Duiker William J., Spielvogel Jackson J. The Essential World History

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

CHAPTER 26

EAST AND WEST IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR

CHAPTER OUTLINE

AND FOCUS QUESTIONS

The Collapse of the Grand Alliance

Why were the United States and the Soviet Union

suspicious of each other after World War II, and what

events be tween 1945 and 1949 heightened the tensions

between the two nations?

Cold War in Asia

How and why did Mao Zedong and the Communists

come to power in China, and what were the Cold War

implications of their triumph?

From Confrontation to Coexistence

What events led to the era of coexistence in the 1960s,

and to what degree did each side contribute to the

reduction in international tensions?

An Era of Equivalence

Why did the Cold War briefly flare up again in the

1980s, and why did it come to a definitive end at the end

of the decade?

CRITICAL THINKING

How have historians answered the question of whether

the United States or the Soviet Union bears the

primary responsibility for the Cold War, and what

evidence can be presented on each side of the issue?

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta



The Art Archive/Imperial War Museum, London, UK

644

‘‘OUR MEETING HERE in the Crimea has reaffirmed our com-

mon determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to

come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory

possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe

that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our

peoples and to all the peoples of the world.’’

With these ringing words, drafted at the Yalta Conference in

February 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Soviet leader

Joseph Stalin, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

affirmed their common hope that the Grand Alliance that had been

victorious in World War II could be sustained into the postwar era.

Only through continuing and growing cooperation and understand-

ing among the three Allies, the statement asserted, could a secure

and lasting peace be realized that, in the words of the Atlantic Char-

ter, would ‘‘afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may

live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.’’

Roosevelt hoped that the decisions reached at Yalta would pro-

vide the basis for a stable peace in the postwar era. Allied occupa-

tion forces---American, British, and French in the west and Soviet in

the east---were to bring about the end of Axis administration and to

organize the free election of democratic governments throughout

The Collapse of the Grand Alliance

Focus Question: Why were the United States and the

Soviet Union suspicious of each other after World

War II, and what events between 1945 and 1949

heightened the tensions between the two nations?

The problems started in Europe. At the end of the war,

Soviet military forces occupied all of Eastern Europe and

the Balkans (except Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia),

while U.S. and other Allied forces secured the western part

of the Continent. Roosevelt had assumed that free elec-

tions, administered promptly by ‘‘democratic and peace-

loving forces,’’ would lead to democratic governments

responsive to the local population. But it soon became

clear that the Soviet Union interpreted the Yalta agreement

differently. When Soviet occupation authorities began

forming a new Polish government, Stalin refused to accept

the Polish government-in-exile---headquartered in London

during the war and composed primarily of landed aris-

tocrats who harbored a deep distrust of the Soviet

Union---and instead set up a government composed of

Communists who had spent the war in Moscow. Roosevelt

complained to Stalin but eventually agreed to a compro-

mise whereby two members of the London government

were included in the new Communist regime. A week

later, Roosevelt was dead of a cerebral hemorrhage,

emboldening Stalin to do pretty much as he pleased.

Soviet Domination of Eastern Europe

Similar developments took place in all of the states oc-

cupied by Soviet troops. Coalitions of all political parties

(except fascist or right-wing parties) were formed to run

the government, but within a year or two, the Communist

Party in each coalition had assumed the lion’s share of

power. It was then a short step to the establishment of

one-party Communist governments. Between 1945 and

1947, Communist governments became firmly en-

trenched in East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland,

and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, with its strong tradition

of democratic institutions, the Communists did not

achieve their goals until 1948. After the Czech elections of

1946, the Communist Party shared control of the gov-

ernment with the non-Communist parties. When it ap-

peared that the latter might win new elections early in

1948, the Communists seized control of the government

on February 25. All other parties were dissolved, and the

Communist leader Klement Gottwald became the new

president of Czechoslovakia.

Yugoslavia was a notable exception to the pattern of

Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. The Communist

Party there had led resistance to the Nazis during the war

and easily assumed power when the war ended. Josip Broz,

known as Tito (1892--1980), the leader of the Communist

resistance movement, appeared to be a loyal Stalinist. After

the war, however, he moved to establish an independent

Communist state. Stalin hoped to take contr ol of Yugo-

slavia, but Tito refused to capitulate to Stalin’s demands

and gained the support of the people (and some sympathy

in the West) by portraying the struggle as one of Yugoslav

national freedom. In 1958, the Yugoslav party congress

asserted that Yugoslav Communists did not see themselves

as deviating from communism, only from Stalinism.

They considered their more decentralized system, in which

workers managed themselves and local communes

exercised some political power, closer to the Marxist-

Leninist ideal.

To Stalin (who had once boasted, ‘‘I will shake my

little finger, and there w ill be no more Tito’’), the cre-

ation of pli ant pro-Soviet reg imes throughout Eastern

Europe may simply have represented his interpretation

of the Yalta peace agreement and a reward for sacrifices

suffered during the war, satisfying Moscow’s aspirations

for a buffer zone against the capitalist West. If the Soviet

leader had any i ntention of promoting future Com-

munist revolutions in Western Europe---and there is

some indication that he did---such developm ents would

have to await the appearance of a new capitalist crisis a

decade or more into the future. As Stalin undoubtedly

recalled, Lenin had always maintained that revolutions

come in waves.

Descent of the Iron Curtain

To the United States, however, the Soviet takeover of

Eastern Europe represented an ominous development

that threatened Roosevelt’s vision of a durable peace.

Public suspicion of Soviet intentions grew rapidly,

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 645

Europe. To foster mutual trust and an end to the suspicions that

had marked relations between the capitalist world and the Soviet

Union prior to the war, Roosevelt tried to reassure Stalin that Mos-

cow’s legitimate territorial aspirations and genuine security needs

would be adequately met in a durable peace settlement.

It was not to be. Within months after the German surrender,

the mutual trust among the Allies---if it had ever truly existed---rap-

idly disintegrated, and the dream of a stable peace was replaced by

the specter of a potential nuclear holocaust. The United Nations,

envisioned by its founders as a mechanism for adjudicating interna-

tional disputes, became mired in partisan bickering. As the Cold

War between Moscow and Washington intensified, Europe was di-

vided into two armed camps, while the two superpowers, glaring at

each other across a deep ideological divide, held the survival of the

entire world in their hands.

especially among the millions of

Americans who still had relatives liv-

ing in Eastern Europe. Winston

Churchill was quick to put such fears

into words. In a highly publicized

speech at Westminster College in Ful-

ton, Missouri, in March 1946, the

former British prime minister declared

that an ‘‘iron curtain’’ had ‘‘descended

across the Continent,’’ dividing Ger-

many and Europe itself into two hos-

tile camps. Stalin responded by

branding Churchill’s speech a ‘‘call to

war with the Soviet Union.’’ But he

need not have worried. Although

public opinion in the United States placed increasing

pressure on Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman (1884--

1972), to devise an effective strategy to counter Soviet

advances abroad, the American people were in no mood

for another war.

The first threat of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation

took place in the Middle East. During World War II,

British and Soviet troops had been

stationed in Iran to prevent Axis

occupation of the rich oil fields in

that country. Both nations had

promised to w ithdraw their forces

after the war, but at the end of 1945,

there were ominous signs that

Moscow mig ht attempt to use its

troops as a bargaining chip to annex

Iran ’s northern territories---known

as Azerbaijan---into the Soviet

Union. When the government of

Iran,withstrongU.S.support,

threatened to take the issue to the

United Nations, the Soviets backed

down and removed their forces from that country in

the spring of 1946.

The Truman Doctrine

A civil war in Greec e created another potential arena for

confrontation between the superpowers and an opportunity

for the Truman administration to take a stand. Communist

guerrilla forces supported by Tito’s Yugoslavia had taken up

arms against the pro-Western government in Athens. Great

Britain had initially assumed primary responsibility for

promoting postwar reconstruction in the eastern Mediter -

ranean, but in 1947, continuing economic problems caused

the British to withdraw from the active r ole they had been

playing in both Greece and Turkey. Pres ident Truman,

alarmed by British weakness and the possibility of Soviet

expansion into the eastern M editerranean, responded with

the Truman Doctrine, which said in essence that the U nited

States would provide money to countries that claimed they

were threatened b y Communist expansion. If the Soviets

were not stopped in Greece, the Truman argument ran, then

the United States would hav e to face the spread of com-

munism throughout the free world. As Dean A ches on, the

U.S. secretary of state, explained, ‘‘Like apples in a barrel

infected by disease, the c orruption of Greec e would infect

Iran and all the East...likewise Africa ...Italy ...France. ...

Not since Rome and Carthage has there been such a po-

larization of power on this earth.’’

The U.S. suspicion that Moscow was actively sup-

porting the insurgent movement in Greece turned out to

be unfounded. Stalin was apparently unhappy with Tito’s

promoting the conflict, not only because he suspected

that the latter was attempting to create his own sphere of

influence in the Balkans but also because it risked pro-

voking a direct confrontation with the United States. But

the Truman Doctrine had its intended effect in the

United States, where public concern about the future

intentions of the Soviet Union rose to new heig hts.

Corsica

Sardinia

GER.

DEM.

REP.

WEST

GER.

SOVIET

UNION

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

ITALY

ALBANIA

HUNGARY

GREECE

AUSTRIA

POLAND

Baltic Sea

0 150 Miles

0 300 Kilometers

Eastern Europe in 1948

A Call to Arms. Within five years of the end of World War II, the

Grand Alliance that had brought victory over the Axis Powers was in

tatters. In March 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,

in an address given at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, declared

that Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe had divided the Continent into

two conflicting halves, separated by an ‘‘iron curtain.’’ The speech is often

credited with launching the first salvo in the Cold War.

AP Images

646 CHAPTER 26 EAST AND WEST IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR

The Marshall Plan

The proclamation of the Truman

Doctrine was followed in June 1947 by

the European Recovery Program, bet-

ter known as the Marshall Plan, which

provided $13 billion for the economic

recovery of war-torn Europe. Under-

lying the program was the belief that

Communist aggression fed off eco-

nomic turmoil. As General George

C. Marshall observed in a speech at

Harvard University, ‘‘Our policy is not

directed against any country or doctrine but against

hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’’

From the Soviet perspective, the Marshall Plan was

capitalist imperialism, a thinly veiled attempt to buy the

support of the smaller European countries ‘‘in return for

the relinquishing ...of their economic and later also their

political independence.’’

A Soviet spokesperson described

the United States as the ‘‘main force in the imperialist

camp,’’ whose ultimate goal was ‘‘the strengthening of

imperialism, preparation for a new imperialist war, a

struggle against socialism and democracy, and the sup-

port of reactionary and antidemocratic, pro-fascist re-

gimes and movements.’’ Although the Marshall Plan was

open to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European sat-

ellite states, they refused to participate. The Soviets were

in no position to compete financially with the United

States, however, and could do little to counter the Mar-

shall Plan except tighten their control in Eastern Europe.

Europe Divided

By 1947, the split in E urope between East and West had

become a fact of life. A t the end of World War II, the

U nited States had fav or ed a quick end to its commitments

in Eur ope. But American fears of Soviet aims caused the

U nited States to play an increasingly important role in

Eur opean affairs. In an article in Foreign Affairs in

J uly 1947, George K ennan, a well-known U .S. diplomat

with much knowledge of Soviet affairs, advocated a policy

of containment against further aggressive Soviet mov es.

Kennan favored the ‘‘adroit and vigilant application of

counter -for ce at a series of constantly shifting geographical

and political points, c orresponding to the shifts and ma-

neuvers of Soviet policy.’’ When the Soviets blockaded

Berlin in 1948, containment of the Soviet U nion became

formal U.S. policy (see the bo x on p . 648).

The Berlin Blockade The fate of Germany had become

a source of heated conten tion between East and West.

Aside from denazification and th e partitioning of

Germany (and Berli n) into four oc-

cupied zones, the Allied powers had

agreed on little with regard to the

conquered nation . Even denazifica-

tion proceeded differently in the

various zones of occupation. The

Americans and British proceeded

methodically---the British had tried

two million cases by 1948---while the

Soviets (and French) went after ma-

jor criminals and allowed lesser offi-

cials to go free. Th e Soviet Union,

hardest hit by the war, took repar-

ations from Germany by pillaging G erman industry. The

technology-starved Soviets dismantled and removed to

Russia 380 factories from the western zones of Berl in

before transferring their control to t he Wes tern powers.

By the summer of 1946, two hundred chemical, paper,

and textile factories in the East German zone had like-

wise been shipped to the Soviet Union. At the same

time, the German Communist Party was reestablished,

under the control of Walter Ulbricht (1893--1973), and

was soon in charge of the political reconstruction of the

Soviet zone in eastern Germany.

Although the foreign ministers of the four occupying

powers kept meeting in an attempt to arrive at a final

peace treaty with Germany, they moved further and fur-

ther apart. At the same time, the British, French, and

Americans gradually began to merge their zones eco-

nomically and by February 1948 were making plans for

unification of these sectors and the formation of a na-

tional government. In an effort to secure all of Berlin and

to halt the creation of a West German government, the

Soviet Union imposed a blockade of West Berlin that

prevented all traffic from entering the city’s western zones

through Soviet-controlled territory in East Germany.

The Western po wers faced a dilemma. Dir ect military

confrontation seemed danger ous, and no one wished to

risk World War III. Therefore, an attempt to break through

the blockade with tanks and trucks was ruled out. The

solution was to deliver supplies for the city’s inhabitants by

plane. At its peak, the Berlin Airlift flew 13,000 tons of

supplies daily into Berlin. The Soviets, also not wanting

war, did not interfere and finally lifted the blockade in

May 1949. The blockade of Berlin had sever ely increased

tensions between the United States and the Soviet U nion

and brought the separation of Germany into two states.

The Federal Republic of Germany was formally created

from the three Western zones in September 1949, and a

month later , the separate German Democratic Republic

(GDR) was established in East Germany. Berlin remained a

divided city and the source of much contention between

East and West.

FRENCH

ZONE

BRITISH

ZONE

U.S. ZONE

SOVIET

ZONE

EAST GERMANY

Berlin at the Start of the Cold War

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 647

NATO and the Warsaw Pact The search for security in

the new world of the Cold War also led to the formation

of military alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

zation (NATO) was formed in April 1949 when Belgium,

Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxem-

bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal signed a

treaty w ith the United States and Canada. All the powers

agreed to provide mutual assistance if any one of them

was attacked. A few years later, Greece, Turkey, and West

Germany joined NATO.

The Eastern European states soon followed suit. In

1949, they formed the Council for Mutual Economic

OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS

HO STARTED THE COLD WAR?AMERICAN AND SOVIET PERSPECTIVES

AlthoughtheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion

had cooperated during World War II to defeat the

Germans and Japanese, differences began to ap-

pear as soon as victory became certain. The year

1946 was an especially important turning point in the relation-

ship between the two new superpowers. George Kennan, an

American diplomat regarded as an expert on Soviet affairs, was

asked to write an analysis of one of Stalin’s speeches. His U.S.

Foreign Service dispatch, which came to be known as the Long

Telegram, was sent to U.S. embassies, U.S. State Department

officials, and military leaders. The Long Telegram gave a highly

critical view of Soviet intentions. A response to Kennan’s position

was written by Nikolai Novikov, a former Soviet ambassador to

the United States. His response was read by Vyacheslav Molotov,

the Soviet foreign minister, but historians are not sure if Stalin or

other officials also read it and were influenced by it.

George Kennan, The Long Telegram, February 1946

At the bottom of [the Soviet] neurotic view of world affairs is a tra-

ditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this

was the insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on

a vast exposed plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples.

To this was added, as Russia came into contact w ith the economi-

cally advanced West, the fear of more competent, more powerful,

more highly organized societies. ... For this reason [the Russians]

have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between

the Western world and their own. ... And they have learned to seek

security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of

rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it. ...

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanati-

cally to the belief that with the United States there can be no per-

manent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary [that] the

internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of

life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken,

if Soviet power is to be secure. ... In addition it has an elaborate

and far-flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other coun-

tries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by

people whose experience and skill in underground methods are pre-

sumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessi-

ble to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. ... This is

admittedly not a pleasant picture. ... But I would like to record my

conviction that the problem is within our power to solve---and that

without recourse to any general conflict. ... I think we may ap-

proach calmly and with good heart the problem of how to deal with

Russia ...[but] we must have the courage and self-confidence to

cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After

all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this prob-

lem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become

like those with whom we are coping.

Nikolai Novikov, Telegram, September 27, 1946

One of the stages in the achievement of dominance over the world by

the United States is its understanding with England concerning the

partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions. The

basic lines of the secret agreement between the United States and En-

gland regarding the division of the world consist, as shown by facts,

in their agreement on the inclusion of Japan and China in the sphere

of influence of the United States in the Far East. ... The American

policy in China is striving for the complete economic and political

submission of China to the control of American monopolistic capital.

Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world domi-

nance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in

peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval and

air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.

Careful note should be taken of the fact that the preparation by

the United States for a future war is being conducted with the pros-

pect of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of American

imperialists is the main obstacle in the path of the United States to

world domination. This is indicated by facts such as the tactical

training of the American army for war with the Soviet Union as the

future opponent, the placing of American strategic bases in regions

from which it is possible to launch strikes on Soviet territory, inten-

sified training and strengthening of Arctic regions as close

approaches to the USSR, and attempts to prepare Germany and

Japan to use those countries in a war against the USSR.

In Kennan’s view, what was the Soviet policy after World

War II? What did he believe determined that policy, and how

did he think the United States should respond? In Novikov’s view,

what was the goal of U.S. foreign policy, and how did he believe

the Americans planned to achieve it? Why was it so difficult to

achieve a common ground between the two positions?

648 CHAPTER 26 EAST AND WEST IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR

Assistance (COMECON) for economic cooperation. Then,

in 1955, Albania, Bulgaria, Cz echoslovakia, East Germany,

H ungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union orga-

nized a formal military alliance, the Warsa w Pact. Once

again, Europe was tragically divided into hostile alliance

systems (see Map 26.1).

Who Started the Cold War? There has been consid-

erable historical debate over who bears responsibility for

starting the Cold War. In the 1950s, most scholars in the

West assumed that the bulk of the blame must fall on the

shoulders of Stalin, whose determination to impose So-

viet rule on Eastern Europe snuffed out hopes for free-

dom and self-determination there and aroused justifiable

fears of Communist expansion in the West. During the

next decade, however, revisionist historians---influenced

in part by aggressive U.S. policies in Southeast Asia---

began to argue that the fault lay primarily in Washington,

where Truman and his anti-Communist advisers aban-

doned the precepts of Yalta and sought to encircle the

Soviet Union with a tier of pliant U.S. client states.

Mor e recently, man y historians have adopted a more

nuanced view , observing that both the U nited States and the

Soviet U nion took some unwise steps at the end of World

War II. Both nations, however, were working within a

framework conditioned by the past. The rivalry between the

two superpowers ultimately stemmed from their different

historical perspectives and their irreconcilable political

ambitions. Intense competition for political and military

supremacy had long been a regular feature of Western

civilization. The U nited States and the Soviet U nion were

the heirs of that European tradition of power politics, and it

should not surprise us that two such different systems

would seek to extend their way of life to the rest of the

world. Because of its need to secure its western border, the

Soviet Union was not prep ared to give up the advantages it

had gained in Eastern Europe from German y’s defeat. But

neither were Western leaders prepared to accept without

protest the establishment of a system of Soviet satellites that

not only threatened the security of Western Eur ope but also

deeply offended Western sensibilities because of its blatant

disregard of the Western concept of human rights.

A City Divided. In 1948, U.S. planes airlifted supplies into Berlin to break the blockade that Soviet troops

had imposed to isolate the city. Shown here is ‘‘Checkpoint Charlie,’’ located at the boundary between the U.S.

and Soviet zones of Berlin, just as Soviet roadblocks are about to be removed. The banner at the entrance to

the Soviet sector reads, ironically, ‘‘The sector of freedom greets the fighters for freedom and right of the

Western sectors.’’



Keystone/Getty Images

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 649

This does not necessarily mean that both sides bear

equal responsibility for starting the Cold War . Some revi-

sionist historians have claimed that the U .S. doctrine

of c ontainment was a provocative action that aroused

Stalin’ s suspicions and drove Mosco w into a position of

hostility toward the West. This charge lacks credibility. As

information from the Soviet archives and other sources has

become a vailable, it is increasingly clear that Stalin’s sus-

picions of the West were rooted in his Marxist-Leninist

worldview and long predated Washington ’s enunciation

of the doctrine of containment. As his foreign minister,

Vyacheslav Molotov, once remarked, Soviet policy was

Corsica

Sardinia

Cyprus

SWITZ.

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

FRANCE

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

ITALY

ALBANIA

BELG.

IRELAND

GREECE

GREAT

BRITAIN

Sicily

Crete

GER.

DEM.

REP.

TURKEY

NORWAY

SWEDEN

HUNGARY

NETH.

DENMARK

FINLAND

AUSTRIA

FED.

REP.

GER.

North

Sea

Atlantic

Ocean

Black Sea

SOVIET UNION

Arctic Ocean

POLAND

0 300 600 Miles

0 300 600 900 Kilometers

NATO member

Non-NATO ally

NATO member until 1959

Warsaw Pact member

Unrest/revolt in

Eastern Europe

Missile bases: NATO

Troops: U.S.

Nuclear bombers: U.S.

Naval port: U.S.

Fleet: U.S.

Nuclear missile submarine: U.S.

United States/NATO

Missile bases: Warsaw Pact

Troops: Soviet

Nuclear bombers: Soviet

Naval port: Soviet

Fleet: Soviet

Nuclear missile submarine: Soviet

Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

MAP 26.1 The Ne w Euro pean A lliance System s Dur ing the Cold War. This map shows

postwar Europe as it was divided during the Cold War into two contending power blocs, the

NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Major military and naval bases are indicated by symbols

on the map.

Whereonthemapwastheso-calledironcurtain?

View an animated version of this map or related maps at www .cengage.com/history/

duikspiel/essentialworld6e

650 CHAPTER 26 EAST AND WEST IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR

inherently aggressive and would be triggered whenever the

opportunity offered. Although Stalin apparently had no

master plan to advance Soviet power into Western E urope,

he was probably prepared to make every effort to do so

once the next revolutionary wave arrived. Western leaders

were fully justified in reacting to this possibility by

strengthening their own lines of defense. On the other

hand, a case can be made that in deciding to respond to

the Soviet challenge in a primarily military manner,

Western leaders overreacted to the situation and virtually

guaranteed that the Cold War would be transformed into

an arms race that could conceivably result in a new and

uniquely destructiv e war.

Cold War in Asia

Focus Question: How and why did Mao Zedong and

the Communists come to power in China, and what

were the Cold War implications of their triumph?

The Cold War was somewhat slower to make its appear-

ance in Asia. At Yalta, Stalin formally agreed to enter the

P acific War against Japan three months after the close of

the conflict with Germany. As a reward for Soviet partic-

ipation in the struggle against Japan, Roosevelt promised

that Moscow would be granted ‘‘preeminent interests’’ in

Manchuria (interests reminiscent of those possessed by

imperial R ussia prior to its defeat at the hands of Japan in

1904--1905) and the establishment of a Soviet naval base at

Port Arthur. In return, Stalin promised to sign a treaty of

alliance with the Republic of China, thus implicitly

committing the Soviet Union not to provide the Chinese

Communists with support in a possible future civil war.

Although many observers would later question Stalin’s

sincerity in making such a commitment to the vocally

anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek, in Moscow the deci-

sion probably had a logic of its own. Stalin had no par-

ticular liking for the independent-minded Mao Zedong

and indeed did not anticipate a Communist victory in any

civil war in China. Only an agreement with Chiang could

provide the Soviet Union with a strategically vital eco-

nomic and political presence in northern China.

The Truman administration was equally reluctant to

get embroiled in a confrontation with Moscow over the

unfolding events in East Asia. Suspicion of Chiang Kai-

shek ran high in Washington, and as we shall see, many

key U.S. policymakers hoped to avoid a deeper involve-

ment in China by brokering a compromise agreement

between Chiang and his Communist rival, Mao.

Despite these c ommitments, the Allied agreements

soon broke down, and East Asia was sucked into the vortex

of the Cold War by the end of the 1940s. The root of the

problem lay in the underlying weakness of Chiang’s regime,

which thr eatened to cr eate a political vacuum i n East Asia

that both Mosco w and Washington would be tempted to fill.

The Chinese Civil War

As World War II came to an end in the Pacific, relations

between the government of Chiang Kai-shek in China and

its powerful U.S. ally had become frayed. Although Roo-

sevelt had hoped that Republican China would

be the keystone of his plan for peace and stability in Asia

after the war, U.S. officials became disillusioned with the

corruption of Chiang’s government and his unwill-

ingness to risk his forces against the Japanese (he hoped to

save them for use against the Communists after the war in

the Pacific ended), and China was no longer the focus of

Washington’s close attention as the war came to a close.

Nevertheless, U.S. military and economic aid to China

had been substantial, and at war’s end, the new Truman

administration still hoped that it could rely on Chiang to

support U.S. postwar goals in the region.

While Chiang Kai-shek wrestled with Japanese ag-

gression and problems of national development, the

Communists were building up their strength in northern

China. To enlarge their political base, they carried out a

‘‘mass line’’ policy (from the masses to the masses), re-

ducing land rents and confiscating the lands of wealthy

landlords. By the end of World War II, 20 to 30 million

Chinese were living under the administration of the

Communists, and their People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

included nearly one million troops.

As the war came to an end, world attention began to

focus on the prospects for renewed civil strife in China.

Members of a U.S. liaison team stationed in Yan’an were

impressed by the performance of the Communists, and

some recommended that the United States should support

them or at least remain neutral in a possible conflict

between Communists and N ationalists for control of

China. The Truman administration, though skeptical of

Chiang’s ability to forge a strong and prosperous country,

was increasingly conc erned about the spread of commu-

nism in E urope and tried to find a peaceful solution

through the formation of a coalition government of all

parties in China.

The Communist Triumph The effort failed. By 1946, full-

scale war between the Nationalist government, now re-

installed in Nanjing, and the Communists resumed. No w

Chiang Kai-shek’s errors came home to roost. In the

countryside, millions of peasants, attracted to the Com-

munists by promises of land and social justice, flocked to

serve in Mao Zedong’s PLA. In the cities, middle-class

Chinese, normally hostile to communism, were alienated by

COLD WAR IN ASIA 651

Chiang’s brutal suppression of all dissent and

his government’s inability to slow the ruinous

rate of inflation or solve the economic problems

it caused. W ith morale dropping in the cities,

Chiang’s troops began to defect to the Com-

munists. Sometimes whole divisions, officers as

well as ordinary soldiers, changed sides. By

1948, the PLA was advancing south out of

Manchuria and had encircled Beijing. Com-

munist troops took the old imperial capital,

crossed the Yangtze the following spring, and

occupied the commer cial hub of Shanghai (see

Map 26.2). During the next few months,

Chiang’s government and two million of his

followers fled to Taiwan, which the Japanese

had returned to Chinese control after World

War II.

The Truman administration reacted to the

spread of Communist power in China with

acute discomfort. Washington had no desire to

see a Communist government on the main-

land, but it had little confidence in Chiang

Kai-shek’s ability to realize Roosevelt’s dream

of a strong, united, and prosperous China. In

December 1945, President Truman sent Gen-

eral George C. Marshall to China in a last-

ditch effort to bring about a peaceful settle-

ment, but anti-Communist elements in the

Republic of China resisted U.S. pressure to

create a coalition government with the Chi-

nese Communist Party (CCP). During the

next two years, the United States gave limited

military support to Chiang’s regime but re-

fusedtocommitU.S.powertoguaranteeits

survival. The administration’s hands-off policy

deeply angered many members of Congress,

who charged that the White House was ‘‘soft

on communism’’ and declared further that

Roosevelt had betrayed Chiang Kai-shek at

Yalta by granting privileges in Manchuria to

the Soviet Union. In their view, Soviet troops

had hindered the dispatch of Chiang ’s forc es

to the area and provided the PLA with weap-

ons to use against its rivals.

MONGOLIA

TAIWAN

CHINA

MANCHURIA

JAPAN

KOREA

South

China

Sea

Pacific

Ocean

Sea of Japan

(East Sea)

Shanghai

Nanjing

Beijing

Yan’an

Route of PLA advance

0 500 1,000 Miles

0 250 500 750 Kilometers

MAP 26.2 The Chinese Civil War. After the close of the Pacific War

in 1945, the Nationalist Chinese government and the Chinese Communists

fought a bitter civil war that ended with a victory by the latter in 1949.

The path of the Communist advance is displayed on the map.

Wher e did Chiang Kai-shek ’s government retreat to after its defeat?



Jack Wilkes/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images

Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek Exchange a

Toast. After World War II, the United States sent General

George C. Marshall to China in an effort to prevent civil

war between Chiang Kai-shek’s government and Mao

Zedong’s Communists. Marshall’s initial success was

symbolized by this toast between Mao (at the left) and

Chiang. But suspicion ran too deep, and soon conflict

ensued, leading to a Communist victory in 1949. Chiang’s

government retreated to the island of Taiwan.

652 CHAPTER 26 EAST AND WEST IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR

In later years, sources in both Moscow and Beijing

indicated that the Soviet Union gave little assistance to

the CCP in its struggle against the Nanjing regime. In fact,

Stalin periodically advised Mao against undertaking the

effort. Although Communist forces undoubtedly received

some assistance from Soviet occupation troops in Man-

churia, their victory ultimately stemmed from conditions

inside China, not from the intervention of outside pow-

ers. So indeed argued the Truman administration in 1949,

when it issued a White Paper that placed most of the

blame for the debacle at the feet of Chiang Kai-shek’s

regime (see the box above).

Many Americans, however, did not agree. With the

Communist victory, Asia became a theater of the Cold

War and an integral element of American politics. During

the spring of 1950, under pressure from Congress and

public opinion to define U.S. interests in Asia, the Tru-

man administration adopted a new national security

policy, known as NSC-68, that implied that the United

States would take whatever steps were necessary to stem

the further expansion of communism in the region.

Containment had come to East Asia.

The New China

Communist leaders in China, from their new capital of

Beijing, probably hoped that their accession to power in

1949 would bring about an era of peace in the region and

permit their new government to concentrate on domestic

goals. But the desire for peace was tempered by their

determination to erase a century of humiliation at the

hands of imperialist powers and to restore the traditional

WHO LOST CHINA?

In 1949, with China about to fall under the control

of the Communists, President Truman instructed

the State Department to prepare a White Paper

explaining why the U.S. policy of seeking to avoid a

Communist victory in China had failed. The authors of the paper

concluded that responsibility lay at the door of Nationalist Chi-

nese leader Chiang Kai-shek and that there was nothing the

United States could have done to alter the result. Most China

observers today would accept that assessment, but it did little

at the time to deflect criticism of the administration for selling

out the interests of our ally in China.

U.S. State Department White Paper on China, 1949

When peace came the United States was confronted with three pos-

sible alternatives in China: (1) it could have pulled out lock, stock,

and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale

to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; (3) it could,

while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as

much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working

for a compromise between the two sides.

The first alternative would, and I believe American public opin-

ion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our

international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of

friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to

be of assistance. The second alternative policy, while it may look

attractive theoretically, in retrospect, was wholl y impracticable. The

Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during

the ten years before the war. Now after the war the Nationalists

were ...weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly

dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated

from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials.

The Communists on the other hand were much stronger than they

had ever been and were in control of most of North China. Because

of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be

tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been

dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American

people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of

our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alterna-

tive policy whereunder we faced the facts of the situation and

attempted to assist in working out a modus vivendi which would

avert civil war but nevertheless preserve and even increase the influ-

ence of the National Government. ...

The distrust of the leaders of both the Nationalist and Commu-

nist Parties for each other proved too deep-seated to permit final

agreement, notwithstanding temporary truces and apparently prom-

ising negotiations. The Nationalists, furthermore, embarked in 1946

on an overambitious military campaign in the face of warnings by

General Marshall that it not only would fail but would plunge

China into economic chaos and eventually destroy the National

Government. ...

The unfor tunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result

of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government

of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have

done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have

changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country

has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces,

forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A deci-

sion was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

How did the authors of the White Paper explain the

Communist victory in China? According to this argument, what

actions might have prevented it?

COLD WAR IN ASIA 653