The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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LI
YOAN-HAO
l8l
Yiian-hao are heavily colored by rumor and legend, more is known from
Chinese sources about this one Tangut chieftain than about all the other Hsia
rulers combined. As a youth, Li Yiian-hao studied Chinese and Tibetan texts
on Buddhism, law, divination, and military strategy. Upon coming to power
he embarked on a bold program of political, social, and cultural reforms
designed to strengthen the power of the Tangut ruler and to manifest the
distinctive identity of his state. In addition, the proud monarch aspired to
make the Sung court recognize him as an equal of the Khitan ruler. But his
long, exhausting war with Sung (1039—44) ended only in
a
partial victory for
Hsia, at the expense of the Khitan alliance. Opposition to his centralizing
policies (and perhaps also to his alienation of both Sung and Liao) led finally
to Li Yuan-hao's assassination and a long devolution of central authority. Yet
he was unquestionably the most talented and imaginative of the Tangut
rulers and left an enduring imprint on the structure of Hsia government as
well as in the popular mind.
A sure dating of the new ruler's activities before 1038 eludes historians, but
several symbolic acts seemed to figure prominently in his scheme of things.
First, he changed the royal surname from Li to Wei-ming (Nwei-mi), a native
name. Thereupon all the "inner" lineages of the ruling clan adopted the new
surname. The Sung authorities continued to use the Sung royal surname Chao,
which their court had bestowed on Li Chi-ch'ien in 991; the Khitans had
continued nonetheless to use the old surname Li. Wei-ming Yiian-hao also
assumed the title of
wu
tsu, the Tangut equivalent of emperor or khaghan,
which was glossed in Chinese as
ch'ing
t'ien
tzu ("blue son of
heaven"
or "son of
blue heaven").
53
Next, he altered the current Sung reign title used in Hsia, in
order to observe a taboo on his father's personal name. Soon an independent
system of Chinese-style reign titles came into use in Hsia, along with Chinese
imperial nomenclature, all having its Tangut equivalents.
The most renowned of Wei-ming Yiian-hao's nativistic innovations was
the head-shaving decree of around 1034: "When Yiian-hao initially enacted
the head-shaving decree [t'u fa ling], he first cut his own hair and then
ordered all his countrymen to cut their hair. If within three days [someone]
had not followed the order, the crowd was permitted to kill him."
The top part of the skull was shaved, leaving a fringe across the forehead
and down the sides, framing the face. Variations of this style have been
observed among other Asian peoples (Hsien-pei, Khitan, Po-hai). By con-
trast, the ancient Ch'iang supposedly wore their hair hanging loose over their
53 On Li (Wei-ming) Yiian-hao's name and title,
see
SS, 485, p. 13993;
HCP,
m, p. 16b; 122, p. 9b;
Wu, Hii
Hsia shih
kao,
pp.
30—3;
Nikolai A. Nevskii,
Tangutskaia
filologiia
(Moscow, i960), vol. 1,
pp.
48—9. For a discussion of Inner Asian and Chinese imperial titles, see Peter Boodberg, "Dayan,
Cinggis, and Shan-yii," in the
Selected works
of
Peter
A.
Boodberg,
comp. Alvin P. Cohen (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1979), pp. 85—9.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
182 THE HSI HSIA
face.
Thus it has been suggested that the head-shaving decree represented an
attempt to reform a "backward" Ch'iang custom and to distinguish Hsia
subjects from their Liao, Sung, and T'u-po neighbors.'
4
Dress regulations were issued, prescribing costume for civil and military
officials and for commoners. Tibetan and Uighur influences have been dis-
cerned in the Hsia dress code."
Of far greater import was the dissemination of a Tangut script around
1036.
Credit for its creation and elaboration is given to the scholar Yeh-li
Jen-jung (a kinsman of two prominent brothers, the generals Yeh-li Yii-ch'i
and Wang-jung), but work on the script probably had begun under Li Te-
ming and continued over many years. Comprising over six thousand charac-
ters,
the new script was adopted in government offices and schools, where
translations of Chinese and Tibetan works into Tangut began at once. Over
one hundred years later, in 1162, Yeh-li Jen-jung was honored with
a
posthu-
mous ode addressed to "the great teacher, Iri." From the 1040s onward, Hsia
communications with the Sung normally included Tangut forms of Hsia
noble and official titles, which were then adopted (in Chinese transcription)
in the Chinese chancellery and diplomatic documents so as to avoid any
suggestion of parity between the Hsia officials and their Sung counterparts.'
6
Although Tangut texts of these documents have not survived, at least many
titles of offices, whose meanings in most cases remain unknown, have thus
been preserved in Sung records.
Wei-ming Yiian-hao's military and administrative reforms gave the
Tangut state its basic political shape. It is tempting to see in the civilian and
military nomenclature of
Hsia
government an expression of that institutional
duality so well known in the Liao state. Certainly Chinese subjects readily
found employment in the bureaucracy, whereas the military naturally re-
mained the preserve of the Tangut elite's ruling power. However, the divi-
sion between civilian and military is not an appropriate basis for analyzing
Tangut government, which was not clearly structured along those lines.
Moreover, the dualistic elaboration of the Liao government has no obvious
counterpart in the Tangut state structure. This does not mean that Liao
models did not inspire the architects of Tangut government, but that is a
subject yet to be examined properly.
54
HCP, 115, p. 14b;
Okazaki
Seiro,
"Scika
no Ri
Genko
to
tokuhatsu
rei,"
Tohogaku,
19
(1939),
pp.
77-86.
55
SS, 485, p.
13993;
Wang
Chung,
"Lun Hsi
Hsia
te
hsingch'i,"
p.
21;
Wu,
Hsi Hsiasbih
kao,
p. 205;
A.
P.
Terentyev-Katansky,
"The
appearance,
clothes
and
utensils
of
the
Tanguts,"
in
The countries and
peoples of the
East,
ed. D. A.
Olderogge
(Moscow,
1974),
pp.
215—24.
56
Wu, Hsi
Hsia sbih
kao,
pp. 203,
215—17.
Regarding
the
invention
and
inventor
of
the Tangut
script,
see
Kychanov,
Ocheri
istorii,
pp.
259—62;
Nevskii,
Tangutsiaia
filohgiia,
vol. 1, pp.
79—80;
Nishida
Tatsuo, Seikago no kenkyu: Seikago
no
sat
kosei to
Seika moji
no
kaidoku (Kyoto, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 539-40
of the English summary.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
LI YOAN-HAO 183
The early Hsia military was highly decentralized, drawing on the indepen-
dent armies
(//'«)
of tribal chieftains for the bulk of its fighting forces. To
strengthen control over his chieftains-general, the Wei-ming ruler issued a
set of military regulations, presumably dealing with conscription, discipline,
and service rewards. Yet he did not abandon traditional tribal customs of
consultation primus
inter
pares.
Before a military undertaking, he summoned
the chieftains to participate in hunting exercises: "Whenever a catch was
made, everyone dismounted and gathered around a campfire to drink and eat,
cutting off fresh meat, at which time [the ruler} queried each as to his views
and selected the most astute {of them]."'
7
Other measures reflect the contemporary expansion of the Tanguts' borders
and armed prowess. Hsia was divided into twelve military districts called
chien
chiin ssu, Army Superintendancies (Kychanov translates these as Military-
Police Boards): six under the Left Wing (tso hsiang), headquartered east of
Hsia-chou and governing the eastern half of the country, and six under the
Right Wing (yu
hsiang),
nominally headquartered at Kan-chou and governing
the western half of the country (see Map 12).
This typically Inner Asian structure had also characterized the Tibetan
organization at Liang-chou, which may have provided its model. Three
officers, appointed from the ranks of imperial relatives and tribal elders,
headed each of the twelve Army Superintendancies (for their headquarters,
see Map 12). Both Chinese and Tanguts served in subordinate capacities.
Presiding over the entire structure were the two chiefs of the Right and Left
Wings, usually imperial kinsmen or consort relatives, whose power rivaled
that of the throne. Inevitably, fatal tensions arose between these representa-
tives of the tribal oligarchy and the Wei-ming monarch.
At the height of Wei-ming Yiian-hao's reign, the Tangut army numbered
from 150,000 to 300,000 troops, most of whom were assigned to garrison the
border and vital interior regions, falling under the jurisdiction of one or
another Army Superintendancy. When a decision was made to mobilize, cen-
tral authorities dispatched messengers with silver tablets (p'ai-tzu) to the
requisite general, who summoned the needed troops from lists of registered
conscripts. All able-bodied males between the ages of fifteen and sixty were
liable for military service.'
8
Acceptance of the silver tablet expressed compli-
ance with the ruler's request for troops, but in addition the ruler often swore an
oath with his generals on the eve of battle, as Wei-ming Yiian-hao did in 1038.
Apart from the twelve Army Superintendancies, which evolved into the
principal organs of regional government, the Tangut ruler restructured and
57 SS, 485, p. 13993; Wu, Hsi Hsia sbih kao, pp. 200—19.
58 On the Hsi Hsia army, see SS, 485, pp. 13994-5; 486, pp. 14028—9; Wu, Hsi Hsia sbih kao, pp.
200-19; Kychanov,
Ocherk
islorri, pp. 115—32.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
184
THE HSI HSIA
LI YUAN-HAO
I8
5
190
100
300 km
2OOmilos
H
s i
chou
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' "%_<-
HSI-P'ING
CHUN-SSU
9
Kua-chou
Su-chou e
H ua ng-t'ou Urghurs
Tibetans
The boundaries of the Hsia state (other than
the border with Sung) are approximate.
At some date early in the twelfth century the
name of the capital was
changed
from Hsing-
ch'ing fu to Chung-hsing fu.
Y
I N-^S HAN
HEI-SHU
CHEN-YEN
CHUN-SSU
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ortress 4
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IHsuan-hiiafu)
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S
ing-ch-ingf
U
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._
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ShunthousT*
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(Hsi-p'ingfu)
HAN-HAI
Ming-shay Yen-chou
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HSIANG-YU
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12. The Hsi Hsia state, mi
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
l86 THE HSI HSIA
expanded the bureaucratic apparatus along Sung institutional lines. He cre-
ated a central Secretariat (Chung-shu sheng), Bureau of Military Affairs
(Shu-mi yuan), Finance Office (San-ssu), Censorate (Yu-shih t'ai), and six-
teen subordinate bureaus
(ssu)
under the nominal supervision of
a
chancellor
(shang-shu
ling).
Top positions in these offices could be held by Tanguts and
Chinese alike. Other appointments carried Tangut titles and were clearly
reserved for the ruling elite, as were the highest military appointments.
59
But behind the facade of Chinese nomenclature, the actual workings of Hsia
government still remain shadowy. Next to nothing is known, for example,
about the government's
fiscal
activities.
During the years 1035—6 Hsia armies campaigned against the Tibetans of
Kokonor, the tribes around Lan-chou, and the Ho-hsi Uighurs. The long-
drawn-out conquest of Ho-hsi has already been discussed. In the Huang
River valley several fierce and prolonged battles took place between Tibetans
and Tanguts, with heavy losses on both sides. Unable to subdue Ch'ing-
t'ang, Wei-ming Yiian-hao nevertheless took advantage of an estrangement
between Ku-ssu-lo and his two elder sons, as well as the son of
his
murdered
ex-minister, to isolate the Tibetan leader and force him into temporary
retreat west of Ch'ing-t'ang. The Tangut army then marched to Lan-chou, to
secure its rear flank against Tibetan attack and to frustrate Tibetan communi-
cations with Sung. Hsia troops penetrated to Ma-hsien-shan (north of Lin-
t'ao hsien) and left a fortified garrison to hold the area.
60
Around this time and especially after 1038, the Sung court tried to foster a
united Tibetan front against Hsia, but its efforts yielded little tangible reward.
Ku-ssu-lo's weakness ultimately posed
a
greater danger to Hsia
by
its failure to
impede Sung annexation of the region at the end of the eleventh century.
In numerous recorded instances the Wei-ming ruler dealt swiftly and
summarily with opposition to his policies or his rule. As he made final
preparations for his public enthronement as emperor in the autumn of 1038,
his chief military leader, (Wei-ming) Shan-yii, sought asylum across the Sung
border with his army but was extradited and executed at Yu-chou. The rebel
and his younger brother, the monarch's paternal uncles, had been the leaders
of the Right and Left Wings of the Hsia army, a clear indication of the depth
of sentiment against Wei-ming Yiian-hao's imminent rejection of Sung vassal
status.
Whatever its misgivings about the Tangut ruler, though, the Chinese
court refused to violate its treaty with Hsia by harboring the would-be
defectors.
6
'
59 SS, 485, p. 13993; HCP, 120, p. 23b.
60 HCP, 117, pp.
17b—
18a;
119, pp.
16b—
17a;
SS, 492, pp. 14161—2.
61 On the rebellion of Shan-yu, see HCP, 122, pp. 8a~9b; Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-86), Su-sbui cbi wen
(TSCCCP ed.) 12, pp. ia-2a.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
LI YOAN-HAO 187
The imperial elevation proceeded as scheduled. Already the ruler and his
chieftains had sworn an oath, sealed with a libation of blood and wine mixed
in a skull, ostensibly vowing first to attack the Sung's Fu-yen circuit. Two
brothers of the Yeh-li clan, Wang-jung (also called Kang-lang-ling) and Yii-
ch'i,
assumed leadership of the Left and Right Wings, respectively, of the
Hsia army in place of Yiian-hao's uncles who had attempted to defect. They
were either uncles or brothers of the Yeh-li empress, mother of the heir
apparent, and they wielded great power.
62
In the tenth month of 1038, thirty-year-old Wei-ming Yiian-hao was for-
mally enthroned as emperor of
Ta
Hsia. He proclaimed a new reign title and
perhaps also at this time bestowed imperial titles and temple names on his
father and grandfather. The new emperor then traveled to Hsi-liang Fu (the
official Hsia designation of Liang-chou) to make offerings to the spirits while
his generals mobilized troops. A special embassy set out for the Sung capital
bearing a letter announcing the establishment of the Tangut state
as
an impe-
rial power and requesting recognition as a friendly but sovereign western
neighbor, something for which its author clearly expected to have to do battle.
Having had some advance notice of these events, the Sung court was not
entirely surprised. After declining a proposal to execute the Hsia ambassa-
dor's party, Sung Jen-tsung (r. 1022—63) proffered the usual courtesies but
refused to accept the gifts of horses and camels. Likewise, the Hsia embassy
rejected his edict and presents and was escorted back to the border. Jen-tsung
then revoked his estwhile subject's titles and ranks and closed all the frontier
markets. The Wei-ming emperor returned all his Sung paraphernalia of office
with an "impudent" letter.
6
'
The Fan [the Tanguts} and Han are each different countries, and their lands are vastly
dissimilar. This is not a case of usurpation. Why is your resentment so deep? Moreover [I] was
elevated by the throng and, in accordance with ancient T'o-pa tradition, aspire to be emperor.
What is wrong with that?
Negotiations to resolve the disagreement over the Tangut ruler's status and
how to denote it thereupon commenced and concluded only in 1044. Mean-
while, the two states engaged in a war of sabotage and attrition, highlighted
by three major Tangut victories. Yeh-li Wang-jung, commander of the Left
Wing, acted as the Tanguts' chief negotiator with the Sung authorities at
Yen-chou, first with Fan Chung-yen (989-1052) and then with P'ang Chi
(988-1063).
62 The Yeh-li clan
is
discussed later. For Wei-ming Yiian-hao's coronation, see HCP,
111,
pp.
8b,
iob—
ita, I4b-i5a.
63
HCP, 125, p.
1
ia-b.
On the
course
of
the ensuing war and negotiations,
see
Wu,
Hit
Hsia
shih
kao,
pp.
59—71;
Evgenii
I.
Kychanov, "Les geurres entre le Song du Nord et
le Hsi
Hsia," in
£.tuda
Song
in
memoriam
ttienne Balazs,
ed.
Francoise Aubin,
1st
series,
no. 2
(Paris, 1971),
pp.
106—18.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
l88 THE HSI
HSIA
Until 1042, negotiations were stalled over the Tangut ruler's refusal to call
himself
ch'en
(subject) in letters to the Chinese court. In that year, however,
Liao diplomatic intervention and a stunning Tangut rout of the Sung forces
broke the stalemate.
64
The Khitans pressed the Chinese for further territorial
concessions in Kuan-nan,
a
strategic wedge of territory in Ho-pei that threat-
ened the approaches to K'ai-feng. In the course of dealing with these de-
mands, the Sung court urged the Khitans to mediate its conflict with Hsia by
applying pressure on their vassal. Further, the Sung court secretly instructed
P'ang Chi to accept the Tangut peace initiatives, agreeing that as long as the
Hsia ruler agreed to accept subject
{ch'en)
status toward Sung, he could keep
his native title of
wu-tsu.
Early in 1043, the Tangut ruler proposed a new formula in a communique
to Jen-tsung: "The son, emperor of the Pang-ni-ting state, Nang-hsiao,
submits a letter to the father, emperor of the great Sung." Pang-ni-ting
appears to be a variant transcription of the Tangut name for their own
country (written Pai-shang kuo in Chinese), and Nang-hsiao the new per-
sonal name of Wei-mi ng Yiian-hao. One Chinese statesman observed that
this address copied the familial protocol then in use in Sung—Liao diplomatic
discourse.
6
' The court rejected it.
A few months later the Sung offered terms by which, among other things,
the Tangut monarch would be invested as "ruler"
(chu;
greater than a king,
wang, but humbler than an emperor,
huang
ti) and receive annual gifts. Soon
the Tangut side responded with eleven demands, including an increase in the
annual gifts, greater trading privileges for the Tangut envoys, and permis-
sion to sell white salt to the Chinese. It was again pointed out that here the
Tanguts were imitating the Khitan example. Liao had just settled for an
increase in its annual subsidy instead of the lands in Kuan-nan they had
originally demanded. This apparent mimicry confirmed Chinese suspicions
of collusion between their two northern neighbors Hsia and Liao, and it
greatly perplexed the court when scarcely a year later the supposed collabora-
tors went to war with each over some rebellious Tangut border tribes.
After the Tangut emperor finally agreed to accept
ch'en
status, the Sung
extended trading rights to the Tangut envoys at government hostels in K'ai-
feng and increased the annual presents. It would not, however, legalize sales
of Tangut salt.
66
Just as negotiations were completed, in the fifth month of
1044 the Khitans invaded Hsia in pursuit of some renegade border tribes.
64 Tao Jing-shen, "Yii Ching and Sung policies toward Liao and Hsia, 1042-44,"
Journal
of
Asian
Studies,
6 (1972), pp. 114—22. Fan Chung-yen has an entry in
Sung
biographies,
vol. 1, pp. 321-30,
and inSungjen
chuan cbi
tzu
liaosuoyin,
vol. 2, pp. 1648—52.
65 HCP, 139, pp. 6b-ja;SS, 485, p. 13998.
66 HCP, 142, pp. 8a-i3b; Wu,
HsiHsia
shibkao,
pp.
69-71.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE SUCCESSION TO WEI-MING YUAN-HAO 189
Perhaps the Tanguts' audacious pursuit of diplomatic parity with Liao vis-a-
vis the Sung court also lay behind the Khitans' punitive campaign. Warned
by the Liao court not to conclude peace with Hsia just yet, the Chinese warily
withheld the Sung patent of investiture for Wei-ming Yiian-hao. But after
learning of
a
Khitan defeat the Sung seized the initiative and dispatched its
envoys to conclude the treaty with Hsia in winter of 1044.
Besides the points already mentioned, the treaty with Sung stipulated that
Hsia would receive Sung envoys at Yu-chou, not at the Tangut capital, using
the same protocol
(pin
k'o li) as it extended to Liao envoys. Border markets
were restored. The annual gifts totaled 255,000 units: 153,000 p'i of silk,
30,000 small chin of tea, and 72,000
Hang
of silver.
67
Clarification of the
boundary between the two states, however, remained subject to discussion.
This failure to clearly demarcate the border was to remain a source of bitter
disputes until the two sides ceased to share a border, after Sung lost its
northern territories to Chin.
Meanwhile, the war with the Khitan continued. Having ably frustrated a
three-pronged Liao invasion of his territory, the Tangut ruler hastened to
mollify the humiliated Liao emperor.
68
Relations were temporarily patched
up,
but the conflict broke out again several years later, and it is not even
certain that the Liao court ever formally invested Wei-ming Yuan-hao's
successor, Liang-tso.
THE SUCCESSION TO WEI-MING YUAN-HAO
The various accounts of Wei-ming Yuan-hao's death and the origins of his
successor are extremely confused.
69
Toward the end of the Sung war the
Tangut emperor took as his own wife the intended bride of
his
son, a lady of
the Mo-i clan. His doing so is usually castigated as incestuous, but perhaps it
was an attempt to loosen the tentacles of the Yeh-li, the empress's extremely
powerful clan. The Mo-i concubine bore a son. Yuan-hao's officially desig-
nated heir was Ning-ling-ko, a son of the Yeh-li empress, and the Yeh-li
elders Wang-jung and Yii-ch'i, who dominated both the court and the
military, doubtless viewed these developments as a serious threat to their own
interests. It was thus arranged to marry Ning-ling-ko to the daughter of the
67 Huang Ch'ing-yiin, "Kuan yii Pei Sung yii Hsi Hsia ho yiieh chung yin chiian ch'a te shu Hang wen
t'i," Chung
hsiieh
li shih
chiao
hsiieh,
9 (1957), pp. 19—20.
68 On the Khitan invasion of Hsia, see SS, 485, pp. 13999—14000; LS, 19, pp.
230-1;
Shen Kua
(1031?—95), Meng-bsi [ch'iipi t'an
chiao
chmg,
ed. Hu Tao-ching (Peking, 1957; repr. Taipei, 1965),
pp.
787-9°-
69 This section draws on the following accounts: HCP, 162, pp. ia—2a; Ssu-ma Kuan, Su-shui
chi
wen,
9,
pp.
9a-b; 10, pp. jb, 9a; 11, pp. nb-i2a; Wang Ch'eng (d. ca. 1200), Tung tu shih
lu'eh,
repr. in
vols.
11—14 of
Sung
shih tzu liao ts'uipirn, 1st series, ed. Chao T'ieh-han (Taipei, 1967) 127, p. 6a-b;
Tai, Hsi Hsia chi, 11, pp.
lib—
12a;
Wu, Hsi Hsiasbusbib, 18, pp. I2b-I3a.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
190 THE HSI HSIA
empress's uncle (or perhaps brother), Yeh-li Wang-jung. Yeh-li Wang-jung
then invited the emperor to visit his tent on the eve of the wedding, intend-
ing, apparently, to assassinate him. Word of the alleged plot leaked out, and
Yeh-li Wang-jung, Yeh-li Yii-ch'i, and the members of three Yeh-li lineages
were executed as a result. In some sources these events are dated 1042 or
1043 and blamed on Sung subversion, but it seems certain that they took
place one or two years after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Sung, in
1045 or 1046.
The Yeh-li empress escaped punishment, but at some point later the
emperor demoted her and installed his Mo-i concubine as empress. The
former empress Yeh-li retained enough influence, however, to persuade the
emperor to repent his hasty execution of her blameless kinsmen and to seek
out survivors of the slaughter. As a result of
this,
the wife of Yeh-li Yii-ch'i, a
member of the prominent Mo-ts'ang clan, was discovered and brought to the
palace. When the emperor began to visit her, the former Yeh-li empress
removed Mo-ts'ang to a temple in the suburbs of
the
capital, but the emperor
continued his amours. The Sung official history asserts that in the second
month of 1047 the lady Mo-ts'ang bore a male child, named Liang-tso after
the river beside which he was born. Other accounts date his birth two
months after the emperor's death, which occurred either at the end of 1047 or
early in 1048.
70
This child was brought up in the home of
his
mother's brother, Mo-ts'ang
O-p'ang, who had served under Yeh-li Yii-ch'i's command. The Yeh-li em-
press's demotion (1047?) spurred the dispossessed heir apparent, with the
connivance of Mo-ts'ang O-p'ang, to avenge the Yeh-li's misfortunes by
attempting to assassinate the emperor later that year. After stabbing his
father in the nose, the luckless young man fled to Mo-ts'ang O-p'ang's
residence, where he was promptly arrested and executed, along with the
remaining Yeh-li clan members.
Now the Mo-ts'ang clan, whose elder O-p'ang may have fabricated the
entire scenario to ensure the position of their puppet child-emperor, stepped
into the power vacuum. When the emperor died the day following the
assassination attempt, a council of great chieftains was convened to select a
new ruler. All the tribal elders approved the heir, a cousin of Wei-ming
Yiian-hao, chosen by the deceased ruler before these events and designated
in his dying testament. Mo-ts'ang O-p'ang alone objected, somewhat disin-
genuously, on the grounds that succession by a cousin would violate the
established practice of primogeniture, and he moreover claimed that the
chosen candidate lacked "merit." Instead, Mo-ts'ang put forward the bastard
70 SS, 485, p. 14000; see also the sources listed in n. 69.
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