Turin, Rome and Pescara. When the plugs were pulled on the commercial networks,
Socialist Prime Minister Craxi was forced to issue an emergency decree that effectively
authorized national commercial broadcasting. This established the RAI/Fininvest
‘duopoly’ which has been the hallmark of the rather unusual Italian broadcasting system
ever since.
The RAI/Fininvest ‘duopoly’ was legitimated by the so-called Mammì law, the 1990
Broadcasting Act (no. 223). The Mammì law sidestepped the serious structural and
financial problems faced by the state broadcasting organization, which were rendered
impossible to negotiate because of the ‘pillarization’ of party interests. Instead, the
Mammì law focused on commercial broadcasting, establishing a ‘guarantor’ to keep a
register of stations, rule on libel controversies, report to Parliament, meet with a
viewers’ advisory council and set up minimal regulations on accepted standards of
decency in programming and scheduling.
In the intervening years, commercial television had transformed the medium and the
context of operation for the RAI. Crippled by organizational inefficiency and financial
crisis, the RAI tried to compete with the entertainment-based transmissions of Fininvest
and lost distinctiveness and credibility as a public service. In contrast, Berlusconi’s
introduction of popular programmes challenged the hierarchy and stifled the cultural
elitism of Italian society that was embodied by the RAI. Given the nickname ‘Sua
Emittenza’ (His Broadcastingship), he was prepared to use his public profile and mass
popularity as a resource for backing politicians to defend his commercial interests.
Furthermore, unlike many media moguls, Berlusconi always took an active personal
control of editorial decisions for his media outlets.
In the 1990s, the RAI state television channels came increasingly under competition
for the provision of information relating to public affairs from the Fininvest commercial
channels. Kickstarted by the legal requirement to provide news, the private channels
increasingly developed a commercial strategy for covering public affairs. This came at a
time when public attention for news and editorial freedom were emerging in response to
the Tangentopoli scandals. High advertising revenues that accrued from peak viewing
figures for public affairs programmes brought the Fininvest channels into competition
with the RAI channels. Prior to 1992, the RAI channels maintained a virtual monopoly of
television news broadcasting. After starting to broadcast national news in 1992, the
Fininvest channels rapidly developed their news programming. By 1994 they supplied a
total of 2,961 hours of news (13.7 per cent of net programming) in comparison to the
3,136 (12.8 per cent) supplied by the RAI channels. The viewing figures for the prime
editions of the television news show that in a short time the Fininvest channels emerged
from the shadow of the RAI as the provider of news.
The data on shifts in programming indicate a convergence between the public and
commercial broadcasting sectors, due to competition and the need to respond to a
changing set of public demands. The Tangentopoli crisis bore the seeds of a more active
civil society in which the media have a greater role to play. In 1989, the Fininvest
channels supplied a net programming of 92 per cent entertainment, 4.6 per cent cultural
programmes and 3.4 per cent news and current affairs. By 1993, Fininvest programming
had shifted to 75 per cent entertainment, 8 per cent cultural programmes and 16.4 per
cent news and current affairs, which compared with the RAI breakdown of 50.7 per cent,
22.6 per cent and 26.7 per cent for the same categories. Such trends were indicative of
Encyclopedia of contemporary italian culture 112