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1970 s, the Weather U nderground, which broke away from the SDS, the Yippies,

the Crazies, the Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers, and other revolutionary

groups took part in antiwar protests.

In general, the counterculturalists’ simplicity in political matters rendered them

ineffective in the larger antiwar movement. Their antics also provided a dditional

ammunition that supporters of the war and administration ofﬁcials used to dis-

credit the antiwar protests. The notion that antiwar protesters and stoned hippies

were dupes of a communist conspiracy was widely believed among the war’s sup-

porters. What could not be denied was the conﬂuence of political responsibility,

ideological awareness, and cultural creativity expanding the inﬂuence of antiwar

protests.

—Charles F. Howlett

Further Reading

Farber, David. “The Counterculture a nd the Anti-war Movement.” In Give Peace a

Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Anti-war Movement, ed. Melvin Small and William

D. Hoover. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993.

Fraser, Ronald, ed. 1968. New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam Books, 1987.

Perry, Charles. Th e Haight-Ashbury: A History. New York: Vintage Books, 1984.

Zaroulis, Nancy, and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War

in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1984.

Kent State (1970)

The announcement on A pril 30, 1970, by President Richard M. Nixon that

American forces had expanded the Vietnam War by invading Cambodia triggered

a new wave of student antiwar protests across the nation’s college campuses. The

next day, Friday, May 1, a large student demonstration against the war took place

at Kent State University in Ohio. To symbolize the belief that the war was uncon-

stitutional because Congress had not enacted a declaration of war, a copy of the

Constitution was buried on the campus commons. Another antiwar rally was

scheduled for May 4.

Students gathered that night as usual in the bars in downtown Kent. Although

the evening started out peacefully, violence broke out as protesters, both students

and persons from out of town, took to the streets and were confronted by Kent

police. Fi res were started in the st reets, and protesters broke store windows and

windshields of police cruisers. Reinforcements from other area police departments

938 Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s)

and from the county sheriff’s ofﬁce were called in to help bring the rioting under

control. Finally, after the police used tear gas, the protesters were dispersed.

Kent mayor Leroy Satrom immediately declared a state of emergency and,

fearful of further violence, asked Governor James A. Rhodes to send the Ohio

National Guard to Kent to help maintain peace on the Kent State campus. Units

of the Guard were already o n dut y i n northeast Ohio, and Guardsmen a rrived on

the Kent State campus around 10:00 on the evening of May 2. The Guardsmen

found the campus in chaos. The ROTC building had been set on ﬁre, and

an estimated 1,000 protesters were cheering as the building burned to the ground.

Confrontations between protesters and guardsmen continued through the night. Tear

gas was used once again, and a number of protesters were arrested for interfering

with efforts by the ﬁre department to ﬁght the blaze consuming the ROTC building.

Further altercations between the Guard andprotestersoccurredonSunday,

May 3. Governor Rhodes arrived in Kent and issued a provocative stateme nt in

which he compared the protesters to revolutionaries and communist conspirators.

Although students and Guardsmen appeared to get along during the day, violence

broke out again that evening. Protesters pelted the Guardsmen with rocks, and they

retaliated with more tear gas and bayonets. Several arrests were made and the

atmosphere on campus, now occupied by about 1,000 National Guard troopers,

became increasingly tense.

Efforts had been made to prohibit the scheduled May 4 rally, but to no avail. Stu-

dents began gathering on the campus commons around 11:00 a.m., and by noon,

some 3,000 persons had arrived there. Facing them were about 70 Guardsmen.

The protesters, who may well have been protesting the presence of the Guard on

campus more than the Cambodian invasion, were ordered to disperse. When the

students refused to do so, another order to disperse was given. This led to jeering

and roc k throwing, and the Guardsmen were ordered to lock and load their weap-

ons. Then the Guardsmen ﬁred tear gas into the mass of protesters an d began to

march across the Commons in an effort to break up the rally. The students retreated

to a nearby practice football ﬁeld, where the two sides faced each other for several

minutes. The Guardsmen then retreated back across the commons, up a hill known

as Blanket Hill. Without warning, a number of the Guardsmen suddenly turned and

ﬁred upon the crowd, killing four students and wounding nine more. Killed were

students Jeffrey Miller, William Schroeder, Sandra Scheuer, and Allison Krause.

Those wounded included Thomas Grace, Alan Canfora, John Cleary, Douglas

Wrentmore, Robert Stamps, James Russell, Robert Stamps, D onald MacKenzie,

and Dean Kahler. Kahler was the most seri ously injured of the wounded students,

suffering a fractured vertebra, which left him paralyzed from the chest down.

The university closed immediately and did not reopen for six weeks. Summer

classes were held, however, and the administration and faculty began the process

Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s) 939

of healing as well as assisting students to complete the term that had been inter-

rupted by the shootings. Furthermore, the faculty embarked upon a process of

scholarship in an effort to try to bring a sense of understanding to the tragic events

that had occurred. Some faculty began to search for alternative forms of protest

that could be conducted peacefully to prevent further violence on the nation’s col-

lege campuses.

The reasons as to why the Guardsmen ﬁred upon the students remain in dispute.

The Guardsmen claimed to be afraid for their lives and testiﬁed accordingly in

several investigations and trials. While some s cholars have supported this argu-

ment, others have asserted that their lives were never in danger. Ultimately, a

series of federal civil and criminal proced ures supported the contention of the

Guardsmen that they believed their lives were in jeopardy. The legal ramiﬁcations

of the shootings were ﬁnally resolved in 1979, when an out-of-court settlement led

to the payment of $675,000 by the state of Ohio to the families of the students who

had been killed and to the wounded students. The 28 Guardsmen who had ﬁred

their weapons also signed a statement, which in their view was nothing more than

an expression of regret rather than an apology or admission of guilt. Today, the

tragic events at Kent State University in May 1970 stand as the most eloquent

symbol of how deeply divided the American nation had become as a result of the

Vietnam War.

—Gregory Moore

Further Reading

Bills, Scott. Kent State/May 4: Echoes through a Decade. Kent, OH: Kent State University

Press, 1988.

Caputo, Philip. 13 S econds: A Look Back at the Kent State Shootings. New York: Cham-

berlain Bros., 2005.

Casale, Ottavio M., and Louis Paskoff, eds. The Kent Affair: Documents and Interpreta-

tions. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1971.

Davies, Peter. The Truth about Kent State: A Challenge to the American Conscience.

New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1973.

Grant, Edward J., and Michael Hill. I Was There: What Really Went on at Kent State . Lima,

OH: C. S. S. Publishing Co, 1974.

Hensley, Thomas R. The Kent State Incident: Impact of Judicial Process on P ublic Atti-

tudes. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981.

Hensley, Thomas R., a nd Jerry M. Lewis. Kent State and May 4th: A Social Science Per-

spective. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1978.

Isserman, Maurice, and Kazin, Michael. America Divided: The Civil Wa rs of the 1960 s.

3rd ed. New York. Oxford University Press, 2007.

Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. Wa shington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1970.

940 Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s)

The Moratorium (1969)

The Moratorium was an effort by young activists in liberal Democratic politics in

which Americans were asked to set aside one day in a month for a moratorium on

business as usual to reﬂect on the Vietnam War in any shape or form deemed appro-

priate. It was designed around a decentralized, grassroots form of antiwar protest.

During the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon campaigned on a promise

to bring “peace with honor.” When Nixon entered the White House, the new

president revealed his plan for the stabilization of South Vietnam. While promis-

ing a gradual reduction in U.S. troop strength, he assured Americans that the com-

munist North Vietnamese government was nearing collapse and that real peace

would be achieved by honoring and fulﬁlling the original goal of a sovereign, anti-

communist South Vietnam. His remarks prompted the antiwar movement to

organize two new coalition efforts aimed at massive protests in the fall of 1969.

One of these coalitions was the Moratorium; the other was the New Mobilization.

The Moratori u m was organized by several young activists in t he aftermath of

the 1968 presidential campaign. All were involved in liberal Democratic politics.

The idea was simple and largely the brainchild of Sam Brown and David Hawk.

After the death of Martin Luther King Jr. in April 1968, Brown became a leader

in the Eugene McCarthy presidential cam paign and later returned to Harvard

University to complete his doctoral studies in divinity. Hawk, meanwhile, had

been working in the Washington ofﬁce of the National Student Association. Both

had been working on antidraft projects. In the spring of 1969, both composed a

letter in which 253 student leaders from major universities vowed to refuse induc-

tion into the armed forces because the war was immoral and unjust.

Avoiding the more radical usage of the word strike for fear of alienating seg-

ments of the middle-class constituency Brown and Hawk intended to rally to their

cause, they deliberately coined their new action a “moratorium.” Instead of taking

it to the streets in dramatic fashion, their plan was to ask people to set aside one

day a month for a moratorium on business as usual for the purpose of reﬂection

on and protest against the Vietnam War. Geared to the gra ssroots , decentralized

nature of antiwar sentiment, the moratorium required that there would be no hag-

gling over terms amo ng the sponsorin g protest groups. The concept itself was

based on four precedents: the 1967 Vietnam Summer experiment, the March halt

in research at Massachusetts Institute in Technology, the various New Politics

campaigns blending reasonable protest with forceful measures for change, and tra-

ditional labor strikes that were long a staple in worker organizing. With funding

assured from antiwar liberals, the Vietnam Moratori um Committee established a

headquarters in Washington and began to start its protest in October.

Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s) 941

The plan called for starting a mon thly antiwar esc alation that would mobilize

the widest combinati on of liberal groups, intellectuals, civil rights and religious

leaders, and organized labor. The committee want ed to initiate an escalating pro-

test, which would force the government to make a ﬁrm commitment to a deﬁnite

timetable for total withdrawal or conclude with a negotiated settlement. The plan

was even endorsed by 24 Democratic senators.

Along with Brown and Hawk were David Mixner, a former staff member of

George McGovern’s commission on the reform of the Democratic Party, and

Marge Sklencar, who helped to form the Conference of Concerned Democrats.

On October 15, 1969, a nationwide protest was held. It was diverse in form, locally

based, and consisted of representatives from all the public sectors. There were ral-

lies consisting of as few as 10 people and as many as over 100,000 people. Some

estimates of the moratorium counted a qua rter of a million ordinary citizens and

elec ted ofﬁcials, housewives, television and movie entert ainers, business people,

and workers more popularly referred to as “hard hats.” What captured the media’s

attention was the deeply patriotic tone of the moratorium’s protest: one calling

for an end to American military involvement.

Stung by the protest, Nixon and the White House took the offensive and dispar-

aged the Moratorium’s organizers. Nixon immediately called for counterdemons-

trations in the name of “Americanism” as a way of showing the nation’s support

for the troops. A televised speech by Nixon on November 3 appealing to the silent

majority of citizens proved devastating to the Moratorium leaders. Congress

withhel d a vote on legislation requiring a withdrawal , and polls suggeste d many

Americans backed Nixon’s position. Moratorium leaders, however, wen t ahead

with their support of the November 15 protest organized by the New Mobilization

Committee, which had also been part of their plan. It was the largest protest

demonstration in American history to that time, but it had very little impact on

the public. The Moratorium and New Mobilization sought to create mass demon-

stra tions demanding an immediate w ithdrawal from Vietnam, but the president’s

policy of Vietnamization (turning the ﬁghting over to South Vietnamese and with-

drawing American forces) and the public concern for domestic order proved more

compelling. In the end, the public’s opposition to the war yet distaste for antiwar

protests frustrated many antiwar activists.

—Charles F. Howlett

Further Reading

Anderson, Terry H. The Movement and the Sixties: Protes t in America from Greensboro to

Wounded Knee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Chatﬁeld, Charles. The American Peace M ovement: Ideals a nd Activism.NewYork:

Twayne Publishers, 1992.

942 Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s)

DeBenedetti, Charles. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Mo vemen t in the Vietnam Era.

Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.

Howlett, Charles F., and Robbie Lieberman. A History of the American Peace Movement

from Colonial Times to the Present. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

Small, Mel. Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University

Press, 1988.

Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of Cal-

ifornia Press, 1994.

Zaroulis, Nancy, and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War

in Vietnam. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1984.

Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS)

The most important political organization of the 1960s, SDS called for expansive

changes in the economic and social structure of America. It symbolized the

nation’s transformation from respectable protest and reform to resistance and

rebellion often marked by violence. It looked to the universities as the vehicle

for social change. The creation of SDS had been sparked by the 1962 publication

of Michael Harrington’s The Other America.

The most prominent New Left organization was Students for a Democratic

Society, which t raced its beginnings to a convention held in June 1962 a t Port

Huro n, Michigan. There, about 200 activists put forth the Port Huron Statement,

which made an explicit connection between ending the Cold War and advancing

domestic reform. Tom Hayden wrote the manifesto. These activists looked ﬁrst

to college campuses, where knowledge was produced, in their call for social

reconstruction and political awareness.

Two issues especially troubled this generation. First was the stark reality of

American citizens as victims of an unfair social and economic system, symbolized

by the struggle against racial bigotry. Many college student activists recogni-

zed the debilitating effects of racial discrimination in America. Second, the Cold

War, symbolized by the bomb, brought i nsecurity and a desperate desire for

change before it was too late. New Left activists wanted reform from the bo ttom

up, and one important part of the equation for reform was a reorganization of the

nation’s priorities. How much more money could be devoted to health care,

improving the inner cities, creating jobs for the poor, and building better schools

if it was not being put into the Pentagon’s pockets? Would there be future genera-

tions, given the awesome power of the bomb?

Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s) 943

On the national level, SDS had a highly decentralized structure barely kept

together by a tiny, highly mobile , and poorly paid staff located in Chic ago.

Distrusting bureaucratic structures, the organization insisted that each local

chapter work out its own programs. After SDS sponsored the ﬁrst big demonstra-

tion against the Vietnam War, in April 1965, hundreds of chapters s prang up

around the country. Each one was autonomous and addressed a range of issues,

from local concerns as mundane as male visiting hours in women’s dormitories

to national elections and international issues. SDS members approached peace

and social justice issues with high moral conviction and emotional commitment.

SDS became a vehicle for students to comment on the society their parents’

generation had built, which, in their view, placed too much emphasis on material

gain at the expense of more meaningful pursuits. Their actions also marked the

era of “obstructive demonstration” and a new, more confrontational approach to

trying to stop the war machine and military involvement in Vietnam. SDS intro-

duced tactical innovations such as antiwar teach-ins, draft counseling, and “resis-

tance” campaigns. In its call for radic al action against the war, for example,

students would lie down in front of troop trains to block their progress; challenge

the r ight of companies such as Dow Chemical, maker of napalm, to rec ruit on

campus; and target symbols of university complicity with the “war machine.”

From 1965 to 1970, SDS activists were involved in some 2,000 demonstrations

and strikes directed at university leaders.

Some of its most dramatic campus confrontations involved opposition to

Reserve Ofﬁcers Training Corps (ROTC) programs (these increased i n intensity

after 1968, when a new draft law went into effect). Very often, these were loud

and boisterous, involving, in certain cases, the burning down of the ROTC building

on campus. It was also in the forefront of the anti-d raft movement callin g for an

end to mandatory ROTC programs and military recruiters on campus. During the

major antiwar demonstrations in Boston, New York City, San Francisco, Chicago,

and Washington, D.C., SDS members were visibly present.

In its origins, however, SDS was mainly concerned with expanding democracy

to end racism and poverty in America. It is fair to state that SDS failed to establish

a permanent leadership presence within the antiwar movement due to its extremist

views and actions, which led to its fragmentation. At the end of 1969, it had

become bitterly divided and reduced to a small group devoted to violence and rev-

olu tion. Its actions thereafter were largely carr ied out underground as its a bove-

ground political impact diminished in importance.

—Charles F. Howlett

Further Reading

Anderson, Terry H. The Movement and the Sixties: Protes t in America from Greensboro to

Wounded Knee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

944 Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s)

Brines, Wini. Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962–1968. New Brunswick,

NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989.

Buhle, Mari Jo, Paul Buhle, and Dan Geogakas, eds. Encyclopedia of the Amer ican Left.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992.

DeBenedetti, Ch arles, with Charles Chatﬁeld. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Mo ve-

ment of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.

Farrell, James J. The Spirit of the Sixties: Making Postwar Radicalism . New York: Rout-

ledge, 1997.

Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam Books, 1987.

Isserman, Maurice. IfIHadaHammer:TheDeathoftheOldLeftandtheBirthofthe

New Left. New York: Basic Books, 1987.

Miller, James. “Democracy in the S treets”: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago.

New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

Sale, Kirpatrick. SDS. New York: Random House, 1973.

Speech Delivered by Paul Potter, President of Students for

a Democratic Society, at the Washington Monument (1965)

The following speech was delivered on April 17, 1965, during a Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS) meeting in front of the Washington Monument by SDS president Paul Potter. After

picketing for two hours at the White House, Potter closed the Washington Monument meeting

with this address. Potter died in 1984.

Most of us grew up thinking that the United States was a strong but humble nation, that

involved itself in world affairs only reluctantly, that respected the integrity of other

nations and other systems, and that engaged in wars only as a last resort. T his was a

nation with no large standing army, with no design for external conquest, that sought pri-

marily the opportunity to develop its own resources and its own mode of living. If at

some point we began to hear vague and disturbing things about what this country had

done in Latin America, China, Spain and other places, we somehow remained conﬁdent

about the basic integrity of this nation’s foreign policy. The Cold War with all of its neat

categories and black and white descriptions did much to assure us that what we had been

taught to believe was true.

But in re cent years, the withdrawal from the hysteria of the Cold War era and the

development of a more aggressive, activist foreign policy have done much to force many

of us to rethink attitudes that were deep and basic sentiments about our country. The

incredible war in Vietnam has provided the razor, the terrifying sharp cutting edge that

has ﬁnally severed the last vestige of illusion that morality and democracy are the guiding

principles of American foreign policy. The saccharine self-righteous moralism that prom-

ises the Vietnamese a billion dollars of economic aid at the very moment we are deliver-

ing billions fo r economic and social destruction and political repression is rapidly losing

what power it might ev er have had to reassure us about the decency of our foreign

Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s) 945

poli cy. The furthe r we explore the reality of what this country is doing and planning in

Vietnam the more we are driven toward the conclusion of Senator Morse that the

United States may well be the greatest threat to peace in the world today. That is a ter-

rible and bitter insi ght for people who grew up as we did—and ou r revulsion at t hat

insight, our refusal to accept it as inevitable or necessary, is one of the reasons that so

many people have come here today.

The President says that we are defending freedom in Vietnam. Whose freedom? Not

the freedom of the Vietnamese. The ﬁrst act of the ﬁrst dictator, Diem, the United States

installed in Vietnam, was to systematically begin the persecution of all political

opposition, non-Communist as well as Communist. The ﬁrst American military supplies

were not used to ﬁght Communist insurgents; they were used to control, imprison or kill

any who sought something better for Vietnam than the personal aggrandizement, politi-

cal corruption and the proﬁteering of the Diem regime. The elite of the fo rces that we

have trained and equipped are still used to control political unrest in Saigon and defend

the latest dictator from the people.

And yet in a world where dictatorships are so commonplace and popular control of

government so rare, people become callous to the misery that is implied b y dictatorial

power. The rationalizations that are used to defend political despotism have been

drummed into us so long that we have somehow become numb to the possibility that

something else might exist. And it is only the kind of terror we see now in Vietnam

that awakens co nscience and reminds us that there is something deep in us tha t cries

out against dictatorial suppression.

The pattern of repression and destruction that we have developed and justiﬁed in the

war i s so thorough that it can only be called cultural genocide. I am not simply talking

about napalm or gas or crop destruction or torture, hurled indiscriminately on women

and children, insurgent and neutral, upon the ﬁrst suspicion of rebel activity. That in itself

is horrendous and incredible beyond belief. Butitisonlypartofalargerpatternof

destruction to the very fabric of the country. We have uprooted the people from the

land and imprisoned them in concentration camps called “sunrise villages.” Through con-

scription and direct political intervention and control, we have destroyed local customs

and traditions, trampled upon those things of value which give dignity and purpose to life.

What is left to the people of Vietnam after 20 years of war? What part of themselves

and their own lives will those who survive be able to salvage from the wreckage of their

country or build on the “peace” and “security” our Great Society offers them in reward

for their allegiance? How can anyone be surprised that p eople who have had total war

waged on themselves and their culture rebel in increasing numbers against that tyranny?

What other course is available? And still our only response to rebellion is more vigorous

repression, more merciless opposition to the social and cultural institutions which sus-

tain dignity and the will to resist.

Not even the President can say that this is a war to defend the freedom of the Viet-

namese people. P erhaps what the President means when he speaks of freedom is the

freedom of the American people.

946 Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s)

What in fact has the war done f or freedom in America? It has led to even more

vigorous governmental efforts to control information, manipulate the press and pressure

and persuade the public through distorted or downright dishonest documents such as

the White Paper on Vietnam. It has led to the conﬁscation of ﬁlms and other anti-war

material and the vigorous harassment by the FBI of some of the people who have been

most outs pokenly active in their criticism of the war. As the war escalates and the

administration seeks more actively to gain support for any initiative it may choose to take,

there has been the beginnings of a war psychology unlike anything that has burdened this

country since the 1950s. How much more of Mr. Johnson’s freedom can we stand? How

much freedom will be left in this country if there is a major war in Asia? By what weird logic

can it be said that the freedom of one people can only be maintained by crushing another?

In many ways this is an unusual march because the large majority of people here are

not involved in a peace movement as their primary basi s of concern. What is exci ting

about the partic ipants in this march is that so many of us view ourselves consciously as

participants as well in a movement to build a more decent society. There are students

here who have been involved in protest s over the quality and kind of educati on they

are receiving in growingly bureaucratized, depersonalized institutions called universities;

there are Negroes from Mississippi and Alabama who are strug gling against the tyr anny

and repression of those states; there are poor people here—Negro and white—from

Northern urban areas who are attempting to build movements that a bolish poverty

and secure democracy; there are faculty who are beginning to question the relevance

of their institutions to the critical problems facing the society. Where will these people

and the movements they are a part of be if the President i s allowed t o expand th e war

in Asia? What happens to the hopeful beginnings of expressed discontent that are trying

to shift American attention to long-neglected internal priorities of shared abundance,

democracy and decency at home when those priorities have to compete with the all-

consuming priorities and psychology of a war against an enemy thousands of miles away?

The President mocks freedom if he insists that the war in Vietnam is a defense of

American freedom. Perhaps the only freedom that this war protects is the freedo m of

the warhawks in the Pentagon and the State Depart ment to experiment with counter-

insurgency and guerrilla warfare in Vietnam.

Vietnam, we may say, is a laboratory run by a new breed of gamesmen who approach war

as a kind of rational exercise in international power politics. It is the testing ground and stag-

ing area for a new American response to the social revolution that is sweeping through the

impoverished downtrodden areas of the world. It is the beginning of the American counter-

revolution, and so far no one—none of us—not the N.Y. Times, nor 17 Neutral Nations, nor

dozens of worried allies, nor the United States Congress have been able to interfere with

the freedom of the President and the Pentagon to carry out that experiment.

Thus far the war in Vietnam has only dramatized the demand of ordinary people to have

some opportunity to make their own lives, and of their unwillingness, even under incredible

odds, to give up the struggle against external domination. We are told, however, that the

struggle can be legitimately suppressed since it might lead to the development of a Commu-

nist system, and before that ultimate menace all criticism is supposed to melt.

Antiwar Movement (1960s–1970s) 947