Hess Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864

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258 Charleston

and the difﬁculties it caused in coordinating the movements of supporting

troops. No more than about 500 men in line could pass through the deﬁle.

Each supporting wave of troops was too late to help the 54th Massachusetts

exploit its minor advantage or to help Putnam’s brigade take advantage of its

signiﬁcant toehold. Gillmore made this problem worse by halting Putnam’s

brigade at least twenty minutes. An additional problem was the confusion

inherent in using the same narrow deﬁle for retreat as well as advance.

Supporting units had to breast the ﬂow of defeated remnants of previous

assaults streaming to the rear.

≥∏

Gillmore was a superb engineer, but he was far less experienced as an

infantry commander. ‘‘It may be said,’’ he later wrote, ‘‘that in making this

assault the traditions and maxims of the engineer and his reverence for the

spade and shovel as weapons of war were placed in abeyance.’’ It was Gill-

more’s way of saying he was out of his element. The attack of July 18 elec-

triﬁed the nation because it was the ﬁrst well-publicized use of black troops

in combat during the war, and the 54th Massachusetts had not only led the

assault but had performed as well as any white unit could have done in its

place. Yet the attempt to capture Wagner by a coup de main utterly failed,

despite the greater degree of preparation, the massive artillery bombard-

ment, and the much larger force employed. Some 5,000 Federals partici-

pated in the operation, and 1,515 were lost. Beauregard reported that his men

buried 800 bodies the next day, while a member of the 32nd Georgia, which

had been rushed into the fort that night, counted 115 dead in a section of the

ditch that measured only 100 feet long. Putnam was killed, Strong was

mortally wounded, and Seymour was injured. Taliaferro lost 222 men.

≥π

Improved assaults would not work against such a strong position, pro-

tected as much by nature as by the engineering art. It was now time for

Gillmore to exercise his own mastery of siegecraft.

12 : The Reduction of Battery Wagner

fter the repulse of July 18, Gillmore decided to reduce

Wagner by siege approaches and to begin bombarding

Sumter at the same time. His position was close enough

to the latter work to allow Parrotts to strike the ma-

sonry walls. It was believed that the siege approaches

might not have to be run all the way to Wagner, for if Sumter’s guns could be

dismounted, the navy might be able to run in and cut off boat communica-

tion between Charleston and Morris Island. This would accomplish a com-

plete investment of Wagner and starve the garrison into surrender.

∞

The result was one of the classic siege operations of the Civil War. The re-

duction of Battery Wagner was the largest, most signiﬁcant offensive against

Charleston. It involved the use of several modern devices, from land mines to

calcium lights, and was directed by a gifted engineer who also served as

commander of the Federal army conducting the siege. The Confederate de-

fending force was badly outnumbered and nearly cut off from the outside

world, but it held Wagner for two months under conditions that became

appalling.

While Gillmore continued to act as his own engineer, he had several engi-

neer ofﬁcers to supervise the construction of works. Col. Edward Wellman

Serrell, Maj. Thomas Benton Brooks, and Lt. Peter S. Michie were among the

best engineers in the Union army. Serrell and Brooks had been commis-

sioned in the 1st New York Engineers. The latter was put in charge of the saps

and the batteries that supported them.

≤

For his part, Beauregard fully realized what was to come. ‘‘Contest here is

now one of engineering,’’ he wrote Adj. Gen. Samuel Cooper in Richmond.

‘‘With sufﬁcient time, labor and long range guns, our success is probable,

owing to plan of defense adopted. Otherwise, it is doubtful in proportion to

the lack of those three elements.’’ To that end, Beauregard ordered Wagner to

be held until its parapet was so badly damaged it could no longer protect the

garrison, and then the infantry was to defend each sand hill between Wagner

and Gregg. The latter work could hold out for a few days on its own, he

thought. Like Gillmore, Beauregard was a ﬁne engineer, and he had a slate of

good subordinates under him. Col. David B. Harris headed a contingent of

’

Beach

Marsh

Beach

Mortar

battery

Mortar battery

Boom

Surf battery

Bombproof for

Picket Reserve

Bombproof for Picket Reserve

Battery Wagner

Palisade

Abatis

Barricade

Inclined

palisade

Inclined

palisade

Inclined

palisade

Battery

Reynolds

Battery

Weed

Causeway to Batteries O

’Rorke,

Rorke,

Reno, Stevens, Strong, and Kirby,

Left Wing Battery, Right

Wing Battery, and Advanced Gun

Old road converted

to military use

Battery

Brown

Battery Meade

Battery

Meade

2nd parallel

3rd parallel

5th parallel

Bombproof

Torpedoes

4th parallel

Battery

Kearney

Battery Kearney

Battery

Rosecrans

Battery

Rosecrans

Abatis

Wire entanglement

Old road

converted

to military use

Causeway to Batteries O’Rorke,

Reno, Stevens, Strong, and Kirby,

Left Wing Battery, Right

Wing Battery, and Advanced Gun

Old road converted

to military use

Old wharf

Battery

Brown

Battery Meade

Battery

Meade

2nd parallel

3rd parallel

5th parallel

Bombproof

Torpedoes

4th parallel

Battery

Kearney

Battery Kearney

Battery

Rosecrans

Battery

Rosecrans

Abatis

Roa

Wire entanglement

Old road

converted

to military use

Reduction of Battery Wagner, July 18–September 7, 1863

The Reduction of Battery Wagner 261

Confederate and state engineers (some of the latter were state ofﬁcers and

others were hired civilians). Normally Harris reported to Ripley; but Beau-

regard wanted to be kept minutely informed of developments, so he he asked

for Harris’s direct report. Later in the siege, Beauregard requested that Chief

Engineer Jeremy F. Gilmer come to Charleston to offer his counsel.

≥

The ﬁrst parallel was opened 1,300 yards from the fort on the night of July

19. Gillmore packed it with defensive features. A palisades was built across

the entire island to its front, and wire entanglements were placed in front of

the palisades. A Requa battery was placed on the left ﬂank of the parallel.

This was an experimental gun that mounted twenty-ﬁve barrels of a similar

caliber as a riﬂe musket on a horizontal platform. The barrels could be

loaded quickly by using a bar to work cartridges into all of them simulta-

neously, and another bar adjusted the barrels laterally so that the bullets

would scatter for a width of 120 yards at the weapon’s maximum range. It

could deliver a barrage by all the barrels at one time.

∂

The second parallel was opened on the night of July 23 by the ﬂying sap

(sending men into the open under cover of darkness to dig in before the Reb-

els discovered their presence). It was about 600 yards in front of the ﬁrst and

only 200 yards from the Confederate picket line. While the ﬁrst parallel was

225 yards long, this second was 175 yards long, since the width of the island

narrowed on the approach to Wagner. A battery of ﬁeld guns was planted on

the right of the second parallel, and inclined palisading and more wire en-

tanglements were placed about 100 yards in front. The parallel was opened by

425 men of the 4th New Hampshire and 75 men of the 1st New York Engineers.

It was not an easy task, as there often was not enough sand dug up before they

reached the water table, and materials had to be hauled forward to build up

the parapet. Worse than that was the discovery right behind the parallel of an

old cemetery used by the city of Charleston to bury victims of disease. Some

were in cofﬁns, but many were simply wrapped in blankets or had no covering

at all. Because there was so little space on the island, the Federals placed the

corpses in the parapet. Zigzag communication trenches connecting the two

parallels were dug on the night of July 24, again using the ﬂying sap under

cover of darkness, while the parapet of the parallel was revetted with sand-

bags. Traverses and the banquette tread were built on July 25. The second

parallel was ready for use by that night, and the ﬁrst parallel was evacuated as

Gillmore’s siege force moved forward. The Federals took up the inclined

palisades in front of the ﬁrst parallel and used it in the advanced position.

∑

Gillmore placed eleven Parrott riﬂes in the second parallel and planted

seven more to the left and rear of the ﬁrst parallel in preparation for the

bombardment of Fort Sumter. A bombproof was built on the site of the

262 The Reduction of Battery Wagner

cemetery just behind the second parallel; it was used by the infantrymen

until needed as a magazine. The headquarters of the general of the trenches

was placed in this parallel, too.

∏

The third parallel was opened on the night of August 9, a month after the

initial Union landing on Morris Island. It lay 330 yards in front of the second

parallel and 540 yards from Wagner. This time only 124 engineer troops were

used. They started a communications trench to link the second with the third

parallels. The sand was of a consistency that allowed them to dig down as far

as 8 feet without revetting. A line of pickets was thrown out 30 yards in front

of the engineers, with the Rebel picket line only 30 yards in front of the

Union pickets. But the engineers dug so quietly on their hands and knees,

using short-handled shovels, that hardly a sound could be heard above the

pounding surf. The opening was done by the textbook. An engineer ofﬁcer

took one end of a rope with knots tied at 6-foot intervals and stretched it

along the line of the proposed parallel. Then the men dropped to the sand,

held onto the knot with their left hand, and dug with their right, throwing

the sand over the rope. They dug laterally to connect their pits with the men

to right and left. Sandbags were used to build loopholes for the sharp-

shooters, who took their places at dawn. The engineers then built the ban-

quette and revetted the parallel, built an emplacement for the Requa battery,

and erected the inclined palisades on the night of August 10.

Gillmore decided not to push farther until the breaching batteries opened

on Sumter, and that would take several days. Meanwhile the engineers

worked to consolidate the position. The communication trench between the

ﬁrst and second parallels was revetted with sandbags so it would last longer

and serve as a splinterproof shelter. It also would prevent the infantrymen

from digging holes in the walls for their personal use, a practice that had

been weakening the trenches for some time. Brooks preferred to use wood

for this revetment, but it could not be obtained on the island. Unlike the ﬁrst,

the second parallel was not abandoned. Maintenance work on all the for-

tiﬁcations was constant. Ofﬁcers in charge of each duty rotation inspected

everything twice to see if repairs were needed. Iron rods were used to mea-

sure the sand covering the magazines, which had to be at least 8 feet deep.

Gillmore and Brooks devoted a lot of time and attention to defensive fea-

tures. The second and third parallels had a 10-foot-wide trench for easy

movement of troops, and the banquette was 2 feet wide. The obstacles in

front were so strong that they would have disrupted attacking formations

even without ﬁring by the defenders. A cover of at least 2 feet was kept on the

splinterproof shelters, the communication trench was 10 feet wide, and para-

pets were at least 6

∞

⁄

≤

feet high and 3 feet thick on top.

∫

The Reduction of Battery Wagner 263

The breaching batteries opened ﬁre on August 17, delivering about 450

rounds per day at Fort Sumter. Its gorge and southeast face were hit the

hardest, with overshoots punching the interior of the north and northwest

faces. Soon Sumter was ‘‘a mere infantry outpost,’’ in Gillmore’s words,

because the Confederates dismounted their guns and held it with a small

garrison. The intense bombardment eased on August 23 when Federal gun-

ners ﬁred only a few rounds per day to prevent repairs to the walls. Then they

resumed pounding the fort on August 30 and 31 in preparation for a pro-

posed navy push into the harbor. That attack, however, was canceled.

Ω

Brooks would have to abandon the ﬂying sap, the quickest and most

decisive way to advance his approaches. He used the full sap (digging an

approach trench forward) beyond the third parallel. Unprotected diggers

could not be sent into the darkness because Battery Wagner was too close. A

sap roller (a rolling obstruction to protect the head of the approach trench)

was constructed. The engineers advanced toward the desired spot on which

to plant the fourth parallel on the night of August 18. A Requa battery was

emplaced to cover the head of the sap. Initially the engineers had to work in

mud and water as they traversed the edge of the marsh, yet ten men of the 1st

New York Engineers dug sixty feet in six hours before they were relieved by

another rotation of men. The second shift dug seventy feet during the day-

light hours of August 19. Confederate sharpshooters ﬁred constantly at the

sappers, who lost one man from a shell explosion that day. Brooks decided it

was worth risking the ﬂying sap on a limited basis and ordered it done that

night. The engineers were able to advance the sap 160 yards, to a point only a

few yards in front of the Rebel picket line. Brooks detailed 300 men to guard

the sap. He complained that it was very difﬁcult to maintain a good parapet

close to the sap roller, for the recent rains had left water standing only two

feet below the surface.

∞≠

Brooks now encountered his most difﬁcult problem: a small sand ridge

directly in the path of his sap. The Confederates pulled their picket line back

to this ridge. Sharpshooters stationed there harassed the sappers unmer-

cifully. An attempt by the 100th New York to attack this position failed on the

night of August 21, so Brooks built a fourth parallel 150 yards in front of the

ridge and massed troops to capture it. He boldly used the ﬂying sap again,

placing his diggers immediately behind a line of skirmishers who kept the

Rebels busy, only 300 yards from Battery Wagner. After furious digging, the

Yankees were deep enough for temporary shelter. The sap was advanced

quickly without using a sap roller to connect with the new parallel that night.

All this digging was done by only 100 infantrymen and 15 engineers. The

parallel was strengthened during daylight hours on August 22, with sand-

264 The Reduction of Battery Wagner

bagged loopholes, a banquette, and a widened trench. Empty powder barrels

were also used to revet the fourth parallel.

∞∞

The attack on the sand ridge took place on the evening of August 26 after

a heavy bombardment of both the ridge and Battery Wagner. This ﬁre dis-

mounted an 8-inch howitzer in the fort and shredded the sandbagged loop-

holes of the sharpshooters on the ridge. The 24th Massachusetts, 400 strong

and supported by the 3rd New Hampshire, sallied from the fourth parallel at

dusk amid volleys of musketry. It captured 76 of the 89 men there, who

belonged to the 61st North Carolina. Most of the captured Tar Heels were

afraid to run back to the fort because of the torpedoes scattered across the

sand. Ofﬁcers in Wagner quickly sent out 175 reinforcements, but they were

too late to help. Col. George P. Harrison, who commanded Wagner that

night, considered a counterattack but concluded from the reports of sur-

vivors that the Federals were too strong. Moreover, he was not certain of the

location of all torpedoes planted in front of Wagner. This was not much of a

problem when moving small groups back and forth to the ridge, but a deter-

mined counterattack would involve many more men who could be endan-

gered by their own torpedoes. Brooks was not impressed by the captured

works on the ridge. He called them ‘‘rude riﬂe-pits’’ with sandbag traverses

and loopholes.

∞≤

The last major barrier to the siege approach had been breached, but the

sapping grew more difﬁcult beyond the sand ridge. There were dozens of

torpedoes in front of Wagner, and the decreasing range meant that more

lead and iron of all kinds could be delivered on the sap head. The ﬁfth and

last parallel was opened on the sand ridge the night of its capture. It would

be the launching point for the push to cover the last 300 yards to Battery

Wagner. This, the most narrow approach to the work, had been the key to

the failure of both Union attacks. What could not be crossed by a wide

frontage of troops could more easily be traversed if the sap were dug at sharp

zigzags, worming its way across the neck of low-lying sand until the ditch of

Wagner was within reach.

∞≥

Gillmore’s men had already constructed an impressive series of siege

works by the time they reached the sand ridge. According to the manuals,

but in contrast to the Union siege approaches at Vicksburg, they had many

defensive features. The Federals had the use of ﬁve Requa guns. Altogether,

nineteen positions were constructed for these guns: four in the ﬁrst parallel,

ﬁve in the second, two in the third, ﬁve in the fourth, two in the ﬁfth, and one

in front of the ﬁfth. Two of the guns were ﬁred in a skirmish on the evening of

August 25, but the Requas were never tested in a major attack.

∞∂

The second parallel remained the base of Gillmore’s advance, and it was

The Reduction of Battery Wagner 265

Federal bombproof, Morris Island. Note the heavy use of sandbags as revetment and

the rich display of tools and debris. A sandbagged lookout post is on the top left of the

structure, and a Confederate torpedo sits on the ground with a bottle on top of it.

(Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion and the U.S. Army

Military History Institute)

the most heavily fortiﬁed line of the siege works. Splinterproofs were built

not only to protect the men but to shield the latrines as well, and a lookout

post was made of sandbags on top of the magazine. Brooks had a tough time

ﬁguring out how to construct an effective obstacle to a Rebel sortie on the

beach at low tide, for when the tide rose, the surf would wash over anything

that was placed there. He built an emplacement for a Requa gun at the edge

of the high-water mark and embrasured it so the gun could sweep the open

beach at low tide. Whatever timber was used at the second parallel had to

be hauled from Folly Island, as there were only two trees on Morris. There

was little space at the second parallel, too. Brooks noted that he had to

cram everything into an area only nine acres in size. ‘‘There is not room

enough, nor earth enough, to make suitable traverses, epaulements, and

bomb proof shelters for the protection of guns, ammunition, and garrison,’’

he complained.

∞∑

Engineer troops constructed 460 yards of inclined palisades covering the

ﬁrst and second parallels. Made of pine saplings four to seven inches in

diameter, the palisades was assembled at the engineer depot and divided

into panels of ﬁve poles each for easier transportation. The engineers also

266 The Reduction of Battery Wagner

Federal splinterproof, Morris Island. Made of barrels, timber, and planks, with brush

as a screen, it was designed to protect occupants from shell fragments but would have

collapsed if directly hit. (Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal

Legion and the U.S. Army Military History Institute)

made abatis to ﬁll the gaps created in the palisades by Confederate artillery

ﬁre. Of course, the material for both palisades and abatis had to be hauled

three miles from Folly Island.

∞∏

Given the nature of the soil on Morris Island, sandbags were used almost

entirely for revetting. Sandbags also were useful in ﬁlling gabions, making

foundations for mortar platforms, and constructing banquettes, traverses,

and splinterproofs. When empty and ﬂat, the bags measured six by ten by

twenty-four inches; they weighed eighty-ﬁve pounds when ﬁlled. But the

Federals preferred them only three-fourths full because when completely

ﬁlled, they tended to burst if too much pressure was exerted on them. The

open end of the sandbag was twisted and tucked underneath, rather than

tied closely. Brooks discovered that he had to secure sandbags in place with

stakes and wire only when he used them to revet the batteries of the heaviest

guns. The muzzle blasts sometimes tore the cloth or even set the bags on ﬁre,

but both problems were solved if the gunners kept the bags wet during ﬁring.

Normal wear and tear created holes in all sandbags and dry sand escaped,

but Brooks noticed that a new sandbag revetment could last about two

The Reduction of Battery Wagner 267

months before this became a problem. He reported that 46,175 sandbags

were used in the reduction of Battery Wagner.

∞π

Other types of revetting material did not work so well with the ﬁne Mor-

ris Island sand, which quickly leaked through the large cracks in gabions.

Empty powder barrels ﬁlled with sand were useful to raise the parapet of

approaches in front of the second parallel, but there were not enough of

them. Strong sea breezes quickly weathered the parapets, which ‘‘are half

destroyed in a week, and the trenches are correspondingly ﬁlled up,’’ re-

ported Brooks. This forced the Federals to constantly repair the works. At

another location they might have put a layer of sod or even mud on them, but

time and materials were not available.

∞∫

Brooks experimented with the embrasures of the heavy batteries, tying

rawhide covers to shield the sandbag revetment, but the blast simply carried

away the hides. Iron coverings were the answer, so Brooks salvaged iron

from the wreck of a blockade runner at Light House Inlet. He made mantlets

(protective covers) for the embrasures out of the same iron. Not all heavy

guns were ﬁxed in this way, but a bit of ingenuity served Brooks well. The

Russians had used the same kind of iron to revet the embrasures of their

batteries at Sebastopol.

∞Ω

The wire entanglements used in front of the parallels were a relatively

new feature of warfare. Stakes three and a half feet long, with two feet in

the ground, were placed seven feet apart ‘‘in quincunx order’’—that is, in a

square with a ﬁfth stake in the middle. Number 12 wire was wrapped in

notches cut in the stakes from twelve to eighteen inches above the ground.

Additional wire was stretched between the quincunxes and even from the

quincunxes to the top of the palisades. Brooks was quite pleased with this

obstacle. It was quickly and easily built and was a very good substitute for an

abatis. Even Federal troops who knew of its existence often tripped over it,

and the wires were seldom disturbed by Rebel artillery ﬁre.

≤≠

Considering the small garrison of Wagner, the Federals expended a great

deal of energy and material on defensive measures in their siege works.

The labor needed to make all this was enormous for the relatively small

force, about 10,000 men, available to Gillmore. Brooks estimated that three-

fourths of the manual labor in the siege was expended in shoveling sand, and

half of the rest was used in carrying material. About three-fourths of the

work was done at night and nine-tenths of it under ﬁre. Rebel sharpshooters

seldom ﬁred in the dark, but during the day they were quite active. Brooks

reported that thirty-ﬁve artillery rounds per hour was considered heavy ﬁre,

but they sometimes received double that rate. That is why up to 150 men

were hit in the advanced working parties and guard detachments during the