I define feminist social work as a form of social work practice that takes
women’s experience of the world as the starting point of its analysis and by
focusing on the links between a woman’s position in society and her indi-
vidual predicament, responds to her specific needs, creates egalitarian rela-
tions in ‘client’–worker interactions and addresses structural inequalities.
Meeting women’s particular needs in a holistic manner and dealing with
the complexities of their lives – including the numerous tensions and
diverse forms of oppression impacting upon them, is an integral part of
feminist social work. Its focus on the interdependent nature of social rela-
tions ensures that it also addresses the needs of those that women interact
with – men, children and other women.
In giving women pride of place in their analyses, feminist social workers
have challenged gender-blind theories and practices that have treated
women as offshoots of men (Harding, 1990) under the guise of the univer-
sal human being that although ungendered resounds to men’s ways of
thinking, living and working. In social work, these have been replaced with
woman-centered approaches (Hanmer and Statham, 1988) that advocate
sensitive gendered responses to the needs of women ‘clients’ and women
workers. More recently, feminist social work has incorporated men more
fully into its theory and practice (Dominelli, 1991; Cavanagh and Cree,
1996; Orme et al., 2000).
However, these conceptualisations of women’s position have not
been unchallenged. Ramazanoglu (1989) has questioned the validity of
approaches that treat women as a singular, uniform category. She terms
these ‘essentialist’ for ignoring the impact of ‘race’, disability, age, sexual
orientations and other social divisions upon gender relations, despite their
commitment to examining women in their social situations. Additionally,
postmodern feminism has critiqued feminist practice and placed greater
emphasis on language and power in the interactive processes between indi-
viduals, including those in the ‘client’–worker relationship (Lloyd, 1998).
Charges of essentialism has been levelled against ‘classical’ texts on
feminist social work (Brook and Davis, 1985; Marchant and Wearing, 1986;
Burden and Gottlieb 1987; Hanmer and Statham, 1988; Dominelli and
McLeod, 1989; Langan and Day, 1992). It is difficult to construct a case that
applies equally to all of them. Some have
highlighted the wide range of
social divisions that are apparent in the lives of women in any given local-
ity to a greater extent than others: Dominelli and McLeod (1989: 3–4
, 27–30)
have argued for the adaption of their analysis to this diversity. Langan and
Day’s (1992) solution has been to examine each social division separately
in its own chapter.
Women do have differentiated experiences of their oppression. So,
while I accept the postmodern caution of not confusing the part for the
whole, the charge of essentialism is wide of the mark. Ordinary discourses
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