All these issues (secrecy, authentication, nonrepudiation, and integrity control) occur in
traditional systems, too, but with some significant differences. Integrity and secrecy are
achieved by using registered mail and locking documents up. Robbing the mail train is harder
now than it was in Jesse James' day.
Also, people can usually tell the difference between an original paper document and a
photocopy, and it often matters to them. As a test, make a photocopy of a valid check. Try
cashing the original check at your bank on Monday. Now try cashing the photocopy of the
check on Tuesday. Observe the difference in the bank's behavior. With electronic checks, the
original and the copy are indistinguishable. It may take a while for banks to learn how to
handle this.
People authenticate other people by recognizing their faces, voices, and handwriting. Proof of
signing is handled by signatures on letterhead paper, raised seals, and so on. Tampering can
usually be detected by handwriting, ink, and paper experts. None of these options are
available electronically. Clearly, other solutions are needed.
Before getting into the solutions themselves, it is worth spending a few moments considering
where in the protocol stack network security belongs. There is probably no one single place.
Every layer has something to contribute. In the physical layer, wiretapping can be foiled by
enclosing transmission lines in sealed tubes containing gas at high pressure. Any attempt to
drill into a tube will release some gas, reducing the pressure and triggering an alarm. Some
military systems use this technique.
In the data link layer, packets on a point-to-point line can be encrypted as they leave one
machine and decrypted as they enter another. All the details can be handled in the data link
layer, with higher layers oblivious to what is going on. This solution breaks down when packets
have to traverse multiple routers, however, because packets have to be decrypted at each
router, leaving them vulnerable to attacks from within the router. Also, it does not allow some
sessions to be protected (e.g., those involving on-line purchases by credit card) and others
not. Nevertheless,
link encryption, as this method is called, can be added to any network
easily and is often useful.
In the network layer, firewalls can be installed to keep good packets and bad packets out. IP
security also functions in this layer.
In the transport layer, entire connections can be encrypted, end to end, that is, process to
process. For maximum security, end-to-end security is required.
Finally, issues such as user authentication and nonrepudiation can only be handled in the
application layer.
Since security does not fit neatly into any layer, it does not fit into any chapter of this book.
For this reason, it rates its own chapter.
While this chapter is long, technical, and essential, and it is also quasi-irrelevant for the
moment. It is well documented that most security failures at banks, for example, are due to
incompetent employees, lax security procedures, or insider fraud, rather than clever criminals
tapping phone lines and then decoding encrypted messages. If a person can walk into a
random branch of a bank with an ATM slip he found on the street claiming to have forgotten
his PIN and get a new one on the spot (in the name of good customer relations), all the
cryptography in the world will not prevent abuse. In this respect, Ross Anderson's book is a
real eye-opener, as it documents hundreds of examples of security failures in numerous
industries, nearly all of them due to what might politely be called sloppy business practices or
inattention to security (Anderson, 2001). Nevertheless, we are optimistic that as e-commerce
becomes more widespread, companies will eventually debug their operational procedures,
eliminating this loophole and bringing the technical aspects of security to center stage again.