Marshall Hodgson. Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam and World History
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12 Conditions of historical comparison among ages and regions 277
Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam have all prevailed, and many regions
have been joined with politically and socially - will manifestly present a
minimum of advantage to a regional study, and a maximum of light will
be thrown on it in the course of studying interregional problems. An
ambiguous case like Russia requires interregional light in a different
manner. Russian history does not fit into the categories for the most part
of the Latin West, but in recent centuries has been so bound up with it as
to be inseparable, in certain respects, at least between the times of Peter
the Great and Lenin. On the other hand, Russia had not been intelligible
simply as an outpost of Byzantium. Yet it can never be divorced intelligi-
bly either, from South or from West. As in the case of the far South East,
the only solution is to develop a more general framework within which
Russia can find a place; but, whereas in Indonesia interregional trade
and other such interactions will be of major importance as factors in
terms of which the region develops its particular forms, in Russia, no
doubt, greater scope can be allowed for internal cultural development,
and interregional relations in the form of geographic balance or of com-
mon events and developments impinging on Russia will be instead a
fundamental frame of reference.
However, there is more to the problem of relative spheres of a regional
approach and of an interregional approach in understanding the rela-
tions of the various regions. It is sometimes suggested that whatever
may be said of the objective correlations and regularities, the "causal"
development of cultures, their human significance is to be sought, if
anywhere, only within a particular culture, whose forms are to be inter-
preted as a common whole; that any relations among these, while they
may have profound causal effect on the various cultures, have no signifi-
cance except in terms of the particular worlds of meaning identified
exclusively with each culture. This point must be accorded due respect,
as it is an important part of a general recognition among us that without
immediate value, the indirect knowledge of science is dead; that no
consensus
gentium
pragmaticorum,
no evaluation by a congress of general
semantics is adequate in human affairs. Nevertheless, the ordinary for-
mulation of it in terms of exclusive cultures leaves much of human
history in the lurch - the Far South East, say, as well as those recognized
periods within a culture which are not highly "integrated" in Sorokin's
sense. It concentrates on finding meaning for men only in the general
cultural configurations, noting only in passing that of course life has
meaning for people in all sorts of connections, whether their individual
personalities or their cultural backgrounds are highly integrated or not.
278 III The discipline of world history
The units of
historical comparison
Several sorts of
historical
complexes
The historical complexes peculiarly relevant to
world
history are the larg-
est units of historical activity isolable short of the world taken as a whole
(world history defined as those historical processes which involve so
much the greater part of mankind that their study from the perspective of
any localized area, such as Europe or the Far East, must remain fragmen-
tary).
Some examples of the several sorts of concepts of historical complex
follow, with appropriate roles of each, (a) The Oikoumene - the civilized
zone of Eurasia and northern Africa, which gradually expands during the
millennia from
ca.
3000
B.C.
to recently - is
a
major historical
complex;
but
for good historical handling of world history, certain component units
within the Oikoumene must be dealt with: (b) A "civilization" is the
commonest unit generally used - a matter of common backgrounds and
current interrelation, a common social-cultural context in which art is
created, institutions modified, and so forth, cultural matters outside of
which are not
as such
much present to the consciousness. (Two common
limiting features are: common religion or common classical and/or polite
language[s].) "Civilizations" are appropriate units to use from the point
of
view of internal spiritual and intellectual evolution and its dialectic - art,
institutional economy, religion, philosophy, even in this respect science,
(c) A "region" is a geographical area (in which historical considerations
determine its delimitations) of common interactions, relatively free of
major physical barriers to communication or interactions - which may
include strongly contrasting cultures in juxtaposition (e.g., Indochina-
Malaysia or the coexistence of Chinese and the Yunnan
Thais).
"Regions,"
including the Oikoumene, are useful units from the point of view of
external interrelations of power dynamics, of finding
constants
relatively
external to the cultural development proper, (d) A "cultural area," for
"area-studies," has less historical than cross-sectional considerations de-
limiting it, including those of physical geography and geology perhaps
(e.g., the geographers' Middle
East).
A "culture-area" is useful for coordi-
nation of various disciplines, especially for
planning,
(e) A "civilized tradi-
tion" is a matter of common basic background in culture and history,
without necessarily constant contact among different parts (e.g., Japan
and China);
two:
"India-Middle East-Europe" and "Far
East";
for four, Far
East, India, Middle East, Europe. This concept may be useful from the
point of view of underlying institutions and their transformations, anthro-
pology, comparative studies, and so forth.
12 Conditions of historical comparison among ages and regions 279
Regionality
Every cultural complex of wide enough scope to be reckoned a "civiliza-
tion" is prevalent over what may be called a "region." But there are
many other regions that cannot readily be defined in terms of a given
civilization. For instance, much can be said about the Middle East which
is true of both pre-Islamic and Islamic times; and if one can, indeed,
speak of "Middle Eastern civilization" (for instance, in the seventh cen-
tury when civilization in that area is being transformed into what will
then be called Islamic), it is because we are aware of the region first, as
an area of identifiable cultural traditions; and so can be led to refer to a
"civilization" characteristic of that region at any given time, though from
first to last such a civilization may vary enormously. Again, India is a
clear region which can be discussed in Indo-Muslim times despite that
fact that it is only a part of the "Hindu civilization" - indeed, the very
question, "is there a common and distinctive civilization in India then?"
presupposes that there is a common historical complex - a region of
historical interactions.
For a region in our particular discussion is merely an area of historical
interrelations and interactions, closely-knit enough so that many ques-
tions can be dealt with in its terms without spreading out to a still wider
region - that is, in practice, to the Oikoumene. Hence a hodge-podge
like the Far South East still forms a region, because Hindus, Buddhists,
Muslims, and Confucians, and finally even Christians, lived out their
history so much in each others' hair that however different their cultural
patterns they formed a common region. The proto-Thai of Yunnan,
though not Chinese, formed for a while a part of the region of China, not
because they participated in its culture, but because they were drawn
into its history.
The Oikoumene is the largest region. But smaller regions than it are
what one is referring to when one says "interregional" - and, so far as
this is contrasted to "local," the regions are the largest complexes usually
isolable before one comes to the level of the Oikoumene, or at least of,
say, the Indo-Mediterranean historical complex. Regions are more flexi-
ble to deal with than "cultures" because, while including them, they
allow for many other sorts of cases.
In designating usable regions for the purposes of interregional history,
there is not always the same traditional difficulty as in the case of the
West. However, there is a problem, indicated for one thing by a lack of
regional terminology. The only standard regional method we have in use
now goes by continents, the only concession to cultural regionalism
280 III The discipline of world history
being to divide off Europe from the rest of Eurasia. This results in a
concept, "Asia," the miscellaneous remainder, which has no geographi-
cal,
ethnographical, or political function, except to exalt the status of
Europe as homologous to its vast
self,
and to confuse well-meaning
professors who talk hopefully about wedding the "ideals of Asia" to the
"skills of Europe."
1
But these "continents," not even useful for geologi-
cal purposes, are hopeless for studying man. At least four-fifths of hu-
mankind live on the one continent Eurasia; and to divide Eurasia into
two as we have does not solve the problem, for though "Europe" is
almost a reasonable region, the lumping all the rest together as "Asia"
merely encourages the Westward distortion. To meet the need we have
evolved terms like "Near East," "Middle East," "Far East," which are the
best available yet; but they are not clear even so, for all these terms have
different meanings attached to them by different people. While for some
the Near East is the area of the old Ottoman Empire, for others it is
restricted to the Balkan Peninsula, and for others it expands to include
Iran, since Iranian history is inevitably bound in with the general course
of the Ottoman area. It is probably in this latter sense that it refers to an
area most frequently useful for interregional purposes, though each of
its meanings of courses has its uses. In this same expanded sense "Mid-
dle East" is now used by the British military, a term usually restricted in
America to lands well east of the Mediterranean, and often extended
even to include India. The Far East as a term is equally difficult, some-
times referring to the old Chinese and Japanese empires, sometimes
extending southward as far as Malaysia, and sometimes expanding to
include, with India, half the human race, and so to become completely
unwieldy.
The term "West" is of course similarly ambiguous, being sometimes
used in the sense of the nations of old Latin heritage, being sometimes
expanded to include Russia and the Balkans, and sometimes contracted
to refer to Britain, France, and Germany as against the "Central" Ger-
man powers. But besides their ambiguity it is the common fault of these
terms to preserve, in their form, the old division into "West" and "East,"
for "Near East" and "Far East" inevitably suggest a correspondence to
similar divisions within the "West."
The inadequacy of terms, of course, merely cloaks an inadequate
regional equipment for use in interregional study. If interregional his-
1
Much the same ambiguities adhere to the term "Asia" as to the "Orient." An amusing
example of the use of the word is found in Michelet: "Long had those two sisters, those
two halves of humanity, Europe and Asia, the Christian religion and the Mussulman, lost
sight of each other. ..." What would the Hindu Mahasabha say to that!
12 Conditions of historical comparison among ages and regions 281
tory is the study of those phenomena too wide to fit conveniently into
any particular region, it is necessary for economy's sake to know what
regions hang well enough together to be dealt with on the regional
level. Within the Oikoumenic Zone, moreover, distinguishing regions,
like the Far East and the Latin West, which form relatively constant
parts of the Oikoumenic Configuration, are of particular use in orient-
ing ourselves in the infinitely complex network of relations across the
Zone. Perhaps the most significant of such regions are the Confucian
Far East, the peninsula and island of the far South East, India and
nearby areas, and vast reaches of Central Asia, the Middle East from
the Nile and the Aegean through Iran, the Russian area, and the Occi-
dent. Certainly in addition to these are likely to be helpful at various
times overlapping regions, the Sudan, the Mediterranean Basin, the
Levant, for instance; and for relatively many purposes certain subdivi-
sions can be noted - within Western Europe, the south around the
Mediterranean, and the north on the Atlantic; within India, the Deccan
and the north; within China, again, the south and the north, the
Hoang-Ho Valley.
It is still necessary to an understanding of the role of Oikoumenic con-
ditions in interregional history, to examine the role of the Oikoumenic
regions in regard to each other. One can hardly, of course, think of the
various regions as fixed entities; nevertheless it
is
helpful to abstract fairly
constant regions within the Oikoumenic Zone, within which regions
there is a degree of cultural integration - a common religion, during
much of the time, a common literary heritage, and a common political
framework.
To
a large extent the Zone divides itself up very conveniently
into such regions, and there is a regular configuration which they form
over many centuries, which while constantly growing and changing re-
mains recognizable from the time of its formation in the first millennium
B.C.
till the Western Metamorphosis upsets
it.
For instance, the Confucian
Far East forms from Chou times a distinct region in such a sense - as it
expands, new countries like Japan are not always incorporated directly
under the imperial rule, but, recognizing common political standards,
and often enough having a common reverence for Chinese imperial au-
thority, Japan and China, as well as the lesser nations in their vicinity,
form a common diplomatic region as well as a literary and religious one.
Moreover, in the Oikoumenic Configuration this Far Eastern region has
for millennia the same general relations with other regions: overland
immediately with Central Asia, and beyond the Middle East; by several
routes, but also by religious
ties,
with India; by sea with the far South East,
and thence with other seafaring regions.
282 III The discipline of world history
For
use in an
interregional study
in
such
a
sense,
it is
likewise useful
to define
a
region
in the far
west that
is
also fairly constant
in
these
senses;
and in the
Latin-using area such
a
region
is
ready waiting
for
us.
In origin
the
term Occident applied
to the
western half
of the
Roman
Empire, essentially Italy, Africa, Spain,
and
Gaul.
The
Greeks never
considered themselves Westerners;
for
them Delphi
was the
center
of
the world;
but the
consciousness
of
cultural dependence drove
the Lat-
ins
to
count themselves
as
west
of
center.
2
In
this western Mediterra-
nean area with
its
hinterland
to the
north
we
have
for the
duration
afterwards
of the
Oikoumenic Zone
a
region consistent enough
to be
studied
as a
cultural whole;
for in the
main there
has
been
a
continuous
Latin tradition over
it
all, except Punic Africa, though
its
center
of
grav-
ity shifted northward
as it
grew. From
the
time when
the
various naval
colonists, Phoenicians, Etruscans,
or
Greeks, were brought into
the La-
tin empire, through
the
time when "Romania"
of the
west was divided
into Germanic Christian kingdoms, through
the
rise
of
Carolingian
and
Papal power which brought uncertain hegemonies
to
the area,
up
till
the
time when
the
Concert
of
Europe
was
still recognized,
the
area main-
tained
its
cultural
and to
some degree
or
other
its
political unity against
the rest
of
the world,
be it
Orthodox, Muslim,
or
further afield.
To
be
sure, just what shall
be
considered regions
for
purposes
of
interregionality will
be
largely
a
matter
of
convenience.
A
study
of the
relations between northern Italy
and
southern France
is
likely
to be
considered
a
matter
of
general European interest, while
the
relations
between northern Italy
and
southern
are
classed
as an
Italian affair;
so
arbitrarily could
the
relations between
the
Latins
and the
Byzantines
be
considered either
as
local
or
as interregional. Conceivably
a
region inclu-
sive
of
Africa
and
Europe could
be set off
from other regions,
and its
students study
the
several matters that such
a
region would have
in
common;
but
this would probably
not be
convenient,
and
such study
would probably
be
more fruitful
if it
were associated with other
in-
terregional study,
as the
lines
of
connection
it
would trace
are
scarcely
more close than those among
any
other great areas.
The
regions them-
selves,
and
consequently
the
interregional field,
are
fairly well marked
Some historians have been misled
by
their
own
feelings
of the
Latin West
as
essentially
the world into
an
emphasis
too
great
on the
"universalism"
of
Latin Medieval political
theory. Truly universalist was Chinese political theory
of
the time, even with so brilliant a
man
as
Wang Anshih, picturing China
as the
world;
but the
Latins were
then
a bit
more
modest;
the
Emperor
of the
Respublica Christiana
was
admittedly emperor
of
only
the
West,
and
functioned
as
general
in
chief solely (as
in the
Crusades) when
the
Respublica
was fighting foreigners, beyond
its
local jurisdiction.
12 Conditions of historical comparison among ages and regions 283
out by the regional studies already done. Moreover, variable as the
regions are, their function for the purposes of study persists. One can-
not assign Tibet to either the Far East or India or Central Asia at all times,
or for all purposes at any one time. Nevertheless it is as part of one or
another of such regions that we study Tibet when it enters into the broad
movements that have covered the hemisphere. As being next to India, it
learns to use the Syrian alphabet, along with Italy and with Bengal; as
part of the Far East it is covered with Buddhist missionaries along with
Parthia and with Japan; as part of Central Asia it fights for control of the
trade routes along with the Huns and with the Arabs.
Periodization
The different sorts of historical complexes bear different relations to time
and periodization. "Regions" would have minimal time-delimitation
(though they are meaningless apart from human settlement patterns).
"Culture-areas" would be present-oriented. "Civilized traditions" would
be seen as persistent through the period of civilization, at least provision-
ally. "Civilizations" are the briefest and most fractionable sorts of world-
scale historical complexes; they, above all, can be regarded as having
limits in space as well as in time (points of relative discontinuity with
regard to central features in terms of which the cultural context must be
defined), e.g., Islamic civilization, despite its continuity with the Sassa-
nid, definitely is new in the 8th century; or, to take a smaller unit than is
perhaps relevant to world-history, one can fractionize down to a "civiliza-
tion of the Renaissance in Italy and environs."
Just as the Oikoumenic Configuration needs to be clarified spatially, in
the finding of suitable regions in terms of which to study it, it also must
be clarified in time, so that a usable periodization is available to deal with
its development as a whole. Of course, any overall periodization will
have to be arbitrary, particularly in earlier periods, while the Configura-
tion was only in process of formation. However, the only general period-
izations at present in use are the Ancient-Medieval-Modern ages, and
the centuries. The former slice off periods too big for use, even were they
possessed of any natural significance for interregional affairs. The latter
do not take advantage of what integration there is in the development of
the Configuration, and so fail to be either suggestive or useful in mark-
ing off units that can be satisfactorily dealt with. The value of periodiza-
tion consists in its abstracting lengths of time during which it is useful to
deal with comparable development or common events as groups. For
instance, the time of the flowering of individual thought, before referred
284 III The discipline of world history
to,
covered several centuries usefully compared together; the same is
true of the expansive and nationalistic movements of early modern
times.
Another useful element in periodization would be to have ages
fairly uniform in length, even if not in creative content; there is an
advantage in recognizing a barren period as such (if it be barren really),
as we inevitably do, for instance, in a century periodization; for barren-
ness needs to be explained and evaluated, too.
Historical complexes in modern history
For characterizing modern history, consciously appropriate kinds of his-
torical complex must be selected according to the problem dealt with; old
categories are often misleading. Among those problems about the na-
ture of modern culture history in which
choice
of sorts of
historical complexes
is relevant are the following: (A) those involving the selection of units of
comparison, when modern phenomena are involved; thus the compari-
son of "Western" and "Islamic" patterns, or "modern" and "medieval"
(within the West), or (better) modern (in the West or elsewhere) and
medieval (Western or, e.g., Islamic); (B) those involving the envisaging
of contexts of inquiry; thus the interpretation of modern art within West-
European art since the Italian Renaissance, or within European art since
the Archaic Greeks, or within the world-wide setting (and various back-
grounds) of the modern transformation, since the 18th century; and (C)
hence in particular, problems of the explanation of what is distinctive in
modern society, which involve defining what is modern, and defining
what other units are comparable thereto and involve at the same time
the setting of the context, intra-European or otherwise.
Such problems can commonly not be envisaged in terms of the histori-
cal complexes generally used, since these commonly do not offer proper
comparability with the modern situation: the Oikoumene itself has in
effect ceased to exist as a continuing historical complex - but it is useful
for comparisons across time. "Regions" have come to have, under mod-
ern conditions, a quite different significance, communication having
been transformed; they are more local in importance - having been re-
placed in effect by "culture-areas," of limited usefulness in analyzing the
past, as noted. "Civilized traditions" institutional study and comparison
is adequately relevant only within a period (between the advent of civili-
zation and the modern transformations) when the type of institution
they presented had basic continuity; hence not in the modern setting
except in a limited degree. As to "civilizations," for most such purposes
it will be necessary to regard the several historical civilizations (including
12 Conditions of historical comparison among ages and regions 285
the West) as having come to an end with the advent of the great "West-
ern" or "Modern" transformations. They have been superseded by a
new type of historical complex, world-wide, and not necessarily compa-
rable with any of the old civilizations - which must be compared as a
historical complex with any that are of use, according to the require-
ments of a particular question - with the Oikoumene, or with
any
of the
pre-modern civilizations.
Orators' preoccupations with "Western Man," etc., are accordingly for
the most part dangerously misformulated!
Creativity and
decadence
Cultural creativity and cultural decadence both happen all the time, but
are usually neither of them predominant - for cultural conservatism is.
(We must distinguish between decline of creativity from an efflorescence
and actual regression. This is especially easy in science and scholarship
generally, but also holds in art and perhaps even in politics.) The question
is,
when does one or the other, by exception, become predominant, in an
epoch of flowering (which is afterwards looked on as classical), or in an
epoch of decay (as distinct from epigonism? Either flowering or decay
may take place in individual fields; the civilization as such is char-
acterizable so only when key fields (key for that civilization or for pur-
poses of
a
specific inquiry) decay or flower, and the civilization as a whole
reflects this - and here decay may happen with or without a correspond-
ing flowering of something new. A civilization may be defined as the
cultural pattern formed in and conserved after a period when cultural
creativity is predominant - hence such flowering periods are of special
importance; but also, a civilization may be defined in societal terms, in
which case the above becomes merely a special case - but an important
one,
and perhaps a type-case.
The cultural creativity of modern times is a special case - only partly
matched by the Classical flowerings (and lesser ones throughout Oikou-
menic history) or even by the original settings up of civilizations - in
that to a greater degree than before cultural creativity has become
institutionalized - measuring cultural creativity and regression by level
of taste, knowledge, and skill, and by the structure of institutions sup-
porting these (including for these purposes justice as one cultural activ-
ity measurable in these terms).
Cultural florescence (with special rules in addition for art and science)
will happen when the
persistent forces
of
disruption
become strong enough
to overcome the powers of authority without being
so
overwhelming
as
to
286 III The discipline of world history
suppress in their turn the equally persistent
forces
of creation, while cultural
decadence is of two main types. The first is decadence which occurs by the
internal logic of a state structure or art form or whatever, by the law of
Exhaustion - the stalemate whereby one would have to descend to a
lower level (anarchy, of government or art) to break a deadlock created by
an overworked form (of taste, of authority, etc.). This is so alike in point of
(a) art forms like the baroque where art cannot persist in the classic form
because new generations' taste demands something fresh, but cannot be
crude as would be demanded by a truly fresh start on a line for which taste
is not yet developed; and in (b) point of politics, where a constitution has
become out-of-date but so entrenched that its modification without re-
course to crude political forms is impossible - e.g., the alienation of lands
for monks and lay lords in late Byzantium; or even (c) in science, where a
theoretical structure is more readily heavily and at last stranglingly
amended rather than dangerously overthrown - e.g., the Ptolemaic sys-
tem, for which neither heliocentrism nor spiral orbits nor others could
offer help. Exhaustion can mean mere conservatism, or can contribute to
actual regression, e.g., by barring the path of better minds and turning
them elsewhere.
The second type is decadence which occurs by a persistently effective
dominance of the forces either of disruption or, in certain cases at least,
of cultural suppression, e.g., puritanism. (Decadence and creativity in
science is a special case; for science is especially dangerous to the status
quo;
hence most intellectual orientations, whether religious or [as in the
case of Confucianism] esthetic, are anti-scientific. Hence science can
flourish only when the power of the intellectual status quo is somehow in
abeyance. Art also is a special case from the point of view of flourishing
and decline, for [apart from iconoclasms which hit only certain media] it
is always in demand and hence has a way of chronically being at high
levels,
subject only to internal developments of particular tastes coming
gradually to climax and then becoming overripe. Hence to judge general
decadence or flowering by either science or art is very dangerous.)
Where growth is not functioning at best is decadence; where growth
does not make up for loss is decline. What is called decadent includes:
(a) in art and religion, the corruption of taste by accustomment to special-
ized highly developed standards, features whereof will be falsely exag-
gerated to produce a seeming freshness; (b) in political institutions, cor-
ruption of judgment by dependence on established patterns of power
rather than the inherent sources of it; (c) in economic life, decline of
enterprise in favor of security, but on an enterprise level (as versus
primitive); (d) in intellectual life, dependence on past masters rather