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Chapter 1
that long-term rates tend to be higher than those predicted by expected
future short-term rates. This phenomenon is referred to as liquidity
preference theory. It leads to long-term rates being higher than short-term
rates most of the time. Even when the market expects a small decline in
short-term rates, liquidity preference theory is likely to cause long-term
rates to be higher than short-term rates.
Many banks now have sophisticated systems for monitoring the deci-
sions being made by customers so that, when they detect small differences
between the maturities of the assets and liabilities being chosen, they can
fine-tune the rates they offer. Sometimes derivatives such as interest rate
swaps are also used to manage their exposure. The result is that net interest
income is very stable and does not lead to significant risks. However, as
indicated in Business Snapshot 1.2, this has not always been the case.
SUMMARY
An important general principle in finance is that there is a trade-off
between risk and return. Higher expected returns can usually be achieved
only by taking higher risks. Investors should not, in theory, be concerned
with risks they can diversify away. The extra return they demand should
be for the amount of nondiversifiable systematic risk they are bearing.
For companies, investment decisions are more complicated. Compan-
ies are not in general as well diversified as investors and survival is an
Business Snapshot 1.2 Expensive Failures of Financial Institutions in the US
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Savings and Loans (S&Ls) in the
United States failed to manage interest rate risk well. They tended to take
short-term deposits and make long-term fixed-rate mortgages. As a result they
were seriously hurt by interest rate increases in 1966, 1969 70, 1974. and the
killer in 1979-82. S&Ls were protected by government guarantees. Over 1,700
failed in the 1980s. A major reason for the failures was their inadequate
interest rate risk management. The total cost to the US taxpayer of the failures
has been estimated to be between $100 and $500 billion.
The largest bank failure in the US, Contintental Illinois, can also be
attributed to a failure to manage interest rale risks well. During the period
1980 to 1983 its assets (i.e., loans) with maturities over a year totaled between
$7 billion and $8 billion, whereas its liabilities (i.e., deposits) with maturities
over a year were between $1.4 billion and $2.5 billion. Continental failed in
1984 and was the subject of an expensive government bailout.