Housden M. Hitler. Study of a Revolutionary? (2000)
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58 Hitler: Study of a revolutionary?
technocrats able to produce memoranda about the sort of policies which might be
pursued in a National Socialist Germany. In other words, under Hitler’s renewed
leadership, the party began to look a bit like a modern political machine.
As of 1928, the self-presentation of Hitler changed according to the needs of
national popularity. So effective was the ‘marketing’ of the man and his message
that lan Kershaw has spoken of the creation of a ‘Hitler Myth’ (Kershaw, 1987, 1994)
An image was built up which offered a benevolent kind of hope to almost everyone.
From 1929 onwards, Hitler took particular pains to appeal to small-town, middle-
class voters and their neuroses. Play was made on economic fears and the dangers
of Communism. Hitler took steps to disassociate himself from the more radical,
socialist-inclined pressure groups within his party. When, in 1929, the party
congress was held in the heartland of its more left-wing (relatively speaking)
followers, the Ruhr, Hitler did not attend (Orlow, 1969, p. 152). By contrast, he was
happy to allow more mainstream middle-class organisations to be established in the
party. In 1928 the Fighting Association for German Culture (Kampfbund für deutsche
Kulture) was set up as a cultural-cum-intellectual organisation to pull professional
people, such as school and university teachers, towards the party (Steinweis, 1991,
p. 406). In the same year the Association of National Socialist German Jurists was
set up with a comparable aim in mind (Jarausch, 1985, p. 391). Similar organisations
were established to attract civil servants and doctors.
The new strategy was ripe for the times. In May 1928 the party received only
2.6% of the national vote in the Reichstag elections and so received only 12 seats
(the figures in 1924 had been 3% and 14). But the drive to capture middle-class
interest was accompanied by the Wall Street crash of October 1929. It was a time
when the bourgeoisie, like everyone else, began to feel under threat (Jarausch,
1990b). As a result of Hitler’s political reorientation and crisis, the Reichstag
election of September 1930 saw support for the NSDAP rise to 18.3% and the
number of seats to 107. A breakthrough had been achieved.
Had Hitler and his movement put their revolutionary origins behind them once
and for all? Was this now a respectable leader heading a respectable party deploying
respectable arguments to rally respectable voters? Actually this was only one side of
a dual-track approach. Hitler had to look this way. After the failure of 1923, the
strategy was a last resort rather than a first choice. In truth, Hitler despised the
German bourgeois middle classes deeply and told Richard Breitlin, a journalist from
the Leipziger Neusten Nachrichten, as much in May 1931 (Calic, 1968, pp. 22 ff.).
Respectability was something only grafted onto the man and his movement. It was
not the main stem of National Socialism. Munich’s police department understood
the true character of Hitler at an early point. Before his release from prison in 1924,
it reported as follows.
Document 3.11 Permanent Danger
Numerous acts of violence committed by his followers . . . must be ascribed
entirely to his influence. With his energy, he will undoubtedly be the
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instigator of serious fresh disturbances and constitute a permanent danger
to the security of the state. The moment he is released . . . Hitler will resume
his ruthless struggle against the government and will not be afraid to break
the law.
Source: Quoted in C. Cross, Adolf Hitler, 1973, p. 102
Two weeks after his release, Hitler visited Bavarian Minister President Held and
persuaded him of his peaceful intent. The party had been banned in the wake of the
putsch, but now Held lifted all bans on the NSDAP and on Hitler being allowed to
speak in public. He waited until 27 February 1925 for his first puplic appearance (i.e.
not including closed party meetings), and then decided to make it in Munich’s biggest
beer hall. People queued for two hours to get a seat; 3,000 gained admittance, a
further 2,000 were turned away. As Hitler got into his stride he soon began to
threaten violence against Jews and Marxists. He promised that either ‘the enemy
passes over our bodies or we pass over theirs’. He announced his hope that should
he fail to win power at his next attempt, then the swastika flag could be draped
across his body. He incited the crowd to violence and as a result was banned from
speaking publicly in Bavaria for two years (Cross, 1973, pp. 108–9; Tyrell, 1969, p.
97). Most other German states followed suit. Bans of two years’ duration came in
Baden, Saxony, Hamburg and Lübeck. Bans of three years were imposed in Prussia
and Anhalt (Tyrell, 1969, pp. 107–8). If Hitler stopped sounding radical in the years
immediately after his release from prison, the characteristic was helped by the German
authorities’ doing much to ensure this was so.
What is more, Hitler’s first choice for a new strategy upon release was not
actually to begin to curry the support of Germany’s most respectable classes. He
was still playing with the possibility of direct action. As late as 1927 Hitler’s
commitment to the electoral process was lukewarm. He had issued no specific
orders about what form participation should take. These only began to emerge in
November 1927. Before this point he was considering an ‘urban plan’. The aim
was to develop more than twenty cities into heartlands for the movement based
neither on paramilitary nor electoral strength, but rather on the establishment of
successful party organisations. These were to become so strong that, should the
need arise, Hitler and his followers could strangle the cities and catapult
themselves to power. The urban plan implied the need to attract city workers
away from Communism and Socialism, and towards National Socialism. The
following leaflet was circulated around the industrial centre of Karlsruhe in May
1927. It reflects the needs of the time. National Socialist racial doctrine was
applied to argue that workers should not be worried so much about ‘capitalist’ as
‘Jewish’ exploitation.
Document 3.12 Marxism is Madness
Creative Workers! Social Democrats! Communists!
Almost seventy years of struggle and sacrifice. And what are the results?
60 Hitler: Study of a revolutionary?
The bank Jews stash away massive profits. The department store capitalists
live the high-life without creating anything.
You slave and suffer! Why?
Because Marxism is madness. Your leaders are liars and traitors. We can
show you the way to bread and freedom.
The miner and National Socialist, Comrade Kaufmann, will speak on the
theme: ‘The proletariat – the bodyguard of the bank-Jews’. (Members of the
SPD [German Socialist Party] and KPD [German Communist Party] who
produce membership cards may come into the meeting free of charge.)
Source: S. Taylor, Prelude to Genocide, 1985, p. 49
Hitler toyed with the urban strategy until its shortcomings became all too clear.
National Socialist organisation in large towns and cities was often chaotic and
feudridden. The party found it hard to compete with the well-established Communist
and Socialist organisations which proliferated there. Wholesale violence with the
Reds led to bans which hindered the very purpose of the plan. As a result, Hitler
allowed the urban plan to lapse.
The quintessence of Hitler’s deception of respectability became manifest during
the trial of the Ulm officers which took place in September 1930. The episode
showed that he remained as much of a revolutionary agitator as ever. It was one of
the most important political events in the life of the Weimar Republic and a
‘milestone’ in the development of the party (Bucher, 1967, p. 1; Broszat, 1987, p.
23). At stake was much more than the actions of the three junior army officers who
were accused of treason on account of setting up National Socialist cells within the
army. Eventually the three received sentences of 18 months’ imprisonment. But in
the midst of weighty accusations, Hitler took the stand. His testimony, made once
again in the full glare of the national press, rambled across the history of his party.
Its main thrust was as follows.
Document 3.13 Hitler at Ulm
a) Hitler: . . . But I may assure you: if our movement is victorious in its legal
battle, then a German supreme court will come and the sins of November
1918 will be found out, and then heads will roll.
The last part of Hitler’s comments was accompanied by a lively shout of
‘Bravo’ from the audience, which the chairman immediately reprimanded.
Chairman: I will not tolerate such talk, we are not in either a theatre or a
political meeting where you can shout ‘Bravo’ and hiss. Rather we are in a
court of law, with all earnestness to seek out justice. . . .
b) Hitler: . . . What is more, I have not created an instrument in order to
implement a violent revolution. I have organised nothing to implement it.
Our party is not the mouthpiece of a German revolutionary movement.
The propaganda which we practise, is a mental/spiritual revolutionising of
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the German Volk, a transformation to a new ideology, which at the very
least is as gigantic as the transformation to Marxist thinking or the
transformation from feudal state to a democratic–parliamentary system.
The NSDAP wants a perfectly new ideas world, to construct a completely
new state. It cannot occur to me for one second to fight against a state with
a consolidated army and a police force. Violence is not necessary for our
movement.
Source: P. Bucher, Der Reichswehrprozess, 1967, pp. 260–1, 266–7
This was a clever performance meant to satisfy the needs of both the court and his
followers. In purely formal terms Hitler emphasised time and again constitutional
intent (as in document 3.13, quotation ‘b’). The chairman of the court accepted the
comments. He found there was no proof of genuine revolutionary purpose on Hitler’s
part at this time. Hitler hoped that the view appealed to the respectable middle-class
individuals being drawn to the party’s new organisations. But the more radical, longer-
established wing of the party would have taken heart too. Clearly Hitler’s commitment
to legality was paper-thin (as shown in document 3.13, quotation ‘a’). He was seeking
to win power within the framework of the law, only to overthrow the state as it
existed at the time and institute a dreadful day of reckoning against his opponents.
Hitler used the Ulm trial to deride the Weimar system.
His taunting took a remarkable turn when the so-called ‘Boxheim’ documents
were handed over to the Frankfurt police in November 1931 by a one-time National
Socialist supporter who had defected from the party’s ranks. Although Hitler
personally was not involved in this débâcle, it emphasises further the true character
of the movement. The documents had been drafted over the previous summer by
National Socialist activist Werner Best and were agreed by leading figures in the
Hesse division of the party in a meeting held at the ‘Boxheimerhof’ near Worms.
The documents were written as if a Communist insurrection had been staged and it
was left to the National Socialist organisation to restore order and govern the land.
In other words, the documents laid down the basis for a Germany in which National
Socialism came to power through force (Herbert, 1996, p. 112).
Document 3.14 Boxheim
Draft of the first announcement of our leadership after the dissolution of the
prior supreme state authorities [i.e. the Weimar authorities] and after the
supersession of the commune [i.e. a hypothetical Communist administration]
in favour of an area suitable for a uniform administration.
Citizens!
The previous bearers of state power in the Reich and Land have been
dissolved by the events of recent days (weeks). By this actual alteration –
as in Nov. 1918 – a new legal condition has been created. At the moment
power stands with the. . . . (SA, territorial army, or some other formation)
alone. As a result, our leadership has the right and the duty to seize the
62 Hitler: Study of a revolutionary?
power of state which has been abandoned and to exercise it for the salvation
of the Volk. It does this in the name of the German nation, before whose
future alone it is responsible for the fulfilment of its tasks and for the
choice of its means.
The unheard of danger demands extraordinary measures, in order in the
first place to save the naked life of the Volk. The first task is the creation of
public security and the organisation of food supplies for the Volk. Only the
severest discipline of the population and the rigorous application of armed
force allows the solution of these tasks to appear possible.
As commander of the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force), in . . .
(Starkenburg, Rheinhessen, Oberhessen) I issue the following order to the
whole population of the land:
1. any order of the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force), issued by
whatever rank of member, is to be carried out immediately. Resistance
will be met basically with the death penalty. Summary courts can impose
other penalties by the presentation of special circumstances;
2. every gun is to be handed over to the . . . (SA, territorial army or any
other force) within 24 hours. Whoever is found in possession of a gun,
after the expiry of the period, will be shot on the spot as an enemy of
the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force) and of the German
Volk;
3. every official, employee and worker in the service of public authorities or
public transport organisations must resume his post at once. Resistance
and sabotage will be punished with the death penalty.
In the place of the supreme offices of state (ministries) appears the
leadership of the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force) represented
by me.
4. the emergency orders issued by the leadership of the . . . (SA, territorial
army or any other force) hold the force of law for everyone on the day of
their publication on posters. Offences against these emergency orders
will be punished above and beyond the penalties they stipulate with death
in especially severe cases.
5. in so far as they are not contradicted by the emergency orders issued by
the leadership of the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force) or the
individual orders of the . . . (SA, territorial army or any other force), all
the other laws which exist remain in force and are to be followed by the
population in every respect.
Source: Das Parlament, 3, 11 (1953) p. 2
With a clear statement of totalitarian control for the community, and the proliferation
of death penalties for offences large and small, the document was as radical as any
likely be agreed by leading regional members of a party which had over 100 seats in
the national parliament. An investigation by the Republic’s police lasted for almost a
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year, but in the end no court case was brought. Once again, however, the commitment
of the National Socialist movement to legality showed itself highly superficial. Hitler
never held this affair against Werner Best, who later rose through the ranks of the
SS to become one of Heinrich Himmler’s leading acolytes.
Hitler played an agitatory role in the Potempa affair of 1932. The year marked
the climax of his political struggle. There were 15 electoral campaigns across the
nation. On 13 March the inconclusive first round of the presidential election saw
Hitler receive 11.3 million votes and Hindenburg 18.6 million. The second round
followed in April. Hitler received 13.4 million votes but Hindenburg won with 19
million. In the Reichstag elections, the party received 37.3% (230 seats) of the vote
in July. It slipped back a little to 33.1% (196 seats) in November. Hitler’s personal
workload during this year was legendary. His use of an aircraft during June and July
to take him from meeting to meeting meant his campaign became dubbed the
‘Freedom Flight over Germany’. (For an additional insight regarding Hitler’s energy,
see Chapter 9, thesis 4.)
The party faithful were highly active too. By 20 July 1932 the year had seen 500
clashes between Nazis and left-wingers in Prussia alone; 99 were left dead and 1,125
wounded (Fest, 1973, pp. 338–9). Competing paramilitaries battled for control of
the streets. President Hindenburg tried to take decisive action. On 9 August 1932 he
introduced a law providing the death penalty for politically motivated manslaughter.
On the night of 9–10 August, in the town of Potempa in Silesia, five drunken SA
men burst into the home of a Communist, Konrad Pietzuch (who was an ethnic
Pole), and kicked him to death in front of his family. The trial of the five was held
later that month in Beuthen. When they were found guilty and sentenced to death,
local National Socialists went on the rampage, smashing up Jewish shops (Bessel,
1977, p. 252). More remarkable, given the horrendous nature of the crime and the
political sensitivity of the period, was Hitler’s reaction. He sent an open telegram to
the five.
Document 3.15 Monstrous
My comrades! As a result of this monstrous blood judgement [Bluturteils] I
feel myself bound to you with unlimited loyalty. From this moment on your
freedom is a question of our honour. The fight against a government under
which this was possible is our duty!
Source: M. Hirsch, D. Majer and J. Meinck, Recht, Verwaltung und Justiz,
1984, p. 77
He went out of his way to publicise his support for the convicted murderers. On 29
August 1932 in Berlin Hitler addressed the National Socialist deputies in the Reichstag.
He said it was incomprehensible that five National Socialists could go to the guillotine
for the sake of a Polish insurgent. Whoever fought for Germany had rights, whoever
fought against the country had none (Domarus, 1990, p. 161). He published a special
article in the National Observer which argued along similar lines (Hirsch et al., 1984,
64 Hitler: Study of a revolutionary?
p. 77). Hitler could not have been clearer in his support for violent, terroristic
action.
Agitatory élan was so much a part of Hitler’s make-up that he carried it into the
negotiations he was holding at this time with President von Hindenburg. As head of
the largest party in the Reichstag, Hitler was exploring the possibility of establishing
a government in association with other parties. On 21 November 1932, just weeks
before he was actually made Reich Chancellor, Hitler wrote to the Reich President
as follows.
Document 3.16 Waging a Fight
Dear Reich President,
From press reports and the declaration by Secretary of State Meissner I
have learned of Your Excellency’s intention to ask me officially to start
negotiations with other parties even before the formation of a new Presidential
Government. This request seems to me so important that, for the sake of Your
Excellency’s name and authority, no less than the urgent salvation of the German
people, I feel that I must set down my views on the matter in writing.
For the past thirteen years I have been waging a fight against the
parliamentary system. I consider it an obstacle to political decision-making
and also the expression of the national will. Thanks to unflagging propaganda
by myself and my collaborators, this conviction is now shared by millions of
Germans, who have welcomed Your Excellency’s decision to do justice to
this new awareness and to appoint a new national leadership. But if this
leadership is not to end in catastrophe then it must have a constitutional
basis and become the true spokesman of the nation in a relatively short time.
It must therefore have an inner, vital contact with a capable section of the
German nation, and must make it its business to increase its numbers until it
eventually extends to the whole nation. If this is not done, the result will be
a dictatorship based on and protected by bayonets alone. It is bound to
collapse for internal reasons or else during the first attack from abroad. The
result can only be Bolshevism. Hence foreseeing the failure of the von Papen
government after the experience of its first six weeks I said on 13 August
that it was only by entrusting the National Socialist Movement with this
mission that the task could be performed satisfactorily.
For reasons into which I need not enter here, Your Excellency saw fit to
reject my proposal.
[Hitler goes on to say he would consider leading a government based on a Presidential
Cabinet with the same authority as the previous comparable governments.]
Source: W. Maser, Hitler’s Letters and Notes, 1974, p. 176
Hitler was quite open in his demand for considerable governmental authority to
create an alternative type of political system (i.e. not parliamentary democracy)
which would bind together the whole of the German people. Understandably,
Agitator 65
Hindenburg was unnerved and sent a reply to Hitler refusing to hand power to him
(Michalka and Niedhart, 1980, p. 340). As late as 27 January 1933 Hindenburg
commented, ‘You cannot for one moment, gentlemen, imagine that I intend to appoint
that Austrian corporal Reich Chancellor’ (Davidson, 1977, p. 357). But with the
Communists having gained 96 Reichstag seats in the November elections, Hindenburg
and the traditional conservatives around him were desperate men.
So did Hitler employ revolutionary means against the Weimar Republic? In terms
of the definition presented in Chapter 1, the answer is unequivocal: he did. Always
a skilled orator who knew how to motivate a following, Hitler was swift to grasp the
political initiative and pursued violent, illegal action which in 1923 culminated in a
direct attack on the state. As a result he was consigned to prison. Upon release, he
changed to political methods which, although nominally legal and respectable, still
gloried in both the threat and the application of violence against his enemies. Even
now elements among his supporters showed evidence of sustained revolutionary
zeal, both in the nature of their plans to seize political power (see document 3.14)
and in their assaults on political opponents. Always bold and confident, Hitler
remained locked in a remorseless and fundamental struggle with the Weimar
system (as he explained unequivocally in document 3.16). It is simply remarkable
that he behaved as he did and still managed to capture almost 40% of the votes cast
in the free national elections of so sophisticated a country.
Dictator
Document 4.1 Hitler at the Olympic Stadium, 1938
4
© Planet News
Source: The Wiener Library, London
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Document 4.2 Hitler after the Fall of France, 1940
© Associated Press
Source: The Wiener Library, London