Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
THE
ULTIMATUM TO
GERMANY
505
country,
and added
that the
Government would
take the matter into
grave
consideration.
Early
on
August
4th,
Sir
Edward
Grey despatched
a
protest against
the
ultimatum
fy
Belgium.
"
H.M.
Government
are bound
to
protest
against
this
violation
of a
Treaty
to
which
Germany
is a
party
in
common
with
themselves,
and
must
request
an
assurance
that
the
demand
made on
Belgium
will
not be
proceeded
with,
and
that
her
neutrality
will
be
respected
by
Germany.
You
should
ask for an
immediate
reply."
Before a
reply
could be
received from
Berlin,
news
arrived from
the
Belgian
Legation
that the
frontier
had been
crossed.
It
was in
vain
that
Jagow
instructed
Lichnowsky
to
repeat
that
under
no
circumstances
would
Germany
annex
Belgian territory,
and
to
impress
on
Sir
Edward
Grey
that the German
army
could
not
be
exposed
to
a
French
attack
across
Belgium,
"which was
planned,
according
to
absolutely unimpeachable
information." It
was
too
late
for
excuses,
and
German
promises
were now
at
a
discount.
When
the Cabinet
met
on
the
morning
of
August 4th,
all doubts
and
hesitations
had been
swept
away.
11
On
Saturday, August
1st,"
declared Mr
Lloyd George
in
an
interview
in
1915,
"a
poll
of
the electors
would
have shewn
99
per
cent,
against
embroiling
their
country
in hostilities. A
poll
on the
following
Tuesday
would have resulted
in a
vote
of
99 per
cent,
in
favour of war. The revolu-
tion in
public
sentiment was attributable
entirely
to an attack
by
Germany
on a small and
unprotected country
which
had
done her
no
wrong;
and
what
Britain was not
prepared
to do for
interests
political
and commercial
she
readily
risked
to
help
the weak
and
helpless.
I would not have been
a
party
to
a
Declaration
of War
had
Belgium
not
been
invaded,
and
I
think I can
say
the same for most
if not all of
my colleagues
1
."
The
ascription
of
his
own
views
to the
great majority
of his col-
leagues
is
unwarranted,
but
the
apologia
illustrates the
changed
atmosphere
in
which
the
ultimatum to
Berlin was
drawn
up, approved
and
despatched.
"We hear that
Germany
has addressed a Note to the
Belgian
Minister
for
Foreign
Affairs
stating
that the German Government
will
be
compelled
to
carry
out,
if
necessary by
force
of
arms,
the measures considered
indis-
pensable.
We are also informed
that
Belgian territory
has
been violated
at
Gemmerich.
In these
circumstances,
and in
view
of the
fact
that
Germany
declined to
give
the
same assurance
respecting
Belgium
as
France
gave
last week
in
reply
to
our
request
made
simultaneously
at
Berlin and
Paris,
we must
repeat
the
request
and ask that
a
satisfactory
reply
to
it and to
my
telegram
of this
morning
be received
here
by
1
Pearson's
Magazine,
March,
1915.
506
TRIPLE
ALLIANCE AND
TRIPLE
ENTENTE
12
o'clock
tonight.
If
not,
you
are
instructed to
ask for
your passports,
and
to
say
that His
Majesty's
Government
feel bound
to
take all
steps
in their
power
to
uphold
the
neutrality
of
Belgium
and
the
observance
of a
Treaty
to which
Germany
is as much a
party
as
ourselves."
Sir
Edward
Goschen delivered
the
ultimatum
to
the
Foreign
Minister,
who
expressed
his
poignant
regret
at the
crumbling
of
his
entire
policy,
which
had been
to make friends
with Great
Britain,
and
through
Great Britain to draw closer
to France.
The
Ambassador
then
paid
a farewell
visit to
the Chancellor.
<fe
I found him
very agitated.
Just
for a
word,
'
neutrality,'
just
for a
scrap
of
paper,
Great
Britain was
going
to
make
war
on a kindred
nation
who
desired
nothing
better than to
be friends
with
her! The
policy
to
which he
had
devoted himself had
tumbled
down
like a house
of
cards.
What
we had
done was
unthinkable.
It
was
like
striking
a man
from
behind
while he
was
fighting
for his
life
against
two assailants.
The
blow
was all the
greater
in
that
he
had
been
working
with us to
maintain
peace
between
Austria
and
Russia.
I
said that this was
part
of
the
tragedy,
which
saw
the
two
nations fall
apart just
at
the moment when the
relations
between
them
had
been more
friendly
and
cordial than
they
had been
for
years."
No
reply
was
expected
or
received
;
and when
the
listening
Ministers
in
Downing
Street
heard
Big
Ben
toll
the
hour
of
midnight,
they
knew
that the British
empire
was launched on
the
greatest
struggle
in
its
history.
On the
following
day,
the
Prime-Minister
informed
the
House
that
a
state
of War
existed with
Germany,
and on
August
6th
he
moved
a
credit
of ioo
millions.
With the
utmost reluctance
and
infinite
regret,
he
declared,
the Government
had
been
compelled
to
declare
War
on
what
had been for
generations
a
friendly
Power.
Every possible
effort
for
peace
had been
made,
but
war
had been
forced on us.
Germany
had
invited
us
to
betray
our friend
and dis-
honour our
obligations,
in
return
for a
promise given by
a
Power
which
was
at that
very
moment
announcing
its
intention to
violate
its
own
Treaty
and
inviting
us
to
do
the
same.
If we had dallied
or
temporised,
we should have
betrayed
the interests
of
this
country.
"
If I
am
asked what we are
fighting
for,
I
reply
in two sentences.
In
the
first
place,
to
fulfil
a
solemn international
obligation
—
an
obligation
which,
if
it had been entered into between
private persons,
would
have
been
regarded
as
an
obligation,
not
only
of
law but of
honour,
which
no
self-respecting
man could
possibly
have
repudiated.
Secondly,
we
are
fighting
to vindicate
the
principle
that small
nationalities
are not
to
be
crushed,
in
defiance
of international
goodfaith,
by
the
arbitrary
will
of
a
strong
and
overmastering
Power.
I do not believe
any great
nation
ever
REFLEXIONS ON
BRITISH
POLICY
507
entered
into a
great
controversy
with
a
clearer
conscience
and a
stronger
conviction that it
is
fighting
not for
aggression
nor
for the maintenance
of
its
own selfish
interest,
but in
defence of
principles
vital to
the civilisation
of the
world."
The action
of
the
Government
was
approved
by
the
great majority
of its
supporters
and
by
the leaders of
the
Opposition
in
both Houses.
The
Declaration
of
War was
ratified
by public
opinion mainly
owing
to the
anger
evoked
by
the
wanton attack on
unoffending
Belgium.
But it was also
the
logical
outcome,
if
not
indeed,
in Lord
Esher's
words,
"the
inevitable
sequel,"
of our
policy
since
1906.
Had we
stood aside
at
Armageddon,
the
Central
Powers
would have
won an
easy victory,
and
at the
conclusion of
the
contest
we should
have found
ourselves
alone in
Europe.
France and Russia would
have scorned us as false
friends,
who,
after
years
of
diplomatic
co-
operation,
deserted
them
in
the crisis
of
their fate
;
and
the
German
menace,
intensified
by
the
collapse
of
the
Triple
entente,
would
have
compelled
us
to
arm
to the teeth
on
sea
and
land.
It
is more difficult
to
pronounce
judgment
on
the
steps
taken
by
the
Foreign Secretary
to
prevent
the
outbreak
of war. Alone
among
European
statesmen
he laboured
night
and
day
to
preserve
peace
;
and
during
the
twelve
days
he
proposed
schemes which
would have
preserved
it,
had the
will to
peace
in
Vienna,
Berlin and
Petrograd
been
equal
to
his own.
"No
one
at
the head
of
affairs
quite
meant
war at
that
stage,"
Mr
Lloyd
George truly
observed,
on December
23rd, 1920:
"it was
something
into
which
they glided
or
rather
staggered
and stumbled."
But
Sir Edward
Grey
had
to deal with obstinate
and
angry
men
;
and
it
has been
argued
that,
when
his
offer
of
mediation
by
the
four
Powers had been
rejected by
Austria,
he
should have announced
in
unhesitating
tones
what
action Great Britain
was
prepared
to take.
He
might,
for
instance,
have
followed
the
precedent
of
1870,
and
proclaimed
our
resolve?
with the assent
of
a
united
Cabinet,
to resist
with all our
strength
the
violation
of
Belgian
neutrality.
The com-
bination
of
warnings
to
Berlin with the refusal
of
pledges
to
Paris
and
Petrograd
was
ineffective,
for
neither
warnings
nor refusals
were
taken
very
seriously.
The chauvinists
in
Petrograd
were
encouraged
by
the
prevalent
conviction
that we
should
be
dragged
in,
and
the
chauvinism of
Berlin
and
Vienna
was
stimulated
by
the
possibility
that
we
might
stand
out.
"Unless
Germany
has lost
her
reason,"
remarked
the
Tsar in
the
critical
week,
"she would not
dare to attack
Russia,
France and
England."
France shared
his
view,
and President
508
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
AND
TRIPLE ENTENTE
Wilson has
expressed
his conviction
that,
had
Germany
been certain
that
we
should
intervene,
she would
have
restrained her
Ally
and held
her own
hand.
It
has
also
been
maintained
that,
had we
informed
France and
Russia
that
we should
decline to take
part
in a conflict
arising
out
of
the Austro-
Servian
quarrel, Petrograd
would not
have
dared
to
pick up
the
glove
which
Vienna had
thrown
down.
On such
conjectures
it is not
possible
to
express
a
final
judgment;
and,
in
any
case,
it would
have been
impossible
to announce either
of these
decisions,
since
the
Cabinet
was divided.
The
inability
to take action
which
might
conceivably
have
pre-
vented the War was
the result
of
the lack
of
precision
in our relations
to
France.
A
policy
of
limited
liability
is
easy
to
define,
but difficult
to
execute.
Sir
Edward
Grey
declared,
on
August
3rd,
that
every
Member
could
construe
the case for
himself;
but
his whole
speech
breathed the
conviction that
we should be for ever
disgraced,
if we
left France
in
the lurch.
The assurances
that
we were
unpledged
were
formally
correct,
but inaccurate
in
substance.
"
There
was a moral
obligation
not
to leave
us
unprotected,"
declares
M. Paul
Cambon,
who
was
in a
position
to
know.
"
We were tied to
France
inextricably,"
wrote
an
acute critic
1
,
"tied
by
countless
invisible threads
such as
fastened down Gulliver while
he slumbered
in
the
land
of little
men."
Mr
Lloyd
George
himself
afterwards
came
to
feel
that
we had not
been
really
free.
"We had a
compact
with
France,"
he declared
on
August 7th,
19
1
8,
"that
if
she were
wantonly
attacked
we
would
go
to her
support."
Mr
Herbert
Samuel
at
once
interposed
that there
was
no
such
compact
or contract
obliging
us
to
fight
;
and
the
Prime-
Minister,
accepting
the
correction,
confessed that
the
word
"com-
pact"
was too
strong.
"In
my
judgment,"
he
added,
"it
was
an
obligation
of honour."
And such will
doubtless
be
the
judgment
of
History.
On
the other
hand,
the
time
has
not
come
for
a
judicial
verdict
on
the
whole
policy
of Continental
commitments,
unaccom-
panied
as
they
were
in
this instance
by
an
Army
of Continental
pro-
portions
or
by
a frank
explanation
to
Parliament
and
the
nation
of
their
contingent
liabilities. It
is
clear
that,
on
the
one
hand,
this
policy
increased
the
probability
of war
by
involving
us in
the
quarrels
and ambitions of
our
friends,
and
that,
on
the
other,
it
ensured that
in the event
of a
German attack we
should not be left to
face
the
ordeal
single-handed.
The
risk and the
premium
will
have to
be
balanced
against
each
other
by
the historical
actuaries
of
the
future.
1
In The Candid
Review,
edited
by
Mr
Gibson
Bowles.
CHAPTER
VII
EPILOGUE.
THE
WAR
AND THE PEACE
I.
The
War,
1914-1918
WITH
the
outbreak
of
hostilities
the
Foreign
Policy
of
Great
Britain
became a
branch of
the
military
problem
of
winning
the
War.
Its
tasks
were to
consolidate
existing
alliances and under-
standings,
to
secure new
partners
in
its
action,
and
to
prevent
the
Central
Powers from
obtaining
allies. Great
Britain,
declared the
Prime-Minister
at the Guildhall on
Lord
Mayor's Day, 19
14,
would
not
sheathe the sword
until
Belgium
had
recovered
all
and more than
all
that she
had
sacrificed;
until France was
adequately
secured
against
the
menace
of
aggression;
until the
rights
of the
smaller
nationalities
were
placed
on
an
unassailable
foundation,
and until
the
military
dominion of
Prussia was
finally
destroyed.
The
entente
started
with
a
preponderance
of human and
material
resources
;
but
the
very magnitude
of
the
new
Grand
Alliance
endangered
unity
of
control,
while
the
whole
strength
of
the
enemy
was directed
by
a
small
group
of
masterful
men in
Berlin.
The
first task
of
the
Foreign
Secretary
was
to
call for
the
aid of
our
Ally
in
the Far East.
On
August
15th,
Japan
demanded
the
withdrawal
of
German
warships
from
the waters
of
Japan
and
China,
and
the surrender of Kiaochow
with
a
view
to its
eventual restoration
to China. No
reply
was
received,
and she
proceeded
to
reduce the
fortress of
Tsing-tau. Timely
aid
was also
rendered
in
sweeping
the
German
flag
from
the
Pacific,
in
convoying
troopships
from different
parts
of
the
empire
to
the
scene
of
action,
and in
supplying
Russia
with the
munitions
of which she
stood
in
need. Her task
was
limited
;
and
she did
not
at first
sign
the Pact
of
London,
by
which,
on
Septem-
ber
4th,
Great
Britain,
France and Russia
engaged
not
to
conclude
peace
separately,
and
not
to
demand
terms
of
peace
without
previous
agreement.
The
next
urgent
task
was to
prevent
or
postpone
the
entry
of
Turkey
into the
War on the
side
of
the
Central
Powers
1
.
On
August
3rd,
the
Cabinet
had
taken over the two
battleships
which
were
being
1
The
British White-book
on the
rupture
with
Turkey
has
been
reprinted
by
J.
B.
Scott,
Diplomatic
Documents
relating
to the outbreak
of
the
European
War.
5
io
EPILOGUE
built
for
Turkey
in
British
yards
;
and
the wisdom
of
the
decision was
confirmed
by
the admission
of
the Goeben and
the
Breslau
to the
Bosphorus.
For
several
weeks,
however,
there
seemed to
be
a chance
of
purchasing neutrality by
a
crescendo
of
promises.
If
Turkey
remained
neutral,
we
declared,
and
Egypt
tranquil,
we
should not
alter the status
of
the
latter.
The
entente would
uphold
Turkish
independence
and
integrity against
all
attacks,
if
she
would observe
scrupulous
neutrality.
When
the
Minister
of Marine
demanded the
immediate abolition
of
the
Capitulations,
Sir
Edward
Grey
promised,
subject
to
the assent
of
France
and
Russia,
to
surrender
our
rights
"as soon as a
scheme
satisfying
modern conditions
is
set
up." King
George
sent
a
personal
message
to
the
Sultan,
expressing
his
deep
regret
at
the
necessity
of
seizing
the
ships,
and
promising
to
restore
them after the
War.
The
Sultan
and
the
Grand-Vizier
invariably
replied
with words of
peace;
but
they
were
merely
playing
for
time,
for the
die was
already
cast.
On
August
ist,
Turkey
had
signed
a
Treaty promising
support
to the
Central
Powers
if
they
were
involved
in war
with
Russia.
Mobilisation
proceeded,
and
German
officers,
sailors and
money
poured
into
Constantinople.
On October
29th,
Turkish
torpedo-boats
attacked Russian
ships
at
Odessa,
and
the
British,
French
and Russian
Ambassadors at
Constantinople
promptly
demanded their
passports.
Great Britain
retaliated
by
the
annexation
of
Cyprus,
the
proclamation
of a
Protectorate
over
Egypt,
the
de-
position
of
the
Khedive
Abbas,
whose
hostility
was
unconcealed,
and
the
selection
of
a
son of
the
Khedive Ismail
as Sultan
of
Egypt.
Russia
proceeded
to work
out
a
plan
for
the
partition
of the Turkish
empire
;
and,
on March
12th,
1915,
her
Allies
assented
in
principle
to
the
annexation
of
Constantinople
and
the
Straits
1
.
The loss of
Turkey
was
balanced
six months later
by
the
gain
of
Italy.
The
unwillingness
of
Vienna to bid
high
for
Italian
neutrality
was
ultimately
overcome
by
pressure
from
Berlin,
and Francis
Joseph
consented to cede
the Trentino
and
the
west
bank
of
the
Isonzo,
with
concessions
in
Trieste
and a
free
hand
in Albania.
The offer
was
sufficient
for
Giolitti;
but the
Salandra-Sonnino
Ministry
preferred
the
risks
of war
in
return
for the
far
higher
price
offered
by
the
entente.
In
addition to the Austrian
concessions,
the
Treaty
of
London,
signed
on
April
26th,
1915,
promised
southern
Tyrol
up
to
the
Brenner
Pass, Gorizia, Trieste,
Istria
and northern
Dalmatia
2
.
1
See
Cocks,
The Secret
Treaties,
ch.
i
.
2
Ibid.
ch.
2.
ITALY
AND
BULGARIA
511
The
only
excuse
for
a
Treaty
which
handed over
the German
popu-
lation
of
southern
Tyrol
and
the Slavonic
population
of
northern
Dalmatia
was
the
familiar
plea
of
necessity.
"The
French
and our-
selves
were
fighting
for
our
lives on
the
western
front,"
bluntly
testifies
Mr
Asquith,
"and
the
Treaty
represented
the terms
on
which
Italy
was
prepared
to
join
forces."
Though
it increased
the
material
strength
of
the Grand
Alliance,
it diminished
its
moral
authority;
and Servia
learned
within a
week of
the
Pact
which had
disposed
of
Jugo-Slav
territory
behind
her
back.
The
Turkish
alliance could
only
be turned
to
full
account
by
the
Central
Powers
if
Bulgaria
joined
their
ranks; whereas,
if
Ferdinand
sided with
the
entente,
communications with Russia could
be
opened
from
the
Mediterranean,
Turkey
isolated,
Servia's flank
secured,
and
Greece
and
Roumania
encouraged
to intervene.
Bulgaria's
price
was
Macedonia
;
but
Servia
refused
to
disgorge
the
province
she had
con-
quered
in
19
12,
and
the
entente
hesitated
to
compel
her.
No
serious
attempt
to
win
Bulgaria
was made
till
the Russian armies
were hurled
back
in Poland and
Galicia and the
costly
attack
on
the Dardanelles
seemed
likely
to fail.
In
June,
1915,
the Powers offered
to
guarantee
her the
possession
of
Macedonia,
on
condition
that she
should not
occupy
it
till
the
peace,
and
that
Servia
received
compensation
in
Bosnia,
Herzegovina
and on
the
Adriatic.
This
conditional
acceptance
of her demands
did
not
tempt
her
calculating
monarch,
who
was
not
only
in
political
sympathy
with the Central
Powers,
but had
con-
vinced
himself
that
they
were
destined
to
win.
At
the end
of
August,
he
agreed
to intervene
on
their
side,
and
obtained
permission
to
conquer
Macedonia
for himself.
Sir
Edward
Grey
promised
the
Servians
"all
the
support
in our
power,
in a
manner that
would be
most welcome
to
them,
without reserve
or
qualifications";
while
Venizelos,
regarding
the
Bulgarian
attack
on
Servia
as
a casus
foederis
,
urged
Greece to
fulfil her
duty,
and
invited Great
Britain to assist
with
150,000
men.
King
Constantine, however,
who
was
determined
to maintain
neutrality,
dismissed
his
Minister,
and a
British offer to
cede
Cyprus,
if
he would
intervene,
was
declined. British
and
French
troops
were hurried to
Salonika
;
but
an
Austro-German
attack
from
the
north,
synchronising
with
a
Bulgarian
invasion
from the
east,
overran
Servia
without
difficulty. Only military
successes,
explained
the
Foreign
Secretary
on October
14th
in
answer to
angry
critics,
could
have won
Bulgaria;
and the
Central Powers
had been able to
offer
her
more than the
entente.
The intervention
of
Bulgaria
opened
512
EPILOGUE
a
direct
route from Berlin
to
Constantinople,
and
rendered the
con-
tinuance
of
the
Dardanelles
adventure
inadvisable. The
troops
were
accordingly
withdrawn
;
but
large
entente
forces
were
kept
at
Salonika
to
hold
the
Bulgarian
Army.
The
struggle against
Turkey
was
facili-
tated
by
an
Agreement
with the
Sherif of
Mecca,
who
entered
the
War in
return
for
recognition
as
King
of the
Hedjaz
and for
promises
of a
share
in
the
spoils
of
victory.
In
the
War of
19
14,
as in
the
struggle
with
Napoleon,
the exercise
of
sea-power
involved
Great Britain
in
dangerous
friction
with
neutrals.
Despite
the
indignation
aroused
by
the
attack
on
Belgium
and
the
preponderant
sympathy
with the Allied
cause,
both
the
Government
and
the
people
of
the
United States desired
at the
outset to
remain
"above the
battle";
for
Europe
was
far
away,
Germany
had
many
friends,
and
the Russian
autocracy
was
detested.
President
Wilson
invited the
belligerents
to observe the
Declaration
of
London;
and,
when
Great Britain made
reservations,
he announced
his
resolve to see the
rights
and
duties
of
the United States
settled
in
accordance with the
accepted principles
of
International
Law and
treaty obligations.
Great Britain's blockade of
the
North
Sea
on
November
3rd,
1914,
evoked a
protest
against searching
ships
for
contraband.
Sir Edward
Grey's
interim
reply
undertook that
neutral
commerce
should
not
be
interfered with further than
was
necessary,
and
repudiated
a desire
to interfere with
genuine
commerce,
but
affirmed
the
right
to
check trade
in
contraband.
He
challenged
the
complaints
of a
large
decrease
in
American trade
owing
to
British
policy,
and
emphasised
the
suspicious
increase of the
export
of
copper
to
Scandinavia
and
Switzerland. It
was
necessary
to
bring
a
ship
into
port
before
it
could be
searched,
as
copper might
be hidden
in
bales
of
cotton.
In
regard
to
food,
Sir
Edward
Grey
refused
an uncon-
ditional
undertaking,
in
consequence
of
the
belligerent
methods
of
Germany.
When,
on
February 4th, 191 5,
Germany
announced that
all
vessels
in
the waters round Great
Britain would be
sunk,
the
United
States
proposed
the cessation
of
attacks
on merchantmen
except
for
detention
and
search,
in
return for the
free
passage
of
food
consigned
to
agents
chosen
by
the
United States
for
distributing
it to
civilians.
The
compromise
was
accepted
in
principle
in
Berlin,
but
rejected
in
London,
where,
on March
1st,
the
Prime-Minister issued
his
rejoinder
to the German
blockade
which,
he
argued,
substituted
indiscriminate
destruction
for
regulated
capture.
THE
LUSITANIA
513
"Her
opponents
are
therefore
driven to
frame
retaliatory
measures
to
prevent
commodities of
any
kind
reaching
or
leaving
Germany;
but
they
will be
enforced
by
Great
Britain
and
France
without
risk to
neutral
ships
or
to
neutral
or
non-combatant
lives.
The
Governments
will hold
them-
selves
free to
take
into
port
ships
carrying
goods
of
presumed
enemy
destination,
ownership
or
origin.
It
is not
intended
to
confiscate
such
vessels or
cargoes,
unless
they
would
otherwise be
liable to
confiscation."
The
British
refusal
to
mitigate
the
blockade
annoyed
the
President;
but the
loss of
a
hundred
American
lives
in
the
Lusitania
relieved
the
British
Government
of
all
fear of
a
break
with
Washington.
Arrange-
ments for
rationing
the
European
neutrals were
made;
but
further
encroachments
on
the
Declaration of
London
became
necessary.
On
August
2
1
st,
1
9
15,
cotton
was
declared
contraband,
and
on
July
7th,
19
1
6,
the
Declaration
itself
was
denounced.
"As
the
struggle
developed,"
explained
the
official
Memorandum,
"it
became
clear
that
the
attempt
made in
time
of
peace
to
determine
not
only
the
principles
of
law,
but
even
the forms
under
which
they
were to
be
applied,
had
not
produced
a
wholly
satisfactory
result.
These
rules,
while
not in
all
respects
improving
the
safeguards
afforded to
neutrals,
do not
provide
belligerents
with
the most
effective
means of
exercising
their
admitted
rights..
.
.The
successive
modifications
may
probably
have ex-
posed
the
purpose
of
the Allies
to
misconstruction;
they
have
therefore
come to
the
conclusion
that
they
must
confine
themselves
simply
to
applying
the
historic and
admitted
rules of
the
law of
nations."
Sir
Edward
Grey
added
that "the
Freedom of
the Sea"
might
be a
very
reasonable
subject
for
discussion,
definition and
agreement
between
the nations
after the
War;
"but not
by
itself
alone,
nor
while there was
no
freedom and
no
security
against
war and
against
German
methods on
sea and
land."
The
crippling
of
Russia,
the fiasco
in
the
Dardanelles,
the over-
throw of
Servia,
and
the
failure of
the
attempts
to
pierce
the German
front
in
France,
rendered
1915
a
year
of
evil
memory
for
the
Allies;
and
191
6,
though
less
disastrous,
brought
no
relief
from
anxiety.
The
battle
of
Jutland
was
claimed as a
victory
by
both
sides
;
and
Italy
battered
in
vain
against
the
Austrian
defences. For
months,
the
invaders
strove to
capture
Verdun,
and
for
months the
defenders
of
French
soil
endeavoured to break
the German
line on the
Somme.
The
deadlock,
at
length,
compelled
the
Allies to
pay
the
extravagant
price
which
Bratiano
had
long
demanded
for
the
intervention
of
Roumania.
Her
Declaration of War on
August
28th
was
hailed
as
a
presage
of
victory;
but her
speedy collapse,
and
the
addition
of her
W.&G.III
33
5
H
EPILOGUE
corn and
oil
to the
dwindling
assets of the
Central
Powers,
seemed
to
postpone
the
decision
to
an
indefinite future.
The
British
Government,
convinced
that
time
was
on the
side
of
the
Allies,
would
not
allow the defeat
of
Roumania
to
disturb
their
equanimity
or
to weaken the
will
to
victory.
The
struggle,
declared
the
Prime-Minister
on
October
nth,
could
not
be allowed to
end
in
some
patched-up,
precarious
compromise.
"The
ends
of the
Allies
are not selfish nor
vindictive;
but
they require adequate
reparation
for
the
past
and
adequate
security
for
the future."
An address
by
Sir
Edward
Grey
to the
Foreign
Press
Association
on
October
23rd
struck the same
note of determination.
"
For
years
before this
War
we
were
living
under
the
deepening
shadow
of
Prussian militarism
extending
itself over the
whole of
Germany
and
then
extending
itself over the
whole Continent. There must
be
no
end
to this
War
except
a
Peace
which
is
going
to
ensure that
the nations
of
Europe
live
in
the future free from
the shadow
of
the
great
anarchist.
A neutral
has asked me
what
neutrals can
do. The
best
thing
is to work
up
an
opinion
for
such an
agreement
between nations as
will
prevent
a
war
like this
happening
again.
If
they
had
been
united in such
an
agreement,
and
prompt
and
resolute to insist
in
July,
19
14,
that the
dispute
must be
referred
to a
conference or to the
Hague,
and
that the
Belgian
Treaty
must be
observed,
there would have
been
no
war."
The
reference of
the
Foreign Secretary
to
an
Association
of
Nations made
a
deep
impression
on the German
Chancellor,
who
believed
that the time had come to
invite
the
belligerents
to
discuss
the
possibility
of
peace,
and
who
secured the assent
of
Austria,
Turkey
and
Bulgaria
to take action
in
this sense so soon as Bucharest
fell. On
December
12th,
he
transmitted
a
note to the
Governments
of
France,
Great
Britain,
Russia,
Japan,
Roumania
and
Servia.
The latest
events,
he
declared,
proved
that the
resistance
of
the
Central
Powers
was
unbreakable
;
but
they
did
not
seek to
crush or
annihilate
their
adver-
saries,
and
they proposed
negotiations.
"They
feel
sure that the
propositions
which
they
would
bring
forward
would
serve as
a
basis for
the
restoration
of a
lasting
peace.
If,
notwith-
standing
this offer of
peace
and
conciliation,
the
struggle
should
continue,
the four Allied Powers
are
resolved
to
carry
it on to
the
end,
while
solemnly
disclaiming
any
responsibility
before
mankind
and
history
1
."
The French
Premier,
M.
Briand,
denounced the
invitation
as
a
manoeuvre
to
divide
the
entente,
the
Russian
Foreign
Minister
rejected
it
"with
indignation,"
and Sonnino
urged Italy
not to
separate
1
See G. Lowes
Dickinson,
Documents
and Statements
relating
to
Peace
Proposals
and
War
Aims,
pp.
1-2.