Housden Martyn. Forgotten Pages in Baltic History: Diversity and Inclusion. (On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics) (ENG)

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alliance, however, was only one dimension in the projected Baltic League

and the construction and maintenance of the sovereignty of the new Baltic

states required―it was believed―co-operation in different social fields. A

league was part of a general project for the reconstruction of the independent

nation state in its totality. The origin of the idea dated back to the last year of

the war when Baltic politicians in exile―Latvian Zigfrīds Meierovics,

Estonians Ants Piip and Kaarel Pusta, as well as Finn Rudolf

Holsti―launched the idea of the Baltic League in their discussions held in

London.

The statements of the Latvian foreign minister, Zigfrīds Meierovics,

explained the logic behind the wide programme and what it was trying to

achieve. At that time, Meierovics was the clear leader of Latvia’s foreign

policy and if we need to find one person behind the programme of the

Bulduri conference, it was him. On the eve of the conference, Meierovics

analysed the international situation in the light of emerging peace treaties

between the Baltic states and Soviet Russia. His opinion was that, after the

peace treaties, it was almost unnecessary to make an alliance against Russia

because it no longer presented a threat. Such an alliance had been a main goal

of the Helsinki conference, but for Meierovics, the greatest challenge for the

future when constructing independence was to resolve several practical

problems. For Meierovics, the unification and integration of the Baltic states

in matters of economic and everyday relations seems to have a goal in its

own right. It was part of the process of constructing a sovereign nation state

and thus successful state-building required the creation of a Baltic League.

This league was not primarily a military alliance. More important than

military co-operation was integration on economic and social questions. As a

concrete example, he mentioned the monetary union of the Baltic states. So

Meierovics was aiming to construct a political-economic-social union, which

was not directed to repel an attack from the East but was to help the internal

building-process of these new states.

In the official journal of the Latvian foreign ministry, an editorial was

published on 22 August, which reflected the same atmosphere and the same

interpretation of the necessity of integration as a means to promoting state

sovereignty. In the editorial, it was suggested that the development of

mankind to a higher level proceeded through the union of nations. The main

point was that the liberation of nations from empire should not lead to

isolation and withdrawal. Rather than disintegration and isolationism,

especially in economic issues, the modern world needed the integration and

association of states. Progress towards a union of states should be a common

goal. The Bulduri conference was believed to be constructing just such an

ideal world.

At a time when the development of the whole international

system―or at least that in eastern Europe―was oriented towards unions of

states, the Baltic League was not an abandonment of something important

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(i.e. political independence) but a natural step in the evolution of international

relations and a necessary condition for the construction of a full sovereignty.

The Latvian discussion had, however, its own discords and there were

those who emphasized more than Meierovics the significance of a common

defence and military alliance, and who saw economic integration only as a

method of achieving this end. In the 1920s, the borders of a nation state were

seen as exclusive dividing-lines and Baltic co-operation was needed precisely

to secure the integrity of these boundaries.

So the Latvian discussion

contained two quite different views on the Baltic League. One discourse,

based on the wider interpretation of the League, emphasized how the

defensive alliance was only a part―and not necessarily a crucial part―of a

much wider league or union, while another, more limited discourse,

understood the defensive alliance as a goal in itself.

As in the Latvian discussion, the Estonian discussion contained two

main interpretations of co-operation: a wider definition and a more limited

definition. In contrast to the Latvian situation, official circles in Estonia

particularly emphasized the significance of a military alliance. In meetings of

the Estonian government led by Jaan Tõnisson and in the Estonian delegation

to Bulduri, a military treaty emerged as a top priority. The significance of

other issues was not, however, denied completely and statements on other

questions were carefully drafted in the foreign ministry ahead of the

conference; yet the government displayed a surprisingly restrained attitude

towards several of the economic and political issues aired at Bulduri. It was

afraid that different economic treaties would constitute a threat to Estonian

economic sovereignty.

However, Kaarel Pusta, one of the creators of the

Baltic League idea, led the Estonian delegation at the conference and this did,

of course, have some influence on Estonian policy.

Nevertheless, Estonian political debates also involved opinions similar

to those of Meierovics. In the Estonian newspaper Vaba Maa, an organ of the

Labour Party, it was stressed that political sovereignty without an

independent economic base was impossible and that this could only be

achieved through a Baltic League. Thus, establishing independence was both

possible and necessary only in association with other states because

unification would bring power.

The Finns took their stand more unanimously on the traditional side of

the discourse on sovereignty. Their attitude towards a variety of issues at

Bulduri was very restrained, yet they wanted to retain their membership of

the grouping to support ―the pleasing zeal for stabilizing the state and

organizing society‖ found among the Baltic states.

A question put by a

journalist of the Helsingin Sanomat to the Finnish delegation after the

Bulduri conference portrayed well the general state of Finnish feelings about

the event. The journalist was not at all satisfied with what the Finnish

delegation said about the different economic, social and other issues, and so

posed an uncertain question as to ―whether the political questions were in the

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end the most important ones at the conference‖.

This showed how difficult

it was for the Finns to understand the meaning of wider co-operation.

During the first twelve months after the First World War, two

different discourses on the Baltic League and international relations clashed.

One was supportive of the Rightist parties, relying on classic Realpolitik and

emphasising security and sovereignty, while the other was supportive of

liberal-leftists circles, applying a liberal-idealist worldview focused on peace

and co-operation. In the case of Baltic co-operation, the former groups

regarded a military alliance as the ultimate goal, while the latter wanted to

build up a new Europe grounded on a more extensive union of nations.

Scenes of co-operation

From the outset, Bulduri distinguished itself from previous meetings of states

from the Baltic region and marked a break with past practices, as it was a

multilateral conference. Lack of experience of organising this kind of forum

caused several problems, but the hosts did their best to offer excellent

frameworks for discussion. The Latvians had staged the conference as a start

to long-term preparations for laying the foundations for a future unity of

Baltic states. The host country had sent out the programmes before the

conference to all participants, which meant that they had enough time to

prepare their own viewpoints.

There were almost forty participants in total,

since the size of the delegations varied from five from Finland to nine from

Estonia. All these delegations were composed of different specialists, and

there was enough time for long and detailed discussions since the conference

lasted the whole month, ending on 6 September. There were no complaints

about the general environment in which the conference took place and

different participants praised both the place and the general atmosphere

which accompanied the proceedings. In the hotel on the Bulduri shore,

everything was arranged impeccably for the participants. Several foreign

newspapers were ordered by the hotel and the latest telegraphic equipment

was installed. Special rooms decorated with Latvian art were also reserved

for every delegation.

This decoration reflected well the strong national

feeling characteristic of these young nation states. The representative of Great

Britain, Stephen Tallents, who participated as an observer, described the

conference as follows:

―The Latvian Government have retained for it [the conference]

an excellent hotel at Bilderlingshof, on the Baltic coast, about

15 miles from Riga, and there, in conditions strongly

reminiscent of the Hotel Majestic, the five delegations both live

and work. I paid an informal visit to Mr. Albat, the General

Secretary of the Conference, in this hotel last night, and was

amused to find that even the usual after-dinner dance for the

young ladies who surround the deliberations of the Conference

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had not been forgotten. The several delegations meet on

amicable terms, and even the Polish and Lithuanian

representatives are reported to engage during official meetings

in occasional humorous repartee.‖

The hosts had not forgotten amusements. Participants enjoyed several dinners

and concerts held in Riga. The whole cream of Latvian political and

diplomatic society attended these events, and so they provided an excellent

forum for unofficial discussions and the exchange of information. On one

occasion, a dinner held by the Latvian president even lasted until one o'clock

in the morning.

The atmosphere of the conference and its long duration created a

situation in which new personal contacts emerged automatically and old ones

were strengthened. However, there was one obstacle to the creation of really

important relationships. The length of the conference also imposed practical

limits on the participation of the most senior leaders of the Baltic states.

Foreign ministers could not stay a whole month in a foreign country when

other important negotiations were also underway. During the Bulduri

conference, the Finns, for example, were engaged in peace negotiations with

Soviet Russia at Tartu. As a result, only the hosts, the Latvians, were always

represented at the ministerial level. The Estonian delegation was led by their

minister in Paris, Kaarel Pusta, while the Poles were led by Leon Wasilewski,

an associate of Piŀsudski, as had been the case at Helsinki. Neither of these

was a government minister but, on the other hand, they belonged to their

country’s political élite. Lithuania and Finland were represented at a lower

political level; the Lithuanian delegation was led by the head of protocol of

the foreign ministry, Dr. Jurgis Saulys, and the Finnish delegation by the

head of the economic department of the foreign ministry, Leonard Åström.

The Finnish and Lithuanian delegations lacked authority to negotiate

on big questions and Åström himself, for example, was forced to ask advice

from Helsinki all the time. Telegraph connections did not always work and

quite often answers arrived too late so that the delegation at Bulduri had to

make ad hoc decisions. That is why the Finns mostly tried to put the brakes

on the conference and to outline different resolutions in such vague ways that

they had little practical significance. Members of the Lithuanian delegation

were forced to travel to Kaunas during the conference to ask advice, but they

did at least receive it.

The variety of authorities exercised by the delegations and the

different political statuses of the participants presented a problem for the

conference. The host country had drafted a programme which included both

big questions of principle and small technical matters, and involvement had

been expected both of senior political leaders and specialists.

The

delegations which arrived at Bulduri were, however, composed mostly of

officials rather than ministers and so lacked the capability to handle really big

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questions. The situation led to an unresolved contradiction between the

programme and the delegations, which in turn had a poor effect on the results

of the conference. Bulduri provided the best of conditions for dogged work

by specialists, but the existence of a certain confusion about the aims of the

conference, not to say the gap between a political summit and the meetings of

the specialists, caused many practical problems.

Towards an integrated Baltic region

A closer examination the Bulduri programme reveals the sort of system

which the Latvians wanted to construct between the Baltic states, while the

reactions of the different participants to several details of the programme

show which parts of it they were ready to accept. All in all, the scope of the

issues put on the table during the conference was surprisingly wide. The

conference was divided into three committees dealing with political and legal

questions, economics and, lastly, cultural, social and health issues. They

outlined proposals and resolutions for the conference.

The proposals and

draft decisions may be divided into four main groups. The first related to the

implementation of international treaties and new practices; the second

involved decisions and recommendations aiming to create closer mutual

contacts; a third group of decisions related to the external situation of the

states; while the last category aimed to generate more effective propaganda

for the Baltic group.

The first group of decisions related to the introduction in the eastern

Baltic Sea area of practices and treaties regulating the European state system.

A good example of these is the resolution on contagious diseases made on 21

August. In this agreement, the participants bound themselves to follow the

1903 Paris treaty. In the light of that treaty, the Baltic states promised to

inform each other of all epidemics, including plague, cholera, smallpox and

typhus. The same rules also applied to livestock diseases.

These questions

were significant in the chaos that followed the Russian revolution and the

Russian civil war. Epidemics affecting people and livestock were still an on-

going problem in the Baltic Sea area in 1920. The cause of cholera had been

found in 1883, but its epidemics still had not been conquered. The situation

became more chaotic because of the internal Russian situation since new

plague epidemics―including typhus―were spreading westwards from

Russia as refugees returned home from that country having been evacuated

by the imperial army during the First World War.

There were other similar decisions and statements for adhering to

international agreements. The economic committee did not draft treaties but

made proposals that were not legally binding. These proposals expressed

clear wishes about participating in different international initiatives―joining

the international bureau of statistics in Brussels, adhering to the resolutions of

The Hague conference on bills and cheques, approving the 1883 Paris treaty

and the 1911 Washington treaty concerning patents.

Legal questions were

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also arranged through a declaration about joining existing international

treaties. In the matter of international civil law, the Hague treaty of 1905 was

accepted. A special draft for a mutual copyright agreement was also drawn

up. Similarly, the treaty on exchanges of prisoners confirmed mutual

relations between the states.

The railway and postal conferences held after Bulduri adopted the

same line over accepting established international practices. The

representatives of the post offices had their own conference in Riga at the end

of September and drafted a treaty regulating postal traffic between the states.

Naturally it aimed to regularise postal communications, including the parcel

post. In effect it was introducing the practices of the International Postal

Union into the eastern Baltic area.

The Baltic railway conference was held

in Helsinki at the start of October and it was decided to observe the Berne

international railway agreement of 1890.

All international or inter-state

railway traffic presupposed regulations about timetables, transit stations and

changes of wagon; adopting the existing agreement was the easiest way of

regulating Baltic traffic.

At Bulduri and its ancillary conferences intentions were declared to

join eleven international treaties, regimes, institutions or codes of practice.

The significance of the initiatives lay in their importance for the creation of

normal, everyday relations between states. Since the middle of the nineteenth

century, the development of modern technology had made the world smaller

and its innovations had linked states together. Different ties created by the

new technology, such as the railways or postal communications, also required

regulation between the states. At the end of the nineteenth century and the

beginning of the twentieth century, a network of different international

treaties and institutions was created in Europe to regulate and control these

interactions.

Because the Baltic states did not form their own units within

the Russian empire, they had to start constructing their independence from

scratch, including every kind of infrastructure. Most of the infrastructures

which were so natural and self-evident for established states were absent

altogether in the Baltic states, and this made them very conscious of the

different treaties and institutions regulating everyday relations. The absence

of international recognition of the Baltic states, however, imposed its own

restraints. Normal, regulated everyday relations were one way of expressing

sovereignty and this was not possible for them, because under international

law they were still incapable of signing international treaties. So the Baltic

conferences offered the only possible forum for introducing the necessary

regulations. If it were not possible to join existing treaties and international

institutions, the best possible solution was to arrange these everyday relations

independently and on the regional level. Regional co-operation between the

Baltic states served as a means for entering full membership of the European

state system. But the ultimate significance of the decisions and

recommendations made at Bulduri was not for the future; in that fateful

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situation of the summer of 1920, regional co-operation offered, above all, an

important means of expressing sovereignty.

The second group of decisions included, for instance, the programme

for increasing contacts between scientific institutions and concerning the

Arts. The need to unify navigation and aviation regulations, also the need to

start collaboration between meteorological institutions, were mentioned—as

were other similar issues. A long list of recommendations was outlined on

economic questions. Most of these involved quite vague statements about

unifying the different practices between the Baltic states or simply promoting

co-operation. Questions involved, for example, customs, finances, the

banking system, patents, agriculture, fishing and meteorology. Basic

conditions for improving mutual trade were examined and monetary union

was again mentioned as a means of developing economic co-operation. The

long-term goal of the Latvians’ programme seemed to be the creation of a

unified economic area among the Baltic states involving uniform customs,

tariffs and currency.

The endeavour aimed at enlarging and consolidating the scope of co-

operation through the establishment of special common institutions. A new

council of representatives of the Baltic states was to be founded in Riga to act

as a new co-ordinating institution for the whole field of co-operation. The

council was supposed to negotiate unfinished questions, promote the

acceptance and realisation of resolutions, draft preparations for the next

conference and outline its budget. The goal was to create a permanent

institution which would symbolise the unity of the Baltic group of states.

The organisation of special conferences on railway issues, on postal and

telegram communications, and liaison between military representatives were

all felt to be necessary. The first two projects were realised soon after the

Bulduri conference and so it was decided to hold a Baltic conference of

specialists to develop and organise this type of co-operation.

New central

bureaux were also planned, including the Eisenbahn Centralbureau der

baltischen Staaten―an institution for co-ordinating mutual traffic and

transit.

Several decisions, agreements and proposals made at the Bulduri

conference focused directly on internal questions of the Baltic states. For

example, recommendations were made for labour protection and a banking

system, also there was a draft treaty for a nationality law. Although these

recommendations were not true treaties between states, the spectrum of issues

under discussion was surprisingly wide, as was shown by the very detailed

proposal for a law on labour protection. The jointly-prepared draft of a

nationality law was equally surprising, because a definition of nationality was

one of the key issues for the new nation states. Here, the right to nationality

was reserved for those persons whose parents and ancestors had lived in the

country. For newcomers, five years’ permanent residence before the war was

expected. After the First World War, however, nationality questions did not

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constitute a matter of principle in the way that they did after the Cold War in

the 1990s.

The need for recommendations of this kind and draft treaties

becomes more understandable when it is remembered that, except for

Finland, all of the other Baltic states lacked their own legislation. Its very

making was therefore also a crucial expression of sovereignty.

The fourth group of decisions was the smallest. This comprised efforts

to organise joint propaganda abroad. At the general level it was to occur

through common information offices in London and Paris, but also through

special fields of activity like art and science. The aim was to propagate a

picture of a united Baltic group, including in the West. In this way, these

decisions served the same purpose as the three others―incorporation into the

European state system, defining one’s place in that system, and expressing in

the only way possible the sovereignty of these unrecognized, young nation

states.

As a whole, this system provided a plan for an economically,

politically, socially and culturally integrated and unified Baltic society; but

all participants were not ready to deal with all the questions proposed by the

Latvians. The Estonians had a reserved attitude especially towards legal

issues that were the concern of internal legislation and had a similarly

negative view of proposals to remove mutual economic restrictions.

But it

was the Finns who opposed most clearly of all scrutiny of small technical

questions. In committee, they tried to outline resolutions so vague that they

became insignificant, or they related them specifically to the existing Finnish

situation so that Finland could approve the initiatives.

Finnish action was

understandable because most of the technical questions at issue had been

solved in Finland during the period of autonomy, when the country had

already had the right to adhere to international treaties and institutions

concerning everyday relations. Furthermore, Finland was recognized de jure.

It thus had the chance to resolve these questions in the full international

forum and there was no need for regional solutions. In questions of this

nature, the Finns were only really interested in ones connected with mutual

trade.

Efforts to create a mutual security community

The timing of the Bulduri conference was bad for political and military co-

operation. Poland’s eastern offensive, which had started in the spring, turned

out to be a failure and the Red Army started a counter-offensive in the

summer which saw them advance into ethnic Poland. On the eve of the

conference, Moscow’s troops were at the gates of Warsaw and the very

independence of Poland was at stake.

In the Baltic States, the politicians

were conscious that, if Warsaw fell, their independence, too, would be put in

question. The situation was, however, in many ways contradictory. Poland’s

losses were unfavourable for the Baltic States but, on the other hand, there

was no sense in helping Poland in its campaign. The Soviet representative in

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Riga, Adolf Joffe, had even circulated a note saying that every ally of Poland

would automatically be considered at war with Soviet Russia. Thus, the

Latvians stated that an alliance would be possible only after all the

participants had concluded a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. So a ―wait-and-

see‖ policy was the only possibility initially and Polish events were followed

with great anxiety.

In mid-August, the situation on the Polish-Soviet front changed

dramatically. The Poles launched a counter-attack on 16 August and after a

couple of days it was clear that the Red Army was being forced to

withdraw.

This change of fortunes influenced the atmosphere of the

conference. Based on its military capacity, Poland had its authority restored

and an open discussion of the Baltic alliance became possible.

This time

Pusta made a suggestion on 21 August to start preparing for a Baltic alliance.

A week later, on 28 August, the Latvians presented a draft treaty. It was

discussed by committees a couple of days after this and the final treaty was

signed on 31 August.

The final treaty was not itself a military alliance, which was already

impossible because of the continuing Polish-Soviet war; its central purpose

lay elsewhere. The participants still promised to start preparations for a

defensive alliance without delay.

A similar statement had already been

made in the final protocol of the Helsinki conference and now one more step

was being taken towards a more binding decision. The commitment to the

preparation of the defensive alliance was not accepted without reservations.

The Lithuanians were not ready to co-operate with the Poles, while the Finns

did not feel it meaningful to undertake a binding commitment over this

question before all the Baltic States were recognised internationally. After all,

a commitment to a defensive alliance might mean standing in relative

isolation on the side of the Baltic States and falling with them. On the other

hand, the Finnish leadership did understand the need for security ties with the

Baltic States and Finland was ready to help if Russia attacked them, although

it was felt that no binding treaties were necessary. The commitment to a

defensive alliance was, however, included in the Bulduri treaty by a majority

decision.

According to this paragraph, military representatives would

continue with their negotiations after the end of the conference.

Mutual disagreements created something of a special atmosphere at

Bulduri as had happened at its predecessor in Helsinki. At Bulduri, Estonia

and Latvia engaged in a discussion about existing territorial disputes, but

these negotiations did not have any serious effect on co-operation.

The

main problem was still between Lithuania and Poland, and their open conflict

left an impression on the whole conference. The situation had changed since

the beginning of the year. The Red Army had conquered its war

aim―Vilnius―from the Poles in mid-July. After that, the Russians had

negotiated with the Lithuanians on returning the city to

Lithuania―something which happened during the conference on 25 August

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when Lithuanian troops replaced the Red Army. At that time, the Lithuanians

were the party that wanted to preserve the existing situation and were willing

to settle the conflict on that basis. The Poles, however, were not prepared to

settle the question of Vilnius according to the status quo; so, suspicious

feelings dominated Polish and Lithuanian attitudes towards each other.

When, at Bulduri, the Poles supported a large-scale programme of co-

operation, the Lithuanians chose instead the old policy of a triple alliance.

They also withdraw from military co-operation because the Poles were

participants.

At this time the resolution of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and other

mutual disagreements was not attempted through mediation, rather Bulduri

witnessed a new method of controlling and regulating mutual relations. Of

course, there was an unofficial discussion between the disputants, but a fresh

official approach was introduced. The military alliance was a question of

only secondary importance in the treaty of 31 August and altogether five

paragraphs were devised to frame mutual relations. In the treaty the

signatories were bound to resolve mutual disputes on borders and territories

by peaceful means only and if no conciliation occurred, the issues had to be

submitted to an outside authority. Further, the Baltic states made a

commitment neither to allow their territories to be used for aggression against

other the Baltic states, nor to conclude any treaties directed against them. The

rights of national minorities belonging to the Baltic nations were also

guaranteed. This latter paragraph obviously concerned the Polish minority in

Latgale, whose rights Poland had tried to protect.

Behind the nationality

paragraph it was possible to discern a new dimension in the sovereignty of

the new nation states because this was understood to cover people of the

same nationality wherever they lived. Hence, the Poles in Latgale were

emerging as―effectively―under the protection of Poland.

The main aim of the treaty was to create a state of affairs between the

eastern Baltic Sea countries in which all possible conflicts would be resolved

peacefully. The history of the first months of independence explained why

this kind of treaty was needed. There had been an inexcusably large number

of mutual disputes during the first two years of independence and these had

formed a significant obstacle to the development of co-operation. The

situation needed to be transformed and the method which the treaty offered

could be described as an effort to create a mutual security community.

The events that followed the conference showed there were very many

reasons for trying to achieve that community in one way or the other. The

Bulduri treaty was not however the right method―or at least it did not

resolve the old disputes or prevent the emergence of new ones during the

final months of 1920. Characteristic of the atmosphere after the Bulduri

conference was the emergence of a new dispute on the de jure recognition of

Latvia. The three Baltic States still lacked de jure recognition by the Great

Powers, while even Poland and Finland―both generally recognised eastern