1942
General William "Strafer" Gott was to have taken command of 8th
Army but was killed in an accident, and Bernard Montgomery
received the appointment instead. Historians argue whether
Montgomery's repulse of Rommel's last attack at Alam Haifa
between August 30 and September 7 owed much to preparatory
work done in Auchinleck's time. In one sense the question is
academic, for Rommel was now a sick man and his forces, yet
again at the end of their logistic reach, were tired and
over-extended.
Montgomery took pains to bring the Desert Air Force under
his wing, stamped his confident mark on 8th Army, and made
meticulous plans for his own offensive, launched on October 23.
Rommel was on sick leave in Germany, and his stand-in died of a
heart attack in the battle's early stages. Montgomery planned
Operation Lightfoot to breach the German-Italian defences with
infantry, and then pass his armour through to hold a line on which
to blunt counterattacks, while the crumbling of the position went
on. Progress was slow, but when Montgomery unleashed Operation
Supercharge, his decisive blow, Rommel recognized that he was too
weak to hold it and began to pull back his mobile units. Many static
units, Italian for the most part, could not be extracted, and 30,000
prisoners were taken. The pursuit was hampered by poor weather
and Montgomery's caution, but the battle broke the pattern of the
war in the Western Desert: this time there would be no return to the
see-saw of the past.
Montgomery's victory was encouraging for the Allies, who
planned to invade French North Africa and then move eastwards so
as to crush German and Italian forces in the theatre between these
new armies and Montgomery. There was secret consultation to
prevent French resistance, and American troops spearheaded the
landings because it was thought that the French would be less likely
to resist them than they would the British. Lieutenant General
Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the operation, in which three
task forces struck in Morocco and Algeria on November 8.
Unfortunately some French troops did fight back, and the navy
resisted strongly. However, Marshal Petain's deputy Admiral Darlan,
fortuitously in Algiers, concluded an armistice on November 10.
Petain at once repudiated the armistice, but an infuriated
Hitler ordered German troops into the Unoccupied Zone of France.
Darlan himself, now freed of his obligations to Vichy, was
appointed high commissioner for French North Africa by
Eisenhower, but was assassinated in December and replaced by the
pro-Allied General Giraud. Darlan had attempted to persuade the
powerful French fleet, based at Toulon, to join the Allies, but it
declined to do so. However, when the German approached on
November 27, Admiral Jean de Laborde ordered the fleet to be
scuttled, and one battleship, two battlecruisers, seven cruisers and
scores of smaller vessels were sunk. It was a tragic but courageous
act, depriving the Germans of a prize which would have thrown a
shadow over Allied operations in the Mediterranean.
The Germans now strained every nerve to hold North Africa,
"the glacis of Europe." Reinforcements were rushed into Tunisia,
forming what became Colonel General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim's
5th Panzer Army. Arnim blocked the way to Tunis, fighting the
Allies to a halt in the atrocious weather of December. Victory in
North Africa was not, as it had seemed at first to be, just round the
corner, but at the year's end it seemed that even Arnim and Rommel,
between them, could simply delay an inevitable defeat.
The Battle of the Atlantic changed character with American
entry into the war. At first German submarines enjoyed a "happy
time", as Allied shipping sailed, virtually unprotected, around the
eastern seaboard of the USA: in May and June, they sunk over a
million tons of shipping in American waters. The year saw the
heaviest loss of Allied merchant shipping, over 6 million tons falling
to U-boats. ULTRA, secret intelligence produced by British
penetration of German ciphered radio communications, was crucial
in the war against submarines, but for much of the year, a new
cipher made U-boat signals safe. However, the extension of the
convoy system, improvements in tactics and the extension of air
patrols pointed the way to future success, and in December, British
experts again cracked German messages. But there remained an "air
gap" in mid-Atlantic, and the Germans, concentrating submarines
in "wolf-packs", brought the battle to a crisis that would break in
early 1943.
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