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56 A Approximations of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria
Theorem 8 ([2]) There is a polynomial time algorithm,
based on Linear Programming, that provides an 0.36392-
Nash Equilibrium.
The second result below is the best till now:
Theorem 9 ([17]) There exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm, based on the stationary points of a natural optimiza-
tion problem, that provides an 0.3393-Nash Equilibrium.
Kannan and Theobald [9] investigate a hierarchy of bi-
matrix games hA; Bi which results from restricting the
rank of the matrix A + B to be of fixed rank at most k.
They propose a new model of -approximation for games
of rank k and, using results from quadratic optimization,
show that approximate Nash equilibria of constant rank
games can be computed deterministically in time polyno-
mial in 1/. Moreover, [9] provides a randomized approxi-
mation algorithm for certain quadratic optimization prob-
lems, which yields a randomized approximation algorithm
for the Nash equilibrium problem. This randomized al-
gorithm has similar time complexity as the deterministic
one, but it has the possibility of finding an exact solution
in polynomial time if a conjecture is valid. Finally, they
present a polynomial time algorithm for relative approxi-
mation (with respect to the payoffs in an equilibrium) pro-
vided that the matrix A + B has a nonnegative decomposi-
tion.
Applications
Non-cooperative game theory and its main solution con-
cept, i. e. the Nash equilibrium, have been extensively used
to understand the phenomena observed when decision-
makers interact and have been applied in many diverse
academic fields, such as biology, economics, sociology and
artificial intelligence. Since however the computation of
a Nash equilibrium is in general PPAD-complete, it is im-
portant to provide efficient algorithms for approximating
a Nash equilibrium; the algorithms discussed in this entry
are a first step towards this direction.
Cross References
Complexity of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria
General Equilibrium
Non-approximability of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria
Recommended Reading
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