The South Atlantic Coast, 1861–1863
55
regiment, the Confederate commander reported, “could not be induced to occupy
their position, and ingloriously deserted the ramparts.”
75
After the failure of the attempt to take Fort Wagner by storm, Union soldiers settled
down to siege warfare. Black soldiers performed many, but not all, of the fatigues, ll-
ing sandbags and wrestling logs for gun emplacements built to house enormous pieces
of ordnance, at least one of which red 200-pound rounds that could reach the city of
Charleston itself. What dismayed men and ofcers alike in the black regiments was
being required “to lay out camps, pitch tents, dig wells, etc., for white regiments who
have lain idle until the work was nished for them,” Capt. Charles P. Bowditch of the
newly arrived 55th Massachusetts Infantry wrote in September. “If they want to keep
up the self-respect and discipline of the negroes they must be careful not to try to make
them perform the work of menials for men who are as able to do the work themselves
as the blacks.” The colonels of the 55th Massachusetts and 1st North Carolina took
the matter to their brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Edward A. Wild. “They have been
slaves and are just learning to be men,” Col. James C. Beecher of the 1st North Carolina
wrote. “When they are set to menial work doing for white Regiments what those Regi-
ments are entitled to do for themselves, it simply throws them back where they were
before and reduces them to the position of slaves again.” General Wild told his colonels
to disregard orders to perform fatigues for white regiments and passed Beecher’s let-
ter to their divisional commander, Brig. Gen. Israel Vogdes. On the same day, Captain
Bowditch noted that only twenty-ve of the eighty-six men in his company turned out
for drill; the rest were sick, on guard, or performing fatigues. General Vogdes thought
that menial employment would “exercise an unfavorable inuence with the minds both
of the white and black troops” and that ample time should be allowed “to drill and in-
struct the colored troops in their duties as soldiers.” Two days later, General Gillmore
issued a department-wide order banning the use of black regiments to perform fatigues
for whites. Meanwhile, the Confederates evacuated Fort Wagner on 7 September, leav-
ing all of Morris Island in federal hands and ending the active phase of the year’s opera-
tions against Charleston.
76
An unlooked-for result of the summer’s siege was a questionnaire survey—
probably the rst on the subject—to evaluate the performance of black troops. Five
questions, put to six engineer ofcers who had supervised labor details from both
black and white regiments, covered such topics as black soldiers’ behavior under
re, the quality and quantity of their work, and comparisons of black troops gener-
ally with whites and of Northern blacks with Southern blacks. The survey was the
brainchild of Maj. Thomas B. Brooks, an engineer ofcer during the siege, and
75
OR, ser. 1, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 418 (“could not be”); vol. 53, p. 10; Appleton Jnl, pp. 60–61,
69, 91 (“went to sleep”). Wise, Gate of Hell, p. 233, estimates Fort Wagner’s garrison at 1,621.
The attackers, including the 54th Massachusetts, could not have numbered fewer than 4,700. Wise
estimates the regiment’s strength at 425, or 26.2 percent of Fort Wagner’s defenders.
76
OR, ser. 1, vol. 28, pt. 1, pp. 27–30, and pt. 2, p. 95; Col J. C. Beecher to Brig Gen E. A.
Wild, 13 Sep 1863 (“They have been”), with Endorsement, Brig Gen E. A. Wild, 14 Sep 1863, and
Endorsement, I. Vogdes, 15 Sep 1863, 35th USCI, Entry 57C, RG 94, NA. “War Letters of Charles
P. Bowditch,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 57 (1924): 414–95, are letters
home from an ofcer of the 55th Massachusetts, describing the day-to-day progress of the siege
(sandbags and logs, pp. 427, 430, 442; “to lay,” p. 444). Emilio, Brave Black Regiment, pp. 106–27,
also describes the siege (artillery, pp. 108–09).