Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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(7) On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William

Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to

potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in

order to corruptly influence the testimony of those wit-

nesses. The false and misleading statements made by

William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses

to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false

and misleading information.

In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has under-

mined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on

the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has

acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice,

to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such con-

duct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from

office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of

honor, trust or profit under the United States.

Article IV

Using the powers and influence of the office of President

of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in viola-

tion of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the

office of President of the United States and, to the best of

his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution

of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional

duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has

engaged in conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of

his high office, impaired the due and proper administra-

tion of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and con-

travened the authority of the legislative branch and the

truth-seeking purpose of a coordinate investigative pro-

ceeding in that, as President, William Jefferson Clinton,

refused and failed to respond to certain written requests

for admission and willfully made perjurious, false and mis-

leading sworn statements in response to certain written

requests for admission propounded to him as part of the

impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of Repre-

sentatives of the Congress of the United States.

William Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and failing to

respond, and in making perjurious, false and misleading

statements, assumed to himself functions and judgments

necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeach-

ment vested by the Constitution in the House of Repre-

sentatives and exhibited contempt for the inquiry.

In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has under-

mined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on

the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has

acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice,

to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such con-

duct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from

office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of

honor, trust or profit under the United States.

See also

INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE REFERRAL OF THE

OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

, 1998;

KENNETH

STARR

STARR REPORT

, 1998;

IMPEACHMENT DEFENSE

1999*;

BILL CLINTON

STATEMENT FOLLOWING IMPEACH

MENT ACQUITTAL

, 1999.

Source:

Landmark Documents in American History, Facts On File, Inc.

Bush v. Gore, 2000

More than a month after voters cast their ballots in one of the

closest elections in U.S. history, the presidential election of

2000 was finally decided by a 5-4 vote of the Supreme Court

Bush v. Gore

. The case pitted Republican Texas Governor

George W. Bush against Vice President Al Gore, the Demo-

cratic nominee. No one disputes that Gore won the popular

vote by nearly 350,000 votes. However, the electoral vote was

a tie with the Florida count in contention.

A number of factors compromised the legitimacy of any

decision favoring Bush. First, George W. Bush’s brother Jeb

was Florida governor; the Secretary of State, who made de-

cisions regarding elections, was a Republican partisan. Many

black voters, a majority of whom were likely to have voted

for Gore, were turned away because they were told their

names were on lists of felons (the lists were later found to

be full of errors, and provisional ballots were not accepted

for those who claimed they were entitled to vote.) Moreover

a number of places where minorities normally voted were

changed without notice. Many Jewish voters, a majority of

whom were presumed Democratic, accidentally voted for

Reform candidate Patrick Buchanan because of a confusing

ballot; even if voters realized the mistake, they were not

permitted to make a correction. Republicans in the military

filing absentee ballots were assisted by the party. Possibly

hurting Republicans, initial results in favor of Gore were

announced when the polls closed in the Eastern Time zone,

although part of the largely Republican Florida panhandle

was in the Central Time Zone and its polls were still

open. Many military absentee ballots were not properly

postmarked.

A number of court fights ensued, in which a Democratic

majority state court found for Gore; the Supreme Court major-

ity, which normally deferred to the state, instead found for

Bush. The deadline to choose and certify state electors was

December 12. About two hours before midnight on December

11, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision. In an unsigned

5-4 opinion, the Court supported Bush. However, it engen-

dered acrimonious dissenting opinions. The majority held that

the lack of standardization in the recount process violated the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution. The Court further determined that there was not

1682 ERA 10: Contemporary United States

enough time to complete the recounts. The Florida legislature

voted to appoint electors for Bush, making him the 43rd pres-

ident. Shortly thereafter Gore made a concession speech, and

an hour later Bush made a victory speech. Both men stressed

the importance of unity and national healing.

The decision prompted an election reform bill that would

give states federal money to upgrade and reform their voting

systems. While the Court retained its legitimacy—something

that dissenters feared might be lost—it divided not only the

country but the Court itself.

In the decision, the Court made clear in the majority opin-

ion that its ruling applied only to

Bush v. Gore

. When asked to

intervene in a 2002 New Jersey senate race in which a losing

Democrat dropped out only weeks before the election and a

former senator took his place, it refused to take the case.

________________________

_______________________

On December 8, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida

ordered that the Circuit Court of Leon County tabulate by

hand 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade County. It also ordered

the inclusion in the certified vote totals of 215 votes iden-

tified in Palm Beach County and 168 votes identified in

Miami-Dade County for Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.,

and Senator Joseph Lieberman, Democratic Candidates

for President and Vice President. The Supreme Court

noted that petitioner, Governor George W. Bush asserted

that the net gain for Vice President Gore in Palm Beach

County was 176 votes, and directed the Circuit Court to

resolve that dispute on remand. The court further held

that relief would require manual recounts in all Florida

counties where so-called “undervotes” had not been sub-

ject to manual tabulation. The court ordered all manual

recounts to begin at once. Governor Bush and Richard

Cheney, Republican Candidates for the Presidency and

Vice Presidency, filed an emergency application for a stay

of this mandate. On December 9, we granted the applica-

tion, treated the application as a petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari, and granted certiorari.

The proceedings leading to the present controversy

are discussed in some detail in our opinion in Bush v.

Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (Bush I). On Novem-

ber 8, 2000, the day following the Presidential election,

the Florida Division of Elections reported that petitioner,

Governor Bush, had received 2,909,135 votes, and

respondent, Vice President Gore, had received 2,907,351

votes, a margin of 1,784 for Governor Bush. Because Gov-

ernor Bush’s margin of victory was less than “one-half of a

percent . . . of the votes cast,” an automatic machine

recount was conducted . . . , the results of which showed

Governor Bush still winning the race but by a diminished

margin. Vice President Gore then sought manual recounts

in Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Coun-

ties, pursuant to Florida’s election protest provisions. Fla.

Stat. §102.166 (2000). A dispute arose concerning the

deadline for local county canvassing boards to submit

their returns to the Secretary of State (Secretary). The

Secretary declined to waive the November 14 deadline

imposed by statute. The Florida Supreme Court, how-

ever, set the deadline at November 26. We granted cer-

tiorari and vacated the Florida Supreme Court’s decision,

finding considerable uncertainty as to the grounds on

which it was based. On December 11, the Florida

Supreme Court issued a decision on remand reinstating

that date. ___

On November 26, the Florida Elections Canvassing

Commission certified the results of the election and

declared Governor Bush the winner of Florida’s 25 elec-

toral votes. On November 27, Vice President Gore, pur-

suant to Florida’s contest provisions, filed a complaint in

Leon County Circuit Court contesting the certification.

He sought relief pursuant to §102.168(3)(c), which pro-

vides that “[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejec-

tion of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place

in doubt the result of the election” shall be grounds for a

contest. The Circuit Court denied relief, stating that Vice

President Gore failed to meet his burden of proof. He

appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which cer-

tified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court.

Accepting jurisdiction, the Florida Supreme Court

affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that

the Circuit Court had been correct to reject Vice President

Gore’s challenge to the results certified in Nassau County

and his challenge to the Palm Beach County Canvassing

Board’s determination that 3,300 ballots cast in that county

were not, in the statutory phrase, “legal votes.”

The Supreme Court held that Vice President Gore

had satisfied his burden of proof under §102.168(3)(c)

with respect to his challenge to Miami-Dade County’s fail-

ure to tabulate, by manual count, 9,000 ballots on which

the machines had failed to detect a vote for President

(“undervotes”). Noting the closeness of the election, the

Court explained that “[o]n this record, there can be no

question that there are legal votes within the 9,000

uncounted votes sufficient to place the results of this elec-

tion in doubt.” A “legal vote,” as determined by the

Supreme Court, is “one in which there is a ‘clear indica-

tion of the intent of the voter. ’” The court therefore

ordered a hand recount of the 9,000 ballots in Miami-

Dade County. Observing that the contest provisions vest

broad discretion in the circuit judge to “provide any relief

appropriate under such circumstances,” the Supreme

Court further held that the Circuit Court could order “the

Supervisor of Elections and the Canvassing Boards, as

well as the necessary public officials, in all counties that

have not conducted a manual recount or tabulation of the

undervotes . . . to do so forthwith, said tabulation to take

Domestic Politics 1683

place in the individual counties where the ballots are

located.”

The Supreme Court also determined that both Palm

Beach County and Miami-Dade County, in their earlier

manual recounts, had identified a net gain of 215 and 168

legal votes for Vice President Gore. Rejecting the Circuit

Court’s conclusion that Palm Beach County lacked the

authority to include the 215 net votes submitted past the

November 26 deadline, the Supreme Court explained that

the deadline was not intended to exclude votes identified

after that date through ongoing manual recounts. As to

Miami-Dade County, the Court concluded that although

the 168 votes identified were the result of a partial

recount, they were “legal votes [that] could change the

outcome of the election. ”The Supreme Court therefore

directed the Circuit Court to include those totals in the

certified results, subject to resolution of the actual vote

total from the Miami-Dade partial recount.

The petition presents the following questions:

whether the Florida Supreme Court established new stan-

dards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby

violating Art. II, §1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution

and failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5 and whether the

use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses. With respect to the

equal protection question, we find a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause.

II A

The closeness of this election, and the multitude of legal

challenges which have followed in its wake, have brought

into sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phe-

nomenon. Nationwide statistics reveal that an estimated

2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for President for

whatever reason, including deliberately choosing no candi-

date at all or some voter error, such as voting for two can-

didates or insufficiently marking a ballot. In certifying

election results, the votes eligible for inclusion in the cer-

tification are the votes meeting the properly established

legal requirements.

This case has shown that punch card balloting

machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots

which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the

voter. After the current counting, it is likely legislative bod-

ies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mecha-

nisms and machinery for voting.

The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to

vote for electors for the President of the United States

unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide

election as the means to implement its power to appoint

members of the Electoral College. This is the source for

the statement . . .(1892) that the State legislature’s power

to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it

may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed

was the manner used by State legislatures in several States

for many years after the Framing of our Constitution. His-

tory has now favored the voter, and in each of the several

States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential elec-

tors. When the state legislature vests the right to vote for

President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature

has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fun-

damental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each

vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. The State,

of course, after granting the franchise in the special con-

text of Article II, can take back the power to appoint elec-

tors. (“[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legislature to

resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken

away nor abdicated”) (quoting Cong., 1st Sess. [1789-90]).

The right to vote is protected in more than the initial

allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well

to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the

right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later

arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote

over that of another. . . .

There is no difference between the two sides of the

present controversy on these basic propositions. Respon-

dents say that the very purpose of vindicating the right to

vote justifies the recount procedures now at issue. The

question before us, however, is whether the recount pro-

cedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are con-

sistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate

treatment of the members of its electorate.

Much of the controversy seems to revolve around bal-

lot cards designed to be perforated by a stylus but which,

either through error or deliberate omission, have not been

perforated with sufficient precision for a machine to count

them. In some cases a piece of the card—a chad—is hang-

ing, say by two corners. In other cases there is no separa-

tion at all, just an indentation.

The Florida Supreme Court has ordered that the

intent of the voter be discerned from such ballots. For pur-

poses of resolving the equal protection challenge, it is not

necessary to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court

had the authority under the legislative scheme for resolv-

ing election disputes to define what a legal vote is and to

mandate a manual recount implementing that definition.

The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the

decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the

minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of vot-

ers necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida’s

basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to con-

sider the “intent of the voter.” This is unobjectionable as an

abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem

inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its

1684 ERA 10: Contemporary United States

equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to

determine intent based on these recurring circumstances

is practicable and, we conclude, necessary.

The law does not refrain from searching for the intent

of the actor in a multitude of circumstances. . . . In this

instance, however, the question is . . . how to interpret the

marks or holes or scratches on an inanimate object, a piece

of cardboard or paper which, it is said, might not have reg-

istered as a vote during the machine count. The factfinder

confronts a thing, not a person. The search for intent can

be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform

treatment.

The want of those rules here has led to unequal eval-

uation of ballots in various respects. . . . As seems to have

been acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for

accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only

from county to county but indeed within a single county

from one recount team to another.

The record provides some examples. A monitor in

Miami-Dade County testified at trial that he observed that

three members of the county canvassing board applied dif-

ferent standards in defining a legal vote. And testimony

at trial also revealed that at least one county changed

its evaluative standards during the counting process. . . .

This is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal

treatment.

* * *

The State Supreme Court ratified this uneven treatment.

It mandated that the recount totals from two counties,

Miami-Dade and Palm Beach, be included in the certified

total. The court also appeared to hold sub silentio that the

recount totals from Broward County, which were not com-

pleted until after the original November 14 certification by

the Secretary of State, were to be considered part of the

new certified vote totals even though the county certifica-

tion was not contested by Vice President Gore. Yet each of

the counties used varying standards to determine what was

a legal vote. Broward County used a more forgiving stan-

dard than Palm Beach County, and uncovered almost

three times as many new votes, a result markedly dispro-

portionate to the difference in population between the

counties.

In addition, the recounts in these three counties were

not limited to so-called undervotes but extended to all of

the ballots. The distinction has real consequences. A man-

ual recount of all ballots identifies not only those ballots

which show no vote but also those which contain more

than one, the so-called overvotes. Neither category will be

counted by the machine. This is not a trivial concern. At

oral argument, respondents estimated there are as many as

110,000 overvotes statewide. As a result, the citizen whose

ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote

for a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still

have his vote counted in a manual recount; on the other

hand, the citizen who marks two candidates in a way dis-

cernable by the machine will not have the same opportu-

nity to have his vote count, even if a manual examination

of the ballot would reveal the requisite indicia of intent.

Furthermore, the citizen who marks two candidates, only

one of which is discernable by the machine, will have his

vote counted even though it should have been read as an

invalid ballot. The State Supreme Court’s inclusion of vote

counts based on these variant standards exemplifies con-

cerns with the remedial processes that were under way.

That brings the analysis to yet a further equal protec-

tion problem. The votes certified by the court included a

partial total from one county, Miami-Dade. The Florida

Supreme Court’s decision thus gives no assurance that the

recounts included in a final certification must be complete.

Indeed, it is respondent’s submission that it would be con-

sistent with the rules of the recount procedures to include

whatever partial counts are done by the time of final certi-

fication, and we interpret the Florida Supreme Court’s

decision to permit this. This accommodation no doubt

results from the truncated contest period established by

the Florida Supreme Court in Bush I, at respondents’ own

urging. The press of time does not diminish the constitu-

tional concern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse

for ignoring equal protection guarantees.

In addition to these difficulties the actual process by

which the votes were to be counted under the Florida

Supreme Court’s decision raises further concerns. That

order did not specify who would recount the ballots. The

county canvassing boards were forced to pull together ad

hoc teams comprised of judges from various Circuits who

had no previous training in handling and interpreting bal-

lots. Furthermore, while others were permitted to

observe, they were prohibited from objecting during the

recount.

The recount process, in its features here described, is

inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to

protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special

instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a

single state judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to

the present circumstances, for the problem of equal pro-

tection in election processes generally presents many com-

plexities.

. . . We are presented with a situation where a state

court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a

statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.

When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at

least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of

equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.

Given the Court’s assessment that the recount process

underway was probably being conducted in an unconstitu-

Domestic Politics 1685

tional manner, the Court stayed the order directing the

recount so it could hear this case and render an expedited

decision. The contest provision, as it was mandated by the

State Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the

confidence that all citizens must have in the outcome of

elections. The State has not shown that its procedures

include the necessary safeguards. The problem, for

instance, of the estimated 110,000 overvotes has not been

addressed. . . .

Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified

to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be con-

ducted in compliance with the requirements of equal pro-

tection and due process without substantial additional

work. It would require not only the adoption (after oppor-

tunity for argument) of adequate statewide standards for

determining what is a legal vote, and practicable proce-

dures to implement them, but also orderly judicial review

of any disputed matters that might arise. In addition, the

Secretary of State has advised that the recount of only a

portion of the ballots requires that the vote tabulation

equipment be used to screen out undervotes, a function

for which the machines were not designed. If a recount of

overvotes were also required, perhaps even a second

screening would be necessary. Use of the equipment for

this purpose, and any new software developed for it,

would have to be evaluated for accuracy by the Secretary

of State.

The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legis-

lature intended the State’s electors to “participat[e] fully in

the federal electoral process,”. . . . That statute, in turn,

requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to

lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by

December 12. That date is upon us, and there is no recount

procedure in place under the State Supreme Court’s order

that comports with minimal constitutional standards.

Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the

December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons

we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the

Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.

Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are con-

stitutional problems with the recount ordered by the

Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. . . . The

only disagreement is as to the remedy. Because the Florida

Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature

intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5

Justice Breyer’s proposed remedy–remanding to the

Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitution-

ally proper contest until December 18-contemplates

action in violation of the Florida election code, and hence

could not be part of an “appropriate” order authorized by

Fla. Stat. §102.168(8) (2000).

* * *

None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial

authority than are the members of this Court, and none

stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s design to

leave the selection of the President to the people, through

their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When con-

tending parties invoke the process of the courts, however,

it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the fed-

eral and constitutional issues the judicial system has been

forced to confront.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-

ings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 45.2, the Clerk is

directed to issue the mandate in this case forthwith.

It is so ordered.

Source:

Cornell University, Legal Information Institute. Available on-

line. URL: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.

html?terms=bush%20v.%20gore&url=/supct/html/

00-949.ZPC.html. Accessed November 2003.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002

Also known as the McCain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan Act after

its sponsors, Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russell Fein-

gold (D.-Wis.) and Congressmen Christ Shays (R.-Conn.) and

Martin T. Meehan.(D.-Mass.), this act was signed by President

George W. Bush March 27, 2002. This act represented “the

most sweeping campaign finance measure in a generation,”

according to the

New York Times

. The law prohibited

national political parties and candidates in federal races from

raising or spending “soft money.” “Soft money” represented a

loophole in the finance reforms passed after the Watergate

scandals in the mid-1970s. It permitted interest groups to

spend as much as they wished to promote their agenda

through Election Day as long as they did not directly mention

a candidate. Soft money contributions were often in the hun-

dreds of thousands of dollars, coming from unions, corpora-

tions, trade associations, and wealthy individuals. Because

the law did not go into effect until the day after the 2002 mid-

term elections, commentators estimated that twice as much

would be raised in that election than in the 1998 mid-term

campaign. The Republicans received far more than the

Democrats.

For the complete act, see thomas.loc.gov.

________________________

_______________________

(a) SHORT TITLE- This Act may be cited as the

‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,’

* * *

1686 ERA 10: Contemporary United States

SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES-

(1) IN GENERAL- A national committee of a politi-

cal party (including a national congressional campaign

committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or

direct to another person a contribution, donation, or trans-

fer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds,

that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and

reporting requirements of this Act.

(2) APPLICABILITY- The prohibition established by

paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any

officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national com-

mittee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly estab-

lished, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a

national committee.

(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMIT-

TEES-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph

(2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal

election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a

political party (including an entity that is directly or indi-

rectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a

State, district, or local committee of a political party and an

officer or agent acting on behalf of such committee or

entity), or by an association or similar group of candidates

for State or local office or of individuals holding State or

local office, shall be made from funds subject to the limi-

tations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act.

(2) APPLICABILITY-

(A) IN GENERAL- . . .Shall not apply to any amount

expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local com-

mittee of a political party for an activity . . . to the extent

the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are

allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commis-

sion) among amounts—

(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of

this Act and

(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the limita-

tions, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act

(other than any requirements of this subsection).

(B) CONDITIONS- Subparagraph (A) shall only

apply if—

(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified

candidate for Federal office;

(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the

costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communica-

tion, other than a communication which refers solely to a

clearly identified candidate for State or local office;

(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are

described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts

which are donated in accordance with State law and which

meet the requirements of subparagraph (C), except that

no person (including any person established, financed,

maintained, or controlled by such person) may donate

more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local committee

of a political party in a calendar year for such expenditures

or disbursements; and

(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made

solely from funds raised by the State, local, or district com-

mittee which makes such expenditure or disbursement,

and do not include any funds provided to such committee

from—

(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any

State party,

(II) the national committee of a political party (includ-

ing a national congressional campaign committee of a

political party),

(III) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any com-

mittee described in subclause (I) or (II), or

(V) any entity directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee

described in subclause (I) or (II).

TIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND

OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING

JOINTLY- Amounts specifically authorized to be spent

under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the requirements of this

subparagraph only if the amounts—

(i) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or

spent by or in the name of any person described in sub-

section (a) or (e); and

(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through

fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State,

local, or district committees of any political party or their

agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a polit-

ical party on behalf of the State, local, or district commit-

tee of a political party or its agent in one or more other

States.

* * *

(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS- A national,

State, district, or local committee of a political party

(including a national congressional campaign committee of

a political party), an entity that is directly or indirectly

established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any

such national, State, district, or local committee or its

agent, and an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such

party committee or entity, shall not solicit any funds for, or

make or direct any donations to—

(1) a [tax-exempt] organization. . .or has submitted an

application for determination of tax exempt status. . .and

that makes expenditures or disbursements in connection

with an election for Federal office (including expenditures

or disbursements for Federal election activity); or

Domestic Politics 1687

* * *

(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES-

(1) IN GENERAL- A candidate, individual holding

Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual hold-

ing Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly estab-

lished, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on

behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Fed-

eral office, shall not—

(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with an election for Federal office, including

funds for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are

subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting

requirements of this Act; or

(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with any election other than an election for

Federal office or disburse funds in connection with such

an election unless the funds—

(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with

respect to contributions to candidates and political com-

mittees. . .; and

(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from

making contributions in connection with an election for

Federal office.

* * *

(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY-

(A) IN GENERAL- The term ‘Federal election activ-

ity’ means—

(i) voter registration activity during the period that

begins on the date that is 120 days before the date a regu-

larly scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the

date of the election.

(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or

generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an

election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on

the ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or

local office also appears on the ballot);

(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly

identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of

whether a candidate for State or local office is also men-

tioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a can-

didate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate

for that office (regardless of whether the communication

expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate); or

(iv) services provided during any month by an

employee of a State, district, or local committee of a polit-

ical party who spends more than 25 percent of that indi-

vidual’s compensated time during that month on activities

in connection with a Federal election.

(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY- The term Federal elec-

tion activity’ does not include an amount expended or dis-

bursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party for—

(i) a public communication that refers solely to a

clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if the

communication is not a Federal election activity. . .;

(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local

office, provided the contribution is not designated to pay

for a Federal election activity;

(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political con-

vention; and

(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, includ-

ing buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or

depict only a candidate for State or local office.

(21) GENERIC CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY- The term

generic campaign activity’ means a campaign activity that

promotes a political party and does not promote a candi-

date or non-Federal candidate.

* * *

SEC. 313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR

CERTAIN PURPOSES.

(a) PERMITTED USES- A contribution accepted by

a candidate, and any other donation received by an indi-

vidual as support for activities of the individual as a holder

of Federal office, may be used by the candidate or indi-

vidual—

(1) for otherwise authorized expenditures in connec-

tion with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate

or individual;

(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in

connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Fed-

eral office;

(3) for contributions to an organization described in

section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(4) for transfers, without limitation, to a national,

State, or local committee of a political party.

(b) PROHIBITED USE-

(1) IN GENERAL- A contribution or donation

described in subsection (a) shall not be converted by any

person to personal use.

(2) CONVERSION- For the purposes of paragraph

(1), a contribution or donation shall be considered to be

converted to personal use if the contribution or amount is

used to fulfill any commitment, obligation, or expense of a

person that would exist irrespective of the candidate’s elec-

tion campaign or individual’s duties as a holder of Federal

office. . . .

SEC. 302. PROHIBITION OF FUNDRAISING ON

FEDERAL PROPERTY.

* * *

(1) IN GENERAL- It shall be unlawful for any person

to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of

1688 ERA 10: Contemporary United States

value in connection with a Federal, State, or local election

from a person who is located in a room or building occu-

pied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or

employee of the United States. It shall be unlawful for an

individual who is an officer or employee of the Federal

Government, including the President, Vice President, and

Members of Congress, to solicit or receive a donation of

money or other thing of value in connection with a Fed-

eral, State, or local election, while in any room or building

occupied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or

employee of the United States, from any person.

(2) PENALTY- A person who violates this section shall

be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than

3 years, or both. . . .

SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY

BAN.

* * *

(a) PROHIBITION- It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make—

(A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing

of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make

a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal,

State, or local election;

(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a

political party; or

bursement for an electioneering communication . . . or

(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution

or donation. . .from a foreign national.

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EX-

PENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.

(1) INCREASE-

(A) IN GENERAL- if the opposition personal funds

amount with respect to a candidate for election to the

office of Senator exceeds the threshold amount, the limit

. . .with respect to that candidate shall be the increased

limit.

. . .

(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PER-

SONAL LOANS- Any candidate who incurs personal

loans made after the effective date of the Bipartisan Cam-

paign Reform Act of 2002 in connection with the candi-

date’s campaign for election shall not repay (directly or

indirectly), to the extent such loans exceed $250,000, such

loans from any contributions made to such candidate or

any authorized committee of such candidate after the date

of such election.

* * *

(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS-

* * *

(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS–. . .

(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal

funds; and

(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the

candidate’s authorized committee.

(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT- Not later than

the date that is 15 days after the date on which an individ-

ual becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the can-

didate shall file a declaration stating the total amount of

expenditures from personal funds that the candidate

intends to make, or to obligate to make, with respect to the

election that will exceed the State-by-State competitive

and fair campaign formula with—

(I) the Commission; and

(II) each candidate in the same election.

* * *

(25) ELECTION CYCLE- . . .The term election

cycle’ means the period beginning on the day after the

date of the most recent election for the specific office or

seat that a candidate is seeking and ending on the date of

the next election for that office or seat. For purposes of the

preceding sentence, a primary election and a general elec-

tion shall be considered to be separate elections.

(26) PERSONAL FUNDS- The term personal funds’

means an amount that is derived from—

(A) any asset that, under applicable State law, at the

time the individual became a candidate, the candidate had

legal right of access to or control over, and with respect to

which the candidate had—

(i) legal and rightful title; or

(ii) an equitable interest;

(B) income received during the current election cycle

of the candidate, including—

(i) a salary and other earned income from bona fide

employment;

(ii) dividends and proceeds from the sale of the candi-

date’s stocks or other investments;

(iii) bequests to the candidate;

(iv) income from trusts established before the begin-

ning of the election cycle;

(v) income from trusts established by bequest after

the beginning of the election cycle of which the candidate

is the beneficiary;

(vi) gifts of a personal nature that had been customar-

ily received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the

election cycle; and

(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games of

chance; and

Domestic Politics 1689

1690 ERA 10: Contemporary United States

candidate and the candidate’s spouse equal to the candi-

date’s share of the asset under the instrument of con-

veyance or ownership, but if no specific share is indicated

by an instrument of conveyance or ownership, the value of

1/2 of the property.

* * *

(2) CONTENT OF BROADCASTS-

(A) IN GENERAL- In the case of a candidate for

Federal office, such candidate shall not be entitled to

receive the rate under paragraph (1)(A) for the use of any

broadcasting station unless the candidate provides written

certification to the broadcast station that the candidate

(and any authorized committee of the candidate) shall not

make any direct reference to another candidate for the

same office, in any broadcast using the rights and condi-

tions of access under this Act, unless such reference meets

the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D).

(B) LIMITATION ON CHARGES- If a candidate for

Federal office (or any authorized committee of such can-

didate) makes a reference described in subparagraph (A)

in any broadcast that does not meet the requirements of

subparagraph (C) or (D), such candidate shall not be enti-

tled to receive the rate under paragraph (1)(A) for such

broadcast or any other broadcast during any portion of the

45-day and 60-day periods described in paragraph (1)(A),

that occur on or after the date of such broadcast, for elec-

tion to such office.

the requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a

television broadcast, at the end of such broadcast there ap-

pears simultaneously, for a period no less than 4 seconds—

(i) a clearly identifiable photographic or similar image

of the candidate; and

(ii) a clearly readable printed statement, identifying

the candidate and stating that the candidate has approved

the broadcast and that the candidate’s authorized commit-

tee paid for the broadcast.

* * *

Source:

Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet. H. R. 2356.

Available on-line. URL: thomas.loc.gov/. Accessed Novem-

ber 2003.

Foreign Policy Issues

Gerald R. Ford, Letter to Congress on the

Recovery of the SS Mayaguez, 1975

Letter from President Gerald R. Ford, informing Congress, pur-

suant to the War Powers Act, that U.S. military forces had

recaptured the American merchant ship,

Mayaguez,

which

had been seized by troops of the new communist Khmer

Rouge government in Cambodia. In the letter he stated that all

39 crew members of the ship were safe after a rescue mission

that began on the evening of May 14. In the letter, he saluted

the sailors and marines who took part in the operation.

The marines had stormed Tang Island where the ship was

located, and suffered only light causalities. Later, three heli-

copters were reported missing. U.S. aircraft bombed Ream air-

field and the naval base in Sihanoukville. Ford waited 11

hours before telling the American people about the

Mayaguez

rescue operation and that U.S. bomber forces were hitting

Cambodian gunboats.

The rescue effort ultimately included fatalities. Twenty-

three deaths occurred when a helicopter carrying security per-

sonnel crashed, and 15 participants died in the actual rescue

mission. The 15 were among the last names placed on the

Vietnam War Memorial wall in Washington , D.C. Eighteen

additional personnel were listed as missing in action (MIA) at

the time. The remains of nine of these MIAs were returned to

the United States in 2000. Despite the casualties, many Amer-

icans accepted the incident as a badly needed U.S. victory

after the fall of Saigon.

________________________

_______________________

On 12 May 1975, I was advised that the SS Mayaguez, a

merchant vessel of United States registry en route from

Hong Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew, was fired

upon, stopped, boarded, and seized by Cambodian naval

patrol boats of the Armed Forces of Cambodia in interna-

tional waters in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. The seized

vessel was then forced to proceed to Koh Tang Island

where it was required to anchor. This hostile act was in

clear violation of international law.

In view of this illegal and dangerous act, I ordered, as

you have been previously advised, United States military

forces to conduct the necessary reconnaissance and to be

ready to respond if diplomatic efforts to secure the return

of the vessel and its personnel were not successful. Two

United States reconnaissance aircraft in the course of

locating the Mayaguez sustained minimal damage from

small firearms. Appropriate demands for the return of the

Mayaguez and its crew were made, both publicly and pri-

vately, without success.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be

informed on this matter and taking note of Section 4(a)(1)

of the War Powers Resolution, I wish to report to you that

at about 6:20 a.m., 13 May, pursuant to my instructions to

prevent the movement of the Mayaguez into a mainland

port, U.S. aircraft fired warning shots across the bow of the

ship and gave visual signals to small craft approaching the

ship. Subsequently, in order to stabilize the situation and

in an attempt to preclude removal of the American crew of

the Mayaguez to the mainland, where their rescue would

be more difficult, I directed the United States Armed

Forces to isolate the island and interdict any movement

between the ship or the island and the mainland, and to

prevent movement of the ship itself, while still taking all

possible care to prevent loss of life or injury to the U.S.

captives. During the evening of 13 May, a Cambodian

patrol boat attempting to leave the island disregarded air-

craft warnings and was sunk. Thereafter, two other Cam-

bodian patrol craft were destroyed and four others were

damaged and immobilized. One boat, suspected of having

some U.S. captives aboard, succeeded in reaching Kom-

pong Som after efforts to turn it around without injury to

the passengers failed.

Our continued objective in this operation was the res-

cue of the captured American crew along with the retaking

of the ship Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late this

afternoon [May 14] an assault by United States Marines on

the island of Koh Tang to search out and rescue such Amer-

icans as might still be held there, and I ordered retaking of

the Mayaguez by other marines boarding from the

destroyer escort Holt. In addition to continued fighter and

gunship coverage of the Koh Tang area, these Marine activ-

ities were supported by tactical aircraft from the Coral Sea,

striking the military airfield at Ream and other military tar-

gets in the area of Kompong Som in order to prevent rein-

forcement or support from the mainland of the Cambodian

forces detaining the American vessel and crew.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. EDT on 14 May, the

Mayaguez was retaken by United States forces. At approx-

imately 11:30 p.m., the entire crew of the Mayaguez was

taken aboard the Wilson. U.S. forces have begun the pro-

cess of disengagement and withdrawal.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant

to the President’s constitutional Executive power and his

authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States

Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R.

Ford, 1975. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1978. pp. 669–670.

Helsinki Accord, 1975

Accord signed on August 1, 1975, by 33 European countries,

Canada, and the United States during the Helsinki Confer-

ence, held to ratify the agreements of the Conferences on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The accord’s sig-

natories pledged respect for national sovereignty, territorial

integrity, human rights, and civil liberties; recognition of a

country’s international obligations; peaceful settlement of dis-

putes between nations; and a policy of international coopera-

tion on technical, scientific, economic, and environmental

issues. An offshoot of the policy of détente adopted by the

superpowers, the Helsinki Accord was not a treaty and had no

legal authority. Nevertheless, it was a landmark document at

the time, and was generally accepted as a standard by which

the human rights records of the Eastern bloc countries were

judged.

(British spelling has been retained)

________________________

_______________________

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at

Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was con-

cluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Repre-

sentatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus,

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German

Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,

Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,

Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Nether-

lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United

States of America and Yugoslavia,

* * *

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to

improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in

Foreign Policy Issues 1691