, Choiseul initially tried to negotiate a settlement to the dispute, and pressed Spain to
moderate her position, but, by the start of December 1770, he saw war both as inevitable and
as likely to consolidate his domestic position. Choiseul also felt that a firm stance was likely
to secure Bourbon goals and, to that end, he sought to match British naval preparations.
Louis XV’s unwillingness to fight defused the crisis. Choiseul and his cousin were dismissed
on 24 December 1770. Louis thus resolved both the international crisis and the divisions
within his ministry. Charles III was notified that France needed peace.
137
This persuaded
Spain to reach an agreement with Britain, and also strained relations between France and
Spain.
138
France and Eastern Europe
The Duke of Aiguillon, Choiseul’s successor as foreign minister, 1771–4, was primarily
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interested not in the colonial world, but in shifts within Europe. This represented a continuation
of Choiseul’s policy from his return to the Foreign Ministry in 1766, and a development of
the earlier Secret du Roi. This secret diplomacy of Louis XV began in the mid-1740s, with
support for a plan that his cousin, the Prince of Conti – grandson of the Conti elected King
of Poland in 1697 – become the next king of Poland. Conti was approached in Paris in 1745
by an emissary sent by several leading Poles who did not want the Saxon presence in Poland
maintained after the next royal election. Louis XV accepted Conti’s request for financial and
political support, but also kept the foreign minister and the Council in the dark. Although
this owed something to the Polish demand for secrecy, it also reflected a somewhat feline
strain in Louis’s character.
Conti discovered from the French envoy in St Petersburg that the Russians would not
support a French candidate, and he therefore helped to give an additional strand to the anti-
Russian character of French foreign policy. Conti’s scheme broadened out into a wish to
recreate a powerful alliance of Poland, Sweden and Turkey, that could serve French interests
against Austria and, especially, Russia, which was seen in France as a disruptive alien force
in Europe. Prussia was regarded as an important addition to the alliance. Conti’s focus was
on Poland and he expected this to be the objective of French policy in Central and Eastern
Europe, but, there was an inherent clash with other, wider views of France’s interests.
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The Secret du Roi had to be suspended during the Seven Years’ War, when France’s
supporters in Poland became understandably disillusioned by her willingness to accept
Russian pretensions there,
140
while French diplomats who were members of the Secret were
outraged by the 1757 alliance with Russia. However, the Secret was to be revived after the
war.
The Secret du Roi interacted with a more generalized concern about European international
developments that focused in particular on Russia. The sources of this were various and
sometimes poorly-formulated, but included a sense of specific concern about France’s allies,
especially Poland, and a more general unwillingness to accept change, because change appeared
to be leading to a more disruptive and hostile environment. The focus of anxiety on Russia
was also an aspect of the sense of Eastern Europe as primitive that characterized much
Western thought. The Russians appeared as the latest wave of barbarian invaders.
Even during the Seven Years’ War, the French had sought to protect their allies from
excessive Russian pressure. Thus, in 1756 Rouillé had urged Russia not to intervene in
Swedish domestic affairs
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and had emphasized continued French concern for Poland.
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Tsarina Elisabeth died in January 1762 and the succession by the pro-Prussian Peter III
severed links with France. Peter was replaced by Catherine II – the Great – in July 1762, but
Louis XV did not seek to resume the confidential correspondence he had had with Elisabeth.
Policy toward Russia reflected the general direction of French diplomacy. It focused not
on developing alliances that could be used against powers with which she was – or was likely
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to be – at war, but, rather, on creating an alliance system that would bring stability to the
Continent and, specifically, counter Russian power. Thus, instead of seeking Eastern European
support against the Habsburgs, as she had done prior to 1756, French diplomacy was
designed to maintain a static territorial system in Eastern Europe, one that would complement
the status quo that her alliances with Austria and Spain had brought to the Low Countries,
the Rhineland and Italy. A defensive and reactive character to French policy became more
marked after 1763, although it was apparent from 1748 and, already in 1756, entry into the
European sphere of the Seven Years’ War had been in response to an act of aggression.
Financial problems affected the French government. The Seven Years’ War had been paid
for by borrowing and this left the government with a substantial debt and a recurrent annual
deficit. The financial situation both hindered Choiseul’s attempt to build up the navy and
encouraged Terray, controller-general from December 1769, to favour conciliation in the
Falklands dispute.
143
Attitudes to foreign policy
French policy can also, in part, be related to a climate of thought, specifically the attempts
of certain prominent French intellectuals to advocate an international order based on morality
and reason; although many were suspicious of the intentions and conduct both of international
diplomacy and of French foreign policy, believing them to be manipulative, dishonest and
aggressive. In common with natural law theorists, French writers on the subject had little
understanding of dynamic elements in international relations, the scope of change and the
attempt by certain powerful rulers to match diplomatic developments to their growing
power.
144
One of the leading writers, Montesquieu, who regarded war as unnatural and the
product of monarchical rule, has been seen as displaying ‘a fearful resistance to change’.
145
Most French writers who discussed international relations sought peace.
146
Just as many natural law theorists came from the federal states of the Empire and the
United Provinces, with their stress on legal relationships, and their – in most cases – only
limited interest in aggression,
147
so the French writers came from a power that had largely
ceased to seek European territorial gains. Their arguments and tone were very different from
those of the writers who had applauded Louis XIV’s attack on the Dutch in 1672.
148
The bold and acquisitive aspirations and aggressive methods that had characterized French
policy in 1741 were not repeated during the ancien régime. In 1752 Hautefort, the envoy in
Vienna, stated that ‘the maintenance of the peace of Europe’ was Louis XV’s principal
object.
149
In 1745 Argenson had proposed a federation of independent Italian states, a
departure from traditional schemes for Valois and Bourbon dynastic aggrandizement. He
suggested that Charles Emmanuel become king of Lombardy and ruler of the federation.
150
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Argenson’s argument that the Bourbons should exploit the desire of the Italian rulers for
liberty against the excessive and tyrannical power of Austria, was countered by Philip V
with the claim that the league was impossible or would take many years to negotiate, that it
would depend on Bourbon armed support, that any league required a number of near-equal
powers which Sardinian power prevented, and that Charles Emmanuel would despoil, not
help, Don Philip and other Italian rulers.
151
The French faced the problem that talk of the
liberties of Germany or Italy was difficult to separate from the particular interests of
Bavaria, Prussia and Sardinia. Furthermore, alliances led to dangerous and excessive
commitments. Amelot suggested in February 1743 that any alliance with Sardinia would
require a basis of the conquest of all Italy, as only thus would it be possible to reconcile
Spanish and Sardinian interests. He noted that this would entail a lengthy war, as Maria
Theresa would never accept the loss of all her Italian territories. The Queen of Spain,
however, believed it necessary to plan for such an outcome.
152
The years after the War of the Austrian Succession saw an increase in French emphasis on
their pacific intentions and on the opposition to any change in the European system.
Justifiably, Louis XV was not seen as a warmonger. Indeed, one diplomat reported in
September 1749, ‘I am assured at the Council Table with his ministers, he employs himself
in writing the names of the dogs he will hunt with the next day’.
153
After 1748, liberties were
construed by the French government not (as they had been from 1741) as being incitements
for change – against, in particular Habsburg strength and Russian hegemony – but, rather, as
part of the existing situation potentially threatened by Austria and Russia. Puysieulx was
especially keen on a politics of peace and stability. In 1748 he presented France as Genoa’s
essential protection against Sardinian expansionism.
154
In November 1750 Puysieulx argued
that if Maria Theresa and her allies only sought peace they could count on the backing of
France, which, he claimed, was always ready to act against any power that sought to trouble
it. If, on the contrary, they had other views, France would block them.
155
In 1751 Puysieulx
proposed a French-supported Electoral league of Prussia, Cologne and the Palatinate to
maintain the German constitution and to support the case for unanimity in the imperial
election. This was a development from France’s position as a co-guarantor of the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648 and from proposals advanced over recent decades, for example by
Chavigny in 1744, for a league modelled on that of the Rhine.
156
Opposed to aggressive hegemony on land, French ministers and diplomats also presented
their naval and commercial policy as determined by the necessity to put just limits on what
Bernis saw in 1758 as the imperial power which Britain wished to exercise on all seas and
over all trading powers, a theme repeated by Choiseul in February 1760, and, again, in
1761.
157
In March 1755 Rouillé had argued that Britain sought to destroy the balance of
power in the New World,
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but such arguments were employed to justify an essentially
defensive policy, rather than as a prelude to aggression. In November 1759 Choiseul proposed
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a Spanish-headed maritime association to resist British claims to a right to search at sea,
although he was aware that the Swedes, Danes and Dutch were not then in any shape to
provide much help.
159
Once the war had ended, a more aggressive note was sounded and the call for a colonial
and maritime balance was employed in order to justify plans for action against Britain.
160
Cutting Britain down to size was seen as a prelude to France taking her rightful place in
Europe: the British would be unable to support her opponents.
The image of French policy was not simply presented in re-active and defensive terms,
although those were emphasized when the support of other powers was sought. The notion
of the king as general arbiter and sovereign protector of ‘la tranquilité et liberté publique’, to
quote a senior French diplomat of 1751,
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was a notion in which gloire, power and this re-
active element were all fused, and in which there was no attempt to disguise that the
definition of what was acceptable was largely a matter of French choice.
The positive interpretation of French power lent itself to different arguments, although
they shared the habit of extending the range of French influence beyond what could be
realistically assumed in terms of conventional power politics. The Marquis de Mirabeau, a
leading physiocrat, argued in L’ami des hommes, ou traité de la population (Avignon, 1757)
that the king of France should lead the rest of Europe towards a peaceful and prosperous
new economic order of mutual benefit. French ministers expressed similar views to the
philosophes, Rouillé, for example, differentiating in 1756 between the ‘grands principes de la
politique’ and ‘la finesse et l’artifice’.
162
The French had already abandoned their support for Jacobitism, a policy that – as they
knew – had caused unease in Protestant Europe.
163
Such support, with its emphasis on
Catholicism and legitimism, seemed anachronistic. Prefiguring the views of the Revolutionaries,
Rouillé had argued in 1755 and 1756 that it was only the British ‘peuples’ who could effect
a change in their government.
164
Under the stress of war, invasion had, indeed, been planned
in 1759, and was to be again in 1779, but there was no longer any serious commitment to the
Stuarts.
D’Aiguillon set out deliberately to make concessions in colonial disputes with Britain, in
order to improve French effectiveness in Europe, and in March 1772 he proposed concerted
pressure on Austria and Russia in order to dissuade them from partitioning Poland. George
III, however, responded coolly, and, when the French-backed Gustavus III staged a coup to
strengthen monarchical authority in Sweden in August 1772, seizing power from a ministry
inclined to Britain and Sweden, suspicion of France increased in Britain.
It was easy for observers to suggest that Britain and France might be able to negotiate an
understanding, based on France agreeing not to offend Britain in commercial and maritime
matters, but British ministerial suspicion of France remained strong; and, although the
British government was concerned about the policies of the partitioning powers, it had no
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wish to allow France to commit Britain to opposition to them. However poor British
relations with the partitioning powers might be, it was more reasonable to hope that they
could be improved than that a successful Anglo-French alliance could be created. These
attitudes led the British to use threats in 1773 to dissuade the French from deploying their
navy against Russia in the Baltic and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, conflict was avoided, as
both powers sought peace, both because of their domestic problems, and because they saw
no reason to fight.
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France and Russia
France, therefore, lacked any effective response to the First Partition of Poland in 1772. It
represented a major blow for French assumptions in Eastern Europe, because the French had
sought a strong Poland and a strong Turkey as a bar to Russian expansion. In 1762 Louis XV
had noted that Poland was the leading object of the Secret.
166
The following year, Châtelet,
the envoy in Vienna, had expressed concern about what he saw as the despotic intentions of
Russia in Poland. France and Austria had discussed joint action to prevent Russia from
choosing a pliant successor to Augustus III, and, instead, to support Prince Xavier of
Saxony. However, in 1763–4, they proved less determined than Russia and Prussia and were
divided over their policy in Poland.
167
The French failed to stir up Turkish opposition, while
French policy itself was harmed by Louis XV’s irresolution and by differences over which
candidate to support. Agents of the Secret criticized Praslin’s caution, but he was clear that
France could not act alone and that powers nearer to Poland had to play the leading role in
opposing Russia. The British government made it clear it would not help.
168
Allied to Frederick, Catherine II was able to impose Stanislaus Poniatowski as the new
King of Poland in 1764 (election, 7 September). His secret diplomacy in ruins, Louis was
reduced to the impotent responses of refusing to recognize him until December 1765 and of
rejecting his request for the hand of the Princess of Orléans,
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despite the advice of Broglie,
the French envoy, that this would help develop French influence.
170
Panin, Catherine’s
leading adviser on foreign policy, had been bitterly opposed to France while envoy in first
Denmark and then Sweden, in 1747–60.
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The French became more active later in the decade. Choiseul pursued a markedly anti-
Russian policy from April 1766, when he became foreign minister for the second time. He
was helped by Turkish disenchantment with Frederick after the Russo-Prussian treaty.
Choiseul had Vergennes, whom he saw as insufficiently bellicose, recalled in April 1768, and
encouraged Turkey to respond to growing Russian pressure on Poland by declaring war in
October 1768.
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The French then sought to use the Polish situation to help the Turks. French agents were
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sent to the anti-Russian Confederation of Bar, Taulès going in 1768. Worried by Russian
successes against the Turks, in August 1770 Choiseul chose General Dumouriez as an agent
charged with creating a Polish Confederate Army that would, with French help, be able to
resist Russia. He was disappointed to find the Confederates divided, badly armed and
disciplined, and less numerous than he had hoped,
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but French plans lent force to the
Russian desire to regain control of Poland. Choiseul also tried to revive the policy of the
barrière de l’est in Sweden. The Count of Modène was sent as ambassador and at the close
of 1768 successfully encouraged King Adolf Frederick to limit Anglo-Russian influence in
Swedish politics.
Russia recovered control of Poland in 1772 by means of the First Partition, a step that
revealed the weakness of the Austro-French alliance. Maria Theresa had opposed the idea of
a partition, but the danger that Prussia and Russia might make gains without an Austrian
equivalent led to a change of heart, much to the fury of the French. All three powers took a
large slice of Poland: D’Aiguillon told Mercy, Austrian envoy in Paris, that the defensive
provisions of the Austro-French alliance could not extend to these new gains, while Mercy’s
counterpart, Rohan, and his government complained about the Austrian failure to consult
France.
174
Anger about the state of the alliance was fuelled by fear concerning the possible
consequences of the partition. There was no reconciliation with Russia.
175
In 1773 the Duke
of Broglie, then the director of the Secret du Roi, a self-confident and difficult aristocrat,
warned Louis XV that the consequences of the new alliance would not be limited to the
humbling of Poland and Turkey. He warned that Gustavus III of Sweden might be dethroned,
Germany brought under Austro-Prussian control, Italy under that of Austria, and all of
Europe subject to the influence of the three partitioning powers.
176
Such fears were exaggerated, not least because the powers rapidly fell out, while, anyway,
the use of strength to gain territory without consideration of even tenuous legal claims was
not new. However, for the French government, the First Partition was a particular shock
because it both represented and underlined the failure of its diplomacy, although some
influential intellectuals, such as Diderot and Voltaire, supported the step because they
regarded Poland as a less enlightened state than her aggressors. Harnessing the resources and
obtaining the backing of the Eastern European states had long been a major theme for their
Western European counterparts, particularly after the Austrian defeat of the Turks in the
1680s and the new-found Russian dynamism of the 1690s. In 1756 France appeared to win
this struggle, displacing Britain from her Austrian alliance and, through that, acquiring links
with Russia that were stronger than those enjoyed by Britain.
Indeed, whereas France had been allied to the weaker ‘side’ in Central and Eastern Europe
from 1742, from 1756 this was, instead, true of Britain. The course of the Seven Years’ War
had not fulfilled French expectations, but she had exited it in a relatively propitious diplomatic
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situation, a position encouraged by a more cautious British attitude towards continental
interventionism from 1761. After the collapse of the Anglo-Prussian alliance in 1762, it was
France, alone, among the powers of Western Europe that had a powerful ally further east.
Choiseul regarded the death of Tsarina Elizabeth that year, and the succession of the pro-
Prussian Peter III, as a vindication of the decision to ally with Spain.
177
Austria also was still
an ally, although Choiseul feared that her ambitious schemes might bring her into conflict
with the Bourbons.
178
Britain had no such option when her alliance with Prussia collapsed
the same year. Furthermore, the lessening of tensions in Italy made it possible for France to
maintain alliances with both Austria and Spain. Charles III was keen to improve relations
with Austria,
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Choiseul to consolidate a system of Austria, France and Spain.
180
Mid-eighteenth-century French policy reassessed
It may therefore appear paradoxical that France should be seen by 1774 as having failed:
Poland was partitioned, the Turks had been forced by the Russians to accept substantial
losses, Austria was clearly not following the French lead, France had no powerful alliance
system within the Empire, and approaches to Britain had proved abortive. Yet, in part, this
is a matter of perspective and expectations. The degree to which it was realistic to assume
that any Western European power could greatly affect developments further east is unclear,
but the events of the period 1680–1735 scarcely suggested that their influence would be
considerable, unless they had a powerful ally willing to co-operate. This was especially true
in wartime. In peace it was possible to have a greater impact, not least if local enmities were
finely balanced, but it was difficult to create or maintain such a balance.
The basis of any balance shifted in the eighteenth century. As late as the close of the
1760s it seemed reasonable to hope that Sweden, Poland and Turkey could counteract
Russia and Austria, or be part of a system that might achieve such a counteracting. However,
such a notion was increasingly supplemented, and, in time, supplanted, by the idea that
Prussia or Austria could counteract Russia. Both strategies collapsed in the early 1770s:
Turkey and Poland were greatly weakened, to an extent that raises doubts about the wisdom
of Choiseul’s policies in the late 1760s, while Austria chose to join Prussia and Russia.
These were failures for France, but it is far from clear what she could have done. When
Broglie pointed out in 1773 that it was difficult for France to assist the Turks, this was not
so much because of the Austrian alliance that he criticized,
181
as because of the inherent
problems of intervening successfully in the Balkans. Louis XV frequently stressed the
difficulties of helping Poland.
182
Broglie wanted a new alliance with Prussia, but that would
have had only a limited impact on the Austro-Russian alignment, and Frederick, anyway,
was not willing to accept French views. In many respects the situation repeated that of the
mid-and late 1710s with France unable to help Eastern European powers and faced in Italy