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The pact with Byzantium remained the backbone of Amalric’s foreign pol-
icy even though he placed increasing strains upon it. But in its shadow, and
protected by it on his northern flank, he embarked on an ambitious policy to
conquer Egypt. The door had been opened by the conquest of Ascalon but
the lure had always been there because Egypt, under the last Fatimid caliphs,
was politically weak and in the grip of competing viziers and corrupt Coptic
bureaucrats. It was, however, a country rich through trade and productivity: in
1168 it was seriously believed that the grant of the city of Bilbais and its contado
would provide the Knights Hospitallers with annual revenues of 100,000 gold
pieces. Since 1156 King Baldwin III had taken a hard line, trying to hit the
Fatimid navy by enforcing an embargo on shipbuilding materials and in 1159
he had discussed the conquest of Egypt with the Byzantine emperor.
Butitwas Amalric who seriously attacked Egypt. He invaded the country in
1163, 1164, 1167, 1168 and 1169. This aggressive policy, together with the internal
weakness of Egypt, was bound to attract Nur al-Din’s attention, and he sent
troops to Egypt. In 1164 he also put the pressure on Amalric by launching, in
spite of the pax Byzantina,ashort but dangerous campaign against Antioch
and Tripoli, capturing the rulers of both. Raymond III of Tripoli (1152–87)
remained in prison for ten years while King Amalric took over his county as
regent. Worse than this, Nur al-Din reconquered Banyas at the same time.
This caused the Franks a profound shock and it forced Amalric out of Egypt.
In 1167 he was obliged to return to the Nile to offset the effects of another army
which Nur al-Din had sent there. He and his Egyptian allies forced the Syrian
army to leave the country and a Frankish garrison was installed in Cairo to
supervise the collection of an enormous annual tribute to be paid to Jerusalem.
But Amalric was not satisfied. He now planned to conquer Egypt with
Byzantine help and strengthened his alliance by marrying a great-niece of Em-
peror Manuel immediately after the campaign of 1167.In1168 a formal treaty
on the conquest of Egypt was concluded. Byzantium was to provide the naval
support indispensable for blockading the Nile delta. But a war party persuaded
the king to commence the camapaign prematurely without Byzantium. Syria
and Egypt now formed a common front. Nur al-Din’s Kurdish general Shirkuh
made himself vizier of Egypt and, after his death in 1169, was succeeded in this
post by his nephew Saladin, the fifth vizier in only six years. Saladin came
from a Kurdish military family in Nur al-Din’s service and was to become the
founder of the great dynasty of the Ayyubids. He was obliged to bide his time
as master of Egypt under Nur al-Din’s formal overlordship even after he had
abolished the Shi‘ite caliphate of the Fatimids in 1171.
By that time he had beaten off Amalric’s last assault on Egypt in 1169, this
time launched against Damietta with the active support of a Byzantine fleet.
The understanding was that, in the event of a conquest, Jerusalem would
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