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differ on the status of an instrument, chiefly bilateral. It is therefore essential that the status is clearly
agreed during the negotiation.
The fifty-three Members of the Commonwealth tend to use MOUs, bilateral or multilateral, even
in those cases where other states might employ a treaty. The Commonwealth schemes for mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition are set out only in MOUs.
25
The member states
of the European Union use MOUs,
26
as do most other states.
In US practice, use of non-treaty language does not necessarily preclude the instrument from
being a treaty. To overcome some of these problems in the defence field, the United Kingdom,
Canada and Australia have concluded ‘chapeau agreements’ with the United States.
27
Today, MOUs are employed in most areas of international relations – diplomatic, defence, trade,
aid, transport etc. In many cases, a treaty could be used, but for the reasons given below an MOU is
used instead. Frequently, MOUs supplement treaties.
A common reason for preferring an MOU is confidentiality. Many arrangements, especially in the
defence field, must be kept confidential and are therefore found only in MOUs. Often, a defence
treaty will be supplemented by numerous MOUs.
28
MOUs do not need elaborate final clauses or the formalities (international or national) which
surround treaty-making. Most often, an MOU will become effective on signature. Not being a treaty,
an MOU is generally not subject to any constitutional procedures, such as presentation to parliament,
although that will depend on the constitution, laws and practice of each state. The lack of formalities
also means that an MOU is much easier to amend.
Are MOUs really treaties?
Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the distinction between MOUs and treaties is valid,
since each embodies some sort of agreement.
29
This theory ignores the abundant state practice. A
state is free to conclude, or not to conclude, treaties. When they do not wish to conclude a legally
25. See p. 264, n. 5 below.
26. See EU Doc. PESC/SEC 899 of 9 August 1996. See also the Opinion of the Advocate-General of the
European Court of Justice in France v. Commission [1994] ECR -3641; 101 ILR 29.