1945
groups of bombers and their fighter escorts were operating from
the island.
In Burma, meanwhile, 14th Army's offensive gained
momentum following its crossing of the Chindwin in December
1944. In February and March 1945 Slim fought the brilliantly
staged battle of Mandalay-Meiktila, first feinting towards
Mandalay and then hooking round the Japanese flank and across
the Irrawaddy to take the communication centre of Meiktila. The
new commander of Burma Area Army (his predecessor had been
dismissed after Imphal-Kohima), Lieutenant General Kimura
Hyotaro, counterattacked quickly, but was unable to shake Slim's
grip. Mandalay itself was taken after fierce fighting of great
symbolic importance, for it was said that "who rules Mandalay
rules Burma." Slim paused briefly at Pyawbwe, but the road to
Rangoon lay open, and his men hustled on down it. It was the
apotheosis of the old British Indian army, men of twenty races, a
dozen religions and a score of languages, surely never more effective
at any time in its long history. The Burmese capital duly fell to an
amphibious attack, Operation Dracula, on May 3.
The capture of Okinawa had cost the Americans 7,613 killed
and 31,807 wounded, and emphasized just how costly an assault on
the Japanese home islands was likely to be. This was at least part of
the reason why President Harry S. Truman, who succeeded
Roosevelt when the latter died suddenly on April 12, used the first
atomic weapons against Japan, and while members of postwar
generations harbour doubts about the morality of this action, there
were far fewer concerns at the time, not least amongst the soldiers,
sailors and airmen who would have risked their lives in the assault
on Japan. But it is also clear that using the bomb against the
Japanese was designed to demonstrate its effectiveness to the
Russians. The Allied conference at Yalta in February 1945 had
focused on the organization of the postwar world, and it was one of
the conflict's many ironies that the Poles who had fought so
gallantly in Italy, France, Poland and Germany were to find that the
postwar borders of their country were to be moved westwards,
leaving the eastern part of Poland in Russian hands while gains to
the west were made at German expense: the new frontier was to run
along the rivers Oder and Neisse. In July and August the last
wartime conference was held in Potsdam, and it was there that
Truman told Stalin of the atomic bomb's existence.
By 1920 it was believed that a supremely powerful weapon
might be created by the fission of heavy nuclei or the fusion of light
ones, and by 1940 German Jewish physicists working in England
suggested that a tiny amount of Uranium 235 could form the basis
for a powerful bomb. British-based scientists were shifted to the
American research team, the "Manhattan Project", in 1942, and
the first nuclear explosion, Trinity, took place at Alamagordo in
New Mexico on 16 July 1945. News of the project's success induced
Truman, as Churchill put it, to stand up to the Russians "in a most
emphatic and decisive manner." Two bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August, and assurances that the
doctrine of unconditional surrender would be modified so as to
enable the emperor to remain on his throne induced the Japanese to
surrender on August 14. The use of atomic weapons not only helped
end the war, but cast a long and enduring shadow over the postwar
world. The alliance that had won the war broke down, all too
swiftly, as the iron curtain described by Churchill in 1946 descended
across a scarred Europe.
One of the most striking effects of the postwar division of
the world into two rival power-blocs was to make balanced
appreciation of the Second World War almost impossible, as
Anglo-American historians generally failed to do full justice to
Russian achievements in the east, while the Russians, for their part,
did not acknowledge the importance of the Anglo-American contri-
bution. As we enter the Twenty-First Century at least that
imbalance is corrected, and the Second World War stands clearly for
what it was: the most momentous event in the whole of human
history, in which a great alliance (with its own huge flaws, contra-
dictions and inconsistencies) brought down a regime of
unprecedented vileness. It is a tragedy that, like their fathers before
them who had endured another great war, the war's combatants,
and the civilians who supported them, did not quite get the world to
which they were entitled: yet this should overshadow neither their
endeavour nor their sacrifice.
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