468 NOTES TO PAGES 355–357
4. See Re
´
mi Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote (Paris: PUF, 1982).
5. G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands,
N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), pp. 327–385.
6. The measure of value means its orderly exploitation, the norm of its
social division, and its capitalist reproduction. Certainly Marx goes beyond
Marx, and one should never pretend that his discussions of labor and
value are only a discourse on measure: beyond value, labor is always the
living power of being. See Antonio Negri, ‘‘Twenty Theses on Marx,’’
in Saree Makdisi, Cesare Casarino, and Rebecca Karl, eds., Marxism
Beyond Marxism (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 149–180.
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1985), p. 119 (1129b30).
8. On the virtual, see Gilles Deleuze and Fe
´
lix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?,
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994); and Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1988), pp. 94–
103. Our conception of virtuality and its relationship to reality is some-
what different from the one that Deleuze derives from Bergson, which
distinguishes between the passage from the virtual to the actual and that
from the possible to the real. Bergson’s primary concern in this distinction
and in his affirmation of the virtual-actual couple over the possible-real
is to emphasize the creative force of being and highlight that being is not
merely the reduction of numerous possible worlds to a single real world
based on resemblance, but rather that being is always an act of creation
and unforeseeable novelty. See Henri Bergson, ‘‘The Possible and the
Real,’’ in The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle Andison (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1946), pp. 91–106. We certainly do recognize the need
to insist on the creative powers of virtuality, but this Bergsonian discourse
is insufficient for us insofar as we also need to insist on the reality of the
being created, its ontological weight, and the institutions that structure
the world, creating necessity out of contingency. On the passage from
the virtual to the real, see Gilbert Simondon, L’individu et sa gene
`
se physico-
biologique (Paris: PUF, 1964); and Brian Massumi, ‘‘The Autonomy of
Affect,’’ Cultural Critique, no. 31 (Fall 1995), 83–109.
9. Marx’s discussions of abstraction have a double relation to this discourse
of virtuality and possibility. One might do well in fact to distinguish
between two Marxian notions of abstraction. On the one hand, and on
the side of capital, abstraction means separation from our powers to act,
and thus it is a negation of the virtual. On the other hand, however, and
on the side of labor, the abstract is the general set of our powers to act,