Knollenberg Bernhard. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775
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as indicated in the opening record of the Congress, quoted above, was
selected.²⁵ The Hall had the advantage of “an excellent Library, a long
Entry where Gentlemen may walk, and a convenient Chamber oppo-
site to the Library.”²⁶ But, according to Deane, it really was chosen over
the Assembly Chamber, which was “evidently the best place,” only out
of pique against Galloway for having secured the exclusion of Charles
Thomson, “the Sam Adams of Philadelphia,”²⁷ from the colony’s dele-
gation to the Congress.²⁸
The convention promptly voted to call itself “the Congress”²⁹ and
apparently to call its presiding officer “President,” not “the President.”³⁰
Lynch nominated Randolph, long Speaker of the Virginia House, for
this office and Thomson, though not a member of the Congress, for
Secretary, and both were chosen.³¹
The New York delegates, the peculiarity of whose election was de-
scribed in Chapter , were readily accepted as representing the colony
as a whole,³² and a couple of points of procedure were also promptly de-
cided,³³ apparently without debate. There also seems to have been little
difficulty in deciding that the voting should be by colonies and not
by individual members.³⁴ Indeed, since there was no limitation on the
number of delegates each colony might send, a vote by individual mem-
bers would have been almost unthinkable. But the question whether
each colony should have a single vote or whether some should have
more than one vote on the basis of population,³⁵ property value, or a
combination of the two, was warmly debated.
Patrick Henry of Virginia, most populous of the colonies, declared
that “it would be a great injustice if a little Colony should have the same
weight in the councils of America as a great one,” and argued that each
should have a number of votes “in proportion to its opulence and num-
ber of inhabitants, its exports and imports,”³⁶ slaves to be excluded in
computing population.³⁷ Harrison of Virginia also “insisted strongly on
the injustice that Virginia should have no greater Weight...than one
of the smallest colonies,” but apparently did not indicate any proposed
basis for apportionment.³⁸ Lynch of South Carolina also favored pro-
portionate voting, yet he maintained that apportionment should be
based on “a compound of numbers and property,”³⁹ presumably with
the inclusion of slaves in the estimate either of numbers or of property.
:
Sullivan of New Hampshire, one of the least populous of the colo-
nies, insisted that each colony should have the same vote, since “a little
Colony had its all at stake as well as a great one,” and was supported by
delegates from two of the other small colonies, Samuel Ward of Rhode
Island and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina.⁴⁰
The delegates from Massachusetts, second most populous of the col-
onies, wisely remained silent throughout the debate on this potentially
explosive question of representation.⁴¹ The peculiar situation of “our
embassy,” as John Adams aptly described the Massachusetts delegation,
was summed up in letters from him to his wife and to his law associate,
William Tudor, stating: “We have a delicate course to steer between too
much activity and too much insensibility in our critical, interested [i.e.,
self-interested] situation.”⁴² “We have been obliged to act with great
delicacy and caution,...to keep ourselves out of sight...,to insinu-
ate our sentiments, designs and desires by means of other persons, some-
times of one province, and sometimes of another.”⁴³
The question of voting was settled in favor of the small colonies
when Lee and Bland of Virginia conceded that the Congress did not
have at hand the materials to work out a just method of proportion-
ate voting.⁴⁴ However, the resolution that “each Colony or Province⁴⁵
shall have one Vote” was qualified by adding “the Congress not being
possess’d of, or at present able to procure proper materials for ascertain-
ing the importance of each colony,”⁴⁶ to provide against the resolution
being “drawn into precedent in future.”⁴⁷ (This initial victory of the small
colonies, nevertheless, was indicative of decisions to come: the draft of
the Articles of Confederation submitted to the Second Continental
Congress in and the Articles finally adopted by the Congress in
provided that “each State shall have one vote.”⁴⁸
Curiously, the question of whether a bare majority of the partici-
pating colonies should suffice to bind the whole
—one of the most con-
troversial in formulating the Articles of Confederation adopted by the
Second Continental Congress
—was decided in the affirmative, appar-
ently without controversy.⁴⁹
The receipt on September of an erroneous report of the British
having cannonaded Boston and killed six of its inhabitants⁵⁰ prompted
a motion that the Congress be opened the next morning with prayer.
This led briefly to a threat of a division along ecclesiastical lines, which
happily was averted by a motion by Congregationalist Samuel Adams
that the Congress be opened the next morning (September ) with
prayer by the Reverend Jacob Duché, a Church of England clergyman.
The motion was adopted,⁵¹ and Duché read the lesson of the day and
prayed most acceptably.⁵²
The first item of business adopted by the Congress was the estab-
lishment on September of a committee,⁵³ hereafter referred to as the
Committee on Rights, composed of two members from each colony,⁵⁴
“to State the rights of the Colonies in general, the several instances in
which these rights are violated or infringed, and the means most proper
to be pursued for obtaining a restoration of them.”⁵⁵
On September the Congress took action, described in Chap-
ter , on the famous “Suffolk Resolves,” adopted at a meeting of dele-
gates from towns in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, of which Boston was
the county seat.⁵⁶
A few days later (September ), the Congress took another important
step by resolving unanimously “to request the Merchants and others in
the several colonies, not to send to Great Britain, any orders for goods,
and to direct the execution of all orders already sent, to be delayed or
suspended until the sense of the Congress on the means to be taken for
the preservation of the liberties of America is made public,”⁵⁷ and on
September , took up a motion by Lee for “a non-importation.”⁵⁸
Galloway, who was opposed to a non-importation agreement,⁵⁹ ap-
parently had hoped to form a party in the Congress of members from
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania strong enough to stave off the
adoption of such an agreement until other efforts to secure relief were
tried. But by the time the Congress met, he had lost hope of this,⁶⁰ the
recent news of the King’s assent to the Quebec Act⁶¹ having convinced
even the most cautious or conservative Whigs that measures other than
mere petitioning were needed. Joseph Reed of Philadelphia wrote Lord
Dartmouth on September that on receipt of this news “those delib-
erate measures of petitioning previous to opposition were laid aside as
inadequate to the apprehended mischief and danger,” and, on the fol-
lowing day, he wrote his brother-in-law, Denny De Berdt, “No man
dares open his mouth against non-importation.”⁶² Another prominent
:
Philadelphian, James Allen, wrote Ralph Izard in similar vein. The
Quebec Act, revealing an “inveterate design of subjugating America,”
had, Izard said, “aroused the most inattentive and given us but one
mind.”⁶³
It is therefore not surprising that, so far as is known, not a single del-
egate now spoke in opposition to Lee’s motion for non-importation.
Debate apparently was confined to three questions: what the effec-
tive date should be; should reference be to the time of shipment or to
the time of arrival
—in either case, what should be the cut-off date; and
whether or not the non-importation agreement should include articles,
such as molasses from the West Indies, not imported from Great Britain
or Ireland but subject to British duties on importation into the colonies.
Bland proposed that the effective date be fixed with reference to
when the goods were shipped rather than when they arrived “because
a ship may have a long Voyage,” i.e., goods shipped well before non-
importation was generally thought of might be penalized because of an
unforeseeable long passage of the carrying vessel. But Gadsden and Lee
objected to this and favored time of arrival because the other would in-
vite fraudulent antedating of invoices, and this view prevailed.⁶⁴
As to the date for the cut-off, Mifflin favored November , , and
Cushing and Edward Rutledge an immediate one.⁶⁵ But, in spite of the
fact that the Virginia convention had proposed November , Henry
spoke in favor of December , and his view prevailed.⁶⁶
Mifflin next proposed that the ban on importation be extended to
all “dutied articles” even if not exported from Great Britain or Ire-
land,⁶⁷ but his proposal on this point also failed.
The resolution adopted unanimously September states: “That
from and after the first day of December next, there be no importation
into British America from Great Britain or Ireland, of any goods, wares
or merchandizes whatsoever, or from any other place, of any such goods,
wares or merchandizes, as shall have been exported from Great-Britain
or Ireland; and that no such goods, wares or merchandizes imported af-
ter the said first day of December next, be used or purchased.”⁶⁸
This resolution, it will be observed, went further than the instruc-
tions to the delegates for a non-importation agreement (discussed in
Chapter ) in that it included Ireland as well as Great Britain.⁶⁹ Since
many members of Parliament had large land holdings or other eco-
nomic stakes in Ireland, the Congress doubtless reasoned that includ-
ing imports from Ireland in the ban would put additional pressure on
members of Parliament to grant the colonists’ demands.
The resolution, it will be noted, also included a ban on the “use or
purchase of goods,” as well as on their importation, thus envisaging di-
rect participation in the boycott not only by importing merchants and
planters as in the non-importation agreements of –, but by
every one in the colonies.⁷⁰
The day following adoption of this non-importation and non-
consumption resolution, Galloway moved the adoption of a resolution:
“That the Congress will apply to his Majesty for a redress of grievances
under which his faithful subjects in America labour;...and, as the
Colonies from their local circumstances cannot be represented in the
Parliament of Great-Britain, they will humbly propose to his Majesty
and his two Houses of Parliament, the following plan under which the
strength of the whole Empire may be drawn together on any emer-
gency, the interest of both countries advanced, and the rights and lib-
erties of America secured.”⁷¹
The Congress voted (September ) that the plan (which is outlined
and discussed in an appendix to this chapter) be “considered, not com-
mitted, but ordered to lie on the table,” and, a few weeks later, voted
that it be “dismissed.”⁷²
Two days after Galloway presented his plan, the Congress resolved,
over his strong opposition,⁷³ “That from and after the th day of
September , the exportation of all merchandize and every commod-
ity whatsoever to Great Britain, Ireland and the West Indies, ought
to cease, unless the grievances of America are redressed before that
time.”⁷⁴
Inclusion of Ireland and the British West Indies in the non-
exportation boycott can be readily explained on the same ground as the
inclusion of Ireland in the non-importation agreement, namely, to put
economic pressure on members of Parliament having economic inter-
ests in Ireland and the British West Indies. Inclusion of the foreign West
Indies in the boycott presumably was prompted by the known ease with
which the ban on exports to the British West Indies could be evaded by
:
ostensibly clearing for a foreign island and actually unloading in one of
the British.
Gadsden and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina and Cushing of
Massachusetts spoke in favor of having the non-exportation agreement
take effect without delay;⁷⁵ but, as shown by the provision for deferment
in the resolution, their view was not adopted. The long deferment of
the date for banning exportation presumably was due to instructions to
the delegates of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina as to the non-
exportation of tobacco, described in Chapter .⁷⁶
Unlike the resolution for non-importation, the non-exportation res-
olution was not passed unanimously,⁷⁷ but no evidence has been found
as to which colony or colonies did not approve it and whether disap-
proval was manifested by a negative vote or by not voting at all.⁷⁸
To increase the pressure on British merchants and manufacturers to
secure the redress of colonial grievances, Gadsden of South Carolina
moved that “from & after the th September no remittances to
be made to G. Brittain”; he was supported by Ward of Rhode Island
and Ross of Pennsylvania. But the motion was opposed by Edward Rut-
ledge and Galloway and was voted down without a dissenting voice.⁷⁹
Thus, by the end of September, the Congress had taken one of the
most important of its steps. Redress was to be sought by putting a stop,
beginning December , , to the importation into the colonies rep-
resented at the Congress of all goods from Great Britain or Ireland; to
the consumption of any such goods imported after that date; and to the
exportation, beginning September , , of all products of these col-
onies to Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies.
STATEMENT OF GRIEVANCES
AND APPROVAL OF THE
SUFFOLK RESOLVES
T
C for the Statement of Rights did not submit its
draft to the Congress until September , and the latter had the
statement under consideration for over three weeks before adopting it,
after amendment, on October .¹
Judging from John Adams’ acid comments, the extreme delay in the
submission and adoption of this basic state paper was due chiefly to
immoderate speechmaking, both in the committee, of which he was a
member, and on the floor of the Congress. The complaint in his diary,
October , that “The Deliberations of the Congress are spun out to an
immeasurable Length. There is so much Wit, Sense, Learning, Acute-
ness, Subtilty, Eloquence, etc. among fifty Gentlemen, each of whom
has been habituated to lead and guide in his own Province, that an
immensity of Time is spent unnecessarily,” is but one of several of this
character made by him.² His fellow New Englanders, Dyer and
Sherman of Connecticut, who spoke “often and long,...very heavily
and clumsily,”³ were, he indicates, among the worst offenders. But the
round of heavy eating and drinking that went on after hours,⁴ with its
inevitable consequence of fatigue and clouded brains, must have con-
tributed materially to the slow pace.
Washington’s diary records that he dined at a different house every
day but three from September to , and, even on one of these he was
a guest at what Paine of Massachusetts described as “a grand Dinner to
the Congress in the State House,” where “almost din’d at once.”⁵
Washington gives no details,⁶ but, thanks again to Adams’ diary, we get
a pretty good idea of what kind of dinners they were.
On September , Adams dined with a large company, including del-
egates McKean and Rodney of Delaware and Hopkins and Ward of
Rhode Island, at the home of Miers Fisher and his “pretty wife,” who,
with all her simple “Thee’s and Thou’s,” had provided a great variety of
tempting dishes
—“Ducks, Hams, Chickens, Beef, Pigg, Tarts, Creams,
Custards, Gellies, fools, Trifles, floating Islands”
—and “Beer, Porter,
Punch, Wine and a long Etc.”
The following evening, dining with delegates Goldsborough and
Johnson of Maryland at the home of Samuel Powell, Adams again
found “Everything which could delight the Eye or allure the Taste,
curds and Creams... sorts of Tarts, fools,⁷ Trifles,⁸ floating Islands,
whipped Sillabubs⁹ ...Parmesan Cheese, Punch, Wine, Porter, Beer
Etc. Etc.”¹⁰
Similar entries continue day after day. Indeed, even as late as Sep-
tember , Adams wrote of its still being part of the daily routine to dine
with some of “the Nobles of Pennsylvania at four O Clock and feast
upon ten thousand Delicacies, and sitt drinking Madeira, Claret and
Burgundy till six or seven and then go home, fatigued to death....”¹¹
But even had the delegates had clear heads and brevity of speech,
the preparation and adoption of the Statement of Rights would have
consumed much time. As the Connecticut delegation wrote in explain-
ing the unexpected length of their stay, “coming from remote colonies,
each of which has some modes of transacting publick business peculiar
to itself, some particular provincial rights and interests to guard and se-
cure, [we] must take some time to become acquainted with each one’s
situations and connexions, as to be able to give an united assent to the
ways and means for effecting, what all are desirious of.”¹²
The statement finally adopted¹³ declared that “by the immutable
laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the sev-
eral charters or compacts,” the colonists were “entitled to life, liberty
and property”; that “the foundation of English liberty, and of all free
government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative
council”; and that, since “the English colonists are not represented, and
from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly be repre-
sented in the British parliament,” they were “entitled to a free and ex-
clusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures” sub-
ject only to “the negative of their sovereign in such manner as had been
heretofore used and accustomed.”¹⁴
As foreshadowed by the instructions to delegates (discussed in Chap-
ter ), the grievances recited in the statement were all the British acts
levying duties for revenue in the colonies:¹⁵ the provisions of the Acts
of and restricting colonial trade and colonial currency (de-
scribed in Chapter of this book); the Acts of authorizing estab-
lishment of the American Customs Board (discussed in Chapters and
) and concerning writs of assistance (discussed in Chapter );¹⁶ the Act
of providing for establishment of colonial district courts of admi-
ralty and defining their jurisdiction (described in Chapter ); the Act
of providing for trial in England of persons accused of destroying
royal dockyards, ships, etc., in the colonies (referred to in Chapter );
and the Intolerable Acts of .¹⁷
The statement also recited as grievances the Crown’s abridging the
right of the colonists “to assemble, consider of their grievances and pe-
tition the King”; “keeping a Standing army in these colonies, in times
of peace, without the consent of the legislature of that colony in which
such army is kept”; and exercising “legislative power in several colonies
by a council appointed, during pleasure, by the crown.”¹⁸
The Delaware convention had recited as one of the colonial griev-
ances to be dealt with by the Congress “the several acts of the British
Parliament for restraining manufactures” in the colonies.¹⁹ Parliament’s
policy of restricting colonial manufacturing that threatened to compete
with British manufacturing doubtless would prove a source of extreme
friction when colonial manufacturing skills and natural resources should
become more fully developed. But the restrictions had as yet not seri-
ously troubled the colonies, and the Congress was, therefore, probably
wise in abstaining, as it did, from including the restriction of colonial
manufacturing in its recital of colonial grievances.
To secure redress of the recited grievances, the statement proposed
the following measures:
“st. To enter into a non-importation, non-consumption and non-
exportation agreement or association; . To prepare an address to the
people of Great-Britain, and a memorial to the inhabitants of British
America, etc.; . To prepare a loyal address to his Majesty....”²⁰
So far as is known from the meager evidence of the deliberations on
the statement, the members’ differences of opinion were confined chiefly,
if not exclusively, to two points: the ground or grounds on which the
claim of colonial rights should be based; and whether or not the state-
ment should include an acknowledgment of a limited authority of Par-
liament to regulate colonial trade.
On the first point, Lee favored grounding the colonial claim of rights
“on a fourfold foundation; on nature, on the British constitution, on
charters, and on immemorial usage.” Jay apparently argued that the
claim should be rested only on the first two bases. John Rutledge agreed
that the claim was “well founded on the British constitution,” but “not
on the law of nature”; and he was seconded by Duane, who favored
“grounding our rights on the laws and constitution of the country from
whence we spring, and charters, without recurring to the law of nature,
because this will be a feeble support.”²¹
As appears from the passage concerning colonial rights quoted
above, the decision was to base the claim of rights on “the immutable
laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the sev-
eral charters or compacts.”
The chief controversy seems to have been over the second point
—
what, if anything, should be said in the Statement of Rights concerning
Parliament’s regulation of colonial trade.
The evidence concerning this controversy, though confusing, indi-
cates that Duane was the leading proponent of some kind of recogni-
tion of Parliament’s authority to regulate colonial trade;²² that he made
a motion to this end;²³ and that his motion was lost by a tie vote, five to
five,²⁴ with the Massachusetts and Rhode Island delegations not voting
because equally divided.²⁵ (The line-up of the ten delegations that did
vote is obscure.)²⁶
The controversy was resolved (October ) through a compromise:
it was agreed to include a statement concerning Parliament’s regulation
of colonial trade but only to declare that “from the necessity of the case,
and a regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully con-
sent to the operation of such acts of the British parliament as are bona