Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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137
contemporary piracy: irritation or menace?
have taken insufficient anti-piracy measures and thus present them with an
opportunity to board. It is possible that corrupt port officials, who have ac-
cess to cargo manifests, may identify high-value cargoes and pass this infor-
mation to pirates who consequently target specific ships and, occasionally,
specific containers.
14
Frécon suggests that even mid-level organised gangs
on Bintan are able to listen in to VhF.
15
Both common and organised
pirates can benefit from political or official support; in the case of common
piracy this tends to come from local officials and law enforcement officers
who provide information or protection in exchange for bribes or a cut of
the proceeds.
Organised pirates do not leave things to chance. ey know what they
are looking for because in most cases they will have a buyer waiting or
know buyers who would be interested. e information they need can, in
many instances, be acquired quite legitimately from Lloyd’s and port ship
movement bulletins. In others they use information obtained corruptly
from either official or commercial sources to identify specific cargoes, or to
target vessels that will be particularly vulnerable either because of the route
they will take or their lack of precautions .
16
Target interception. Common pirates can attack their targets using either
direct methods, which often involve the use of firearms to persuade their
targets to heave-to, or surreptitious methods, which involve boarding their
target as silently as possible. Organised pirates can do the same. ey can
also employ deceptive techniques such as disguising their boats and them-
selves as police, coast guards or members of armed services. is can be
especially effective if they are members of such services. Organised pirates
have been known to place an accomplice aboard (a “sleeper”) to sabotage
the vessel or its defences, to transmit updates of its position and to help
the gang get on board.
17
e “sleeper” who was on board the Nepline De-
14 McDaniel, ‘Modern high seas piracy’, p. 12 and Ken Cottrill, ‘Modern maraud-
ers: pirates on the South China Seas use high-tec weapons’, Popular Mechanics,
no. 12, 1997, and Fabey, ‘Sitting ducks’, refer to reports of pirates coming
aboard with computer printouts of where specific cargo is stored.
15 Frécon, ‘piracy and armed robbery at sea along the Malacca Straits’, p. 78.
16 Chalk, ‘reats to the maritime environment’, p. 7 suggests that such groups
rely on intelligence from brokers and operators across several countries to pro-
vide them with current information on cargoes, ships, routes and buyers, as well
as government counter-measures.
17 ‘Terror on the high seas–A spreading plague’, DEBKANet-Weekly Special Re-
port, 14 Aug. 2002. perry, ‘Buccaneer tales in the pirates’ lair’, provides a de-
tailed description of a hijacking involving a ‘sleeper’.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
lima when it was hijacked in 2005 sent text messages to the raiding party
reporting the ship’s speed, course and position. Most importantly he told
the gang when he would be on watch and almost certainly was responsible
for disabling the Ship’s Security Alarm System (SSAS).
18
By using multiple
identities and false papers “sleepers” usually have little trouble finding work
on other ships, which for the right price they will also betray.
19
Attack persistence. Common and organised pirates may press their attacks
with equal vigour. Ships currently have a number of non-violent measures
they can employ to discourage boarding: speed, manoeuvre, “fishtailing” to
create a violent wake, or the use of powerful lights, noise and water from
their high-pressure hoses. persistence, however, motivated by the belief the
victim can be made to stop as a result of terror or exhaustion, appears to
be an indicator either of common criminal piracy—some ships have been
chased and harried for hours—or rogue military forces using government
vessels to launch pirate attacks.
20
Organised pirates are more likely to be
able to mount their assault quickly and effectively because they are likely
to have good intelligence on a ship’s course and defensive capabilities, have
the resources to mount more effective deceptions, employ heavier firearms
and be able to either place a “sleeper” on board, or know which seamen are
open to offers.
Objectives
Common piracy targets, in the main, cash and the personal belongings
of the crew or passengers and items of ships’ equipment, although small
items of cargo have been taken on occasion. Common pirates have been
known to hijack small vessels: fishing boats are attacked regularly, and in
some areas yachts can be prize targets because they have few defenders, are
easy to board and, ton for ton, usually carry large quantities of cash and
valuables.
21
Common pirates will then take what they can and leave. Once
organised pirates are on board they will obviously take cash and anything
else that comes to hand, but their main purpose is either to steal the cargo,
which often means stealing the entire vessel, or, more recently, to kidnap
18 Gwin, ‘Dark passage’, p. 136. Also NGA ASAM 2005-208, 13 June 2005.
19 Gwin, ‘Dark passage’, p. 139.
20 uS Department of Energy, ‘piracy: e reat to Tanker Traffic’, p. 6.
21 Gray et al., Maritime Terror, p. 3.
139
contemporary piracy: irritation or menace?
members of the crew. In Somalia, the pirates hijacked the ship and the crew
together for a combined ransom.
Organised piracy is looking for substantial profits. It appears that these
can be earned in four ways: cargo theft, ship and cargo theft, cargo fraud,
and kidnap-and-ransom. Cargo theft occurs when the ship is highjacked
and the cargo transferred to another ship or barge at sea before the ship
is sent on its way. Ship and cargo theft is similar but the ship is disguised
and re-registered before being sailed to a port where the cargo is sold. e
ship can then be sold to an unsuspecting buyer or even, in some cases, for
scrap.
22
Small vessels can be taken to remote bays or harbours where the
cargo can be offloaded and the ship cut up. Larger ships can be stripped
of their components while ships of any size can be simply abandoned and
allowed to rust away undetected.
23
One of the first examples of this type
of piracy took place in 1990 with the hijacking of the Marta on a voyage
from ailand to Korea. e pirates knew exactly where the ship would be
and had made detailed plans for its hijacking and disposal. e ship’s name
and appearance were changed and it was sailed to an unknown port where
accomplices, using forklifts, took two and a half days to transfer its cargo to
a waiting barge. It was then taken out to sea again at which point the crew
and the master were separated. e master was taken hostage and released
independently to ensure that the crew, who were allowed to sail the ship
to Bangkok once the pirates left, obeyed their instructions. During the hi-
jacking one of the pirates admitted that the Marta was their sixth successful
hijacking, a series that might have begun with the ai Wong in 1986.
24
e most notorious cases have been the Cheung Son (which is dealt with in
more detail below), the Anna Sierra and the Alondra Rainbow.
25
A party of thirty pirates hijacked the Anna Sierra in 1995 in the Gulf
of ailand. parts of the ship were repainted and it was renamed the Artic
Sea and re-registered in honduras. About half the crew were set adrift on a
makeshift pontoon (and fired upon by the pirates as they drifted away) while
the other half were forced to leave the ship in rough weather aboard a life
raft. e ship was sailed to Beihai in Guangxi province in China where its
$4 million cargo of sugar, which had already been sold to local interests in
22 See ICC-IMB piracy Report, 2003, p. 24.
23 Ryan, ‘Captain counts the cost of piracy’.
24 Menefee, TMV, p. 80. Also ICC-IMB, ‘Organised maritime crime in the Far
East’, pp. 75-6.
25 For the history of this form of piracy see Abhyankar, ‘Maritime fraud and pi-
racy’, pp. 187-91.
140
small boats, weak states, dirty money
a pre-arranged deal at well below the market price, was due to be unloaded.
While in the harbour it was identified by the IMB which proved the ship had
been stolen. Nonetheless, the Chinese authorities allowed the pirate crew to
slip away, impounded the cargo, demanded a “docking fee” of $350,000
for the ship’s release and then eventually sold the cargo themselves without
compensating the rightful owners.
26
In the end the Anna Sierra was never
released and remains in the harbour at Beihai, little more than a rusting
hulk.
27
Jayant Abyankar asked the pertinent question, “Is the…Anna Sierra case
the result of inefficiency and infighting amongst the seemingly inept Chi-
nese authorities concerned, or part of a deeper plot to cover up China’s
participation in criminal activity?”
28
In fact both factors were probably in-
volved. Ken Blyth was the Australian master of another ship, the Petro
Ranger, which was hijacked in 1998. In his case the Chinese Marine police
became suspicious, boarded his ship and arrested his hijackers.
29
eir in-
tervention might well have saved his life. Nonetheless he recognised, after
sitting through numerous interviews, that the various parts of the Chinese
government were in conflict. e attitude of the people’s Liberation Army
(pLA) and the Marine police was that the incident could embarrass China
and therefore the pirates who had taken his ship should be punished. e
people’s Security Bureau (pSB) appeared to be under the control—or in-
fluence—of the local authorities which almost certainly had links to, and
benefited from, the pirates’ activities.
30
As if to confirm this ambiguous po-
26 NGA ASAM 1995-123, 13 Aug. 1995. Dubner ‘human Rights and Envi-
ronmental Disaster’, p. 7. Five further descriptions of this case are to be found
in Seth Faison, ‘pirates, with speedboats, reign in China Sea port’, New York
Times, 20 April 1997; John Grissim, ‘e hijacking of the Anna Sierra’, e
World Paper, May 1997; Abhyankar, ‘Maritime fraud and piracy’, pp. 187-92;
IMB, ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships: A special report’, pp. 33-9 and
Mark Bruyneel, ‘Tale of a modern pirate gang’, 21 Nov. 2000.
27 Jack hitt, ‘Bandits in the global shipping lanes’, e New York Times Magazine,
20 Aug. 2000.
28 Jayant Abhyankar, ‘e case of the Anna Sierra’ in Ellen, Shipping at Risk, p.
279.
29 Ken Blyth (with peter Corris), Petro Pirates: e Hijacking of the Petro Rang-
er’, St Leonards, NSW: Allan & unwin, 2000, pp. 54-5. Also NGA ASAM
1998-33, 17 April 1998 and Charles Glass, ‘e new piracy’, London Review of
Books, vol. 25, no. 24, 18 Dec. 2003.
30 Blyth, Petro Pirates, particularly pp. 71-8 & 104. herman, the pirate leader,
also suggested that the crews of the two vessels that came alongside the Petro
Ranger to remove its cargo were manned by Chinese naval personnel, although
141
contemporary piracy: irritation or menace?
sition, the pirate’s leader was beaten brutally (“he looked like he’d aged ten
years”), yet a few months later he and his gang were all quietly released.
31
e Chinese refused to explain why.
32
A few months after that five of the
gang were spotted off the Malaysian coast once again working as pirates.
33
Similarly, among the 16 pirates who hijacked the Tenyu and killed its crew
in 1998 (see below) and who were also released by the Chinese authorities,
at least two were identified as members of the Anna Sierra gang that had
been let go in 1997.
34
At about the same time that the crew of the Tenyu
lost their lives, officials in China apparently began to recognise that the
country had such a significant interest in economic growth that it needed
to adapt to the modern world and play by the rules of global trade. e
central authorities began to reassert control over provincial interests in a
campaign that drove the most successful and high profile smuggler, Lai
Changxing, into exile in 1999. According to prosecutors, Lai’s organisa-
tion had revenue of $6.4 billion between 1996 and 1999 alone. Lai himself
admits to paying bribes (or “gifts” as he preferred to call them) to public
security and customs officials amounting to $2 million between 1991 and
1997.
35
Despite Lai’s demise, the old ways of doing business are unlikely to
Blyth speculates that they may have come from the pSB: ibid., p. 47. Even after
his arrest, herman was confident that a bribe would secure his release: ibid., p.
76.
31 Sandra Speares. ‘IBM condemns pirates’ release’. Lloyd’s List, 19 Oct. 1998.
Matthew Flynn. ‘China promises crackdown as it strives to escape image of a
safe haven for pirates’. Lloyd’s List, 24 February 1999.
32 Two explanations have been advanced: the first, incredibly, was that there was
insufficient evidence. ‘Indonesians deported due to lack of evidence: China’.
Agence France-Presse, 29 October 1998. e second was that, according to Zou
Keyuan, there was no extradition treaty in place: Zou, ‘Seeking effectiveness for
the crackdown of piracy at sea’, p. 129. is argument is somewhat undermined
by the fact that China was a signatory to the SuA Convention, which is argu-
ably applicable in this case, that encourages states to consider extradition even
when no formal treaty is in place. Blyth suggests a deal was agreed: Blyth, Petro
Pirates, pp. 114 & 140-4.
33 hitt, ‘Bandits in the global shipping lanes’.
34 ‘Dead men tell no tales’, e Economist, 16 Dec. 1999; ‘China frees “Anna
Sierra” hijackers’. Lloyd’s List, 11 Feb. 1997; Flynn. ‘China promises crackdown
as it strives to escape image of a safe haven for pirates’.
35 See Susan V. Lawrence, ‘A city ruled by crime’, FEER, 30 Nov. 2000 and han-
nah Beech, ‘Smuggler’s blues’, TIMEAsia, 7 Oct. 2002. For a more detailed
account of this extraordinary individual and the milieu that allowed him to
operate see Oliver August., Inside the Red Mansion: On the Trail of China’s Most
Wanted Man, New York: houghton Mifflin Company, 2007.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
disappear in China for, as a uS State Department officer put it, if money is
involved, it is “not always clear how devoted they are [to making changes]
when push comes to shove”.
36
e case of the Alondra Rainbow illustrates many of the methods of
organised piracy and also many of the problems of international law en-
forcement even when a state is willing to act. In October 1999 the ship
loaded a cargo of aluminium ingots valued at $10 million at the Indone-
sian port of Kuala Tanjung. e cargo was due to be delivered to Japan.
Within hours of the ship leaving the port and while it was heading down
the Straits of Malacca a 15-man pirate gang made up of Malays, Indone-
sians, ais, Chinese and possibly other nationalities hijacked it. eir ar-
rival was the result of detailed planning. e gang had been assembled on
the Indonesian island of Batam by a professional recruiter who in turn took
his orders from a criminal boss. e boss’ nationality was reputedly Chi-
nese but this could not be determined accurately as he only communicated
by telephone. e boss, or the syndicate he represented, had hired an old
freighter, the Sanho.
37
e pirates boarded this ship off Jakarta and sailed it
up the Malacca Strait to Kuala Tanjung where it anchored, waiting for the
Alondra Rainbow to leave. When it did, the Sanho either left the anchor-
age first or followed. When night fell a fast boat was launched that carried
the gang to the stern of their target. It is possible that the gang were in
contact with a “sleeper” aboard who lowered the ropes they used to shinny
up to the deck. Equally, they could have thrown grappling hooks over
the rail. What is known is that once on board they took over the bridge.
ey blindfolded the crew and locked them in the messroom. ey stole
their passports plus their personal papers and valuables. e ship’s safe was
broken into and the cash removed. It seems likely that while this was hap-
pening the ship was not under proper control. e pirates came equipped
36 hitt, ‘Bandits in the global shipping lanes’. Doubts exist not merely about
China’s law enforcement methods but about its judicial processes as well. See,
for example, James Brewer, ‘London Club tells members to be wary of Chinese
legal system’, Lloyd’s List, 10 July 2006.
37 e use of freighters as support vessels is not uncommon. e MV Pulau Mas is
noted below. Another was the MV Polaris which was certainly in use in 1997. It
only used this name during a hijack. At other times it used its registered name.
Its only cargo was a large speed boat which was hidden in the hold but interest-
ingly it was sometimes accompanied by a fishing boat which was used to scout
out victims and observe them in port. Arms were delivered to the ship prior to
an attack and were thrown overboard before it entered another port. private
correspondence.
143
contemporary piracy: irritation or menace?
with pistols and knives and used them to threaten any crew member who
refused to obey their orders. is threat undoubtedly had an effect: the
previous year the Tenyu, another Japanese-owned freighter also carrying a
cargo of aluminium ingots, had disappeared after departing from the same
port, to be discovered three months later in the Chinese port of Zhangijana
on the Yangtze River with a new name, a new honduran flag and a new
cargo of palm oil.
38
e original cargo had disappeared, as had the original
crew of 15. e presumption was that they had been murdered.
39
At some stage someone with ship handling experience took control on
the bridge. e ship slowed and the Alondra Rainbow’s crew, still blind-
folded, were marched up on deck. ey thought they were going to be
pushed overboard. Instead, the blindfolds were removed and they were
forced to jump across to another ship, probably the Sanho, which had been
brought alongside. After seven days at sea the crew were forced into the
Alondra Rainbow’s own life raft, which appears to have been brought along
for the purpose, and set adrift. e pirate ship left them and has never been
found. With no sails or means of propulsion the life raft drifted. e crew
had no way of telling where they were but they had ten flares. Whenever
they saw a ship they fired off a flare. Not one ship stopped. On the tenth
day, a ai fishing vessel approached them. Because pirates are believed
to have deceived seafarers into stopping by posing as distressed mariners,
the fishermen treated them with extreme suspicion and only took them to
phuket once their story had been verified.
In the meanwhile the Alondra Rainbow had been sailed through the busy
Singapore Strait towards the Malaysian port of Miri in Borneo. On the way
it had been renamed the Global Venture and its funnel had been repainted.
At Miri it transferred nearly half its cargo of aluminium ingots to another
freighter, the Bansan II, an operation that must have taken several days.
is ship then sailed to Subic Bay in the philippines, changing its name to
the Victoria on the way. ere the cargo was successfully sold. e insur-
ers subsequently tried to recover what they could through the philippine
courts but failed. e police investigation got nowhere. When the Alondra
38 ‘Dead men tell no tales’; also Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Note 43, p. 38. NGA
ASAM 1998-61, 27 Sept. 1998.
39 Langewiesche, e Outlaw Sea, pp. 54-5; Michael Richardson, ‘India and
China set sights on piracy’, International Held Tribune, 23 Nov. 1999; Corey
Bousen. ‘Tenyu crew feared murdered’. Lloyd’s List, 30 December 1998; Yoshi-
hikio Yamada, ‘Defending Asian seas from marauding by pirates’, e Tokyo
Foundation Japanese Dynamism no. 6, March 2004.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
Rainbow, a.k.a. Global Venture, set sail from Miri it was now overdue at its
original destination and the ship’s owners had informed the IMB which in
turn issued an international alert.
On 13 November a ship answering the Alondra Rainbow’s description
was spotted off the southwest coast of India. e IMB contacted the Indian
authorities who agreed to take action, which was remarkable given that
the ship was owned by Japanese interests, registered in panama, crewed
by Filipinos, and had been pirated off Indonesia. perhaps they did not
realise what they were getting themselves into. An Indian Coast Guard
vessel chased the ship. It was joined later by a more heavily armed In-
dian Navy corvette after the Alondra Rainbow, which was now named the
Mega Rama, refused to even slow down despite being hit repeatedly by
gunfire. It stopped finally when confronted by the corvette’s heavier arma-
ment. When the Indians were able to board they discovered the pirates had
burned every incriminating document, including their own passports, and
had opened the sea valves in an attempt to sink the ship.
40
Only prompt
action by Indian Navy divers prevented it from going down. e ship was
towed to Mumbai. On the way a number of the pirates were reported to
have confessed, but these confessions were deemed inadmissible at their
trial. ey claimed they were beaten up, a claim that was denied, although
one was somehow shot in the leg.
eir trial started finally in 2001. e first problem that arose was that
India had no law prohibiting piracy. Relevant legislation dating from the
time of the British Raj was found eventually but given that Indian law had
in the meanwhile been codified questions arose as to whether it was still in
force. Consequently, to be sure of a conviction, the prosecuting authorities
charged the men with a catch-all list of crimes. e trial dragged on in the
Mumbai Sessions Court until 2003 when the men were convicted success-
fully and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In 1999 the IMB, which
had emphasised the need for international cooperation and the importance
of political will if piracy was to be defeated, said it was “fantastic to see the
Indian authorities act under the auspices of international law to intercept
the ship.”
41
All the authorities concerned now congratulated each other on
a job well done.
40 Suspicions exist that the original cargo was bartered for arms to be supplied to
the LTTE. NGA ASAM 1999-114, 22 Oct. 1999.
41 ‘International cooperation beats modern-day pirates’, IMB, 24 Nov. 1999.
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contemporary piracy: irritation or menace?
Sadly, however, this was not the end of the case. In March 2005 the
Mumbai high Court overruled the Session Court and acquitted all the
accused. e high Court appeared to have concerns about the process and
over the fact that neither the Master of the Alondra Rainbow, who had
twice travelled from Japan to confirm that the Mega Rama really was the
Alondra Rainbow and to testify as to what had happened, nor the Chief
Engineer was prepared to identify any of the pirates, apparently because
they feared reprisal. Like so many victims of piracy, they have never gone
to sea again.
42
Improved security measures, greater awareness of the problem amongst
harbour authorities and shippers, the introduction of the IMO Ship Iden-
tification Numbering Scheme under which a unique number is affixed in a
prominent position on a ship’s superstructure,
43
the Continuous Synopsis
Record of the ship’s history including flag and registration details,
44
and
the widespread installation of SSAS
45
have meant that gangs involved in
this form of theft have become more ingenious. On 10 July 2006 the
MV Kimtrans Mega-Lift left pangkalbalam on Indonesia’s main tin pro-
ducing island, Bangka, for Singapore loaded with about 800 tons of tin
ingots; on 12 July the ship was hijacked and the crew abandoned in a
small boat; the following day the ship was seen sinking. Reports indicate
that pirates intentionally sank the vessel in shallow water to hide it from
the authorities, so that they themselves could later dive and salvage the
valuable cargo. Only a gang with considerable technical knowledge and
transnational connections to ensure of its disposal could have undertaken
such a complex operation.
46
42 is account of the Alondra Rainbow case is based on the very full description
in Langewiesche, e Outlaw Sea, pp. 46-61 & 70-81. See also Michael Rich-
ardson, ‘India and China set sights on piracy’. On the decision of the Mumbai
high Court to acquit see R.S. Vasan, ‘Alondra Rainbow revisited: A study of
related issues in the light of the recent judgement of Mumbai high Court’,
South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 1379, 13 May 2005 and Vijay Sakhuja,
‘Maritime legal conundrum’, Institute of peace and Conflict Studies Paper no.
1778, 29 June 2005.
43 ‘IMO ship identification number scheme’; also Stephen Jones, Maritime Secu-
rity: A Practical Guide, London: e Nautical Institute, 2006, pp. 210-11.
44 International Maritime Organisation, ‘IMO adopts comprehensive maritime
security measures’, ND
45 Jones, Maritime Security, pp. 211-12.
46 ISC, ‘Report for December 2006’, p. 10. e ship did trigger its SSAS. NB: this
incident was not reported to the IMB.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
e attack was similar to two others. e first was mounted on the MV
Prima Indah hijacked on 30 September 2005 three hours after departing
Bangka, also for Singapore. It was reported to be transporting 660 tons of
tin worth an estimated $4.7 million. e crew was set adrift in a fishing
boat and later landed safely on an island. e vessel was later spotted sunk
off Bangka in about 35 metres (115 feet) of water, not far from where it
began its journey. e second incident involved the MV Inabukwa, hi-
jacked on 22 April 2005 off the Lingga Islands. pirates, armed with guns,
ordered the crew to sail the tin-laden ship to pasir Gudang port, in Ma-
laysia’s southern Jahor state. e vessel was reported to be carrying a cargo
of at least 575 tons, worth an estimated $4.6 million. e vessel docked
in pasir Gudang port for two days while the crew unloaded the tin into a
warehouse under threat of being killed if they did not cooperate. On 25
April the pirates ordered the ship back to Indonesian waters and escaped in
a speedboat, leaving the crew uninjured. After the incident was reported,
authorities checked the warehouse and found the cargo of tin intact.
47
ONI
noted the similarities between these incidents and the hijacking of the MV
Steadfast in their report on the latter, discussed earlier.
48
Cargo fraud takes several forms.
49
Only one is related to piracy directly,
the so-called “phantom-ship” phenomenon that mixes fraud with theft.
50
A “phantom ship” is one that has been registered with a phantom identity
using the temporary registration procedure in which all the details of pre-
vious names, tonnage, dimensions and ownership details are fictitious.
51
Although “phantom ship” scams can be undertaken using compliant crews,
47 See NGA ASAM 2005-140, 22 April 2005 on the MV Inabukwa and ASAM
2005-309, 30 Sept. 2005 on the MV Prima Indah. It is of interest that the MV
Inabukwa was the victim of a previous pirate hijacking in 2001 while lifting
$1.2 million of tin plates from pangkalbalam to Singapore. In this incident,
the cargo was untouched and only the crew’s accommodation was raided. NGA
ASAM 2001-98, 15 March 2001.
48 NGA ASAM 2006-07, 19 Dec. 2005.
49 Like all crime, it adapts to exploit new opportunities. Although the number of
fraudulent scuttles may have declined, trade frauds have increased with buyers
and sellers often working in collusion with banks: ‘Maritime crime changes
with time’, Fairplay, 3 Oct. 2006.
50 e ‘phantom’ or ‘ghost’ ship is, in fact, another British innovation of the Vic-
torian era. See hepburn, e Black Flag, pp. 286-7 for the story of herbert
Rennie Smith.
51 ICC-IMB, ‘phantom ships’, July 1994, paragraphs 3.1, 5 & 7.