Knollenberg Bernhard. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775
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of the New York Assembly took steps, even before the bill for the Re-
straining Act had finally passed, to comply with the Quartering Act.
The Assembly passed a bill which became law on June , “granting
unto His Majesty the Sum of Three thousand Pounds for furnishing
necessaries for the Troops Quartered within this Colony,” and ordering
the Treasurer of the colony to pay General Thomas Gage, Commander-
in-Chief of the British forces in North America, up to £, “to be ap-
plied for furnishing Necessaries for His Majesty’s Troops” quartered in
New York. This grant, fully covering the cost of all the supplies required
by the Quartering Act,⁹⁵ was held by the Crown’s chief legal advisers to
constitute compliance with the act.⁹⁶
Thus, the immediate controversy over the Quartering Act was qui-
eted, and, though several of the colonies other than New York⁹⁷ failed
from time to time to comply with the act,⁹⁸ it never again became a
leading issue, perhaps because the controversy over it was overshad-
owed by the Townshend Act of , to which we now turn.
THE TOWNSHEND ACT DUTIES
OF 1767
D
by the House of Commons in Jan-
uary, , of the estimated cost of maintaining the British army in
the colonies for the current year,¹ amounting to over £,,² George
Grenville, one of the leaders of the Opposition, moved “That the troops
to be kept up in America shou’d be Paid by the Colonies respectively for
whose defence & benefit they were Employ’d.”³ The motion was over-
whelmingly defeated ( to ),⁴ but it drew from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Charles Townshend, an extremely important statement. He,
too, he said, “approved of our taxing the Colonies so as to provide for
their own safety and preservation,” and at this very session would pro-
pose a bill “by which the Colonys should be taxed conformable to their
abilities, in a manner that should be least burdensome and most effica-
cious.”⁵ He had no thought, he added, of raising a sufficient revenue
from the colonies immediately to cover all colonial expense, but would
“plan by degrees” to “form a revenue in time to bear the whole.”⁶
Townshend did not state what kind of tax he had in mind, but on
February , Secretary of State Lord Shelburne wrote Lord Chatham,
who was laid up with the gout,⁷ of having heard “from general conver-
sation” that Townshend planned “a new regulation of the tea duty here
and some other alterations to produce a revenue on imports there.”⁸ In
this same letter, Shelburne also described Townshend’s plan for dealing
with the East India Company which differed from the one favored by
Chatham and most members of the Cabinet.⁹
In reply (February ) Chatham denounced Townshend’s plan con-
cerning the East India Company, but said nothing as to Townshend’s
proposal for colonial taxation, thereby tending to indicate that he had
no objection to it.¹⁰
For some weeks following Townshend’s statement of January as
to colonial taxation he apparently said nothing further on this point,
but at a Cabinet meeting on March , he outlined his plan for colonial
taxation, reported by Grafton to Chatham the next day.
“The vote of supply for the American extraordinaries,” wrote Grafton,
“were then considered; when Mr. Townshend declared that if the reduc-
tion of them was not determined the closing of the [sittings of the] com-
mittee of supply by drawing the troops nearer the towns,¹¹ laying the In-
dian charges upon the provinces¹² and by laying a tax on the American
ports, he would not remain chancellor of the exchequer. His behavior, on
the whole, was such as no cabinet will, I am confident, ever submit to.”¹³
Chatham replied the same day (March ): “Lord Chatham’s best re-
spects attend the Duke of Grafton....Lord Chatham not being yet well
enough to engage in business, is particularly directed by Dr. Addington,¹⁴
to desire to be excused from Conversations of that sort for the present.
He begs to express his best acknowledgements to the Duke of Grafton
for the honor of His Grace’s Note, and hopes His Grace will have the
goodness to pardon an Invalid for not writing with his own hand.
“Lord Chatham is unable to suggest any new Plan for the Disposi-
tion of the Troops in America, and submits that it may be more advis-
able to postpone it for this year, for further Consideration. The Indian
Trade, will be most safely and properly settled, by the opinion of The
Lords of Trade.¹⁵
“Upon the whole, Lord Chatham will acquiesce with pleasure, to
the Opinions of the Cabinet; and thinks those Opinions when taken,
and approved by the King, ought to be communicated to the rest of the
King’s Servants and to the Friends of Government. Lord Chatham
must beg leave for the present to be excused entering into business, till
he is somewhat stronger.”¹⁶
In the light of this letter from Chatham, indicating no disapproval
of Townshend’s project of colonial taxation, it is not surprising that the
Cabinet did not take a stand against the project.¹⁷
In presenting his budget as Chancellor of the Exchequer to the
House of Commons on April , Townshend barely mentioned an un-
described “American tax,”¹⁸ but in a debate in the House, May , on
the proposed New York Restraining Act (discussed in Chapter ), he fi-
nally outlined what he had in mind.
He proposed, he said, to lay taxes upon America but not internal
taxes, because, though he looked upon “the distinction between exter-
nal and internal taxes as ridiculous”¹⁹ it was accepted by “the Ameri-
cans,” and this was sufficient for his purposes.²⁰
Pointing out that Crown officials in several of the colonies were de-
pendent on the local legislatures for their salaries and that “the Au-
thority of the executive Power” would be strengthened by their being
“no longer dependent upon the pleasure of any Assembly,”²¹ he prom-
ised to offer “in the Committee of Supply,...a Duty upon [colonial im-
ports of] Raisins...Oranges, Lemons and Oil [olive oil] and a Duty
upon Port Wine, [and]...allow to America the Importation thereof di-
rect from Portugal and from any part of Spain.” He also would propose
a reduction of the drawback (refund) of British duties allowed on reex-
portation to the colonies of several foreign products, thus increasing the
net revenue from existing British import duties.²² “All these together,”
he said, “might produce between £ and £, per annum.”²³
This plan, it will be observed, differed radically from the one sug-
gested by Townshend in January. The amount to be collected was a small
fraction of the sum then indicated, and, as brought out later in this chap-
ter, the revenue was to be applied not toward payment of British troops
stationed in America, but to payment of the salaries of civil officials there.
The act was to be sweetened for the colonists by amending the Act
of , forbidding importation of European products into the colonies
except by way of Great Britain, to permit colonial importation of fruit,
olive oil, and port wine directly from continental Europe. But when
Grenville protested against such “subversion of the Act of Navigation”²⁴
and was widely supported,²⁵ this article of Townshend’s program was
dropped.
The plan finally presented to the House of Commons sitting in
Committee of the Whole on June , and to the House in regular session
the following day provided for the following import duties payable in
the colonies: four shillings a hundredweight on crown, plate, flint, and
white glass; one shilling two pence a hundredweight on green glass; two
shillings a hundredweight on paint and lead; a flat rate of three pence a
pound on teas of all grades;²⁶ three pence to twelve shillings (thirty-six
pence) a ream on sixty-six grades of paper.²⁷ Townshend estimated that
the duty on tea would produce an annual revenue of about £, and
the duties on glass, paint, lead, and paper, about £,.²⁸
Unlike the British Acts of and levying duties for revenue
on colonial imports and the Stamp Act of , which provided that the
revenue was to be applied “towards defraying the expences of defend-
ing, protecting and securing the British colonies and plantations in
America,”²⁹ the revenue from the proposed new act was to “be applied,
in the First Place, in making a more certain and adequate Provision for
the Charge of the Administration of Justice, and the Support of Civil
Government in such of the said Colonies and Plantations, where it shall
be found necessary.” Only the residue, if any, was to be applied “to-
wards defraying the necessary Expences of defending, protecting and
securing the said Colonies and Plantations.”³⁰
This feature of the proposed act made it particularly dangerous to
colonial liberty. The act would not only further implement Parliament’s
assertion of authority to tax the colonists without their consent, but
would, if productive of the estimated revenue, enable the British gov-
ernment to make some Crown-appointed Governors and judges in the
colonies dependent on the British government not only for their ap-
pointment and continuance in office but for their salaries. By voting
their salaries for only a year at a time, colonial Legislatures had retained
an influence over them balancing that of the British government de-
rived from the Crown’s power to dismiss them at pleasure. By paying
the salaries of the colonial Governors and judges, the British govern-
ment would gain greater if not exclusive power of influencing them.
This object, long held in view by British ministers,³¹ could, of course,
be attained by the Crown’s payment of the officials from revenue raised
from British taxpayers; but apparently no Ministry thought it expedi-
ent to ask Parliament for taxes payable by British taxpayers to pay co-
lonial judges and Governors heretofore supported by funds voted by co-
lonial Legislatures.
A bill incorporating Townshend’s plan passed quickly through both
the Commons and the Lords,³² apparently without opposition³³ or a di-
vision³⁴ at any stage of the proceedings, and was assented to by com-
missioners for the King on June .³⁵ This act, the act of Geo. III
ch. , commonly known as the Townshend Act, was to take effect No-
vember , .
Many factors contributed to the easy passage of this potentially ex-
plosive act.
One of the most important was Chatham’s failure to take a stand
against the proposed duties. His distinguished biographer, Basil Williams,
states that Chatham was indignant with Townshend over his “threat to
tax America.”³⁶ But Williams cites no evidence for this assertion, and
there is reason to believe he was mistaken.*
In the first place, Chatham’s letters of February and March to
Shelburne and Grafton, quoted earlier in this chapter, give no sign of
indignation over Townshend’s proposal for duties on colonial imports.
Furthermore, Chatham’s wrath over the New York Assembly’s opposi-
tion to the Quartering Act, virtually imposing a tax on the colonies in
which British troops were quartered, indicates that he was now not op-
posed to colonial taxes of all kinds. Indeed, if Lord George Sackville’s
letter concerning Chatham’s (Pitt’s) speech against the Stamp Act in
January, (quoted in Chapter ), correctly reported him, he had in-
dicated even then that he was not opposed in principle to duties on co-
lonial imports and exports.³⁷
A second important factor in the lack of opposition to the proposed
duties was that, in view of the Rockingham Ministry’s sponsorship in
of the duty for revenue on colonial imports of molasses (described
in Chapter ), Rockingham’s party could not now consistently attack in
principle the similar duties on colonial imports to be levied by the
Townshend Act.³⁸
Another important factor was the flood of newspaper articles and
pamphlets published in England after repeal of the Stamp Act playing
up the light financial burdens of the colonies compared with those of
Great Britain; the colonists’ alleged ingratitude and lawlessness; and
* See Cornelius P. Forster, The Uncontrolled Chancellor, ch. . [B.W.S.]
the necessity of compelling them to recognize their subordination to
British rule.³⁹ Despite the counter propaganda of Franklin,⁴⁰ this anti-
colonial campaign had apparently made much impression; letter after
letter from England during the spring of spoke of the recent strik-
ing change in public sentiment concerning the colonists.⁴¹
Yet another factor was the passivity at this time of British merchants
trading with the colonies, whose support of repeal of the Stamp Act had
been an important contribution toward securing repeal. Offended by
the failure of their colonial correspondents to express gratitude for their
successful efforts for repeal,⁴² they offered no opposition to passage of
the Townshend Act.
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, was the fact that Franklin,
chief spokesman for the colonies in the proceedings in Parliament for
repeal of the Stamp Act, had testified that the colonists were not op-
posed in principle to Parliament’s levying duties for revenue on colonial
imports and exports.
At the beginning of his testimony, Franklin said merely that he had
never heard any colonial objections in principle to Parliament’s levying
duties on colonial imports and exports “to regulate commerce,” leaving
open the question whether they would object to such duties if imposed
for revenue.⁴³ But when pressed for his opinion on this further, vital
point, he stated, as quoted earlier in this volume, that the colonists ob-
jected in principle only to “internal” taxes (such as stamp or excise taxes)
and not to “external” taxes, i.e., duties on imports and exports, even
though these were for revenue, rather than for the regulation of trade.⁴⁴
You cannot conceive, wrote Franklin’s London friend, William Stra-
han, to a correspondent in Philadelphia, “what impression his Replies
made upon the House...,” and others wrote in similar vein concern-
ing the great influence of Franklin’s testimony.⁴⁵
Again, on April , , only about a month before Townshend’s
plan for colonial taxation was laid before the House of Commons, Frank-
lin (writing in the guise of an Englishman in an article in the London
Chronicle) stated, “The colonies submit to pay all external taxes laid on
them by way of duty on merchandizes imported into their country and
never disputed the authority of Parliament to lay such duties. The dis-
tinction indeed between internal and external taxes is here looked upon
as groundless and frivolous....⁴⁶ However, whether there be validity in
this distinction or not, seems to be immaterial; since if they are willing
to pay external though not internal taxes,...’tis then the same thing to
us, provided we get the same money....”⁴⁷
Moreover, Franklin’s statements had seemingly been confirmed by
the colonists’ general acceptance, without protest, of the duty on mo-
lasses levied by the Act of (described in Chapter ).⁴⁸
Since, as Townshend pointed out, the colonists themselves appar-
ently accepted in principle the authority of Parliament to levy duties on
colonial imports,⁴⁹ and the proposed rates of duty were not immoder-
ate,⁵⁰ could English friends of the colonies in Parliament justify them-
selves in objecting to Townshend’s plan? Would they not lay themselves
open to the charge, which Opposition members of Parliament were at
all times anxious to avoid, that they were merely trying to embarrass the
administration for party reasons?
Two other important measures relating to the colonies, enacted by
Parliament in , must be noted.
The first, embodied in section of the Townshend Act, required
colonial superior courts to grant writs of assistance to British customs
officers in the colonies to aid them in searching warehouses, homes, and
other buildings for smuggled goods.
Section apparently was intended to require the superior courts of
all the other colonies to issue so-called “general” writs, giving the cus-
toms officers a blanket warrant for searches,⁵¹ such as the Massachu-
setts Superior Court was granting customs officers stationed in Massa-
chusetts. But, as brought out in the appendix to this chapter, most of the
colonial courts narrowly construed section to require the granting of
only so-called particular or special writs. Thus, in spite of section of
the Townshend Act, the commotion over general writs of assistance in
Massachusetts, described in the second appendix to this chapter, did
not spread to the other colonies.
The other new measure was an act ( Geo. III ch. ) authorizing an
American Customs Board,⁵² whose establishment and activities are de-
scribed in Chapter .
THE FARMER’S LETTERS
T
T A , though complained of,¹ went
into effect on November , , without any attempt in the col-
onies to prevent their enforcement.
The Boston Gazette, organ of the Boston radicals, was the only colo-
nial newspaper that conducted anything approaching a campaign
against the act,² and it failed to arouse massive opposition even in
Boston. A movement for non-consumption of many foreign imports
launched at a Boston town meeting of October made considerable
headway, but it was so little directed specifically against the Townshend
Act that not one of the articles taxed by the act was included in the
thirty-odd items that signers of the agreement promised not to pur-
chase.³ Furthermore, when handbills tending to provoke resistance to
the act were posted around the city, another Boston town meeting (No-
vember ) denounced the “scandalous and threatening Papers...
posted up in various parts of the Town...tending to excite Tumults
and Disorders.”⁴
According to Governor Francis Bernard of Massachusetts, the for-
mer leading firebrand, James Otis, had taken a forward part in encour-
aging acquiescence, advising the town meeting of October , “to tread
warily for fear of offending G.B.” and stating at the meeting on No-
vember that, “as to the New Duties...it would be very imprudent
in this Town to make an opposition when every other Town in the
Province and every other Province in America seemed to acquiesce in
them and be contented.”⁵
Several factors contributed to the initial colonial acquiescence in the
Townshend Act, so strikingly in contrast to the immediate and wide-
spread colonial opposition to the Stamp Act.
First was the fear that opposition to the Townshend Act was likely to
get out of hand, as had the opposition to the Stamp Act. The frighten-
ing riots in New York, Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, and Charleston⁶
and the tenants’ uprising on the Hudson⁷* growing out of opposition to
that act were still fresh in the minds of many.⁸
The second was the testimony of Franklin⁹ and other responsible
spokesmen for the colonists that they recognized the right of Parliament
to levy duties for revenue on the colonies and the colonists’ subsequent
acquiescence in the duty for revenue on molasses levied by the Act of
. How could the colonists justly now oppose in principle the duties
levied by the Townshend Act?¹⁰ If any of these duties were excessively
heavy, let the colonists petition for a reduction of these particular du-
ties, as Franklin had said they would do if they considered any duty too
high.¹¹
A third factor was the difference in severity and immediate impact
between the Stamp Act and the Townshend Act.
Though some of the Townshend Act duties might perhaps be con-
sidered too high, none of them was conspicuously so. But this was not
true of some of the taxes levied by the Stamp Act. In the case of Frank-
lin and Hall’s Pennsylvania Gazette, for example, the stamp tax on ad-
vertisements would come to around % of the paper’s advertising
revenue¹² and to around % of its revenue from subscribers.¹³ The
percentage of tax on copies of cheaper newspapers (the Gazette was a
relatively high-priced newspaper) would be even greater,¹⁴ and on al-
manacs, another important resource of colonial printers, greater still.¹⁵
David Hall, Franklin’s partner in publishing the Gazette, wrote him
from Philadelphia in June, , that “there is the greatest Reason to
fear that the Number of our Customers from the First of November
* Sung Bok Kim, Landlord and Tenant in Colonial New York: Manorial Society, – (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, ), ch. . [B.W.S.]