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within the limits of the United States, the judicial depart-

ment is also bound to recognize, and to administer in it the

laws of the United States, so far as they apply, and to main-

tain in the Territory the authority and rights of the Gov-

ernment, and also the personal rights and rights of

property of individual citizens, as secured by the Constitu-

tion. All we mean to say on this point is, that, as there is no

express regulation in the Constitution defining the power

which the General Government may exercise over the

person or property of a citizen in a Territory thus acquired,

the court must necessarily look to the provisions and prin-

ciples of the Constitution, and its distribution of powers,

for the rules and principles by which its decision must be

governed.

Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed

that citizens of the United States who migrate to a Terri-

tory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot

be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the

General Government, and to be governed by any law it

may think proper to impose. The principle upon which our

Governments rest, and upon which alone they continue to

exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent

within their own limits in their internal and domestic con-

cerns, and bound together as one people by a General

Government, possessing certain enumerated and

restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of the sev-

eral States, and exercising supreme authority within the

scope of the powers granted to it, throughout the domin-

ion of the United States. A power, therefore, in the Gen-

eral Government to obtain and hold colonies and

dependent territories, over which they might legislate

without restriction, would be inconsistent with its own

existence in its present form. Whatever it acquires, it

acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States

who created it. It is their trustee acting for them, and

charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the

whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers

specifically granted.

At the time when the Territory in question was

obtained by cession from France, it contained no popula-

tion fit to be associated together and admitted as a State;

and it therefore was absolutely necessary to hold posses-

sion of it, as a Territory belonging to the United States,

until it was settled and inhabited by a civilized community

capable of self-government, and in a condition to be

admitted on equal terms with the other States as a mem-

ber of the Union. But, as we have before said, it was

acquired by the General Government, as the representa-

tive and trustee of the people of the United States, and it

must therefore be held in that character for their common

and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several

States, acting through their agent and representative, the

Federal Government, who in fact acquired the Territory in

question, and the Government holds it for their common

use until it shall be associated with the other States as a

member of the Union.

But until that time arrives, it is undoubtedly necessary

that some Government should be established, in order to

organize society, and to protect the inhabitants in their

persons and property; and as the people of the United

States could act in this matter only through the Govern-

ment which represented them, and through which they

spoke and acted when the Territory was obtained, it was

not only within the scope of its powers, but it was its duty

to pass such laws and establish such a Government as

would enable those by whose authority they acted to reap

the advantages anticipated from its acquisition, and to

gather there a population which would enable it to assume

the position to which it was destined among the States of

the Union. The power to acquire necessarily carries with it

the power to preserve and apply to the purposes for which

it was acquired. The form of government to be established

necessarily rested in the discretion of Congress. It was

their duty to establish the one that would be best suited for

the protection and security of the citizens of the United

States, and other inhabitants who might be authorized to

take up their abode there, and that must always depend

upon the existing condition of the Territory, as to the num-

ber and character of its inhabitants, and their situation in

the Territory. In some cases a Government, consisting of

persons appointed by the Federal Government, would

best subserve the interests of the Territory, when the

inhabitants were few and scattered, and new to one

another. In other instances, it would be more advisable to

commit the powers of self-government to the people who

had settled in the Territory, as being the most competent

to determine what was best for their own interests. But

some form of civil authority would be absolutely necessary

to organize and preserve civilized society, and prepare it to

become a State; and what is the best form must always

depend on condition of the Territory at the time, and the

choice of the mode must depend upon the exercise of a

discretionary power by Congress, acting within the scope

of its constitutional authority, and not infringing upon the

rights of person or rights or property of the citizen who

might go there to reside, or for any other lawful purpose.

It was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it

must be held and governed in like manner, until it is fitted

to be a State.

But the power of Congress over the person or prop-

erty of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power

under our Constitution and form of Government. The

powers of the Government and the rights and privileges of

the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Con-

stitution itself. And when the Territory becomes a part of

the United States, the Federal Government enters into

832 ERA 5: Civil War and Reconstruction

possession in the character impressed upon it by those

who created it. It enters upon it with its powers over the

citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution,

from which it derives its own existence, and by virtue of

which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government

and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it;

and it cannot, when it enters a Territory of the United

States, put off its character, and assume discretionary or

despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it.

It cannot create for itself a new character separated from

the citizens of the United States, and the duties it owes

them under the provisions of the Constitution. The Terri-

tory being a part of the United States, the Government

and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the

Constitution, with their respective rights defined and

marked out; and the Federal Government can exercise no

power over his person or property, beyond what that

instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it

has reserved.

A reference to a few of the provisions of the Constitu-

tion will illustrate this proposition.

For example, no one, we presume, will contend that

Congress can make any law in a Territory respecting the

establishment of religion, or the free exercise thereof, or

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the

right of the people of the Territory peaceably to assemble,

and to petition the Government for the redress of

grievances.

Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to

keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor com-

pel any one to be a witness against himself in a criminal

proceeding.

These powers, and others, in relation to rights of per-

son, which it is not necessary here to enumerate, are, in

express and positive terms, denied to the General Govern-

ment; and the rights of private property have been

guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are

united with the rights of person, and placed on the same

ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which

provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

and property, without due process of law. And an act of

Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of

his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or

brought his property into a particular Territory of the

United States, and who had committed no offense against

the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due

process of law.

So, too, it will hardly be contended that Congress

could by law quarter a soldier in a house in a Territory

without the consent of the owner, in time of peace; nor in

time of war, but in a manner prescribed by law. Nor could

they by law forfeit the property of a citizen in a Territory

who was convicted of treason, for a longer period than the

life of the person convicted; nor take private property for

public use without just compensation.

The powers over person and property of which we

speak are not only not granted to Congress, but are in

express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise

them. And this prohibition is not confined to the States,

but the words are general, and extend to the whole terri-

tory over which the Constitution gives it power to legislate,

including those portions of it remaining under Territorial

Government, as well as that covered by States. It is a total

absence of power everywhere within the dominion of the

United States, and places the citizens of a Territory, so far

as these rights are concerned, on the same footing with cit-

izens of the States, and guards them as firmly and plainly

against any inroads which the General Government might

attempt, under the plea of implied or incidental powers.

And if Congress itself cannot do this—if it is beyond the

powers conferred on the Federal Government—it will be

admitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a Terri-

torial Government to exercise them. It could confer no

power on any local Government, established by its author-

ity, to violate the provisions of the Constitution.

It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a dif-

ference between property in a slave and other property,

and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding

the Constitution of the United States. And the laws and

usage’s of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon

the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and

duties, and the powers which Governments may exercise

over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument.

But in considering the question before us, it must be

borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing

between the people of the United States and their Gov-

ernment, and interfering with their relation to each other.

The powers of the Government and the rights of the citi-

zen under t, are positive and practical regulations plainly

written down. The people of the United States have dele-

gated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to

exercise others. It has no power over the person or prop-

erty of a citizen but what the citizens of the United States

have granted. And no laws or usage’s of other nations, or

reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of mas-

ter and slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government,

or take from the citizens the rights they have reserved. And

if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the

master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that

description of property and other property owned by a cit-

izen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United

States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has

a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit

of the provisions and guarantees which have been pro-

vided for the protection of private property against the

encroachments of the Government.

The Causes of the Civil War 833

Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this

opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a

slave is distinctly and express affirmed in the Constitution.

The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of mer-

chandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of

the United States, in every State that might desire it, for

twenty years. And the Government in express terms in

pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slaves escapes

from his owner. This is done in plain words—too plain to

be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Con-

stitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave

property, or which entitles property of that kind to less

protection than property of any other description. The

only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty

of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.

Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the

court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen

from holding and owning property of this kind in the terri-

tory of the United States north of the line therein men-

tioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is

therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor

any of his family, were made free by begin carried into this

territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner,

with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.

We have so far examined the case, as it stands under

the Constitution of the United States, and the powers

thereby delegated to the Federal Government.

But there is another point in the case which depends

on State power and State law. And it is contended, on the

part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being taken to

Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, independently of his

residence in the territory of the United States; and being

so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slav-

ery by being brought back to Missouri.

Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief;

for the principle on which it depends was decided in this

court, upon much consideration, in the case of Strader et

al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, 82. In that case,

the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the

consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to Ken-

tucky. And this court held that their status or condition, as

free or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when

they were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio;

and that this court had no jurisdiction to revise the judg-

ment of a State court upon its own laws. This was the point

directly before the court, and the decision that this court

had not jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the

report of the case.

So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into

the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held

as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as

free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of

Illinois.

It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by

the laws of Missouri he was free on his return, and that this

case, therefore, cannot be governed by the case of Strader

et al. v. Graham, where it appeared, by the laws of Ken-

tucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be slaves on their

return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may, at

one time, have been entertained upon this subject, we are

satisfied, upon a careful examination of all the cases

decided in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it

is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court

in the State, that Scott and his family upon their return

were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the prop-

erty of the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the

United States had no jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the

State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen.

Moreover, the plaintiff, it appears, brought a similar

action against the defendant in the State court of Missouri,

claiming the freedom of himself and his family upon the

same grounds and the same evidence upon which he relies

in the case before the court. The case was carried before

the Supreme Court of the State; was fully argued there;

and that court decided that neither the plaintiff nor his

family were entitled to freedom, and were still the slaves of

the defendant; and reversed the judgment of the inferior

State court, which had given a different decision. If the

plaintiff supposed that this judgment of the Supreme

Court of the State was erroneous, and that this court had

jurisdiction to revise and reverse it, the only mode by

which he could legally bring it before this court was by writ

of error directed to the Supreme Court of the State,

requiring it to transmit the record to this court. If this had

been done, it is too plain for argument that the writ must

have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court.

The case of Strader and others. v. Graham is directly in

point; and, indeed, independent of any decision, the lan-

guage of the 25th section of the act of 1789 is too clear and

precise to admit of controversy.

But the plaintiff did not pursue the mode prescribed

by law for bringing the judgment of a State court before

this court for revision, but suffered the case to be

remanded to the inferior State court, where it is still con-

tinued, and is, by agreement of parties, to await the judg-

ment of this court on the point. All of this appears on the

record before us, and by the printed report of the case.

And while the case is yet open and pending in the

inferior State court, the plaintiff goes into the Circuit

Court of the United States, upon the same case the same

evidence, and against the same party, and proceeds to

judgment, and then brings here the same case from the

Circuit Court, which the law would not have permitted

him to bring directly from the State court. And if this court

takes jurisdiction in this form, the result, so far as the rights

of the respective parties are concerned, is in every respect

834 ERA 5: Civil War and Reconstruction

substantially the same as if it had in open violation of law

entertained jurisdiction over the judgment of the State

court upon a writ of error, and revised and reversed its

judgment upon the ground that its opinion upon the ques-

tion of law was erroneous. It would ill become this court to

sanction such an attempt to evade the law, or to exercise an

appellate power in this circuitous way, which it is forbid-

den to exercise in the direct and regular and invariable

forms of judicial proceedings.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this

court, that it appears by the record before us that the

plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in

which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the

Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no

jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it.

Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be

reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Source:

19 Howard (60 U.S.) 393.

The quotation in the introduction is by Walter Erlich, “Scott V.

Sandford,” in Kermit Hall, ed., The Oxford Guide to United

States Supreme Court Decisions. New York: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1999, p. 278.

Lincoln-Douglas Debate Number 2, 1858

One of a historic series of debates on slavery and the Union

between candidates Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas

during the 1858 campaign in Illinois for the U.S. Senate.

These debates, among the most significant political dis-

courses in American history, took on the explosive issue that

would sunder the nation sectionally and bring civil war

between North and South. The Democrat Douglas was seek-

ing reelection to a third term against the Republican Lincoln’s

challenge. The tone of the campaign was set in mid-June by

Lincoln in his “house divided” speech in Springfield, in which

he warned that the nation must inevitably become either

entirely slaveholding or entirely free. After weeks of attacking

each other’s positions on slavery, the rival candidates agreed

to a series of seven debates in prairie towns throughout Illi-

nois. The debates kicked off in Ottawa on August 21 and pro-

ceeded to Freeport on August 27, Jonesboro on September

15, Charleston on September 18, Galesburg on October 7,

Quincy on October 13, and Alton on October 15. Lincoln,

opposed on moral and constitutional grounds to slavery’s

extension to the territories, accused Douglas, who supported

the doctrine of popular sovereignty (which held that residents

of the territories should decide for themselves whether to per-

mit slavery), of complicity in a conspiracy to expand slavery

everywhere. Popular sovereignty, Lincoln contended, contra-

dicted the Supreme Court’s landmark 1857

Dred Scott

deci-

sion. Slavery was a moral wrong, he argued, because it

denied blacks the right guaranteed to them in the Declaration

of Independence to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

At the same time Lincoln opposed the political and social

equality of the races and assured southerners that he had no

intention of interfering with slavery where it already existed.

Lincoln accused Douglas of departing from the position of the

founding fathers, who, Lincoln argued, had intended to

restrict slavery’s growth and thereby put it on a course to ulti-

mate extinction. Douglas rejected both Lincoln’s forecast of

irrepressible sectional conflict and his interpretation of the

founding fathers’ intention. He observed that the founders

were themselves slaveholders who had left the sovereign

states free to do as they pleased on the slavery question. Dou-

glas charged Lincoln and the so-called “Black Republican

Party” with endorsing equality between the white and black

races and with favoring black citizenship. Slavery, he sup-

posed, would be restricted by economic, geographic, and

demographic factors.

During the Freeport speech, excerpted below, Douglas

responded to Lincoln’s claim that popular sovereignty and

Dred Scott

were irreconcilable. Douglas contended that

inhabitants could exclude slavery from a territory despite the

Supreme Court’s ruling by withholding local legislative pro-

tection. This became known as Douglas’s “Freeport Doctrine.”

Douglas won the election, but the debates helped earn

Lincoln a national reputation, reinforced by his 1860 speech

at Cooper Union in New York City, which helped make Lin-

coln better known in the East.

________________________

_______________________

Freeport, Illinois

Mr. Lincoln’s Speech.

Ladies and Gentlemen—On Saturday last, Judge Douglas

and myself first met in public discussion. He spoke one

hour, I an hour-and-a-half, and he replied for half an hour.

The order is now reversed. I am to speak an hour, he an

hour-and-a-half, and then I am to reply for half an hour.

. . . In the course of that opening argument Judge Douglas

proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. . . . I now

propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories . . .

whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have done

so, I shall propound mine to him.

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the

Republican party at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as

a party man by the platforms of the party, then and since.

If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I go beyond

the scope of what is within these platforms it will be per-

ceived that no one is responsible but myself.

The Causes of the Civil War 835

* * *

Question 1. “I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day

stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional

repeal of the fugitive slave law?”

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of

the unconditional repeal of the fugitive slave law.

Q. 2. “I desire him to answer whether he stands

pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of

any more slave States into the Union, even if the people

want them?”

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against

the admission of any more slave States into the Union.

Q. 3. “I want to know whether he stands pledged

against the admission of a new State into the Union with

such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit

to make.”

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a

new State into the Union, with such a Constitution as the

people of that State may see fit to make. [Cries of “good,”

“good.”]

Q. 4. “I want to know whether he stands to-day

pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of

Columbia?”

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of

slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. “I desire him to answer whether he stands

pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the

different States?”

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the

slave trade between the different States.

Q. 6. “I desire to know whether he stands pledged to

prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States,

North as well as South of the Missouri Compromise line.”

A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief

in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all

the United States Territories.

Q. 7. “I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to

the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first

prohibited therein.”

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of

territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not

oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such

acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery ques-

tion among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived upon an exami-

nation of these questions and answers, that so far I have

only answered that I was not pledged to this, that or the

other. The Judge has not framed his interrogatories to ask

me anything more than this, and I have answered in strict

accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered

truly that I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to

which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang

upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I am rather dis-

posed to take up at least some of these questions, and state

what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law,

I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to

say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United

States, the people of the Southern States are entitled to a

Congressional Fugitive Slave Law. Having said that, I have

had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave

Law further than that I think it should have been framed

so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to

it, without lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are

not now in an agitation in regard to an alteration or modi-

fication of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it

as a new subject of agitation upon the general question of

slavery.

In regard to the other question of whether I am

pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the

Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceed-

ingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to pass

upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know

that there would never be another slave State admitted

into the Union; [applause]; but I must add, that if slavery

shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial

existence of any one given Territory, and then the people

shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they

come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary

thing as to adopt a Slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the

actual presence of the institution among them, I see no

alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into

the Union.

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to

the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery

in the District of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my

mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad

to see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I

believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power

to abolish it. Yet as a member of Congress, I should not

with my present views, be in favor of endeavoring to abol-

ish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be

upon these conditions. First, that the abolition should be

gradual. Second, that it should be on a vote of the majority

of qualified voters in the District, and third, that compen-

sation should be made to unwilling owners. With these

three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to

see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia,

and, in the language of Henry Clay, “sweep from our Cap-

ital that foul blot upon our nation.”

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here,

that as to the question of the abolition of the Slave Trade

between the different States, I can truly answer, as I

have, that I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject

836 ERA 5: Civil War and Reconstruction

to which I have not given that mature consideration that

would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to

hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that

question has never been prominently enough before me

to induce me to investigate whether we really have the

Constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I

had sufficient time, to bring myself to a conclusion upon

that subject, but I have not done so, and I say so frankly

to you here, and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however,

that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess

the Constitutional power to abolish the slave trade among

the different States, I should still not be in favor of the

exercise of that power unless upon some conservative

principle as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in rela-

tion to the abolition of slavery in the District of

Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should

be prohibited in all the Territories of the United States is

full and explicit within itself, and cannot be made clearer

by any comments of mine. So I suppose in regard to the

question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any

more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my

answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustra-

tion, or making myself better understood, than the answer

which I have placed in writing.

* * *

I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogato-

ries. . . . [The four questions are answered in Douglas’s

reply.]

* * *

I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on

my part, that, in the introduction of the Nebraska bill

[Kansas-Nebraska Act, 1854] into Congress, there was a

conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have

arranged from time to time the evidence which establishes

and proves the truth of this charge. . . .

. . . I have called his attention to the fact that when he

and some others began arguing that they were giving an

increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories

over and above what they formerly had on the question of

slavery. . . . A question was raised whether the law was

enacted to give such unconditional liberty to the people

and to test the sincerity of this mode of argument. Mr.

Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which he

made the law—if the amendment were adopted—

expressly declare that the people of the Territory should

have the power to exclude slavery if they saw fit. I have

asked attention also to the fact that Judge Douglas and

those who acted with him, voted that amendment down,

notwithstanding it expressed exactly the thing they said

was the true intent and meaning of the law. I have called

attention to the fact that in subsequent times, a decision of

the Supreme Court has been made in which it has been

declared that a Territorial Legislature has no constitutional

right to exclude slavery. And I have argued and said that

for men who did intend that the people of the territory

should have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and

unconditionally, the voting down of Chase’s amendment is

wholly inexplicable. . . . They left room thereby for this

Dred Scott decision, which goes very far to make slavery

national throughout the United States.

. . . I ask him to give some attention to the evidence

which I brought forward, that he himself had discovered a

“fatal blow being struck” against the right of the people to

exclude slavery from their limits. . . . He discovers a simi-

lar or identical provision in the Lecompton Constitution.

Made by whom? The framers of that Constitution. Advo-

cated by whom? By all the members of the party in the

nation, who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the

Union under the [proslavery] Lecompton Constitution.

* * *

Go on, Judge Douglas

Mr. Douglas’ Speech:

Ladies and Gentlemen—

. . . I laid the foundation for those interrogatories by

showing that they constituted the platform of the party

whose nominee he is for the Senate. I did not presume

that I had the right to catechize him as I saw proper, unless

I showed that his party, or a majority of it, stood upon the

platform and were in favor of the propositions upon which

my questions were based. I desired simply to know, inas-

much as he had been nominated as the first, last, and only

choice of his party, whether he concurred in the platform

which that party had adopted for its government. . . . I will

first respond to those which he has presented to me. Mark

you, he has not presented interrogatories which have ever

received the sanction of the party with which I am acting,

and hence he has no other foundation for them than his

own curiosity.

. . . In reference to Kansas; it is my opinion, that as she

has population enough to constitute a slave State, she has

people enough for a free State. I will not make Kansas an

exceptional case to the other States of the Union. I hold it

to be a sound rule of universal application to require a

territory to contain the requisite population for a member

of Congress, before it is admitted as a State into the Union.

. . . Either Kansas must come in as a free State, with what-

ever population she may have, or the rule must be applied

to all the other territories alike. I therefore answer at once,

that it having been decided that Kansas has people enough

for a slave State, I hold that she has enough for a free State.

. . .

The Causes of the Civil War 837

The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln

is, can the people of a territory in any lawful way against

the wishes of any citizen of the United States; exclude slav-

ery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Con-

stitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard

me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois,

that in my opinion the people of a territory can, by lawful

means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the for-

mation of a State Constitution. . . . It matters not what way

the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract

question whether slavery may or may not go into a territory

under the constitution, the people have the lawful means

to introduce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason

that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless

it is supported by local police regulations. Those police

regulations can only be established by the local legislature,

and if the people are opposed to slavery they will elect rep-

resentatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation

effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst.

If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor

its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the

Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the

right of the people to make a slave territory or a free terri-

tory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I

hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that

point.

[Re the Chase Amendment:] The language of that

bill [Kansas-Nebraska Act] which I have quoted, gave the

full power and the full authority over the subject of slav-

ery, affirmatively and negatively, to introduce it or

exclude it, so far as the Constitution of the United States

would permit. What more could Mr. Chase give by his

amendment? Nothing. He offered his amendment for the

identical purpose for which Mr. Lincoln is using it, to

enable demagogues in the country to try and deceive the

people.

* * *

The third question which Mr. Lincoln presented is, if the

Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that a

State of this Union cannot exclude slavery from its own

limits will I submit to it? . . . Mr. Lincoln’s object is to cast

an imputation upon the Supreme Court. . . . He might as

well ask me, suppose Mr. Lincoln should steal a horse

would I sanction it; and it would be as genteel in me to ask

him, in the event he stole a horse, what ought to be done

with him. He casts an imputation upon the Supreme Court

of the United States by supposing that they would violate

the Constitution of the United States. I tell him that such

a thing is not possible. I would be an act of moral treason

that no man on the bench could ever descend to Mr. Lin-

coln himself would never in his partisan feelings so far for-

get what was right as to be guilty of such an act.

The fourth question of Mr. Lincoln is, are you in favor

of acquiring additional territory in disregard as to how such

acquisition may effect the Union on the slavery questions.

This question is very ingeniously and cunningly put.

. . . I answer that whenever it becomes necessary, in

our growth and progress to acquire more territory, that I

am in favor of it, without reference to the question of slav-

ery, and when we have acquired it, I will leave the people

free to do as they please, either to make it slave or free ter-

ritory, as they prefer. It is idle to tell me or you that we

have territory enough. . . . With our natural increase, grow-

ing with a rapidity unknown in any other part of the globe,

with the tide of emigration that is fleeing from despotism

in the old world to seek a refuge in our own, there is a con-

stant torrent pouring into this country that requires more

land, more territory upon which to settle, and just as fast as

our interests and our destiny require additional territory in

the north, in the south, or on the islands of the ocean, I am

for it, and when we acquire it will leave the people, accord-

ing to the Nebraska bill, free to do as they please on the

subject of slavery and every other question.

I trust now that Mr. Lincoln will deem himself

answered of his four points. . . . You Black Republicans

who say good, I have no doubt think that they are all good

men. I have reason to recollect that some people in this

country think that Fred. Douglass [former slave and

prominent abolitionist] is a very good man. The last time I

came here to make a speech, while talking from the stand

to you, people of Freeport, as I am doing to-day, I saw a

carriage and a magnificent one it was, drive up and take a

position on the outside of the crowd; a beautiful young

lady was sitting on the box seat, whilst Fred. Douglass and

her mother reclined inside, and the owner of the carriage

acted as driver. I saw this in your own town. All I have to

say of it is this, that if you, Black Republicans, think that

the negro ought to be on a social equality with your wives

and daughters, and ride in a carriage with your wife, whilst

you drive the team, you have a perfect right to do so. I am

told that one of Fred. Douglass’ kinsmen, another rich

black Negro, is now traveling in this part of the State mak-

ing speeches for his friend Lincoln as the champion of

black men. All I have to say on that subject is that those of

you who believe that the negro is your equal and ought to

be on an equality with you socially, politically, and legally;

have a right to entertain those opinions, and of course will

vote for Mr. Lincoln.

I have a word to say on Mr. Lincoln’s answer to the

interrogatories contained in my speech at Ottawa, and

which he has pretended to reply to here to-day. . . .

During the late discussions in this city, Lincoln made

a speech, to which Judge Douglas replied. In Lincoln’s

speech he took the broad ground that, according to the

Declaration of Independence, the whites and blacks are

838 ERA 5: Civil War and Reconstruction

equal. From this he drew the conclusion, which he several

times repeated, that the white man had no right to pass

laws for the government of the black man without the nig-

ger’s consent. This speech of Lincoln’s was heard and

applauded by all the Abolitionists assembled in Spring-

field. . . . This platform was adopted in nearly every county

that gave a Black Republican majority for the Legislature

in that year, and . . . it was the creed of the Black Republi-

can party at the time. . . . I will now read the resolutions

adopted at the Rockford [Illinois] Convention on the 30th

of August, 1854

Resolved, That the continued and increasing aggres-

sions of slavery in our country are destructive of the best

rights of a free people, and that such aggressions cannot be

successfully resisted without the united political action of

all good men.

Resolved, That the citizens of the United States hold

in their hands peaceful, constitutional, and efficient rem-

edy against the encroachments of the slave power, the bal-

lot box, and, if that remedy is bodily and wisely applied,

the principles of liberty and eternal justice will be estab-

lished.

Resolved, That we accept this issue forced upon us

by the slave power, and, in defense of freedom, will co-

operate and be known as Republicans, pledged to the

accomplishment of the following purposes:

To bring the Administration of the Government back

to the control of first principles; to restore Kansas and

Nebraska to the position of free Territories; to repeal and

entirely abrogate the fugitive slave law; to restrict slavery

to those States in which it exist; to prohibit the admission

of any more slave States into the Union; to exclude slavery

from all the territories over which the general government

has exclusive jurisdiction, and to resist the acquisition of

any more territories unless the introduction of slavery

therein forever shall have been prohibited.

Resolved, That in furtherance of these principles we

will use such constitutional and lawful means as shall seem

best adapted to their accomplishment, and that we will

support no man for office under the General or State Gov-

ernment who is not positively committed to the support of

these principles and whose personal character and conduct

is not a guaranty that he is reliable and shall abjure all party

allegiance and ties. . . . Now, Mr. Lincoln complains; Mr.

Lincoln charges that I did you and him injustice by saying

that this was the platform of your party. . . .

* * *

. . . The compromise measures of 1850 were . . . sanctioned

by the National men of both parties. They constituted a

common plank upon which both Whigs and Democrats

stood. . . . Thus the old line Whigs and the old line

Democrats stood pledged to the great principle of self-

government, which guarantees to the people of each Ter-

ritory the right to decide the slavery question for them-

selves. . . . As Mr. Lincoln would be very sorry to be placed

in such an embarrassing position as to be obliged

to vote on the admission of any more slave States, I pro-

pose, out of mere kindness, to relieve him from any such

necessity.

* * *

[In his “House Divided” speech] you find that Mr. Lincoln

lays down the doctrine that this Union cannot endure

divided as our Fathers made it, with free and slave States.

He says they must all become one thing, or all the other;

that they must be all free or all slave, or else the Union

cannot continue to exist. It being his opinion that to admit

any more slave States, to continue to divide the Union into

free and slave States, will dissolve it. I want to know of Mr.

Lincoln whether he will vote for the admission of another

Slave state.

* * *

If [President James] Buchanan stands, as I doubt not he

will, by the recommendation contained in his message,

that hereafter all State constitutions ought to be submitted

to the people before the admission of the State into the

Union, he will find me standing by him firmly, shoulder to

shoulder, in carrying it out. I know Mr. Lincoln’s object, he

wants to divide the Democratic party, in order that he may

defeat me and get to the Senate.

Mr. Douglas’ time here expired, and he stopped on

the moment.

Mr. Lincoln’s Rejoinder

As Mr. Lincoln arose he was greeted with vociferous

cheers. He said:

* * *

. . . It is true that many of these resolutions are at variance

with the positions I have here assumed. All I have to ask is

that we talk reasonably and rationally about it. I happen to

know, the Judge’s opinion to the contrary notwithstanding,

that I have never tried to conceal my opinions, nor tried to

deceive any one in reference to them. . . . These meetings

which the Judge has alluded to, and the resolutions he has

read from were local and did not spread over the whole

State. . . . I’ll tell you what [Douglas] is afraid of. He is

afraid we’ll all pull together. This is what alarms him more

than anything else. For my part, I do hope that all of us,

entertaining a common sentiment in opposition to what

appears to us a design to nationalize and perpetuate slav-

ery, will waive minor differences on questions which either

belong to the dead past or the distant future, and all pull

together in this struggle. . . .

The Causes of the Civil War 839

. . . If I were put to the test, and a Territory from which

slavery had been excluded should present herself with a

State Constitution sanctioning slavery—a most extraordi-

nary thing and wholly unlikely ever to happen—I did not

see how I could avoid voting for her admission. But he

refuses to understand that I said so, and he wants this audi-

ence to understand that I did not say so. Yet it will be so

reported in the printed speech that he cannot help seeing

it. . . .