Hillstrom K., Hillstrom L.C. Vietnam war. Almanac

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after a long war. A few months later, both China and the Soviet

Union formally recognized Ho Chi Minh and his Communist

leadership as the rightful rulers of Vietnam. Then, in June

28 Vietnam War: Almanac

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower

(1890–1969; president 1953–1961) was a

firm believer in the so-called “Domino

Theory.” This theory stated that when one

country in a region fell to communism,

other nations in that region came under

much greater risk of falling to communism

as well. In April 1954, he held a press

conference in which he explained the

theory and his views on Indochina to the

American public. At one point, a reporter

asked Eisenhower to explain the strategic

importance of China to the United States

and other democratic nations. Eisenhower

gave the following response:

You have, of course, both the specific

and the general when you talk about such

things. First of all, you have the specific

value of a locality in its production of

materials that the world needs. Then, you

have the possibility that many human

beings pass under a dictatorship that is

inimical [harmful] to the free world.

Finally, you have broader

considerations that might follow what you

would call the ‘falling domino’ principle.

You have a row of dominoes set up, you

knock over the first one, and what will

happen to the last one is the certainty that

it will go over very quickly. So you could

have a beginning of a disintegration that

would have the most profound influences.

Now, with respect to the first

[consideration], two of the items from this

particular area that the world uses are tin

and tungsten. They are very important.

There are others, of course, the rubber

plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people

passing under this domination, Asia, after

all, has already lost some 450 million of its

peoples to the Communist dictatorship,

and we simply can’t afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible

sequence of events, the loss of Indochina,

of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula,

and Indonesia following, now you begin to

talk about areas that not only multiply the

disadvantages that you would suffer

through loss of materials, sources of

materials, but now you are talking about

millions and millions and millions of

people.

Finally, the geographical position

achieved [by controlling Indochina] does

many things. It turns the so-called island

defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the

Philippines . . . to the southward; it moves

in to threaten Australia and New Zealand

[with communism].

[The loss of Indochina to communism]

takes away, in its economic respects, that

region that Japan must have as a trading

area or Japan, in turn, will have only one

place in the world to go—that is, toward

the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the

loss [of Indochina to communism] are just

incalculable [beyond calculation] to the

free world.

President Eisenhower and the Domino Theory

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1950, North Korea’s Communist government attacked U.S.-

supported South Korea, apparently with the approval of the

Soviets. The attack by North Korea triggered the Korean War

(1950–53), in which American-led forces defended South

Korea against the Communist armies of both North Korea and

China.

These events convinced the United States that it

needed to focus greater attention on the French-Viet Minh

conflict in Vietnam. All of Southeast Asia seemed to be in dan-

ger of being swallowed up by communism, and Vietnam sud-

denly loomed as a key strategic country in the fight to contain

it. American policymakers condemned Ho Chi Minh as a

Soviet-sponsored agent of communism and assured France

that the United States was willing to step forward and help

them in their battle to regain possession of Vietnam.

On February 7, 1950, the United States formally recog-

nized the French-controlled government of Bao Dai as the

legitimate government of Vietnam. By the spring of 1950, the

United States was providing direct political, economic, and

military support to French forces in Vietnam. Despite such aid,

however, many leaders harbored doubts about getting

involved in the region. In fact, many officials did not believe

that the United States would be able to help transform Viet-

nam into a peaceful, anticommunist nation. For example, ana-

lyst Raymond B. Fosdick argued that “whether the French like

it or not, independence is coming to Indochina. Why, there-

fore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their battered kite?” Most

U.S. officials, however, believed that the threat posed by com-

munism was so great that the United States had to side with

the French.

French support for war fades

U.S. military and economic assistance provided a

much-needed boost to the French war effort in Vietnam.

Despite the influx of U.S. aid, however, the Viet Minh man-

aged to strengthen their hold over the country’s northern

provinces. They were able to do this in large part because the

rise to power of the Communists in China, Vietnam’s neigh-

bor to the north, gave Ho Chi Minh and his forces a valuable

ally. In fact, the Chinese Communists provided the Viet Minh

The Indochina War (1946–54) 29

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with considerable military assistance throughout the remain-

der of the Indochina War.

With the help of Chinese weapons and other equip-

ment, the Viet Minh expanded quickly into a significant mili-

tary force. As their army grew in size, the Vietnamese Com-

munists showed a greater willingness to confront the French

in bigger battles, especially in the thick jungles of northern

30 Vietnam War: Almanac

Captured French soldiers

marching through fields

after surrendering to

the Vietnamese.

Reproduced by permission

of AP/World Wide Photos.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 30

Vietnam. The Viet Minh continued to

strengthen their hold over the region’s

rural areas, and in the fall of 1950 they

launched successful strikes against

French military positions and supply

routes throughout the area.

The assaults resulted in the

death or capture of approximately

6,000 French troops in October alone,

and ultimately forced French troops to

abandon large expanses of territory

along the Chinese border. “That was the

first disaster of the war,” confirmed

French historian Jean Lacouture. “[It]

gave the idea that the war was nearly

impossible to win because the Viet

Minh, with China behind it, had a great

enormous sanctuary. So the war became

more and more unpopular from 1950—

and very expensive, though of course

the United States paid.”

By the end of 1950, the Viet

Minh forces—commanded by General

Vo Nguyen Giap (1911– )—seemed to

be on their way to eventual victory. “Giap could feel satisfied

with his achievements in 1950,” writes Phillip B. Davidson,

author of Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975. “He demon-

strated the effectiveness of his Main Force units; he seized the

initiative; and he demoralized the French command. Beyond

that, he had unnerved the French government, which now

realized that there was no way to win Indochina without a

massive effort, and this was politically impossible.”

American aid not enough

From 1950 to 1954, the United States steadily

increased the amount of financial assistance it provided to

France’s military operations in Vietnam. By 1954, the U.S. aid

total reached almost $3 billion, an amount that covered about

80 percent of all French military spending in the Indochina

War. This was even more aid than France received from the

The Indochina War (1946–54) 31

Vo Nguyen Giap was the

leader of the North

Vietnamese military forces

for more than thirty years.

One of his greatest

achievements came in

the decisive battle of Dien

Bien Phu, which ended

the Indochina War in 1954.

Reproduced by permission

of Archive Photos.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 31

Marshall Plan, a massive U.S. program of financial assistance

designed to help European nations rebuild after the devasta-

tion of World War II.

Nonetheless, the war continued to swing in favor of

the Viet Minh. By the end of 1952, French casualties (dead,

wounded, and missing) had reached 80,000 to 90,000, and the

Communists showed no signs of letting up. In fact, the Viet

Minh made good use of traditional Vietnamese hostility

toward France in their efforts to gain new recruits to their

cause. Ho Chi Minh also continued to present the Viet Minh

as a primarily nationalistic—rather than Communist—force

that was fighting to restore Vietnamese independence. This

message appealed to many young men. It also made it very dif-

ficult for France to gain the support of Vietnamese communi-

ties, most of which just wanted an end to the war.

The battle of Dien Bien Phu

As 1953 unfolded, France continued to lose ground. By

late 1953, French territorial control had been reduced to posi-

tions around Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon, and a smattering of

other areas.

And in May 1954, France’s dream of re-establishing

colonial rule over Vietnam finally came to an end, as the

French suffered one of the most significant defeats in modern

military history.

In late 1953, a large French military force had been

assigned to Dien Bien Phu, a military post in northwestern

Vietnam. The French troops were sent there in order to prevent

the Viet Minh Communists from taking control of the Mekong

River valley and the nearby region that bordered the country of

Laos. By this time, however, war-weary France was already

preparing to negotiate an end to the war. In fact, Viet Minh and

French negotiators were scheduled to join other international

officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 7, 1954, to discuss

terms of a peace treaty. But French General Henri Navarre, who

ordered the deployment to Dien Bien Phu, reasoned that if the

French military still held strong positions in Vietnam when the

negotiations began, France would be able to negotiate a treaty

that would be more beneficial to its interests. As U.S. official

32 Vietnam War: Almanac

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Walter Medell Smith remarked at Geneva, “You don’t win at

the conference table what you’ve lost on the battlefield.”

Navarre’s plan underestimated the size and strength of

Viet Minh forces in the area surrounding Dien Bien Phu. In

early 1954, the Viet Minh successfully isolated the garrison

(military post) from other French troops, and in March they

launched a fierce siege on the stronghold. Over the next two

months, Viet Minh units battered the trapped French soldiers

with artillery, antiaircraft guns, and automatic weapons fire.

France tried to provide the garrison with supplies by para-

chute, but this strategy did not work very well. Many para-

chute drops missed their mark, and Viet Minh antiaircraft guns

shot down several French transport planes.

As the siege dragged on, conditions inside Dien Bien Phu

decayed rapidly. Outnumbered and outgunned, the garrison’s

defenders—which also included Vietnamese troops from Bao

Dai’s government—suffered terrible casualties, especially as food,

The Indochina War (1946–54) 33

A Vietnamese soldier

waving a flag over the

captured headquarters

of the French army at

Dien Bien Phu.

Reproduced by permission

of AP/World Wide Photos.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 33

medicine, ammunition, and other supplies dwindled away. “The

surgeons at Dien Bien Phu are reaching the limit of their

endurance, and the overflow of wounded are waiting on the

ground for their dressings to be changed,” reported the French

magazine Le Monde at the height of the siege. “The water of the

river in which bodies float can be filtered only in eyedrop

amounts. There is just enough water to give the men when they

get delirious from thirst.”

Alarmed by the deteriorating situation, some top U.S.

generals and advisors, including Vice President Richard Nixon

(1913–1994), recommended that the United States begin mili-

tary air strikes on Communist positions throughout northern

Vietnam. President Dwight Eisenhower (1890–1969; president

1953–1961), who succeeded Truman as president in 1953, gave

serious consideration to the proposal. After all, he firmly

believed that if the Communists gained control of Vietnam,

other Southeast Asian nations might also turn to communism.

But despite his belief in the Domino Theory, Eisenhower

decided that direct military involvement in Vietnam was too

risky. His refusal to order air strikes greatly angered the French

government, which realized that a major disaster was unfold-

ing at the remote outpost.

On May 7, 1954, the garrison at Dien Bien Phu was

finally overrun by Viet Minh forces. An estimated 8,000 Viet

Minh were killed in the siege and battle, and another 15,000

troops were injured during the campaign. By comparison, only

2,200 French troops died in the clash (another 6,000 were

wounded, and 10,000 were captured). But despite these statis-

tics, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was universally regarded as a

tremendous Viet Minh victory, and as a shocking defeat for

France. In fact, the loss of Dien Bien Phu triggered a tremen-

dous shakeup in the French government and created an outcry

against the war throughout France that could not be ignored.

On July 20, 1954, France agreed to permanently withdraw

from Vietnam under terms of an agreement known as the

Geneva Accords.

“The battle of Dien Bien Phu . . . ranks with Agincourt,

Waterloo, and Gettysburg as one of the great military engage-

ments in history,” writes Stanley Karnow in Howard Simpson’s

Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. “It spelled the end

of France’s crumbling empire in Asia, and while nobody fore-

34 Vietnam War: Almanac

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saw the possibility then, it eventually opened the way for

America’s commitment to the region over the years that fol-

lowed. So it was a decisive episode that indirectly set in motion

a process that was to have profound and pervasive conse-

quences for the United States.”

Sources

Billings-Yun, Melanie. Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu,

1954. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New

York: Praeger, 1958.

Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975. Novato, CA:

Presidio Press, 1988.

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boul-

der, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985.

Fall, Bernard. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadel-

phia: J. B. Lippincott, 1966.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. Rev. ed. New York: Viking, 1991.

Olson, James, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Viet-

nam, 1945–1990. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Wash-

ington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994.

The Indochina War (1946–54) 35

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n 1954, France gave up its colonial claims on Vietnam. But

even as France prepared to leave the region, the United States

and other democratic nations continued to assert influence on

the internal affairs of the country. Specifically, they forced Ho

Chi Minh’s Vietnamese Communists to accept a treaty that

divided Vietnam in half.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Ho Chi

Minh (1890–1969) established a Communist government in

North Vietnam. At the same time, the United States govern-

ment worked hard to support a non-Communist government

in South Vietnam. Ignoring the 1954 Geneva Accords—which

called for reunification of the country in 1956 after nation-

wide elections—U.S. officials threw their support behind an

anti-Communist politician named Ngo Dinh Diem

(1901–1963). At first, Diem’s government seemed like a strong

candidate for U.S. financial and military support. But as time

passed, Diem’s style of governing and the growth of political

opposition to his regime (government) sparked great concern

in the United States.

Early American Involvement

in Vietnam (1954–62)

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The division of Vietnam

The year 1954 marked a major turning point in the his-

tory of Vietnam. France reluctantly prepared to give up control

of the country, which it had held since the late nineteenth

century. At the same time, Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi

Minh hoped to establish Communist rule over the entire

nation. After all, the Viet Minh had seized control of much of

38 Vietnam War: Almanac

ARVN The South Vietnamese army, officially

known as the Army of the Republic of

South Vietnam. The ARVN fought on

the same side as U.S. troops during the

Vietnam War.

Buddhism A religion based on the teach-

ings of Siddhartha Gautama (known as

the Buddha; c. 563–c. 483

B.C.), in

which followers seek moral purity and

spiritual enlightenment. Buddhism was

the religion of the majority of citizens of

South Vietnam.

Communism A political system in which

the government controls all resources

and means of producing wealth. By

eliminating private property, this sys-

tem is designed to create an equal

society with no social classes.However,

Communist governments in practice

often limit personal freedom and

rights.

Hanoi The capital city of Communist North

Vietnam. Also an unofficial shorthand

way of referring to the North Viet-

namese government.

North Vietnam The Geneva Accords of

1954, which ended the First Indochina

War (1946–54), divided the nation of

Vietnam into two sections. The north-

ern section, which was led by a Com-

munist government under Ho Chi

Minh, was officially known as the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but

was usually called North Vietnam.

Saigon The capital city of U.S.-supported

South Vietnam. Also an unofficial short-

hand way of referring to the South Viet-

namese government.

South Vietnam Created under the Geneva

Accords of 1954, the southern section

of Vietnam was known as the Republic

of South Vietnam. It was led by a U.S.-

supported government under Ngo

Dinh Diem.

Viet Cong Vietnamese Communist guerilla

fighters who worked with the North Viet-

namese Army to conquer South Vietnam.

Viet Minh Communist-led nationalist group

that worked to gain Vietnam’s indepen-

dence from French colonial rule.

Words to Know

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