Copleston F. History of Philosophy. Volume 7: Modern Philosophy

344

REACTION AGAINST. METAPHYSICAL IDEALISM·

stages Kierkegaard uses as a symbol Abraham's willingness

to

sacrifice his son Isaac

at

God's command. The tragic hero, such as

Socrates, sacrifices

himself for the universal moral law;

but

Abraham, as Kierkegaard

puts

it, does nothing for the universal

'So

we

stand

in

the

presence of

the

paradox. Either the Individual

as the Individual can

stand

in

an

absolute relation to the Absolute,

and

then ethics is not supreme, or Abraham is lost: he is neither a

tragic hero

nor

an

aesthetic hero.'l Needless

to

say, Kierkegaard

does

not

intend

to

enunciate the general proposition

that

religion

involves

the

negation of morality.

What

he means is

that

the man

of faith

is

directly related to a personal God whose demands are

absolute

and

cannot be measured simply

by

the standards of

the

human reason. At

the

back of Kierkegaard's mind there is doubtless

the

memory of his behaviour towards Regina Olsen. Marriage is an

ethical institution,

the

expression of

the

universal. And if ethics,

the

universal, is supreme, Kierkegaard's conduct was inexcusable.

He was justified only if he

had

a personal mission from God whose

absolute demands are addressed to

the

individual. Obviously,

I do not intend

to

suggest

that

Kierkegaard is universalizing his

own experience

in

the

sense of assuming

that

everyone has

the

same specific experience. He universalizes

it

in the sense

that

he

reflects on its general significance.

As Kierkegaard's dialectic is one of discontinuity, in

the

sense

that

the

transition from one stage

to

another is made

by

choice,

by

self-commitment,

and

not

through a continuous process

of

conceptual mediation, he

not

unnaturally plays down

the

role of

reason and emphasizes

that

of will when he is treating of religious

faith.

In

his view faith

is

a leap.

That

is

to

say,

it

is an adventure, a

risk, a self-commitment to

an

objective uncertainty. God is

the

transcendent Absolute,

the

absolute Thou; he is not an object

the

existence of which can be proved. True, God reveals himself to the

human conscience in

the

sense

that

man can become aware

of

his

sin

and

alienation and his need of God.

But

man's response is a

venture,

an

act

of

faith in a Being who lies beyond

the

reach of

speculative philosophy. And this act of faith is not something

which can be performed once

and

for all.

It

has

to

be constantly

repeated.

It

is true

that

God has revealed himself in Christ,

the

God-Man.

But

Christ is the Paradox,

to

the Jews a stumbling-block

and

to the Greeks foolishness.

Faith

is always a venture. a leap.

Looked

at

from one point of view Kierkegaard's account of the

1 Fear and Trembling, p.

I7I.

KIERKEGAARD

345

standpoint of faith is a vigorous protest against the way in which

speculative philosophy, represented principally

by

Hegelianism,

blurs

the

distinction between God and

man

and rationalizes

the

Christian dogmas, turning them into philosophically-demonstrated

conclusions.

In

the

Hegelian system 'the qualitative distinction

between God

and

man

is pantheistically abolished'. 1 The system

does indeed hold

out

the attractive prospect of

'an

illusory land,

which to a mortal eye might appear to yield a certainty higher

than

that

of

faith'. 2

But

the mirage

is

destructive of faith,

and

its

claim

to

represent Christianity

is

bogus. 'The entirely unsocratic

tract

of

modern philosophy is

that

it wants to make itself

and

us

believe

that

it

is Christianity.'3

In

other words, Kierkegaard

refuses

to

admit

that

in this life there can be a higher standpoint

than

that

of faith. The vaunted transformation of faith into

speculative knowledge is an illusion.

But

though in such passages it is Hegelianism which Kierkegaard

has principally in

mind. there is no adequate ground for saying

that

he would

have

had

much sympathy with

the

idea

of

proving

God's existence

by

metaphysical argument provided

that

an

unequivocally theistic idea

of

God were maintained.

In

his view

the

fact

that

man

is held eternally accountable for belief or dis·

belief shows

that

belief is not a

matter

of

accepting the conclusion

of a demonstrative argument

but

rather a

matter

of

will. Catholic

theologians

would obviously wish

to

make some distinctions here.

But

Kierkegaard was not a Catholic theologian. And the point is

that

he deliberately emphasized the nature of faith as a leap.

It

was not simply a case of opposition to Hegelian rationalism.

This comes out clearly in his famous interpretation of

truth

as

subjectivity.

'An

objective uncertainty held fast

in

an

appropriation-

process

of

the

most

passi01Jate

inwardness is the truth, the highest

truth

attainable for an existing individual.'4 Kierkegaard is not

denying

that

there is

any

such thing as objective, impersonal truth.

But

mathematical truths, for example, do not concern the 'existing

individual' as such.

That

is to say,

they

are irrelevant

to

a man's

life

of

total. self-commitment. He accepts them. He cannot do

otherwise.

But

he does not stake his whole being on them.

That

on

which I stake

my

whole being is not something which I cannot

1 The Sickness unto Ddath, p. 192.

t Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 213

(translated

by

D.

F.

Swenson,

Princeton

and

London, 1941).

I The Sickness unto Death, p.

15

1

.

, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 182.

34

6

REACTION AGAINST METAPHYSICAL IDEALISM

deny without logical contradiction or something which is so

obviously true

that

I cannot deny

it

without palpable absurdity.

It

is something which I

can

doubt

but

which is so important

to

me

that

if I accept it, I do so with a passionate self-commitment.

It

is

in a sense

my

truth.

'The

truth

is precisely the venture which

chooses

an

objective

uncertainty

with the passion of

the

infinite. I

contemplate

the

order

of

nature

in

the

hope of finding God,

and

I

see omnipotence

and

wisdom;

but

I also see much else

that

disturbs

my

mind

and

excites anxiety. The sum of all this is

an

objective uncertainty.

But

it

is for this very reason

that

the

inwardness becomes as intense as

it

is, for

it

embraces this objective

uncertainty with

the

entire passion of the infinite.'l

Obviously,

truth

as so described

is

precisely

what

Kierkegaard

means

by

faith. The definition of

truth

as subjectivity

and

the

definition of faith

are

the

same. 'Without risk there is no faith.

Faith

is precisely

the

contradiction between

the

infinite passion of

the

individual's inwardness

and

the objective uncertainty.'2

Kierkegaard does indeed

assert more

than

once

that

the

eternal

truth

is

not

in

itself a paradox.

But

it

becomes paradoxical

in

relation

to

us. One can indeed see some evidence

in

Nature of God's

work,

but

at

the

same time one can see much which points in

the

opposite direction. There is,

and

remains, 'objective uncertainty',

whether we look

at

Nature

or

at

the Gospels.

For

the

idea of

the

God-Man is itself paradoxical for the finite reason.

Faith

grasps

the

objectively uncertain

and

affirms it;

but

it

has

to

maintain

itseH,as

it

were, over a fathomless sea. Religious

truth

exists only

in

the

'passionate' appropriation of

the

objectively uncertain.

3

In

point

of fact Kierkegaard does

not

say

that

there are no

rational motives

at

all for making the act of faith

and

that

it

is a

purely arbitrary

act

of capricious choice. 'But he certainly takes

delight

in

minimizing

the

rational motives for religious belief

and

in emphasizing

the

subjectivity of

truth

and

the

nature

of faith as

a leap. Hence he inevitably gives the impression

that

faith is for

him

an

arbitrary act of

the

wilL And Catholic theologians

at

least

criticize him on this score.

But

if we prescind from

the

theological

analysis of faith

and

concentrate on

the

psychological aspect of

the

matter, there is no difficulty in recognizing, whether one is

Catholic or Protestant,

that

there are certainly some who under-

stand

very well from their own experience what Kierkegaard is

1 Coftelwli,., UflSCimli/lc Postscript, p.

182.

• Ibid.

• We have

to

remember

that

for taerkegaard faith is a self-commitment

to

the

abaolute and transcendent Thou,

the

personal God,

rather

than

to

propositions.

KIERKEGAARD

347

driving

at

when

he

describes faith as a venture

or

risk. And,

in

general, Kierkegaard's phenomenological analysis of

the

three

distinct attitudes

or

levels of consciousness which he describes

possess a value

and

a stimulative power which is

not

destroyed

by

his characteristic exaggerations.

5·

In

the

passage quoted above which gives Kierkegaard's

unconventional definition of

truth

mention is made of the 'existing

individual'.

It

has already been explained

that

the

term'

existence',

as

used

by

Kierkegaard, is a specifically

human

category which

cannot be applied, for example,

to

a stone.

But

something more

must

be said about

it

here.

To illustrate his use of

the

concept of existence Kierkegaard

employs

the

following analogy. A

man

sits in a cart

and

holds

the

reins,

but

the

horse goes along its accustomed

path

without

any

active control

by

the

driver, who

may

be asleep. Another

man

actively guides

and

directs his horse.

In

one sense

both

men

can

be said

to

be drivers.

But

in another sense

it

is only

the

second

man

who can be said

to

be driving.

In

an

analogous manner

the

man

who drifts with

the

crowd, who merges himself in

the

anonymous

'One', can be said

to

exist in one sense of

the

term, though

in

another sense he cannot

be

said

to

exist.

For

he is

not

the

'existing

individual' who strives resolutely towards

an

end which cannot be

realized once

and

for all

at

a given moment

and

is

thus

in a constant

state

of becoming, making himself, as

it

were,

by

his repeated

acts

of choice. Again,

the

man

who contents himself with the role of

spectator of

the

world

and

of life

and

transmutes everything

into

a dialectic

of

abstract concepts exists indeed

in

one sense

but

not

in

another.

For

he wishes

to

understand everything

and

commits

himself

to

nothing.

The

'existing individual', however, is

the

actor

rather

than

the

spectator.

He

commits himself

and

so gives form

and

direction

to

his life. He ex-ists towards

an

end for which

he

actively strives

by

choosing this

and

rejecting

that.

In

other

words,

the

term

'existence' has with Kierkegaard more or less

the

same sense

as

the

term

'authentic existence' as used

by

some

modem

existentialist philosophers.

If

understood simply

in

this way,

the

term

'existence' is neutral,

in

the

sense

that

it

can

be applied within

any

of

the

three stages of

the

dialectic. Indeed. Kierkegaard says explicitly

that

'there are

three spheres of existence:

the

aesthetic,

the

ethical.

the

religious'.

1

A

man

can

'exist' within

the

aesthetic sphere

if

he

deliberately.

1 COfIdtldi",

UfI,ciMIi/lc

PO,IIcripl, p.

44

8

•

REACTION AGAINST METAPHYSICAL IDEALISM

resolutely

and

consistently acts as the aesthetic man, excluding

alternatives.

In

this sense Don

Juan

typifies the existing individual

within the aesthetic sphere. Similarly, the

man

who sacrifices his

own inclinations to the universal moral law and constantly strives

after the fulfilment of a moral ideal which beckons him ever

forward

is

an

existing individual within the ethical sphere. 'An

existing individual

is

himself in process of becoming. . . .

In

existence the watchword

is

always forward.' 1

But though .the

term

'existence' has indeed this wide field of

application, it tends

to

take on a specifically religious connotation.

Nor

is

this in

any

way surprising.

For

man's highest form of self-

realization as spirit is for Kierkegaard his self-relating

to·

the

personal Absolute. 'Existence is a synthesis of the infinite and the

finite,

and

the existing individual is both infinite

and

finite.'a

But

to say

that

the existing individual is infinite

is

not to identify him

with God.

It

is to say

that

his becoming

is

a constant striving

towards God. 'Existence itself, the act of existing, is a striving

...

(and) the striving

is

infinite.'3 'Existence is the child

that

is

born

of the infinite

and

the finite, the eternal

and

the temporal,

and

is

therefore a constant striving.

'4

One can say, therefore,

that

existence comprises two moments: separation or finiteness and a

constant striving, in this context towards God. The striving

must be

constant, a constant becoming, because the self-relating to God

in faith cannot be accomplished once

and

for all:

it

has to take the

form of a constantly

repeated self-commitment.

It

can hardly be claimed

that

Kierkegaard's definition or

descriptions of existence are always crystal clear.

At

the same time

the

general notion

is

intelligible enough. And it is clear

that

for

him

the

existing individual

par

excellence is the individual before

God, the man who sustains the standpoint of faith.

6.

In

the writings of the existentialists the concept of dread

5

is

conspicuous.

But

the

term

is

used

by

different writers in different

ways. With Kierkegaard

it

has a religious setting. And in

The

Concept

of

Dread

it

has a close association with the idea of sin.

However, one can, I think, broaden the range of application

and

say

that

dread

is

a state which precedes a qualitative leap from

one stage in life's way to another.

1 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 368.

• Ibid., p. 350. • Ibid .. p. 84. ' Ibid., p. 85.

•

The

Germans

speak

of

Angst,the

French

of angoisse. Some English writers

have

employed

'anguish'

or

even

'anxiety'.

I

have

retained

'dread'.

In

any

case

'fear'

should be avoided, for a reason explained in

the

text.

KIERKEGAARD

349

Dread is defined

by

Kierkegaard as a 'sympathetic antipathy

and

an

antipathetic

sympathy'. 1 Take

the

case of the srriall boy who

feels an attraction for adventure,

'a

thirst for

the

prodigious,

the

mysterious'. I The child is

attracted

by

the

unknown, yet

at

the

same time is repelled

by

it,

asa

menace

to

his security. Attraction

and

repulsion, sympathy

and

antipathy, are interwoven.

The

child

is in a

state

of dread,

but

not

of fear. For fear is concerned with

something quite definite, real or imagined, a snake under

the

bed,

a wasp threatening to sting, whereas

dread

is

concerned with

the

as

yet

unknoWn

and

indefinite. And

it

is precisely

the

unknown,

the

mysterious, which

both

attracts

and

repels

the

child.

Kierkegaard applies this idea

to

sin.

In

the

state

of innocence,

he

says, spirit is in a dreaming state,

ina

state

of immediacy.

It

does not

yet

know sin. Yet

it

can have a vague attraction,

not

for

sin as something definite,

but

for the use of freedom

and

so

for

the

possibility of sin. 'Dread is the possibility of freedom. j a Kierkegaard

uses Adam as an illustration. When Adam, in

the

state

of innocence,

was told

not

to

eat

the

fruit of the tree of the knowledge

algood

and

evil under pain of death, he could

not

know

what

was meant either

by

evil or

by

death.

For

the knowledge could be obtained only

by

disobeying

the

prohibition.

But

the

prohibition awoke in Adam

'the

possibility of freedom . . .

the

alarming possibility of

being

able'

. ' And he was

attracted

and

repelled

by

it

at

the same time.

But

there is also, Kierkegaard says, a dread in relation

to

the

good. Let us suppose, for example, a man sunk

in

sin. He

may

be

aware of

the

possibility of emerging from this state,

and

he

may

be

attracted

by

it.

But

at

the

same time

he

may

be repelled

by

the

prospect, inasmuch as he loves his

state

of sin. He is then possessed

by

dread of the good. And this is really a dread of freedom, if,

that

is to say, we suppose

that

the

man

is in the enslaving grip of

sin. Freedom is for him

the

object of a sympathetic

antipathy

and

an

antipathetic sympathy. And this dread is itself the possibility

of freedom. '

.

!he

~otion

of dread

may

perhaps become clearer if we can apply

It m thiS way. A man, let us suppose, has become conscious of sin

and

of his

utter

lack of self-sufficiency. And he is faced with

the

possibility of the leap of faith,

5

which, as

we

have seen, means

self-commitment

to

an

objective uncertainty, a leap into

the

unknown. He is rather like the

man

on the edge of the precipice

1 The Concept

of

Dread, p. 38 (tranSlated

by

W.

Lowrie, Princeton and London

1944)· I Ibid. • Ibid, p. 139.. , Ibid., p. 4

0

• '

,

'The

opposite

of

sin is

not

virtue

but

faith';

Till

Sickn,,!

unto Death,

p.

13

2

.

35

0

REACTION AGAINST METAPHYSICAL IDEALISM

who

is

aware

of

the possibility

of

throwing himself over and who

feels

attraction and repulsion

at

the same time. True, the leap

of

faith means salvation, not destruction. 'The dread

of

possibility

holds him as its prey, until

it

can deliver him saved into the hands

of

faith.

In

no other place does

he

find repose

....

'1

This seems to

imply

that

dread

is

overcome

by

the leap.

But

in

so

far

at

least as

the maintenance

of

the standpoint

of

faith involves a repeated

self-commitment to an objective uncertainty,

it

would appear

that

dread recurs as the emotive tonality of the repeated leap.

7.

Kierkegaard was first and foremost a religious thinker. And

though for his actual contemporaries he was pretty

well

a voice

crying in the wilderness, his idea

of

the Christian religion has

exercised a powerful influence

on

important currents

of

modem

Protestant theology. Mention has already been made

of

the name

of

Karl Barth, whose hostility to 'natural theology' is very much

in tune with Kierkegaard's attitude towards any invasion

by

metaphysics into the sphere

of

faith.

It

may be said,

of

course, and

with justice,

that

in the type

of

theology represented

by

Karl

Barth

it

is

a case not

so

much

of

following Kierkegaard as

of

making

a renewed

contact with the original well-spring

of

Protestant

thought and spirituality.

But

inasmuch as some

of

Kierkegaard's

ideas were distinctively Lutheran, this was just one

of

the effects

which his writings could and did exercise.

At the same time his writings are obviously capable

of

exercising

an

influence in other directions.

On

the one hand

he

had some very

hard things

to

say about Protestantism, and

we

can discern a

movement in his thought not only away from emasculated

Protestantism

but

also from Protestantism

~s

such.

It

is

not my ,

purpose to argue

that

if

he had lived longer. he would have

become a

Catholic. Whether he would or not is a question which

we

cannot possibly answer. Hence it is unprofitable to discuss it.

But

in point of fact

his

writings have had the effect of turning some

people's minds towards

Catholicism which. as he remarked, has

always maintained the ideal

at

any rate

of

what he called

No.

I

Christianity. On the other hand one can envisage the possibility

of

his writings contributing to

tum

people away from Christianity

altogether. One can

im~ine

a man saying, 'Yes, I see the point.

Kierkegaard

is

quite right. I am not really a Christian. And. what

is more, I do not wish

to

be.

No

leaps

forme.

no passionate

embracing

of

objective uncertainties.'

1 TA,

COfIUP'

0/

Dr,fIIl. p. I.fI.

KIERKEGAARD

351

I t is not

so

surprising, therefore, if in the development

of

the

modem existentialist movement

we

find certain Kierkegaardian

themes divorced from their original religious setting and employed

in

an

atheistic system. This

is

notably the case in the philosophy

of

M.

Sartre~

With Karl Jaspers indeed, who of all the philosophers

commonly classified as existentialists

1

stands nearest to Kierke-

gaard, the religious setting of the concept

of

existence

is

to

a large

extent

retained.·

But

the philosophy of

M.

Sartre reminds us

that

the concepts

of

authentic existence, of free self-commitment and

of dread are capable of displacement from this setting.'

These remarks are certainly not meant to imply

that

the

origins of modem existentialism can be attributed simply to the

posthumous influence

of

Kierkegaard. This would be a gross mis-

statement.

But

Kierkegaardian themes recur in existentialism.

though the historical context has changed. And writers on the

existentialist movement are perfectly justified in seeing in

the

Danish thinker its spiritual ancestor, though not,

of

course, its

sufficient cause. At the same time Kierkegaard has exercised a

stimulative influence

on many people who would not call them-

selves existentialists

or, for the matter of

that,

professional

philosophers or theologians of any kind.

As

was remarked in the

first section of this chapter, his philosophical thought tends

to

become both an attempt to get men to see their existential

situation and the alternatives with which they are faced and an

appeal to choose, to commit themselves, to become 'existing

individuals'.

It

is also, of course, a protest in the name of the free

individual or person against submergence in the collectivity.

Kierkegaard indeed exaggerates. And the exaggeration becomes

more evident when the concept of existence is deprived of the

religious significance which he gave it.

But

exaggeration

so

often

serves

to

draw attention to what is after all worth saying.

1 Some of these,

it

is true, have repudiated

the

label.

But

we cannot discuss this

matter

here.

In

any

case, 'existentialism', unless

it

is confined

to

the

philosophy of

M.

Sartre, is a portmanteau term.

I Jaspers is a professional philosopher and a university professor, whereas

it

is

difficult.

to

imagine

the

eccentric and passionate Danish thinker

as

the

occupant of

any

chair.

But

the

life

and

thought

of Kierkegaard (as of Nietzsche) has been for

Jaspers a subject of prolonged meditation.

PART

III

LATER

CURRENTS

OF

THOUGHT

CHAPTER

XVIII

NON-DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Introductory

remarks-The

first phase

of

the

materialist

movement-Lange's

cr£tiC£sm

of

materialism-H

aeckel'

s monism

-Ostwald's

energeticism-Empirio-criticism considered

as

an

attempt

to

overcome

the

opposition

between

materialism and

idealism.

I.

THE

collapse of absolute idealism was soon followed

by

the rise

of a materialistic philosophy which did not stem, as did dialectical

materialism, from left-wing Hegelianism

but

professed to be based

on

and

to follow from serious reflection on the empirical sciences.

Science has,

of

course, no intrinsic connection with philosophical

materialism, even if

the

philosophies of Nature expounded

by

Schelling

and

Hegel did little to foster the conviction

that

the

natural complement of science

is

metaphysical idealism. Further,

the leading German philosophers,

apart

from Marx, have certainly

not been materialists. Hence I do not propose to devote much space

to the nineteenth-century materialist movement in Germany.

But

it

is as well to understand

that

there was such a movement. And

though it did not represent

any

profound philosophical thought,

it

was none the less influential. Indeed,

it

was precisely because of its

lack of profundity

and

its appeal to the prestige of science

that

a

book such as Buchner's

Force and Matter enjoyed a wide vogue and

passed through a great number

of

editions.

2.

Among

the

German materialists prominent in the middle of

the nineteenth century were Karl

Vogt (1817-95). Heinrich

Czolbe (I8I9-73),

Jakob

MoleschoU (1822-93)

and

Ludwig

Buchner (I824-99).

Vogt, a zoologist

and

professor

at

Giessen for

a time, is memorable for his statement

that

the

brain secretes

thought as the liver secretes bile. His general outlook

is

indicated

by

the title of his polemical work against the physiologist Rudolf

Wagner,

Blind Paith and Science (Kohlerglaube und Wissenschaft,

352

NON-DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 353

1854. literally Faith

of

a Charcoal-burner and Science). Rudolf

Wagner

had

openly professed belief in divine creation,

and

Vogt

attacked

him in

the

name of science. Czolbe,

author

of a New

Exposition

of

Sensualism (Neue Darstellung

des

Sensualismus,

1855)

and

of attacks on Kant, Hegel

and

Lotze, derived conscious-

ness from sensation, which he interpreted in a manner reminiscent

of Democritus.

At

the

same time he admitted the presence

in

Nature of organic forms which are

not

susceptible of a purely

mechanistic explanation.

Moleschott was a physiologist

and

doctor who

had

to abandon

his chair

at

Utrecht in consequence of the opposition aroused

by

his materialistic theories. Subsequently he became a professor in

I

taly

where he exercised a considerable influence on minds

inclined to positivism

and

materialism.

In

particular he influenced

Cesare Lombroso (1836-I909). the famous professor of criminal

anthropology

at

Turin, who translated into Italian Moleschott's

The Cycle

of

Life (Der Kreistauf

des

Lebens, 1852).

In

Moleschott's

view

the

whole history of the universe can be explained in terms of

an

original matter, of which force or energy is

an

intrinsic

and

essential attribute. There is no

matter

without force,

and

no force

without matter. Life is simply a

state

of

matter

itself. Feuerbach

prepared

the

way for

the

destruction of all anthropomorphic,

teleological interpretations of

the

world,

and

it

is the

task

of

modern science to continue and complete this work. There is no

good reason for making a dichotomy between

the

natural sciences

on

the

one hand

and

the

study

of man

and

his history on

the

other.

Science can use

the

same principles of explanation in

both

cases.

The best known product of

the

earlier phase of German

materialism is probably Buchner's

Force

ami Matter (Kraft umi

Stoff, I855), which became a kind of popular textbook of

materialism

and

was translated into a number of foreign languages.

The author condemned out of hand all philosophy which could

not

be understood

by

the ordinary educated reader. And for this very

reason the book enjoyed considerable popularity.

As

its

title

indicates, force

and

matter

are taken as sufficient principles of

explanation. The spiritual soul, for example, is thrown overboard.

3.

In

I866 Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75) published his

famous

History

of

Materialism

(Geschichte

des

Mattrialismus) in

which he subjected

the

materialist philosophy

to

well-founded

criticism from the point of view of a Neo-Kantian.

If

it

is con-

sidered simply as a methodological principle

in

natural

science.

354

LATER

CUR~NTS

OF THOUGHT

materialism is to be affirmed.

That

is

to say, the physicist, for

example, should proceed as though there were only material

things.

Kant

himself was of this opinion. The natural scientist is

not concerned' with spiritual reality.

But

though materialism is

acceptable as a methodological principle in the field of natural

science,

it

i.s

no longer acceptable when it has been transformed

into a metaphysics or general philosophy.

In

this form

it

becomes

uncritical

and

naive. For example, in empirical psychology it is

quite right and proper to carry as far as possible the physiological

explanation of psychical processes.

But

it

is

a sure sign of an

uncritical

and

naive outlook if it

is

supposed

that

consciousness

itself

is

susceptible

of

a purely materialist interpretation. For it is

only through consciousness

that

we

know anything

at

all about

bodies, nerves and

so

on. And the very attempt to develop a

materialist reduction of consciousness reveals its irreducible

cha.racter.

Further,

the

materialists betray their uncritical mentality when

they treat matter, force, atoms and

so

forth as though they were

things-in-themselves.

In

point of fact they are concepts formed

by

the mind or spirit in its effort to understand the world.

We

have

indeed to make use of such concepts,

but

it

is naive to assume

that

their utility shows

that

they can properly be made the basis for a

dogmatist materialist metaphysics. And this is what philosophical

materialism really is.

4.

Lange's criticism dealt a telling blow

at

materialism, all the

more

so

because he did not confine himself to polemics

but

was

at

pains to show what was, in his opinion, the valid element in

the

materialist attitude. But, as one might expect, his criticism did not

prevent a recrudescence of materialism, a second wave which

appealed for support to

the

Darwinian theory of evolution as a

proved factor which showed

that

the origin and development of

man was simply a phase

of

cosmic evolution in general,

that

man's

higher activities could be adequately explained in terms of this

evolution, and

that

at

no point was it necessary to introduce

the

notion of creative activity

by

a supramundane Being. The fact

that

there is no necessary connection between the scientific

hypothesis of biological evolution and philosophical materialism

was

indeed clear to some minds

at

the time.

But

there were many

people who either welcomed or attacked the hypothesis, as

the

case might be, because they thought

that

materialism was

the

natural conclusion to draw from it.

NON-DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

355

The characteristic popular expression

of

this second phase of the

materialist movement in Germany

waS

Haeckel's The Riddle

of

the

Universe (Die Weltratsel, 1899). Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) was for

many years professor of zoology

at

J ena, and a number of his works

treated simply of the results of his scientific research. Others, how-

ever, were devoted to expounding a monistic philosophy based on

the hypothesis

of

evolution. Between 1859, the year which saw the

publication

of

Darwin's The Origin

of

SPecies by Means

of

Natural

Selection,

and r871, when Darwin's The Descent

of

Man

appeared,

Haeckel published several works on topics connected with

evolution and made

it

clear

that

in his opinion Darwin had

at

last

set the evolutionary hypothesis on a really scientific basis.

On this

basis Haeckel proceeded

to

develop a general monism and to offer

it

as a valid substitute for religion in the traditional sense. Thus in

1892 he published a lecture, with additional notes, bearing the

title

Monism as

Link

between

Religion and Science

(Der

M onismus

als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft). And similar attempts

to

find in his monism a fulfilment of man's need for religion can be

seen in

The Riddle

of

the

Universe and in God-Nature, Studies

in

Monistic Religion (Gott-Natur, Studien uber monistische Religion,

19

1

4).

Reflection on the world has given rise, Haeckel asserts, to a

number of riddles or

problems~

Some of these have been solved,

while others are insoluble and are no real problems

at

all. 'The

monistic philosophy

is

ultimately prepared to recognize only one

comprehensive riddle of the universe, the problem

of

substance.'l

If

this

is

understood to mean the problem of the nature of some

mysterious thing-in-itself behind phenomena, Haeckel

is

prepared

to grant

that

we

arc perhaps as unable to solve it as were

'Anaximander and Empedocles

2400 years ago'. 2 But inasmuch as

we

do not even know

that

there

is

such a thing-in-itself, discussion

of its nature

is

fruitless. What has been made clear

is

'the com-

prehensive law of substance', 3 the law

of

the conservation of force

and matter. Matter and force or energy are the two attributes

of

substance, and the law of their conservation, when interpreted as

the universal law of evolution, justifies us in conceiving the universe

as a unity in which natural laws are eternally and universally valid.

We

thus arrive

at

a monistic interpretation of the universe which

is based on the proofs

of

its unity and of the causal relation between

1 Die Welt,4tsel, p. 10 (Leipzig, 1908 edition).

I Ibid., p. 239. • Ibid.

LATER CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

all phenomena. Further, this monism destroys the three principal

dogmas of dualistic metaphysics, namely

'God, freedom and

immortality'

.1

Kant's

theory of two worlds,

the

physical, material world and

the moral, immaterial world, is thus excluded

by

the monistic

philosophy.

But

it does not follow

that

there

is

no place in monism

for

an

ethics, provided

that

it

is

grounded on the social instincts of

man

and, not

I)n

some imagined categorical imperative. Monism

acknowledges as its highest moral ideal the achievement of a

harmony between egoism and altruism, self-love

and

love of

the

neighbour. 'Before all others it

is

the great English philosopher

Herbert· Spencer whom

we

have to

thank

for finding in the

theory of evolution a basis for this monistic ethics."

Haeckel protests

that

materialism is an entirely inappropriate

epithet to apply to his monistic philosophy. For while it does indeed

reject the idea of immaterial spirit, it equally rejects the idea of

a dead, spiritless matter.

'In

every atom both are inseparably

combined.'3 But to say

that

in every atom spirit and matter

(Geist und M aterie) are combined

is

really to say

that

in every atom

force and 'stuff'

(Kraft

und

Stoff) are combined. And though

Haeckel asserts

that

his philosophy might just as well be labelled

spiritualism as materialism, it

is

evidently what most people would

describe as materialism, an evolutionary version of it, it is true,

but

none the less materialism. His account of

the

nature of

consciousness and reason makes this quite clear, whatever he may

say to the contrary.

If

the term 'materialism' is objectionable to Haeckel,

so

also

is

the term 'atheism'. The monistic philosophy

is

pantheistic, not

atheistic~

God

is

completely immanent and one with the universe.

'Whether

we

describe this impersonal" Almighty" as "Goq-N ature"

(Theophysis) or as "All-God" (Pamheos) is ultimately a matter

of

indifference."

It

does not seem to have occurred to Haeckel

that

if

pantheism consists in calling the universe 'God' and if religion

consists in cultivating science, ethics and aesthetics as directed

respectively towards the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty,

pantheism

is

distinguishable from atheism only

by

the possible

presence of a certain emotive attitude towards

the

universe in

1 Die WeltriJlsel, pp. 140, 217

and

240.

I

Ibid.,

p.

218.

If

Haeckel were still alive, he would doubtless express appreciation

of

the

ethical ideas of Professor

Julian

Huxley.

•

De..

Monism"s, p.

27

(Stuttgart,

1905

edition).

• Gott-Nalur, p. 38 (Leipzig, 1914).

NON-DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

357

those who call themselves pantheists which

is

not present in those

who

call themselves atheists. Haeckel does indeed make the

suggestion

that

'as the ultimate cause of all things "God"

is

the

hypothetical "original ground of substance"

'.1 But this concept

is

presumably the same as

that

of the ghostly impersonal

thing:-:in-

itself which,

as

we

have seen, Haeckel elsewhere dismisses 'from

consideration. Hence his pantheism cannot amount to much more

than calling the universe 'God'

and

entertaining a certain emotive

attitude towards it.

5.

In

1906

a German Monist Society (Monistenbund) was

founded

at

Munich under the patronage

of

Haeckel,

2

and in 1912

The Monist Century (Das monistische ] ahrhundert) was published

by

Ostwald, the then president

of

the Monist Society.

Wilhelm

Ostwald (1853-1932) was a famous chemist, professor

of chemistry first

at

Riga and afterwards

at

Leipzig, a recipient

of the Nobel Prize (1909) and founder

of

the Annalen

der

Natur-

philosophie

(19°1-21), in the last issue

of

which there appeared the

German text of Ludwig Wittgenstein's

Tractatus

logico:-philo-

sophicus.

In

1906

he resigned from his chair

at

Leipzig, and in

subsequent years he published a considerable number of writings

on philosophical topics.

In

1895

Ostwald published a book on The Overcoming oj

Scientific Materialism (Die

U eberwindung

des

wissenschaftlichen

M aterialismus).

But the so-called overcoming of materialism meant

for

him

the substitution

of

the concept of energy for

that

of

matter.

The fundamental element of reality

is

energy which in a process of

transformations takes a variety of distinct forms. The different

properties of matter are. different forms of energy; and psychic

energy, which can be either Wlconscious or conscious, constitutes

another distinct level or form. The different forms or levels are

irreducible, in the

sense

that

one distinct form cannot be identified

with another. At the same time they arise through transformation

of

the one ultimate reality, namely energy. Hence 'energeticism'

is

a monistic theory.

It

hardly fits in perhaps with Ostw31d's own

canons of scientific method, which exclude anything approaching

metaphysical hypotheses. But when he turned to the philosophy

of Nature he was in

any

case going beyond the limits

of

empirical

science.

6.

It

is

only in its crudest form

that

materialism involves the

1 Ibid.

• The Society's guiding idea was

that

of science as providing a way of life.

358

LATER

CURRENTS

OF

THOUGHT

assertion

that

all processes are material.

But

a philosophy could

not be classified as materialist unless

it

at

any

rate

maintained

the

priority of

matter

and

that

processes which cannot be properly

described as material are emergents from

matter

or epiphenomenal

to material processes. Similarly, though idealism does not involve

the

assertion

that

all things are ideas in

any

ordinary sense, a

philosophy could not be properly described as a system of meta-

physical idealism unless

it

at

any

rate

held

that

Thought or Reason

or Spirit is prior

and

that

the material world is its expression

or

externalization.

In

any

case

the

dispute between materialism

and

idealism presupposes a prima facie distinction between

matter

and

spirit or thought. An

attempt

is then made to overcome the

opposition

by

subordinating one term of

the

distinction

to

the

other.

One way, therefore, of excluding

the

dispute between

materialism

and

idealism is

to

reduce reality

to

phenomena which

cannot properly be described either as material or as spiritual.

We find

such'

an

attempt

in

the

phenomenalism of Mach

and

A venarius, which is commonly known as empirio-criticism. This is

not

to

say

that

the two philosophers in question were simply

concerned with overcoming

the

opposition between materialism

and

idealism. Mach, for instance, was largely concerned with

the

nature

of physical science. At

the

same time they regarded their

phenomenalism as eliminating

the

dualisms which give rise

to

metaphysical essays in unification. And

it

is from this point

of

view

that

their theory is considered here.

Richard Avenarius

(I843-96), professor

of

physics

at

Zurich

and

author

of a Critique

of

Pure Experience (Kritik derreinen Erfahrung,

1888-<)0)

and

The

Human

Concept

of

the

World (Der menschliche

Weltbegriff,

1891), sought

to

reveal

the

essential nature

of

pure

experience,

that

is, of experience stripped

of

all added interpreta-

tion. And he found the immediate

data

or elements of experience

in

sensations. These depend on changes in

the

central nervous

system which are conditioned

by

the

environment acting either

as

an

external stimulus or

by

way of

the

process of nutrition. Further,

the

more

the

brain develops,

the

more is

it

excited

by

constant

elements in

the

environment. Thus

the

impression of a familiar

world is produced, a world in which one can feel secure. And

increase in these feelings

of

familiarity

and

security is accompanied

by

a decrease

in

the

impression of

the

world as enigmatic,

problematic

and

mysterio~s.

In

fihe,

the

unanswerable problems

of metaphysics

tend

to

be eliminated. And

the

theory of pure

NON-DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

359

experience, with

its

reduction of

both

the

outer

and

the

inner

worlds

to

sensations, excludes those dichotomies between

the

physical

and

the psychical, thing

and

thought, object

and

subject,

which have formed

the

basis for such rival metaphysical theories

as materialism

and

idealism.

A similar theory

was

produced, though

by

way

of a

rather

different approach,

by

Ernst

Mach (I838-I9I6) who was for

many

years a

profes&or

in

the

university of Vienna

and

published, in

addition

to

works concerned with physical science, Contributions

·10

the A

na~sis

of

Sensations (Beitrdge zur A

~se

der Empfindungen,

1886),

and

Knowledge and Error (Erkenntnis

und

Irrtwm, I905).

Experience is reducible to sensations which are neither purely

physical nor purely psychical

but

rather neutral. Mach

thus

tries

to

get behind

the

distinctions which philosophers have used as a

basis for

the

construction

of

metaphysical theories.

But

he is more

concerned· with purifying physical science from metaphysical

elements

than

with developing a general philosophy.l Arising

out

of our biological needs, science aims

at

control of Nature

by

enabling us

to

predict.

For

this purpose

we

have

to

practise

an

economy of thought, uniting phenomena

by

means of

the

fewest

and

simplest concepts possible.

But·

though these concepts are

indispensable instruments for rendering scientific prediction

possible,

they

do not give us insight into causes or essences or

substances in a metaphysical sense.

In

Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (I909) Lenin maintained

that

the

phenomenalism of Mach

and

A venarius leads inevitably

to

idealism

and

thence

to

religious belief.

For

if things are reduced

to

sensations or sense-data,

they

must be mind-dependent. And

as

they

can hardly be dependent simply on

the

individual

human

mind,

they

must be referred

to

a divine mind.

Historically,

the

phenomenalism of Mach

and

Avenarius formed

part

of

the

line of thought which issued in

the

neopositivism of

the

Vienna Circle in

the

twenties

of

the

present century.

It

can hardly

be

said

to

have led

to

a revival of idealism,

and

much less of

theism.

It

does

not

follow, however,

that

Lenin's point of view

has

nothing

to

be said for it.

For

example, as Avenarius

had

no

intention of denying

that

there were things

in

some sense before

there were

human

beings,

he

maintained

that

sensations could

1 Mach rejects

the

concept of

the

ego

as

a spiritual substance standing over

aga.il;1st

Nature and interprets

the

self

as

a complex of phenomena which

are

co!ltinuous with Nature.

B~t

he does

not

"!Ork

out

this

theory

in

any

thorough-

lomg

manner,

and

he admits

that

the

ego 18

the

bond which unites experience.

360

LATER CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

exist before minds, as possible sensations. But unless the reduction

of things to sensations is interpreted as equivalent to the

state-

ment, with which not even the most resolute realist would quarrel,

that

physical objects are in principle capable of being sensed if

there

is

any

sentient subject

at

hand,

it

becomes difficult to avoid

some such conclusion as

that

drawn

by

Lenin. One can, of course,

try

to do

so

by

spea~ing

of sensibilia rather than of sensations.

But in this case one either reinstates physical objects over against

the mind or

bec.omes

involved in the same difficulty as before.

Besides,

it

is absurd, in the opinion

olthe

present \\Titer, to reduce

the self to a complex

or

succession of sensibilia. For the presence

of

the self as irreducible to sensibilia

'is

a condition

of

the possibility

of attempting such a reduction. Hence one would be left with the

self on the one hand and

sensibilia on the other, in other words

with a dualism of the very type which empirio-criticism was

concerned to overcome.

1

Mach's attempt to purify physical

science from metaphysics

is

one thing: phenomenalism as a

philosophical theory

is

quite another.

I The neopositivist attempted

to

transform phenomenalism from an ontological

into a linguistic theory

by

saying

that

the statement

that

physical objects are

sense-data means

that

a sentence in which a physiCal object is mentioned can

be

translated into a sentence

or

sentences in which only sense-data are mentioned,

in such a way

that

if the original sentence is true (or false) .the translation will

be

true (or false) and vicil VII,.S/J.

But

I do

not

think

that

this

attempt

proved

to

be

successful.

CHAPTER

XIX

THE

NEO-KANTIAN

MOVEMENT

In.troductory

remarks~The

Marburg

School-The

School

of

Baden~The

pragmatist

tendency-E,

Cassirer,'

conClud'ng

observations-Some

notes

on

Dilthey.

I.

IN

1865

Otto Liebmann (1840'-1912), in his Kant

-und

die

Epigonen, raised

the

cry of 'Back to Kant!' This demand

fora

return to

Kant

was indeed perfectly understandable in the

circumstances.

On the one hand idealist metaphysics had produced

a crop of systems which, when the first flush

of

enthusiasm had

passed away, seemed to many

to

be incapable

of

providing any-

thing which could properly be called knowledge and thus to justify

Kant's attitude towards metaphysics,

On the other hand

materialism, while speaking in

the

name of science, proceeded to

serve up its own highly questionable form of metaphysics

and

was

blind to the limitations placed

by

Kant

to the use which could

legitimately be made

of

scientific concepts.

In

other words, both

the idealists and the materialists justified

by

their fruits the

limitations which Kant had set to man's theoretical knowledge.

Was

itnot

desirable, therefore, to

turn

back

to the great thinker of

modem times

Who

by a careful critique of human knowledge had

succeeded in avoiding the extravagances of metaphysics without

falling into the dogmatism of the materialists?

It

was not a

question

of

following Kant slavishly, but rather of accepting his

general position or attitude

and

working on the lines which he had

followed.

The Neo-Kantian movement became a powerful force in

German philosophy.

It

became in

fact

the

academic philosophy or

'School Philosophy'

(Sclmlphilosophie), as

the

Germans say, and by

the turn

of

the century most of the university chairs

of

philosophy

were occupied by people who were in some degree

at

least

representatives of the movement. But Neo-Kantianism assumed

pretty

well as many shapes as

it

had representatives. And

we

cannot possibly mention them all here. Some general indications

of the principal lines of thought will have

to

suffice.

2.

A distinction is drawn within the Neo-Kantian movement

3

61

LATER CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

between the Schools of Marburg and Baden. The Marburg School

can be said to have concentrated principally on logical,

epistemo-

logical and methodological themes. And it

is

associated above all

with the names of Hermann

Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp

(

18

54-

1

9

2

4).

Cohen, who was nominated professor

of

philosophy in the

university of Marburg in

1876, concerned himself with both the

exegesis and the development

of

Kant's thought.

In

a wide sense

his principal theme

is

the unity of the cultural consciousness and

its evolution, and whether he is writing on logic, ethics, aesthetics

or religion

l

it

is

noticeable

that

he is constantly referring to

the

historical development

of

the ideas which he

is

treating and to

. their cultural significance

at

different stages of their development.

This aspect of his thought makes

it

less formalistic and abstract

than

Kant's, though the wealth of historical reflections does not

facilitate

an

immediate grasp of Cohen's personal point of view.

In

the

first volume of his System

of

Philosophy (System

der

Philosophie, 1902-12) Cohen abandons Kant's doctrine of sensi-

bility,

the

transcendental aesthetic, and devotes himself entirely

to

the

logic of pure thought or pure knowledge

(die

reine Erkenntnis),

especially of the pure or a priori knowledge which lies

at

the basis

of mathematical physics. True, logic possesses a wider field of

application.

But

'the

fact

that

logic must have a relation which

extends beyond the

field

of mathematical natural science to the

field of the mental sciences

(Geisteswissenschaften)

in no way affects

the fundamental relation of logic to knowledge in mathematical

natural science'.

1 Indeed, 'the establishment of the relation

between metaphysics and mathematical natural science

is

Kant's

decisive act'.

8

In

the

second volume, devoted to the ethics of the pure will

(Ethik

des

"einen Willens), Cohen remarks

that

'ethics, as the

doctrine of man, becomes the centre of

philosophy'."

But

the

concept of

man

is complex and comprises the two principal

aspects of man, namely as an individual and as a member of

society. Thus the deduction of the adequate concept of man moves

1

In

his System

of

Philosophy

the

idea of God is discussed in

the

second volume.

Cf. also

Th~

Concept

of

Religion

in

the

System

of

Philosophy

(Dey

BegYiff de,

Religion

im

System de, Philosophie, Giessen, 1915). The

idea

of God is depicted

as

the

unifying ideal of

truth

and

perfection.

• System

der

Philosophie,

I,

p.

15

(Berlin, 1922,

3rd

edition).

The

term

Geistes-

wissenschaften

will be discussed later.

a Ibid., p. 9. Cohen is obviously referring

to

metaphysics

in

the

sense

in

which

Kant

accepted metaphysics.

• System

der

Philosophie,

11,

p.

I (Berlin 1921,

3rd

edition).

THE

NEO-KANTIAN MOVEMENT

through several phases or moments until the two aspects are seen

as

iI).terpenetrating one another.

In

his discussion of this

matter

Cohen observes

that

philosophy has come to look on the State as

the embodiment

of

man's ethical consciousness.

But

the empirical

or actual State

is

only too evidently the State 'of the ruling

classes'.1 And the power-State

(der

M

achtstaat)

can become the

State which embodies the principles of right and justice

(der

Rechtsstaat)

only when it ceases to serve particular class-interests.

In

other words, Cohen looks forward to a democratic socialist

society which will be the true expression

of

the ethical will of man

considered both as a free individual person and as essentially orien-

tated towards social life and the attainment of a common ideal end.

As

the whole system of philosophy

is

conceived 'from the point

of view

of

the unity of the cultural consciousness'z and as this

consciousness

is

certainly not completely characterized by science

and morals,

Cohen devotes the third volume to aesthetics.

As

Kant

saw, a treatment

of

aesthetics forms an intrinsic

part

of

systematic

philosophy.

Natorp, who also occupied a chair

at

Marburg, was strongly

influenced by

Cohen.

In

his Philosophical Foundations of

the

Exact

Sciences

(Die

philosophischen

Grundlagen

der

exakten Wissenschaften,

1910) he tries to show

that

the logical development

of

mathematics

does not require any recourse to intuitions of space and time. His

philosophy of mathematics is thus considerably more 'modern'

than Kant's.

As

for ethics, Natorp shared Cohen's general outlook,

and on the basis of the idea

that

the moral law demands of the

individual

that

he should subordinate his activity to the elevation

of

humanity he developed a theory

of

social pedagogy.

It

can also

be mentioned

that

in a well-known work, Plato's

Theory

of Ideas

(Platons

Ideenlehre,

1903), Natorp attempted to establish an

affinity between Plato and Kant.

Both

Cohen and N atorp endeavoured to overcome the dichotomy

between thought and being which seemed to be implied by the

Kantian theory

of

the thing-in-itself. Thus according to Natorp

'both, namely thought and being, exist and have meaning only in

their constant mutual relations to one another'.

8

Being is not

something static, set over against the activity

of

thought;

it

exists

only in a process

of

becoJIling which

is

intrinsically related to this

activity. And thought

is

a process which progressively determines

1 Ibid., p. 620. I System

der

Philosophi"

JIJ,

p. 4 (Berlin, 1922).

• Philosophie, p.

13

(GOttingen, 1921, 3rd edition).

Copleston F. History of Philosophy. Volume 7: Modern Philosophy

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