Lieven D. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Reform, war and revolution

were delivering substantial quantities of guns and ammunition. The situation

recovered sufﬁciently that by June 1916, Russia was actually able to ﬁght and

win a major offensive on the Habsburg section of the front. The offensive led

to nearly a million Austrian casualties and prisoners and forced Germany to

send reinforcements to save the Habsburg army from complete collapse. On

the eve of February 1917, the Russian army was holding the line. Russia was

certainly not losing the war in a military sense. But inﬂation and the distorted

grain market contributed both to the general level of discontent and to the

key precipitant cause of the revolution: bread lines in Petrograd.

The rapidity of the wartime industrial expansion caused wrenching social

changes. The rapid increases in production by the urban defence industry led

to a massive inﬂux of peasants to the cities, increasing the urban population by

as much as 6 million by 1917. The institutions and infrastructure of the cities,

which could barely cope with the rapid growth of the pre-war years, were

simply overwhelmed. In this hothouse growth of the industrial workforce,

women entered the workplace in large numbers, breaking down old gender

norms. The proportion of women in industry rose from 27 per cent in 1914

to 43 per cent in 1917.

In the drive to produce military supplies, the rapidly

growing workforce toiled in a dangerous environment where accidents were

frequent and long hours the norm. Moreover, shortages of skilled labour

and the impossibility of slowing production put many of the most politically

active skilled workers in a relatively strong bargaining position. With ofﬁcial

recognitionon the warindustry councils, the skilled workers of Petrograd were

in some measure empowered by war conditions. They played an important

role in the February crisis by taking control of the working class Viborg district

on the twenty-ﬁfth,then engaging in a general strike and crossing over from the

working districts to take over the central avenues and squares of the capital.

The election of worker councils on 27 and 28 February created a political

alternative to the old regime and pressed the Duma leaders to form their own

government. But it was the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison which was the

turning point in the revolution.

The Petrograd garrison and its mutiny

Why did the Petrograd garrison refuse to follow orders to suppress the demon-

strations and strikes? The problem was not a lack of troops. Therewere roughly

9 J. McDermid and A. Hillyar, Midwives of Revolution: Female Bolsheviks and Women Workers

in 1917 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), p. 128.

662

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

War and revolution, 1914–1917

180,000 men in Petrograd itself and another 150,000 in the suburbs. In fact, these

large numbers were part of the problem. The Russian reserve system used Pet-

rograd and other cities as places to keep troops before sending them to the

front. So rather than a manageable force with some preparation for civilian

duty, the barracks housed a massive number of some of the least reliable troops

in the entire army. Many were new recruits who had almost no training. This

reﬂected larger problems with the military as a whole that were building up as

the war ground on. Attrition rates for trained ofﬁcers and soldiers were high.

By the end of 1916, of nearly 15 million men who served in the army, over 2

million had been taken prisoner, over 1.5 million had died and 2 million were

seriously ill or injured for a total of 5.5 million casualties.

The pointlessness of

the endless slaughter makes it perhaps more incumbent upon the historian to

explain why mutiny and rebellion did not occur sooner rather than to explain

why it occurred when it did.

By 1916 the regime was increasingly desperate for new bodies for the army.

Among other things, it abolished exemptions for primary breadwinners; these

recruits tended to resent their obligation to serve and were more outspoken

than the young. Exemptions previously granted to minorities also came under

pressure.Most dramatically, theKyrgyzin Central Asia rosein a major rebellion

to resist their induction in 1916. In the military campaign to suppress the

rebellion, thousands were killed. The difﬁculty in ﬁnding reliable men to

draft into the army by late 1916 was a problem for the whole army but was

particularly acute for the Petrograd garrison, wherethe Russian reserve system

left the least trained and least reliable recent recruits. The Petrograd garrison

included disproportionate numbers of convalescent soldiers recovering from

injuries and expecting to be forced to return to the front, primary breadwinners

and even Petrograd workers whohad lost their draft exemptionsas punishment

for participation in strikes.

Even so, it would be somewhat misleading simply to attribute the causes

of the participation of soldiers from the garrison in the revolution to anti-war

sentiments. For one thing, many studies of soldier loyalties have found that

the key to explaining their behaviour lay in the dynamics of the primary unit.

This is a powerful explanation for the occurrence of the ﬁrst major mutiny in

the Russian army well behind the front, where the sense of abandoning fellow

10 A. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, vol. I: The Old Army and the Soldiers’

Revolt (March–April 1917) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 95.

11 J. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics,

1905–1925 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Wildman, The End of the

Russian Imperial Army,p.157.

663

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Reform, war and revolution

soldiers was less direct. Likewise, the mutiny spread most rapidly to sailors

of the Baltic ﬂeet (in particular to the crews of the larger warships) – that is,

to groups that had not seen action in the war. Police and army reports on

the mood of the soldiers often reveal that they expressed their opposition to

the tsar and regime along with hatred of the enemy. Among the troops, the

notion that the tsar and his government had become the main impediments to

the war effort became widespread. This idea took ribald form in the barracks,

where rumours ran wild about treason at court and among generals with

German names. Respect for the tsar disintegrated so thoroughly by February

1917 that patriotism and mutiny no longer seemed mutually incompatible for

many rank-and-ﬁle soldiers.

The army command and the February Revolution

Patriotic motives of course much less equivocally lay at the core of an expla-

nation of the actions of the army commanders during the February crisis. At

the crucial moment on 1 March, the commander-in-chief of the army, M. V.

Alekseev, ordered General Ivanov to halt his march on Petrograd to put down

the mutiny, then tried to convince the tsar to abdicate. When the tsar did not

immediately agree, Alekseev sent his crucial telegram to all the major mili-

tary front commanders asking their opinion on the future of the monarchy.

The responses came quickly and unanimously argued that Nicholas should

abdicate to save the nation and the war effort. In part, Alekseev and the other

generals fearedthat sending frontline troops against the Petrogradgarrison and

civilians in the Petrograd streets would risk rapidly spreading the revolution to

the army at the front. But the uniﬁed reaction of the army commanders was

also the result of the powerful notion that had long been promoted among

military reformers that modern wars could only be won by truly national

citizen armies.

Some of the key generals – most importantly General Ruzskii, who was

with the tsar on the day of the abdication – had come to believe that the tsar

stood in the way of a successful national mobilisation against the enemy well

before the February crisis. A key event in the development of this outlook had

been the March 1916 removal of the popular war minister A. A. Polivanov,

who had worked closely with the Union of Cities and Towns (Zemgor), War

Industries Councils, and nationalist moderates and liberals. Discussions among

military and opposition civilian leaders about the possibility of a coup d’etat

had begun in earnest already in late 1916. The army command had come to

see the tsar and the nation as separate, and even in opposition. As one of the

664

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

War and revolution, 1914–1917

most important generals, A. A. Brusilov, the hero of the successful summer

1916 offensive, reportedly said: ‘if it comes to a choice between the tsar and

Russia, I will take Russia’.

The formation of the Progressive Bloc and

the Provisional Government

One reason the generals thought such a choice could be made in the middle of

the war was that a broad-based political opposition that supported the war had

ﬁrmly established itself as an alternative to the tsar. The crucial turning point in

the rise of the political opposition was the abandonment of the ‘internal peace’

(the pledge of most political and nationality parties to stop all oppositional

activities and to stand ﬁrmly in support of the tsar) and the creation of a united

opposition to the government in the form of the ‘Progressive Bloc’, a broad

coalition of parties in the Duma.

This in turn was a direct result of the German decision to launch a major

offensive against Russia in the spring of 1915 in an attempt to force Russian

capitulation. Taken by surprise, outnumbered and vastly outgunned, the Rus-

sian armies suffered defeat after defeat, retreating in rapid order from April

to September 1915 until most of previously occupied Austrian Galicia, all of

Russian Poland, Lithuania and much of Latvia had been lost. This ‘Great

Retreat’ had enormous implications for domestic politics. First, it caused a

massive wave of refugees to ﬂee the front zones for the Russian interior. Esti-

mates vary widely but likely exceeded 6 million civilians during the war.

The

refugee crisis was greatly exacerbated by the military command, which had

nearly unlimited powers over civilian affairs in a massive zone declared under

military rule. While many refugees left of their own volition, the army also

conducted targeted mass expulsions of at least a million civilian Jews, Germans

and foreigners. Brieﬂy in the summer of 1915 the army turned to a disastrous

‘scorched-earth’ policy that included driving the entire civilian population of

certain regions to the interior. The army did little to stop a wave of dozens

of violent pogroms against Jews in the front zones primarily instigated by

Cossack army units with substantial participation of local populations. These

policies stirred up ethnic tensions both in the predominantly non-Russian areas

of refugee creation near the front and in the internal provinces inundated by

millions of impoverished displaced people. Not only did inter-ethnic tensions

12 Golder, Documents of Russian History,pp.116–17.

13 P. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 212.

665

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Reform, war and revolution

often run high between refugees and native populations, but the refugees put

an enormous ﬁnancial and administrative strain on local governments and

administrations throughout the country.

The retreat also caused a great wave of popular anger. The press – on all

sides of the political spectrum – turned much more critical of the government.

The defeats at the front were in part caused by shortages of key weaponry, and

industrialists and Duma members alike began to call on the government to

do more to organise and stimulate defence production – above all, to include

society more closely in the process. In early June, the tsar made a series of key

concessions, replacing conservatives in the Council of Ministers with moder-

ates who were more willing to work with society. In July, the Duma reopened

to a series of blistering speeches attacking the government for incompetence

in its prosecution of the war. Behind the scenes, negotiations began for the

formation of a broad national coalition of parties to form a political opposi-

tion. This opposition united nearly three-quarters of the Duma membership

in the Progressive Bloc, with representatives from moderate socialists on the

left to Russian nationalists on the right. The Progressive Bloc renewed many

of the liberal demands of 1905, demanding more powers for the Duma, more

legal limitations on the state and military’s extraordinary wartime powers in

civilian affairs, amnesty for political prisoners, and full equality before the law

for all religious and national groups.

The programme was classically liberal, and it expressed the growing sense

that the tsar and his government stood in the way of a successful war effort.

Only the granting of full civic equality and rights, and the granting of a fully

representative government could inspire society and the army to mobilise

with true enthusiasm and patriotism for the war effort. Nothing was more

instructive of this underlying notion than the negotiations between the noto-

rious right-wing Russian nationalist leader Vasilii Shulgin and Pavel Miliukov,

leader of the radical liberal Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party during

the formation of the Progressive Bloc. As Shulgin recalls, he had been deeply

suspicious of Miliukov, whom he regarded as an unpatriotic political opponent

until he heard Miliukov’s ardently patriotic logic based on the idea that only a

truly national effort that included society could bring victory.

If anything, the

leader of the socialist Trudovik faction, Aleksandr Kerenskii (later the head of

the Provisional Government), was an even stronger proponent of these ideas

than Miliukov.

14 V. V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906–1917 (New York:

Hippocrene, 1984), pp. 241–5.

666

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

War and revolution, 1914–1917

These moves were followed in the summer of 1915 by the creation of spe-

cial councils with ofﬁcials, private entrepreneurs and Duma deputies to deal

with the economic crisis and co-ordinate national responses to the war effort.

Four special councils – on transport, fuel, grain and, most importantly, war-

industry – were created. The war councils included representatives of elected

municipal and local government, from private industry, and even worker rep-

resentatives. It was an important concession to the demands of liberals for a

truly national war effort in which society had a signiﬁcant role to play. The

councils made signiﬁcant contributions to turning around the dire situation

in defence production.

At the same time, the government ﬁnally dropped its opposition to the

formation of a national association to represent local elected bodies, allowing

the All-Russian Union of Zemstvo and Municipal Councils (Zemgor) to form.

Zemgor took on such tasks as caring for the welfare and needs of the massive

wave of refugees that appeared in internal provinces and providing aid and

nursing for convalescent soldiers. The special councils and Zemgor together

not only helped bring thousands of employees and volunteers directly into

the war effort but also gave the leaders of both these national organisations

leadership experience and national recognition. They also worked in close co-

operation with some of the more progressive branches of the administration

such as the food supply administration of the Ministry of Agriculture, assuming

what one historian has called ‘parastatal’ functions.

In some measure, liberal

society was simply taking over the state.

In 1905 the tsar granted constitutional concessions and appointed strong

and competent ministers who accepted the new political realities. Ten years

later, the tsar turned in the opposite direction. When the crisis of the German

offensive passed, Nicholas misread it as the passing of the larger political crisis.

His ﬁrst move was to take personal command of the army in August 1915. His

ministers saw this as a potential disaster. Not only would it create a power

vacuum in the capital which they rightly feared might be ﬁlled by Alexandra

and her favourite Rasputin, but they also saw the replacement of the popular

Grand Duke Nicholas with the tsar – who had no real military qualiﬁcations

for the post – as a move that would directly tie the fate and legitimacy of the

monarchy itself to the fortunes of war. But they were unable to convince him

to rethink his decision. Within months, the tsar had replaced the competent

ministers that he had appointed in June with reactionaries who had no ties

to liberal society – perhaps as a result of Empress Alexandra’s prodding on

15 Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution,pp.12–46.

667

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Reform, war and revolution

behalf of Rasputin.

The most signiﬁcant change was the replacement of the

reasonable N. B. Shcherbatov as minister of interior with Khvostov, leader of

the radical Right faction in the Duma, a chauvinist who used every chance to

expound on his paranoiac conspiracy theories of Jewish, German and foreign

domination of Russians. His repressive policies did much to undermine any

remaining spirit of co-operation between the government and society. From

late 1915 to February 1917, conﬂict between the government and society grew

more and more intense.

Respect for the tsar continued to decline throughout the following year.

Rumours spread throughout society about the pernicious inﬂuence and even

defeatist or treasonous inclinations of Empress Alexandra and Rasputin, along

with ministers and generals with German names. The tsar’s rule had always

depended to a certain degree upon the respect and dignity of his title and

person. By late 1916, the tsar and court had become a laughing-stock. While

no solid evidence of treason or even probes for a separate peace by Alexandra,

Rasputin or others at court has surfaced, it is clear that they inﬂuenced min-

isterial appointments from late 1915 through the end of 1916 and successfully

pushed the wavering tsar to abandon competent moderate ministers willing

to work with Zemgor, the War Industries Councils and the Progressive Bloc.

The rumours about Alexandra and Rasputin help to explain the sensational

response to Miliukov’s speech in the Duma in November 1916, in which he

directly accused the government of treason. Shortly thereafter, political actors

of all persuasions began to take increasingly radical steps against the monarchy

in the name of the nation and the war effort. Symbolic of this turn wasthe assas-

sination of Rasputin by the leader of the extreme Right in the Duma, Vladimir

Purishkevich, with the assistance of two relatives of the tsar: F. F. Iusupov and

the Grand Duke Dmitrii Pavlovich. By the end of 1916, the monarchy had

become fully discredited among liberal and conservative elites alike. At the

same time, quasi-governmental organisations headed by liberal politicians had

gradually taken over many key elements of the domestic war effort. This dual

process – disintegration at the top and the coalescence of opposition from

below – drove the politics of the February Revolution and made possible the

decisive third step in the revolution, from mutiny to regime change.

The regime change itself was the single most important cause of the series

of events that led to the disintegration of the state and the army, the agrarian

revolution and the emergence of minority nationalist movements. With the

loss of the tsar as the symbolic centre of authority and loyalty, little held the

16 Golder, Documents of Russian History,pp.227–33.

668

War and revolution, 1914–1917

empire together. In creating the new government, the Duma leaders accepted

a list of strict conditions imposed upon them by the leaders of the executive

committee of the Petrograd Soviet. This compromise dissolved the police

and declared elections to positions in local government. This undermined the

two most important remaining pillars of authority, the administration and

the police. Order No. 1, issued by the Petrograd Soviet on 1 March, called for

elections of soldier councils throughout the army and contributed directly to

the collapse of authority among army ofﬁcers. The collapse of the army and

the bureaucracy was a complex process that continued through the end of

1917. The disintegration of authority facilitated the agrarian revolution, which

swept the land during that year as peasants ﬂooded back to the villages from

the army and the city to participate in the expropriation of lands belonging to

individual proprietors, gentry and the Church, and then reabsorb them into

the commune, which rapidly reasserted its dominance over the countryside.

But the war not only led to the collapse of state authority. As in other

countries, it also brought an expansion of the state’s activities, in many ways

paving the way for the revolutionaries’ attempts to transform and shape the

population, to watch overit, to cull it of enemies and to manage it more actively.

For example, the politics of nationalising both rural and urban property got

well under way during the war. The army used its broad powers to requisition,

sequester and simply conﬁscate land, grain, horses and machinery and the

civilian government enacted a set of measures to nationalise both lands and

businesses belonging to enemy minorities. Likewise, as part of its wartime

economic policy, the regime – with the support of public bodies – attempted

to overcome ‘middlemen’ in the grain trade, and in effect the entire domestic

grain market. The old regime ended up conducting a massive experiment

in a state-administered grain monopoly replete with coercive measures to

force grain delivery to the state. These measures can be seen as the ﬁrst

steps in a vicious cycle of increasingly violent interventions in the countryside

that continued through the revolutionary era. The First World War not only

brought the end of the Russian monarchy but also began the revolutionary

creation of a new regime.

669

Bibliography

1. primary sources: collected documents,

official histories, anthologies and

directories

Adres-kalendar’. Obshchaia rospis’ nachal’stvuiushchikh i prochikh dolzhnostnykh lits, 135 vols.

(St Petersburg: 1765–96; 1802–1916).

Adrianov, S. A., Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del. Istoricheskii ocherk 1802–1902 (St Petersburg,

1901).

Afanasiev, A., Russian Fairy Tales Collected by Aleksandr Afanasiev (New York: Pantheon,

1945).

Arkhiv gosudarstvennogo soveta, 5 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. II otd., 1869–1904).

Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossisskoi imperii (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1995).

Bartenev, P. (ed.), Arkhiv kniaz’ia Vorontsova, 40 vols. (Moscow, 1870–95).

Bezotosnyi, V. M. (ed.), Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda. Entsiklopediia (Moscow: Rosspen,

2004).

Bil’basov, V. A. (ed.), Arkhiv grafov Mordvinovykh, 10 vols. (St Petersburg, 1901–3).

Edie, J., Scanlan, J.P.,and Zeldin M.-B. (eds.) RussianPhilosophy, 2 vols. (Chicago: Quadrangle

Books, 1965).

Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’. Brokgauz i Efron, 43 vols. (St Petersburg: Brokgauz and Efron,

1890–1906).

Fondy Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo voenno-istoricheskogo arkhiva. Kratkii spravochnik (Moscow:

Rosspen, 2001).

Golubstov, S. A. (ed.), Pugachevshchina, 3 vols. (Moscow: Tsentrarkhiv, 1926–31).

Gosudarstvennaia duma. Stenograﬁcheskie otchoty, 1906–1916, 4 sessions (St Petersburg,

1906–17).

Gosudarstvennyi sovet. Stenograﬁcheskie otchoty, 1906–16, 4 sessions (St Petersburg, 1906–16).

Istoriia Pravitel’stvuiushchego Senata za dvesti let. 1711–1911, 5 vols. (St Petersburg: Senatskaia

tip. 1911).

Ivanov, I. S. (ed.), Ocherki istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh del Rossii, 3 vols. (Moscow: OLMA

Press, 2002).

Katorga i ssylka, 115 vols. (Moscow: Obshchestvo byvshikh politicheskikh katorzhan,

1921–35).

670

Bibliography

Kelly, C. (ed. and tr.), An Anthology of Russian Women’s Writing, 1777–1 992 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1994).

Korkunov, N. M., Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo, 2 vols. (St Petersburg: Tsinzerling, 1909).

Krasnyi Arkhiv, 106 vols. (Moscow: Tsentrarkhiv, 1922–41).

Leatherbarrow, W., and Offord, D. (eds.), A Documentary History of Russian Thought from the

Enlightenment to Marxism (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1987).

Martens, F., Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennikh Rossiei i inostrannymi derzhavami,

15 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. ministerstva put’ei soobshchenniia, 1874–1909).

Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vre-

mennogo pravitel’stv, 1878–1917, 2nd series, 6 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad: Gospolitiz-

dat, 1938–40).

Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vre-

mennogo pravitel’stv, 1878–1917, 3rd series, 10 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad: Gos.

sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izd., 1931–8).

Ministerstvo ﬁnansov. 1802–1902, 2 vols. (St Petersburg: Expeditsiia zagotovleniia gos. bumag,

1902).

Ministerstvo iustitsii za sto let. 1802–1902. Istoricheskii ocherk (St Petersburg: Senatskaia tip.,

1902)

Mironenko, S. V., and Freeze, G. (eds.), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Putevodi-

tel’. Fondy Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Rossiiskoi Federatsii po istorii Rossii XIX–nachala XX

vv., vol. I (Moscow: Blagovest, 1994).

Padenie tsarskogo rezhima. Stenograﬁcheskie otchoty doprosov i pokazanii, 7 vols. (Leningrad:

Gos. izd., 1925).

Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897g. (St Petersburg, 1897–1905).

Pis’ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikogo, 11 vols.: vols. I–VII (St Petersburg: Gos. tip., 1887–

1918); vols. VIII–XI (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1948–64).

Pol’noe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 1st series, 45 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. II otd., 1830).

Pol’noe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 2nd series, 55 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. II otd.,

1830–84).

Pol’noe sobranie zakonov, 3rd series, 33 vols. (St Petersburg: Senatskaia tip., 1885–1917).

Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia: Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’, in progress, 7 vols. to date

(Moscow: Tserkovno-nauchnyi tsentr ‘Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia’, 1998–).

Prilozheniia k trudam redaktsionnykh komissii dlia sostavleniia polozhenii o krest’ianakh, vykho-

diashchikh iz krepostnoi zavisimosti, 6 vols. (St Petersburg, 1860).

Pypin, A. (ed.), Sochineniia (Ekateriny II), 12 vols. (St Petersburg, 1901).

Rozhdestvenskii, S. V., Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia.

1802–1902 (St Petersburg: Izd. ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 1902).

RussianState Historical Archives:St Petersburg. Annotated Register (St Petersburg:Russian-Baltic

Information Center – Blitz, 1994).

Russkaia Starina, 175 vols. (St Petersburg: various publishers, 1870–1918).

Russkii Arkhiv (Moscow: Izd. P. Barteneva, 1863–1917).

Sbornik Imperatortskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, 148 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. M.

M. Stasiulevicha, 1867–1916).

Shilov, D., Gosudarstvennye deiateli Rossiiskoi imperii. 1802–1917 (St Petersburg: Dmitrii

Bulanin, 2001).

671