Housden Martyn. Forgotten Pages in Baltic History: Diversity and Inclusion. (On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics) (ENG)

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Marko Lehti

Baltic states―had not recognised Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Finland

made only one exception when it recognised Estonia on 7 June 1920. Poland

and Finland had, however, promised at the Helsinki conference that they

would support the de jure recognition of the Baltic States, and the same

statement was repeated at Bulduri.

Finland, and especially long-term Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti, had

engaged in active propaganda for the recognition of the Baltic States in 1920,

and this form of support surely helped influence the Western powers when

they outlined their attitude towards the three Baltic States.

The Baltic States

thus had at least one supporter among the European states. The Poles,

however, wanted to gain advantages from recognition and the situation

became critical at the end of October. At this time the Poles presented the

Latvian government with their conditions for recognition. These were tough,

including the creation of a defensive alliance with Poland, extraterritorial

rights in Latvian harbours, modifications in land reform as it affected Polish

landowners in Latgale, and cultural autonomy for Latvia’s Poles.

The

Latvian position was not, however, so desperate that the government felt

compelled to accept the Polish ultimatum. This conflict, in any case, received

a natural solution in January 1921 when the Western powers recognized

Estonian and Latvian independence de jure and after that the Poles were

forced to do the same without any conditions.

The Polish-Latvian conflict was not the worst confrontation between

Baltic states and the Polish-Lithuanian conflict took on even worse

dimensions during the autumn. The conflict reached its peak on 9 October

when General Żeligowski conquered Vilnius district which had been

incorporated into Lithuania just a month and half earlier. Vilnius district was

declared an independent Central Lithuanian Republic but everyone knew that

in reality Piŀsudski was behind the operation. The conquest of Vilnius finally

broke Polish-Lithuanian relations and after this final episode there were no

longer even postal or railway connections between these two countries.

The Polish-Latvian and Polish-Lithuanian conflicts showed clearly

that the use of force had not been surpassed in the relations between the

Baltic states, and that all dreams of common security were blown away

within a couple of months of the Bulduri conference ending. In fact, perhaps

there had never been so serious a set of conflicts between the states in the

eastern Baltic Sea area as those occurring in the autumn of 1920. As a result,

the foundations of the Bulduri treaty collapsed. Hence, there was no realistic

possibility of the Bulduri treaty finally being ratified. Consequently, when the

original deadline for signing arrived―the middle of December―, no state

had verified the treaty. In January 1921, the Latvians finally declared

officially that the Bulduri treaty had been dropped.

After Bulduri: the Baltic Council and beyond

Even if the Bulduri conference in many ways failed in its ultimate goals, it

The Dancing Conference of Bulduri

did create some institutions of a new kind between the Baltic states. The most

remarkable achievement undeniably was the creation of the permanent

council of the Baltic states, an organisation that was envisaged as being a

controlling and planning institution of Baltic co-operation in between big

conferences.

The council held its first meeting on 7 September, a day after the

conference ended and attention was focused on its methods and organisation.

The Baltic Council held two further meetings the same month where the

implementation of the Bulduri agreements was dealt with and the fate of

Belarus discussed. The council met several times towards the end of the year

and it tried to carry out the tasks given to it. The on-going conflicts were

discussed several times, a budget was drawn up for the conference and

council, the Finns and Poles informed the other states of their peace

negotiations with Soviet Russia, the publicising of Bulduri’s outcomes was

discussed, and attempts were made to sort out traffic and transit questions.

All these issues had been given to the council at Bulduri. Meierovics, the

Latvian foreign minister, chaired most of the council’s meetings. Estonia was

represented by Aleksander Hellat (the Estonian minister in Riga), Lithuania

by Dovas Launius, Poland by Witold Kamieniecki (the Polish envoy in

Riga), and Finland by Reino Sylvander (the Finnish envoy in Riga). The

Ukrainian representative, Mr. Kedrovsky, also participated in early meetings.

The Latvians, the host-nation, took quite seriously the Baltic Council’s work,

while perhaps the others―at least the Finns―took part largely because they

wanted to stay well informed about what was happening. The problem facing

the Baltic Council, however, was that discussion and exchange of

information were more characteristic of its work than the really effective

implementation of the Bulduri agreements by all the participating countries.

Even if the influence of the Baltic Council on the realisation of the

Bulduri agreements in all five Baltic states was a minor one, the

organisation’s existence was in itself important. The Council held seven

official meetings during 1920 and continued to exist into the following year.

After a break lasting two and a half months, it met on 5 March 1921 when the

next Baltic conference was discussed. The most dramatic subject of mutual

deliberation was, however, the conquest of independent Georgia by the Red

Army―an event which aroused fears among the Baltic States just as

happened ninety years later in the wake of the Russian-Georgian War of

August 2008. The Baltic Council even drew up its own note on that question

as the Baltic politicians did 87 years later.

During the spring of 1921, the Baltic Council held six official

meetings in which it reverted to the question of implementing the mutual

treaties. In addition to the official meetings, it assembled on ten further

occasions. Both Lithuania and Poland were still participating in the

organisation even in March 1921, when the Lithuanians finally stayed away.

At the same time, the Finnish representative, Reino Sylvander, stopped

Marko Lehti

participating in every meeting. The Baltic Council was never officially

abolished, but its last general meeting was held on 25 April 1921. Even so,

two further meetings were held in the autumn of 1921, but it is unclear

whether anyone other than the Latvians participated in these. Nonetheless,

the Baltic Council represented an important symbol for the unity of the Baltic

group of states. When Riga was the seat of the council, the Latvians could

dominate its activities and managed to promote its relative success. Even so,

it remained primarily a forum for discussion rather than a really effective

planning organisation. This was particularly because participants other than

the Latvians were not so eager to develop the council into an institution

organising effective Baltic co-operation and so it was not used as a tool to co-

ordinate foreign policy internationally.

But even with all of this said, in a

period when relations between Baltic states were awkward, the very existence

of the council was significant in itself.

At Bulduri, it was decided to form a council of military

representatives too, but the fate of this body was different to that of the Baltic

Council. The first meeting was planned for 1 October in Riga and it was

originally intended that the representatives at the meeting would be given

authority to draft a military treaty. Though the military council met, the

different Baltic states reacted to it in different ways. The Lithuanians and

Ukrainians did not send any representatives at all and Finland was

represented only by its military attaché in Latvia, Colonel Karl Helsingius.

The Estonian government, on the other hand, appointed Lieutenant-General

Johan Laidoner and the chief of staff, General Paul Lill, which showed how

ready they were for a military treaty. The military council, however,

disappeared from view during the late autumn soon after its foundation when

Polish-Latvian relations became strained.

The creation of a Baltic Council was an exception among the

decisions taken at the Bulduri conference. As far as its decisions were

concerned, the best results were accomplished over questions involving the

adoption of international treaties and practices. But these achievements were

not really realised for the sake of mutual co-operation per se, but because

they were the necessary for sovereign states entering the European state

system. Hence in this case the Bulduri conference was only really a means to

an end. The worst results involved decisions and proposals relating to mutual

relations between states, and most of these were never realised. Most of these

proposals were so vague that they were easily forgotten and no mutual treaty

was ratified in the form it was prepared at Bulduri. There were, however, a

few recommendations that were put into effect. For example, the National

Boards of Health did exchange monthly information on epidemics as was

decided at Bulduri.

Also all the protocols and decisions of the Bulduri

conference (leaving aside some political issues) were published in French by

the Latvians―a step approved by other states in the Baltic Council.

This

reflected the new, sincere diplomacy of the period and the public circulation

The Dancing Conference of Bulduri

of the documents helped strengthen the image of a united Baltic group―even

if the impression was not matched by the reality.

Consequently the Bulduri conference should not be regarded as a

failure. At a time when the Baltic States had not yet received de jure

recognition, it served as an important mechanism demonstrating the

sovereignty of the young Baltic states. It also created the impression that

something important was going on.

In the wider context, bringing up so large a variety of questions on

economic, social and everyday relations was something exceptional in

international co-operation. Within other quite similar state groups―for

example the Little Entente―there was no similar initiative in the early 1920s.

Hence the Bulduri conference marked a new opening in international

relations. It reflected not only the attempt to organise everyday relations

among Russia’s successor states, but also the goal of achieving unification

and integration. Thus, even if the Bulduri system never came into being, it

tells us much about the expectations of the time and how European peace was

conceptualised. For instance, the Bulduri system that was planned reflected

the early idealistic views epitomised in the League of Nations according to

which lasting peace should be best guaranteed through international

organisation. At this moment, many prominent Baltic politicians looked

towards integrationist and inclusive models of international political

development. However, these integrationist views clashed with more

nationalistic and exclusive ideas of security, with the result that, in the end,

the Bulduri system could not be realised as a possible alternative future for

the Baltic region.

Marko Lehti

Notes

1. ―Baltic States‖ refers only to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but ―Baltic

states‖ is a more open notion and may include also Finland and Poland.

2. Lehti 1999, pp. 243–59.

3. The minutes of the organizing committee, LVVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 63, Ip.

3; Letters concerning the drafting of the Riga conference, April 1920, ERA f.

957, n. 11, s. 422, I. 1–8; Eeltood Riia konwerentsiks, PO 28.2.1920; Balti

riikide konwerents, PO 25.5.1920.

4. See also the article in this collection by Housden.

5. The minutes of the organizing committee, LVVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 63, Ip.

6. Tallents’s report from Riga 6.7.1920, PRO 371/3620/452-453; Rumbold's

report from Warsaw 10.7.1920, PRO 371/3620/458–459.

7. Conférènce des États Baltiques, Bulletin 3.8.1920. See also Revue de la

presse (Latvijas Sargs), Bulletin 19.8.1920; The material concerning the

preparations for the Bulduri conference, L VVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 64, pp. 3–

8. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 6–20.8.1920, MBC, 4, pp. 18–19.

On Polish policy see Dziewanowski, 1969, p. 302.

9. The meeting of the Estonian delegation 6.8.1920, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s.

296, I. 21.

10. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 6.8.1920, MBC, 6. See also

Baltijas walstu konferenze, BZ 8.8.1920.

11. Conférènce de Riga. Projet d'ordre du jour, Bulletin 3.8.1920; Riia

konverents paevakord, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 422, I. 9–10b.

12. Conférènce de Riga. Projet d'ordre du jour, Bulletin 3.8.1920.

13. D’Helsingfors a Riga, Bulletin 4.8.1920.

14. La presse Lettone sur la conférènce, Bulletin 5.8.1920.

15. Lehti 1999, pp. 121–27.

16. Les travaux de la Conférènce Baltique (Meierovics's writings), Bulletin

17.8.1920; Riia konwerents. Meierowitsh Balti liidust, WM 18.8.1920. See

also Klive 1935, pp. 39–40; Rodgers, 1975, p. 17.

17. Vers une plus haute union des peuples, Bulletin 22.8.1920. See also Kas

panahktas Bulduru konferenze?, BZ 5.8.1920.

18. La presse Lettone sur la Conference, Bulletin 5.8.1920; La presse Lettone

et la paix, Bulletin 13.8.1920. Especially in the Latvijas Sargs was the

significance of military cooperation stressed.

19. Material concerning the preparations for the Bulduri conference, ERA f.

957, n. 11, s. 422, I. 87; ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 380, I. 1–34; The meeting of the

Estonian delegation 11.8.1920, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 296, I. 24. The secret

decision of the Estonian government nr 39 31.8.1920, ERA f. 31, n. 1, s. 14,

I. 23; The Estonian government to the foreign minister 1.9.1920, ERA f. 957,

n. 11, s. 378, I. 91.

The Dancing Conference of Bulduri

20. For Pusta’s opinion on the Bulduri conference and generally on the Baltic

Union, see Pusta 1927, pp. 11–13.

21. Riia konwerents, WM 29.6.1920, Werner Liik, Balti riikide konwerents

tööde lõpetamise puhul, WM 10.9.1920.

22. Ulkoministerion poliittisen osaston tiedotuksia no.13 30.9.1920, KA,

RHK 29; Memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga conference, KA, RHK

29; Instructions to the Finnish delegations at the Riga conference, UM 12 A

23. Balttilaisten maiden Riian konferenssi, HS 11.9.1920. The Bulduri

conference was often called simply the Riga conference by contemporaries.

24. Riia konwerents paevakord, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 422, I. 1–8. On

Estonian preparations see also ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 422, 1.87; ERA f. 957, n.

11, s. 380, I. 1–34.

25. Balti riikide konwerentsi ruumidest Bilderlinghofis, PO 14.8.1920;

Residence de la Conference Baltique a Bulduri, Bulletin 10.8.1920;

Baltialaisten maiden Riian konferenssi, HS 11.9.1920.

26. Tallents’s report from Riga 23.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/335.

27. Kirjeitä balttilaisten valtioiden konferenssista, HS 7.8., 26.8.1920.

28. List of participants of the conference, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 668, I. 1.

29. Telegrams between Astrom and the foreign ministry, KA, RHK 29. The

tactics of the Finnish delegation sometimes looked even more negative than

instructions would have required. The disjointed connections between

Bulduri and Helsinki gave more power to the delegation at the conference

and so with respect to Astrom it is clear that his personal attitude was a

significant factor that influenced the work of the delegation. Astrom had been

an opponent of the German orientation, but, on the other hand, what he had

proposed as the alternative was a policy of turning Finland inwards. In his

small book Suomen valtiollinen orienteeraus (The Orientation of the Finnish

State), he did not even mention Estonia or other Baltic States and he was not

regarded as being among the warmest supporters of the Baltic orientation.

(Astrom 1918, 17–18.)

30. Meierovics’s telegram to Holsti, KA, RHK 29.

31. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 6.8., 7.8., 9.8., 20.8.1920, MBC,

1–18.

32. The memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga conference, KA, RHK

29; The minutes of the Bulduri conference 21.8.1920, MBC, 43, 48.

33. Pesonen, 1980, pp. 382–84, 498, 521–22, 579–80.

34. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 20.8., 3.9.1920, MBC, pp. 24–26,

77–83; The resolutions of the Riga conference on economic issues.

Ulkoministerion poliittisen osaston tiedotuksia no 13.30.9.1920, KA, RHK

29.

35. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 20.8., 2.9., 3.9.1920, MBC, pp.

20–21, 35–41, 57–61, 69–70, 84–92.

Marko Lehti

36. Resolutions of the Riga postal conference and its draft treaty, UM 40 A

Baltian maat; Memorandum 14.2.1922, UM 40 A Baltian maat; Postal

conference of the Baltic states in Riga 17–26.9.1920, ERA f 957, n, 11, s.

297, I. 57–58.

37. The minutes of the railway conference of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

Poland, the Ukraine and Finland, UM 85 B.

38. Mangone, 1954, pp. 67–97; Pollard, 1974, pp. 49–51,55, 118–21, 123–29

39. The minutes of the Bulduri conference, MBC, pp. 24–26, 43, 47–48, 69–

70, 77–92; The railway conference of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the

Ukraine and Finland, UM 85 B; The resolutions of the Riga conference on

economic issues. Ulkoministeriön poliittisen osaston tiedotuksia no. 13

30.9.1920, KA, RHK 29.

40. Tallents’s report from Riga 7.9.1920, PRO 371/3622/38-39; Åström’s

memorandum, KA, RHK 29; Memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga

conference, KA, RHK 29; The minutes of the Bulduri conference 6.9.1020,

MBC, 103; Balti riikide wolnikude nõukogu, PO 10.9.1920.

41. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 20.8.1920, MBC, pp. 24–26;

Memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga conference, KA, RHK 29;

Åström’s memorandum, KA, RHK 29.

42. The railway conference of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine

and Finland, UM 85 B. Regional railway conferences were not exceptional

during the post-war years but the idea of a common central bureau was

unique.

43. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 3.9., 4.9.1920, MBC, pp. 72–76,

93–95. In the draft version of the nationality law the right to nationality was

reserved to those persons whose parents and ancestors had lived in the

country. For newcomers, five years’ permanent residence before the war was

expected. Nationality questions did not, after the First Word War, form a

similar question of principle as after the Cold War in the 1990s.

44. The meeting of the Estonian delegation 6.8.1920, ERA f.9S7, n.11, s.378,

1.89; the secret decision of the Estonian government nr 39 31.8.1920, ERA f

31, n.1, s.14, 1.23.

45. Ulkoministerion poliittisen osaston tiedotuksia no. 13 30.9.1920, KA,

RHK 29; Memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga conference, KA, RHK

29; Instructions to the Finnish delegation, UM 12 A 7.

46. Dziewanowski, 1969, pp. 295–302; Zamoyski 2008.

47. Dziewanowski, 1969, p. 302; Arumae, 1983, pp. 49–51. Arumae has

argued that the main aim of the Poles was to receive help. However, no sign

of this kind of activity during the first critical weeks of the conference were

seen. The Poles still perhaps aimed at guarantees from the Baltic States for a

right of passage to the Polish troops led by General Żeligowski through

Latvian and Lithuanian territories against the Red Army. A mysterious and

obscure document is the only evidence preserved. (Itämeren valtioiden

The Dancing Conference of Bulduri

kokouksen salainen sopimus (The Secret Treaty of the Baltic States)

16.8.1920, KA, EK-VALPO XXXVII, folder 698; Baltijas waists

konferenzes slepenais 16.8.1920, LVVA f. 1313, apr. 1, I. 155, Ip. 8. See also

Tallents’s reports 14.8, 6.8 .1920, PRO 371/3620/586-589, 371/3621/15–18. .

48. Dziewanowski, 1969, pp. 303–04; Davies, 1972, pp. 195–225.

49. On the general shift in the conference atmosphere see Dziewanowski,

1969, pp. 321–22; Hovi, 1980, p. 98. See also Tallents’s report from Riga

23.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/308–22; Åström’s telegram 25.8.1920, KA, RHK

29.

50. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 21.8.1920, MBC, 49─50;

Åström’s report 11.9.1920, KA, RHK 29.

51. The treaty of Riga, 31.8.1920, KA, RHK 29.

52. Instructions to the Finnish delegation at the Riga conference, UM 12 A 7;

Minutes of the Bulduri conference, 31.8.1920, MBC, 52; Decisions of the

Estonian government nr 39, ERA f. 31, n. 1, s. 14, I. 23; The meeting of the

Estonian delegation at Bulduri 18.8.1920, ERA f. 1582, n. 1, s. 71, I. 10–13.

53. Tallents’s report from Riga 31.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/422–40; Holsti’s

telegram 27.8,1920, KA, RHK 29; Åström’s telegram 25.8.1920, KA, RHK

29. Military co-operation had its own difficult problems. The Poles and

Latvians were afraid that the Lithuanians might use the information received

for wrong purposes and the Lithuanians were afraid of the aims of the Poles.

54. Pusta’s telegram 31.8.1920, ERA f. 31, n. 1, s. 1578, I. 337; Estonian

delegation material concerning border questions, ERA f. 1622, n. 1, s. 296, I.

124–34.

55. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 31.8.1920, MBC, 53–54;

Tallents’s report from Riga 12.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/49–50; Rumbold’s

report from Warsaw 17.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/223–28; Pusta’s telegram

31.8.1920, ERA f. 31, n. 1, s. 1578, I. 337. British observers saw the Poles as

the main obstacle to the success of cooperation at Bulduri. On the general

development between Poland and Lithuania see Senn, 1966, 32–36.

56. The treaty of Riga, KA, RHK 29.

57. The concept of security community was introduced by Karl Deutsch and

it was not used by contemporaries but, on the other hand, it provides a

concrete model for their efforts. The existence of this kind of community is,

of course, a relative question, but it could be used as tool of study. The

Nordic countries after the Second World War were for Deutsch an example

of a security community. Deutsch, 1957, pp. 5–6.

58. The resolutions of the Helsinki conference, UM 12 A 2; Tallents’s report

from Riga 30.8.1920, PRO 371/3621/421–26; Holsti’s telegram 25.8.1920,

KA, RHK 29.

59. The resolutions of the conferences were given immediately to the British

representatives. See Acton’s report from Helsinki 24.1.1920, PRO

Marko Lehti

371/3617/582–85. On Holsti’s activity see Tallents’s report from Riga

19.10.1920, PRO 371/5373/23–31.

60. For more detail on these demands see Tallents’s report from Riga

26.10.1920, PRO 371/5373/32–37; Hovi, 1984, pp. 146–48.

61. Hovi, 1984, pp. 149–50.

62. Senn, 1966,pp. 49–51, 59.

63. Balti riikide liidu konstrueerimine wiibid, WM 10.1.1921; Balti riikide

konwetsioonide saatus, WM 23.1.1921.

64. Credentials, LVVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 123, Ip. 2–5; Tallents’s report from

Riga 7.9.1920, PRO 371/3622/38–39.

65. The protocols of the meetings of the Baltic Council, LVVA f. 1313, apr.

2, I. 122, Ip. 9–34; Protocol of the list of names of the Baltic Council, LV VA

f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 124, Ip. 2–7. On Finnish attitudes see Åström’s

memorandum, KA, RHK 29.

66. The protocols of the meetings of the Baltic Council I, L VV A f. 1313,

apr. 2, I. 122, I p .9–72; Protocol of the list of names of the Baltic Council, L

VVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 124, Ip. 2–7.

67. Memorandum on the resolutions of the Riga conference, KA, RHK 29;

Åström’s memorandum, KA, RHK 29; Sylvander’s telegram 12.9.1920, KA,

RHK 29; Holsti to the chief of staff 23.9.1920, KA, RHK 29; Helsingius’s

report 3.12.1920, Sark 1407/14; Holsti to the chief of staff 16.11.1920, KA,

RH K 29. The decision of the Estonian government, ERA f. 31, n. 1, s. 215;

The protocol of the Baltic Council 14.10.1920, LVVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 122,

Ip. 23; Tallents’s report from Riga 18.10.1920, PRO 371/5374/261–62. See

also Skrzypek, 1972, pp. 69–71.

68. A good example was the Baltic postal treaty, which was drawn up in the

postal conference held just after the Bulduri conference. The Latvians ratified

the treaty on 3 January 1921, but no other nation followed them. See Piip’s

memorandum on the Riga conference, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 1127, I. 1–2;

Settlement of the results of the Riga conference, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 379, I.

19; The list made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry on the Implementation of

the Decisions of the Baltic Conferences, U M 12 A 2.

69. The minutes of the Bulduri conference 21.8.1920, MBC, 44; Bulletin 3.B.

5.9.1920; The protocol of the meeting of the Baltic Council 27.10.1920,

LVVA f. 1313, apr. 2, I. 122, Ip. 27; Budget du Conseil des Delegues

plenipotentiaires des Etats Baltiques, ERA f. 957, n. 11, s. 671, I. 3.

70. For the contemporaries’ views, see, e.g., Kas panahktas Bulduru

konferenze? BZ 5.9.1920.

The Dancing Conference of Bulduri

Bibliography