CONFLICT OVER REVOLUTIONARY GOALS 619
created an atmosphere of crisis in the foreign settlements in Shanghai.
In Peking the British, American, Japanese, French and Italian ministers
consulted among themselves and with their governments concerning
reprisals. They reached agreement on a set of demands for retribution but
their governments could not agree on sanctions if apologies from the
Nationalist government and punishments of those guilty were not
forthcoming. The Japanese government under the influence of Foreign
Minister Shidehara Kijuro, attempted to restrain Great Britain and the
other powers from too bellicose a posture, while at the same time hoping
to persuade Chiang Kai-shek and the other moderate leaders of the Kuo-
mintang 'to solve the present issue and eventually stabilize conditions
throughout the south.' In short, Chiang was to be encouraged to act
against the radicals in his party. The Japanese consul-general in Shanghai,
Yada Shichitaro, passed this advice to Chiang Kai-shek through his close
associate, Huang Fu. The British government's policy towards the
Nationalists hardened. Great Britain now had the power in place to ex-
ecute a variety of punishments, but the American government would not
consent to participate in sanctions. In the end, after protracted interna-
tional debate, the powers did not take direct sanctions: developments in
the power struggle within the Kuomintang superseded such ideas.
1
"
The Wuhan government was at first poorly informed on the Nanking
Incident. The foreign minister, Eugene Chen, learned the details of what
had happened to the foreign community in Nanking from Eric Teichman,
the British representative in Hankow, with confirmation from the
American and Japanese consuls. Not until i April did the Political
Council, now fully informed about the Incident and with some inkling
as to reaction in foreign capitals, consider seriously how to deal with
the situation. Great Britain and America, it appeared, were preparing to
intervene, while Japan's policy was still unclear. Borodin put the matter
bluntly - 'if the imperialists should actually help the counter-revolu-
tionaries, it could bring about the destruction of the Revolutionary
Army.' His proposals were rather familiar: divide Great Britain and Japan.
This could be done by allaying Japanese fears of the revolution and by
ensuring that Japanese in China were protected, particularly in Hankow
where, according to Eugene Chen, Japanese residents were fearful their
concession would be seized. Propaganda laying the blame for the Nanking
Incident upon imperialism, and with moral appeals, should be addressed
155 Iriye, After
imperialism,
130-3, describes Shidehara's policy and instructions to his officials
in China, based on Japanese Foreign Office documents. Wilson, 'Great Britain and the
Kuomintang', 575-91 describes the British reaction based on British Foreign Office and
Cabinet documents. American policy is covered in FRUS, 1927, 2. 164-236; and in Borg,
American policy and the Chinese revolution, 296—317.
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