a problem of definition 377
is modern example is of course merely a single case, and can hardly
be generalized. A much wider range of cultic and other religious ritual
examples would need to be studied to provide a proper range of pos-
sibilities and trends in ritual performance. Nevertheless, this example
raises several issues that can be kept in mind when considering ancient
cult and religious ritual. If this diusion of ritual throughout the house
can be true for modern societies, then what of ancient ones, where it is
commonly acknowledged that religion was not compartmentalized, but
rather a much more essential part of everyday life? On the one hand,
we might expect more abundant examples or ritual behavior; at the
same time, we might expect religious ritual activities to be even more
scattered through the house, and not concentrated in a specic area.
7
is then leads to the ancient examples:
2) One of the clearest examples of a small-scale, low-level cultic
practice in the Hebrew Bible is the baking of cakes for the Queen of
Heaven (Jer. 7: 17–18; 44: 15–19, 25). e precise setting of this rit-
ual, or set of rituals, is unclear, although it appears to center on the
house as the members of the family are invoked: the children gather
the wood, the fathers build the re, and the women knead dough for
7
Related to this problem is the identication of “cult corners” in the archaeologi-
cal record. e term cult corner or cultic corner was rst introduced into Palestinian
archaeology by Y. Shiloh in a paper on early Iron II cultic contexts (1979). Shiloh
identied a series of tenth-century cult corners in Megiddo, notable among them
Locus 2081 (1979: 149). He continued (1979: 150–151, 156) by noting the existence of
groups of artifacts (altars, ceramic stands, etc.) similar to those from Megiddo at other
sites, such as Lachish and Taʿanach (Lapp’s “Cultic Structure”), in order to identify
cult corners at the latter sites as well. e cultic nature of these contexts, however, is
by no means a consensus view. For example, Yeivin (1973) and Fowler (1984a) both
disputed the identication of the “Cultic Structure” as religious in nature, suggesting
instead that it was part of a house, with perhaps a kitchen and/or a storeroom. Even
Rast (1994), though highly critical of Fowler and Yeivin, provides an interpretation
that is not necessarily contradictory: he in fact argues that only the artifacts from the
structure are necessarily “cultic,” with the “Cultic Structure” itself (and other similar
contexts, such as Megiddo Locus 2081) being the house of a priestly family where
cultic items from a temple were stored. is interpretation is extremely signicant.
First, although Rast defends Lapp’s label of the building as a “Cultic Structure,” this
usage would stretch the meaning of the term cultic beyond real analytic value (i.e., the
context itself would not at all be a locus of “cultic” activity). In addition, even Rast
has concluded that the Taʿanach “Cultic Structure” (and Megiddo Locus 2081) is not a
“cult corner” but simply a storage area. us, some of the very denitional examples of
the concept provided by Shiloh are undermined. is is not to say that “cult corners”
do not exist in the southern Levant; rather, I only suggest that they need to be clearly
proven and not assumed to be a common feature. Gilmour, at least, has gathered some
evidence to suggest that cult corners are a fairly universal feature (1995: 15), but more
investigation of both generalizing and culture-specic data is needed.