The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
THE SECOND UNITED FRONT 221
However, this call attracted little attention outside the soviet areas and
was interpreted by the country at large mainly as a move to protect the
socialist fatherland rather than China. In no sense did the call succeed in
gaining the CCP a share in the KMT's leadership of the struggle for
national independence. The CCP was still considered by many as a mere
instrument of Russia.
The CCP's proposal for a united front acquired a new meaning after
the fall of Kuang-ch'ang during Chiang's final encirclement in April 1934;
it became an attempt to reverse the worsening civil war situation and to
rescue the CCP from its predicament. The central committee's letter to
the nation on 10 April 1934 left the role of the KMT in the united front
purposely vague. The KMT was not explicitly left out of the alliance;
nor was the aim of overthrowing it renounced.
224
The deteriorating war
situation moderated the CCP's attitude to the KMT, as shown in Chou
En-lai's Six Point Programme of
20
July 1934,
225
which suggested a united
front including all anti-Japanese forces, even Chiang Kai-shek's. Pragmatic
as the new proposal indeed was, it was not completely opportunistic. In
embryonic form it contained a new theoretical formulation to direct the
revolution from the withering Soviets onto a more hopeful course. Lenin's
old theses of a national united front were obviously worth reviving. In
Lenin's conception a nation may have no ultimate value; but in a China
under the pressure of Japanese aggression, the existence of the Chinese
nation was a matter of cardinal importance. In other words, the struggle
for national liberation (anti-imperialist) was gradually overshadowing the
struggle for social liberation (anti-feudal). In reviving this idea, the CCP
had on its mind the bad experiences of the first united front of 1923—7,
especially the 'betrayal' by the bourgeoisie and big landlords thought to
be represented by Chiang Kai-shek. If the CCP was to mitigate its land
revolution for the sake of
a
united anti-imperialist struggle, the questions
that must be answered were (in the language of the day): was it to be
a united front on a national-political level with all the anti-Japanese forces
who had been at variance with Chiang? Or was it to be a united front
of a social revolutionary sort based on the mobilization of the workers,
peasants and soldiers with sufficient political consciousness to supervise
their leaders so as to ensure its solidarity and success? The contradiction
between these two approaches was explicit. Then tactically should the CCP
forge
a
united front before mobilizing and arming the masses or vice versa?
The failure of the first united front was to a large measure due to the
absence of an independent Communist armed force. In 1935-6, the CCP
224
Hsiao Tso-liang, Power relations, 226.
215
Hung-bsing
(Red star) (20 July 1934), 1.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
222 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 1927-1937
did have an army and an occupied territory. For the sake of unity against
Japan, should the party give them up or should the resistance war be left
to cement national unity without either of the major parties sacrificing
its autonomy? Closely related to this last question was that of the
temporary or permanent nature of the united front. If it was merely
temporary, it followed that the two opposing parties entered into an
alliance for national preservation without at the same time abandoning
their long-range goals, whose fulfilment required both to continue their
military and territorial expansion. If it was permanent, China must
undergo a basic political change in order to permit the parties to contend
for their long-term goals by peaceful means. The change would entail the
nationalization of all armed forces, the creation of
a
democratic assembly,
the guarantee of the basic freedoms, and so on. Above all, the most
difficult question in 1935-6 was: could a united front with Chiang be
meaningful and effective in view of Chiang's enmity and fickleness? These
questions received serious consideration at the Seventh Congress of the
CI in the summer of 1935, when the International called for a general
anti-imperialist united front to curb the growth of fascism in the West and
Japanese aggression in the East. In the spirit of this call, the August First
Declaration was issued in the name of the Central Committee of the CCP
by Wang Ming in Moscow.
226
The scope of the united front envisaged in the declaration was broad
enough to embrace all anti-Japanese forces. However, it still attacked
Chiang as the enemy of the nation who should be excluded from the
alliance. But there was a change in priority - Japan had replaced Chiang
as the most feared enemy.
227
The exclusion of Chiang from both the
proposed national defence government and the anti-Japanese allied armies
provoked further questions: would Chiang stand aside and watch the
allied armies fight Japan without taking any action? Would he continue
to fight the CCP and other opponents while the anti-Japanese war was
in progress? What justification could he have for either his action or
inaction? Was he to declare neutrality in the Japanese war or to play the
role of an ally of Japan? The illogicality of the declaration was soon
realized and remedied by Wang Ming in his speech at the Seventh
Congress of the CI on 7 August 1935. 'The path is left open for the
Kuomintang if Chiang Kai-shek is to call off his anti-Communist
126
Hu Hua,
Materials,
265-9. At the Mao-crh-kai Conference no one even mentioned the possibility
of an anti-Japanese united front; no one knew of
the
publication of
the
August First Declaration.
Chang Kuo-t'ao,
Ming-pao,
50.85.
227
For discussions on the various aspects of the second united front, see L. P. Van Slyke,
Enemies
and friends; and Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and
revolution
in China: the Communists and the
second
united front.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE SECOND UNITED FRONT 223
campaign and join in the fight against Japan.' Still later, in his essay ' New
situation and new strategy', Wang Ming addressed Chiang as ' Mr Chiang',
saying, ' If Mr Chiang
is
willing
to
change his attitude, the Chinese
Communist Party can cooperate with him'. In Wang's view, the national
contradiction so outweighed the class contradiction that 'apart from the
people's interests the Chinese Communist Party had no other interest in
mind'.
228
The thinking in north Shensi, where the real power of the party resided,
if not the real authority, seems to have been different. The Red Army's
anti-Japanese manifesto of
13
November 1935 was decidedly against both
Japan
and
Chiang.
220
Two days later Mao drafted
his
Ten Point
Programme, which was discussed and adopted without much revision by
the Wa-yao-pao Conference
of
the Politburo
on
25 December. Mao
described Chiang as
a
'running dog' of Japan,
to
be opposed by the
CCP.»°
The Wa-yao-pao Conference envisaged
a
broad alliance of all revolu-
tionary classes against Japanese imperialism and the traitorous group led
by Chiang. In order to arouse and mobilize these classes of people, it was
necessary to satisfy the peasants' demand for land and workers', soldiers'
and intellectuals' demands for improvement in their livelihood. Only in
that way could their revolutionary zeal be sustained. It followed that the
property
of
traitors, including Chiang, should
be
confiscated
and
redistributed; extortionate taxes should end; wages and salaries should
be increased; and relief work should be organized. As to the strategy of
this national war, the Red Army and the red territories should under no
circumstances be abolished. Instead, in the Japanese and KMT occupied
areas,
revolutionary bases should be founded, and
a
two-front struggle
against internal oppressors and foreign foes should be carried on from
these bases. As conceived
at
Wa-yao-pao, the war
of
resistance was
to
be simultaneously
a
war of social revolution. Otherwise
it
could never
become the mass war needed to ensure victory. Organizationally the first
step was to set up an anti-Japanese government, similar to Wang Ming's
national defence government. But organizational development would not
stop there. In the base areas, revolutionary committees would serve as
a transitional form of government leading to the creation of Soviets.
A
prerequisite for the creation of the base areas was the expansion of all
anti-Japanese armed forces and guerrillas. If the situation evolved in this
228
Wang Ming, Hsuan-cbi, 1.9-10, 11-13,
25 and 53; Van
Slyke, Enemies and friends,
53-4;
Kataoka
Tetsuya,
z)R.
lz
" Ho
Kan-chih, Modern revolution, 1.187.
230 MTTC 5.10 and 13-14.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
224 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT I927-I937
manner, Chiang's China would be subject to external pressure from Japan
and internal pressure from
his
opponents;
it
would grow weak
and
disintegrate. The CCP would then make fresh allies with the dissidents
from Chiang's clique.
231
Two points emerged clearly from the Wa-yao-pao resolutions
-
north
Shensi had as yet no appetite for parleying with Chiang; and the peasant
war remained the leading form of struggle, with the proletarian struggle
in the cities its closest ally. The strategy of encircling the cities from the
countryside would continue with little revision. But the application
of
such
a
strategy
in a
national war begged
a
theoretical and
a
pragmatic
question: how could peasants be aroused to anti-imperialist struggle
?
Was
a united anti-Japanese front without Chiang feasible?
In
the
nation
at
large there existed
a
widespread belief that
the
Communist movement was at the end of
its
tether and its grandiose plans
did not deserve serious attention. To put teeth in its proposals the CCP
launched
in
February-April 1936
its
'eastern expedition' across
the
Yellow River into Shansi, ostensibly to engage the Japanese in Hopei and
Jehol. As Liu Chih-tan's army pushed towards Taiyuan, Yen Hsi-shan,
the perennial governor there, sent a call for help to Chiang Kai-shek. The
subsequent death
of
Liu in action and the withdrawal of the Red Army
did
not
mean that
the
venture
was a
total failure.
In
addition
to
demonstrating the CCP's determination to fight the Japanese,
it
recruited
8,000
fresh troops and broke the back of Chiang's encirclement campaign
which had been manned by
a
motley
of
'miscellaneous' troops.
232
(See
below, chapter 12.)
Another significant result
of
the 'eastern expedition' was that local
military leaders in north-west China, including Chang Hsueh-liang, were
now convinced
of
the CCP's patriotic commitment; consequently they
lost their interest in fighting the Red Army. Relations between Chang and
the CCP began
to
improve.
233
It
was
at
this juncture that Lin Yii-ying
came back from Moscow with the CI's new policy proposal. On
14
March
1936,
Mao could therefore declare
to
the KMT that
if
the government
troops stopped attacking the soviet area, the Red Army was prepared
to
conclude a truce with them.
234
The party's policy thus underwent a sharp
change from the idea
of
a two-front struggle against both Japan and
Chiang
to
that
of
forcing Chiang
to
join the united front. The way
to
231
The
text
of
the
Wa-yao-pao resolutions
in
MTTC 5 passim.
232
Mark Selden,
The
Yenanway
in
revolutionary China,
103;
Kataoka Tetsuya,
35-7.
233
Snow,
Red
star, 370-8.
234
Van
Slyke, Enemies and friends,
60.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE SECOND UNITED FRONT 225
force
him
was
to
provoke
a
fight with Japan,
to
struggle first
in
order
to achieve unity later.
It
was perfectly Maoist.
235
Now there was
at
least
a
basis
for
bargaining between
the two
major
parties. They could jockey
for the
most advantageous terms
to
ensure
victory against Japan, and also for hegemony to rule and shape China after
the conclusion
of
the resistance. When Chiang replied
by
assaulting
the
soviet area in April 1936, Mao and Chu loosed a tirade of violent language
against him; when Chiang's assault was called
off,
the military commission
of the Red Army proposed that
the
civil
war be
stopped
for the
sake
of
unity.
236
Meanwhile Chou En-lai
and
other CCP representatives were
in
Shanghai making contact with KMT leaders, such
as
Chang Ch'iin
and
Ch'en Li-fu, over the terms
of
cooperation.
237
From
the end
of
1935, when Japan's East Hopei Anti-Communist
Special Regime was established,
238
Chiang's efforts
to
reach a detente with
Japan came
to an
impasse.
The
negotiations between Chang Ch'iin
and
Kawagoe,
the
Japanese ambassador
to
China, deadlocked while
the
Kwantung army instigated Mongolian troops to invade Suiyuan. Students
in Peking, leading intellectuals
in
Shanghai,
and
military leaders
in
Kwangtung and Kwangsi criticized Chiang's accommodating attitude
to
Japan
in
harsher
and
more strident tones. Unable
to
contain Japanese
militant nationalism
or to
destroy
the
CCP, Chiang's frustration
led him
to prepare
for an
eventual showdown with
the
foreign aggressor. That
eventuality required moral and material aid from the USSR, the only major
power willing
to
assist China. According
to
Chiang
himself,
239
he
sent
an emissary
to
Vienna
to
sound
out
Russia's intention
to
help
and
these
negotiations
for a
non-aggression pact and military
aid
between
the two
governments went
on
throughout 1936.
It
was
in
the context
of
popular
sentiment against Japanese aggression,
of
deteriorating Sino-Japanese
relations,
of
improving Sino-Russian feelings,
and of
a softer attitude
of
the
CCP
to
Chiang, that
the
epochal Sian incident took place
on 12
December 1936.
240
135
Ho
Kan-chih, Modern revolution, 1.302.
236
Ibid.
1.194;
Red
China,
26
May 1936.
237
Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia
in
China:
a
summing-up
at
seventy,
72-5.
238
Hollington Tong, Chiang, 2.225.
2
™
Ibid.
245.
240
Charles McLane, Soviet policy
and the
Chinese communists, if ji-1946,
79-91.
Prof.
T. F.
Tsiang
visited Moscow
at
Chiang's request
in
late 1934; see Charles Lilley, 'Tsiang T'ing-ru: between
two worlds 189J-193J'.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
226 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT I927—1937
The Sian incident
The plot to arrest Chiang in Sian was hatched in great secrecy. When it
occurred it shocked the world, the nation, and the CCP. Understandably,
the CCP's initial reaction, based on imperfect information, showed signs
of panic. From the point of view of all the anti-Japanese forces
concerned - the USSR, the CCP and Chiang's captors - Chiang's death at
any stage of the incident would have defeated their purpose of forming
a united front. Chiang was narrowly preserved from death during the
initial hours of his capture (in the chaos and confusion on the morning
of the 12 December), and after that his safety was secured for the duration
of his detention in Sian. Since Chang Hsueh-liang, Chiang's captor, gave
no orders to kill Chiang, it is safe to assume that he had never entertained
the thought of assassinating him. Moscow's directive to the CCP was
clearly for Chiang's preservation. Among the rank and file of Chang
Hsueh-liang's and Yang Hu-ch'eng's troops and the CCP there may have
been a strong enough hatred to demand Chiang's blood, but this hardly
reflected the wisdom of the leaders. True, Mao is reported to have gone
into a rage when the Moscow directive arrived;
241
even this may have
been a way to pacify his followers or an expression of his indignation
against Moscow's interference in the CCP's internal affairs. With Chiang
captured, the united front was definitely in the offing. The problems to
be negotiated concerned the strategies, organizations, and ideologies that
in the long term would affect the future of both Chiang's and the
Communists' revolutions. (See pp. 162-3 above.)
In Nanking the pro-Japanese wing, represented by General Ho Ying-
ch'in, advocated a tough reaction to the Sian incident by starting a
punitive expedition against the rebels and the reds, while Wang Ching-wei
was to be invited back to strengthen the possibility of a rapprochement
with Japan.
242
But the influential press like the
Ta-kung-pao
demanded the
release of Chiang and a settlement of the differences between Nanking
and the rebels by peaceful means.
243
At the scene of the incident, Chou
En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and others held talks with Chiang, insistently
arguing for a united front.
244
On both sides, the toughest problems lay
in the reconciliation between erstwhile enmity and future friendship, unity
and struggle, revolution and counter-revolution.
241
Snow, Random notes,
iff.
242
Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan
and her
destiny, 222—3.
243
Editorial
of
Ta-kung-pao,
14
December
1936 in
Chang Ch'ih-chang, Chi-luan wcn-ts'un (Taipei
ed.,
1962),
222—3.
244
J. M.
Bertnm,
Crisis
in
Cbina:
tbestoryoftbeSia/>mutiny(phottiitdFirstactinCbina),\-io;KMa.oV2L
Tetsuya,
46.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE SECOND UNITED FRONT 227
Up to this time Chiang's method of resolving these contradictions had
been to eliminate the class struggle as represented by the CCP before facing
up to the tension between China and Japan - a solution in line with Prince
Kung's and Tseng Kuo-fan's policy of the 1860s toward the Taiping
rebels. Wang Ming's method was to subordinate class struggle to national
struggle so as to achieve national unity, for without unity China could
not resist Japan. Mao, however, believed that unity was to be obtained
only through struggle, as unity could not be bought cheaply. If it came
cheaply, the unity would not be durable enough for a mass war against
Japan. The Sian incident made Chiang give up his method. Thereafter
a debate was to develop in the CCP between Wang Ming's broad
cooperation to achieve unity for struggle and Mao's limited cooperation
to achieve unity
through
struggle.
With his more orthodox view on the lack of political consciousness of
the peasants, Wang was anxious to take the national revolution back to
the cities where the KMT dominated. His original plan for a national
defence government and anti-Japanese allied armies did not imply an
overhaul of the government in Nanking, only its reform to include
representatives of the other parties and popular bodies. Later he went even
further to advocate unity of command, discipline, supply, equipment, and
planning of the anti-Japanese allied forces.
24S
According to him, unity
without sincere cooperation could not ensure a successful resistance to
Japan.
246
For him, therefore, everything must be for the resistance war
and for unity. To be sure, he still had a considerable following in his party
and the backing of the authority of the CI and the USSR. China's need
for Russian aid tended to enhance his status in the CCP. Furthermore,
in Central and South China there were guerrilla bands soon to be grouped
together to form the New Fourth Army under Hsiang Ying, a follower
of Wang Ming. Wang's personal prestige in the ECCI, his eloquence,
and his real power made him a considerable figure capable of challenging
Mao's leadership.
Mao,
on the other hand, had scarcely any trust in Chiang as an ally.
The war could be localized; it could be settled peacefully and quickly be
transformed into a Japanese-Chiang joint campaign against the CCP. In
that eventuality, to give up the Red Army and soviet territory would be
sheer folly. To prepare against such an eventuality the CCP must not only
preserve its autonomy and its ability to defend
itself.
It must also promote
what Mao called democracy and progress for the improvement of people's
livelihood and mass participation in the war, turning it into a true people's
war. The struggle for democracy and progress was in itself a guarantee
M5
Wang Ming, Hsiuut-M, 1.168-9. *** Ming-pao,
61.91.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
228 THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT I927-I937
of the solidarity of the nation. In a mass war, even if the grande
bourgeoisie and big landlords turned away from righting Japan, the CCP
could still stand alone without repeating the sorrowful history of 1927.
The crux of
mass
mobilization for a mass war lay in an appropriate land
policy and economic reform. Once again the focus of the party was on
the rich peasants. Wang Ming in his 'New situation and new strategy'
of
193 5
came out with
a
land policy even more moderate than Mao's before
1931:
only landlords' land was to be confiscated while rich peasants could
retain their farming tools and receive an equal share of land, not just poor
land.
247
To be sure, Wang at this stage was disheartened by the failure
of the land revolution, regarding it as merely an armed struggle with little
social and political meaning.
248
At the Wa-yao-pao Conference this more
lenient land policy was accepted. The rich, middle and poor peasants were
to receive an equal share of the same land while the rich peasants'
investments in commerce and industry were to remain intact. Their
livestock, movable property and farm tools were not to be redistributed.
249
By the summer of 1936 the CCP tempered its land policy still further to
draw it closer to Wang Ming's views, in order to facilitate cooperation
between the two major parties.
250
There were pragmatic reasons for the mitigation of CCP land policy.
The fundamental agrarian problems of north Shensi, for that matter of
North China in general, were not high tenancy rates and a hunger for
land, but a shortage of labour and how to organize labour efficiently in
order to achieve high productivity. Earlier, an ultra-left land policy
implemented there had proved to be detrimental to agricultural
production.
251
The change in land policy in December 1935, to one of
confiscating only the rich peasants' land for rent, eliminated extreme
inequality in land distribution and released the middle and poor peasants'
enthusiasm for mass work. Their activism was to put an end to the
monopoly of local power by landlords and rich peasants. The emphasis
then was not on redistribution of land, but on a fairer distribution of
grain.
252
Mao's alternative strategy was never as crude as the ' defeat both Japan
and Chiang' policy described by Chang Kuo-t'ao.
253
Its essence was how
to keep Chiang in the war of resistance and if Chiang made peace with
Japan, how to fight on independently and win the revolution. With
247
Wang Ming, Hsuan-ebi, 1.97-8. ""
Ibid.
81.
249
Ho Kan-chih, Modern
revolution,
1.191; Central Executive Committee's directive on 15 December
1935 in MTTC 5.13.
25
° MTTC 5.63-5.
151
Mao Tse-tung, Cbing-cbi wen-fiji tfai-cbeng wen-ft (Economic and financial problems), 8-9 and
12.
"
2
Ibid.
12-15.
2
« Ming-pao, 60.88.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE SECOND UNITED FRONT 229
inferior military strength, victory could be assured only by mass
mobilization to set up, defend and enlarge base areas, and thus to hasten
the arrival of a nationwide revolutionary situation. The overall strategy
in the war of resistance, as in the civil war before it, had to be the
encirclement of
cities
from the countryside, thus cutting the ground under
the feet of the cities and thereby taking the revolution to the cities.
Meanwhile a social revolution in the countryside was in progress that was
protected by the party's army and guided by its mass line. Early in 1937,
as in the summer of 1936, when Mao engaged Edgar Snow in systematic
conversation, his strategy may not yet have developed in its full form.
But the main points were all there. Many of Mao's comrades, particularly
Wang Ming, disagreed with him and the debate within the party
continued. Meanwhile fast-moving events on the national front compelled
the two major parties to enter a formal alliance in April 1937, less than
three months before the outbreak of the war against Japan.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHAPTER
5
THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM
The narratives in preceding chapters have concerned China's international
relations to 1931 and the fortunes of
the
Nationalist government in power
at Nanking and
its
Chinese Communist opponents down
to
1937.
Yet,
as earlier volumes
in
this series have made plain, China's modern history
can hardly be grasped through narrative alone; too many specific (though
often little known) situations affected the course
of
events
-
institutional
practices, economic
and
social conditions,
the
ideas
and
aspirations
of
leaders and followers. The next chapters therefore deal with the agrarian
economy, peasant movements, local government, higher education
and
literary trends
-
contextual elements that influenced the dramatic events
from 1937
to
1949. We begin with
an
appraisal
of
the livelihood
of
the
common people
on
the land.
By
the end of
the
ancien regime
in
1912 Chinese agriculture supported
a huge farming population, which worked hard
and
diligently
but had
to use ingenious methods
to
make
a
living from the inadequate amount
of land available. Since aggregative statistics
are
lacking, this chapter
presents
a
qualitative account
in
order
to
describe
a
situation quite
unfamiliar
to
most people in Europe and the Americas.
While travelling to Nanking in January
1869
Ferdinand von Richthofen
noted the following scene:
That honeybee-like diligence to cultivate the land
is
the special quality
of
the
Chinese.
I
know of
a
most astonishing example At the rear of
a mine
workmen
had thrust large coal slabs into
the
ground Nearby villagers
had
built
a
staircase
to
the top
of
these slabs and carried soil and fertilizer on their backs
In this way small parcels of land were farmed above the land. These areas
were several square meters in size. From below, one could see only jagged coal
slabs jutting upward,
but
from above, one only saw green fields laid out
in a
complex pattern.
In
the winter the peasants planted wheat, in the summer rice.'
Chinese farmers
had
mastered
the
secrets
of
replenishing
the
soil's
nutrients even while obtaining two crops a year in some regions and three
1
Ferdinand Paul Wilhelm
von
Richthofen,
Tagebucber
am
China;
tr.
Eihara Masao
as
Sbina ryoko
nikJki (Diary
of
travel
in
China), 1.159.
230
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008