18 Hitler: Study of a revolutionary?
He did not believe for a minute that the ideology should be taken at face value and
treated within the framework of the ‘history of ideas’ (Stern, 1961, pp. xi and xiv).
The psychology of the men creating the concepts was what mattered, not the
intellectual content itself. Questioning both the originality and consistency of Nazi
ideas, Hans Mommsen has denounced them as ‘an eclectic conglomeration of
völkisch concepts indistinguishable from the programmes of out-and-out
nationalist organisations and parties of the imperialist period’ (Mommsen, 1976, p.
152). There was nothing new, or of particular interest in the ideas: Nazism was not
an ideological movement, but a ‘political propaganda organization’, ‘a negative
people’s party’ (Mommsen, 1976, p. 154). It opposed everything, but offered only
images and slogans in return.
Perhaps the most sustained attack on Nazi ideology came from Martin Broszat.
He agreed that Hitler’s movement based itself less on rational argument than on
emotional appeal. The ideas at stake did not matter so much in their own right as
how they operated psychologically (Broszat, 1958, p. 60). Nazi ideology was not a
proper analysis of the world, just a mass of commonly held disappointments
jumbled together (Broszat, 1966, p. 32). It was typified by ‘intellectual chaos’, a
‘frightening lack of foundation’ and ‘moral perversion’ (Broszat, 1966, pp. 38 and
50). Hitler was not concerned with clarifying concepts and systematising thought,
he was not interested in understanding the world and trying to improve upon it, he
was only expressing ‘the fanaticism of pure aggression’ which was ‘without content,
believing only in its own irresistible momentum’ (Broszat, 1966, p. 59). The
attractiveness and skill with which Hitler presented his movement covered up its
complete lack of intellectual foundation. If you ignored Hitler’s anti-Semitic
obsession, even his personal ideology became just a set of propaganda slogans
(Broszat, 1966, p. 53).
Views such as these have been taken on board wholesale. Ian Kershaw has
characterised Nazi doctrine as ‘a paradoxical concoction of conservative and
radical elements without any basis in the intellectual rigour of a rational
philosophy, a cynical “catch-all” programme offering a rag-bag of contradictions in
which it is hard to distinguish “idea” from “presentation of an idea”’ (Kershaw,
1983, pp. 162–3). Attempts have been made to divest even Hitler’s anti-Semitism
of an ideological element. As Hannah Arendt has put it, to try to understand anti-
Semitism is to challenge your sanity (Arendt, 1966, p. 3). In the words of Peter
Merkl, it remains ‘no more an idea or an ideology than a common obscenity is’
(Merkl, 1985, p. 448).
These are the views of full-time, professional scholars: individuals with the luxury
of time to chase and define ideas. They have been trained to do just this. When
Hitler as a young man was rejected by the Academy of Art in Vienna (see Chapter
7), his entrée to the academic world was closed firmly. What is more, as a full-time
politician he had plenty of pressing practical issues to deal with ahead of clarifying to
a pedantic degree ideological thinking. So are the standards applied by historians as
they dismember and vilify Hitler’s ideas really applicable? In other words, Hitler’s
ideas were certainly unpleasant, unevenly developed, downright wrong-headed and