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Marketing Dynamics: Theory and Practice
1989, HP unveiled its Desk-Jet, meant for office use. By the end of the 1980s, HP was already
famous for its laser printers, which offered sharp quality, but were very expensive. Desk-Jet was
meant to bridge the price gap between laser printers and dot-matrix ones. It offered a resolution as
high as 300 dpi (dots per inch), and could almost match laser-quality printouts of plain text. But high
custom duties (300 percent) made Desk-Jet uncompetitive. In 1989, HP imported five Desk-Jet
printers, for trial runs (price: Rs 50,000). Local PC-maker PCL got 20 units. But the market gave a
thumbs-down to the product. In 1992, one year after the opening of the Indian economy, HP revived
the idea of marketing Desk-Jet. But this time, it was cautious. Godrej was appointed as its distributor.
Yet, the product didn’t get beyond sales of 5-10 units a month. In contrast, HP’s LaserJet - 4,
launched at the end of 1992, was an instant success. The market’s polarization defied logic. People
ought to have been excited by modern clarity at a price that did not break them away from the
traditional virtue of thrift. Yet, it took a market study in April-May 1993 to reveal the reasons for the
failure of DeskJet. The main market inhibitor, it turned out, was price. It was so much above the
austere dot-matrix that it did not qualify as a thrifty purchase. Then there were perceptual blocks.
Channel partners had reservations about the Desk-Jet’s ability to handle 132-column printing. It was
also seen as something only for graphics.
In response, in June 1993, HP came up with price points that were only slightly higher than dot-
matrix printers. Yet, people were too accustomed to the buzz of these old-fashioned printers to bother
replacing them. And everyone had dot-matrix, so why complain? The company knew that it had to
shake people out of their sense of conformism. HP was on the lookout for a disruptive market
programme, which would make people sit up and take notice. But the big challenge was to convince
the trade that the dot-matrix era would end soon. In July 1993, Godrej organized a reseller meet in
Goa, which brought together top 100 dealers the distribution firm. National Panasonic and HP, two of
Godrej’s partners, were invited to address the conference. Sensing its big chance, HP got a creative
pitch worked out with MAA Bozell, its ad agency. The first presentation by National Panasonic was
a damp squib. The Japanese team reinforced old thinking - that the Indian market was primarily dot-
matrix. HP opened its show with an action sequence from the movie Star Trek VI-The Last Frontier.
The sequence showed the Starship Enterprise battling an invisible star-ship and destroying it. It ends
with Captain Kirk remarking ‘It is all about change, madam chancellor.’ On this cue, the HP team
projected the future market as an undiscovered entity, where change was inevitable. It projected
itself as a change agent, committed to delivering better value to customers, even if that meant busting
the comfortable old paradigm. Next, HP addressed the channel inhibitors that it had identified earlier.
Desk-Jet print-outs with 136 columns were distributed, and HP promised to meet price points that
were acceptable to the trade. It also promised advertising support. That did it. Resellers flocked to
the HP counter, and for once, the company felt buoyant about DeskJet’s prospects. HP decided to
focus on the West and North markets, and the product was re-launched in August, 1993. It sold 500
units that month. HP was back in business. By the end of the year, the product was selling across
India, with volumes up.
In December 1993, whispers of Canon’s imminent entry to the market were doing the rounds.
Sensing a threat, HP drew up a contingency plan. In February 1994, HP swung into action. The new
Desk-Jet 520 C of HP, a 600 dpi machine, to counter Canon’s 360 dpi machine was launched in the
Indian market. HP got a boost. By early 1994, HP was using a 50-60 member team to give