Tsutsui W.M. A Companion to japanese histоry

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

on the other hand, if the Soviet Union has collapsed, how can the opponents of the

treaty gain support for neutrality between a division which no longer exists?

The 1991 Gulf War brought the question of Japan’s role in the world to the

forefront of scholarly and popular debate. At the time, the type of contribution

Japan was to make was debated in the context of the constitution and the restraint

this placed on the government in making a military contribution. At one end of the

spectrum were those who argued that, due to Article 9, Japan could make only a

financial or other non-military contribution, whereas others argued that, in order to

make a visible contribution, Japan should make some sort of ‘‘human contribution,’’

whether by the creation of new special forces to carry out peace-keeping and hu-

manitarian work or by the deployment of the SDF. In the end, the government’s

contribution to the Gulf War was financial assistance to the tune of $13 billion and

the dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces for mine-clearing after the end of

the war.

Indeed, the Gulf War can be regarded as a watershed in the debate on Japan in the

world. For the large payment made towards the costs of the war did not lead to

widespread recognition of Japan’s contribution, but rather to criticism of Japanese

‘‘check book diplomacy,’’ and the government did not even receive thanks for its

efforts. The academic debate in the wake of the 1991 Gul f War now includes more

frequent calls to revise the constitution: the aim is to enable Japan to make a full

international contribution, particularly a contribution in support of US strategy.

What some have in mind, as suggested by the call for Japan to become the ‘‘Britain

of the Far East,’’ is a strengthening of the military relationship with the United States

and the creation of the same sort of ‘‘special (military) relationship’’ Britain and the

United States enjoy.

It is certainly true that, in comparison with the 1980s, Japan’s military role today is

far greater, with PKO forces dispatched to Cambodia and elsewhere, support for the

war in Afghanistan, and the deployment of ground troops in Iraq. With the pressure

on Japan to do more, however, the academic debate has taken up the question of why

Japan does not do more. As indicated above, one interpretation is that, as a result of

the constitution and the anti-militarist or, more loosely, ‘‘pacifist’’ orientation of the

public, Japan is unable to play a full military role in support of the United States. In

other words, anti-militarist norms are at the heart of the problem. The second

interpretation places emphasis more on how, with the widely accepted decline of

these anti-militarist norms, Japan will become a ‘‘normal state’’ along the lines of a

Britain of the Far East. In other words, Japan should begin to use its military

resources in the same way as Britain. At the least, this is the desire of some academics

seeking to influence the debate on the Japanese role in the world. The third inter-

pretation is that, in the end, Japanese leaders are pragmatists for whom not only

military but also economic security is essential.

In this latter case, the idea is of US

forces as a ‘‘military shield’’ and economic links with countries essential to Japanese

prosperity as a ‘‘mercantile sword.’’ The point here is that, as in the case of Japan’s

participation in the war against Afghanistan, policy-makers will do only the minimum

necessary to satisfy US demands,

and not fully develop Japan into a ‘‘normal state.’ ’

Indeed, for Japanese policy-makers, security is seen in a much wider context than

simply military security, taki ng into account economic as well as other non-military

factors.

JAPAN IN THE WORLD 339

Japan as Leader? The Debate on Reactivity and Proactivity

One of the key points in the broader scholarly debate on Japan in the world has been

whether the role played can be accounted for by internal or external pressures,

gaiatsu, especially those from the United States, and more generally whether changes

in the Japanese role have occurred due to one, the other, or a combination of the two.

A number of variables can help to answer this question fully. To start with, the specific

issue area can influence the range of actors involved in the policy-making process. For

instance, Japanese farmers are much more likely to act as an interest group in trying to

influence policy regarding the wider opening of the Japanese market to foreign rice

than they are in the case of the SDF being dispatch ed on PKO. Similarly, depending

on whether a policy is implemented in response to a crisis, or is short-, medium-, or

long-term, the actors involved in the decision-making proc ess are likely to differ. For

instance, the Koizumi Jun ichiro

government’s response to the crisis created by the

kidnapping of Japanese citizens in Iraq in April 2004 engaged a different range of

actors to those promot ing the much longer-term policy goal of gaining a seat on the

United Nations Security Council. Again, the geographical focus of a policy will

often be of concern to different actors, as Japan’s interests differ considerably de-

pending on the policy’s scope. For instance, Japan has historically maintained much

stronger ties with East Asia than with Africa, suggesting the former is likely to enjoy a

higher profile in the policy-making process than the latter. We can also expect the

actors to differ depending on whether the issue is consensual or controversial in

nature. For instance, even though the United States may exert pressure on the

government to play a greater military role in support of American regional or global

strategy, as this is a controversial issue domestically the efficacy of such external

pressure is likely to be weaker than in the case of an issue enjoying wider consensus

among domestic actors, such as Japan offering humanitarian aid under United

Nations auspices. Finally, whether Japanese and US inter ests are shared, different,

or in conflict with each other could influence Japan’s role in the world, with American

pressure likely to be more effective when interests are shared than when they are in

conflict. In short, in seeking to explain Japan’s more proactive role in the world,

whether through an exam ination of external pressures, internal pressures, or both, a

full account of their respective roles would need to take into consideration these types

of variables.

Although space precludes an examination of the impact these variables may exert,

we can nevertheless point to a tendency in the debate on Japan in the world for some

commentators to try to explain Japan’s role by placing greater emphasis on external

pressures and for others to pay greater attention to internal pressures on the policy-

making process. It was Kent Calder who, in a 1988 article, first put forward a

conceptual way to understand Japan’s susceptibility to foreign (US) pressure with

the idea of Japan as a reactive state. By focusing on foreign economic policy, he

demonstrated how Japan reacts to rather than shapes international relations.

specifically, the argument is that, due to domestic constraints, particularly those

imposed by the bureaucracy and interest groups, Japan is constrained in any attempt

to play a leadership role in the world, and instead simply reacts to US pressures in

determining policy.

340 GLENN D. HOOK

Other research has shown that, even though gaiatsu may be an important variable,

the extent to which this external pressure is successful or not is less than clear-cut. In

the case of the US–Japan trade talks in the 1980s, for instance, Leonard Schoppa

found US pre ssure was most efficacious when a domestic constituency in support of

the policy existed in Japan. Sato

ichiro

, in turn, demonstrated how US pressure has

been used by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now Ministry

of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI) to bolster its monitoring of key sectors of

the economy, on the one hand, whereas supermarkets like Toys ‘‘R’’ Us were able to

escape MITI’s clutches by the use of US pressure, on the other.

Other participants

in the debate such as T. J. Pempel have shown how the change in Japanese foreign

economic policy, characterized as a move from an exporter to an overseas investor,

resulted from internal, rather than external, factors, especially the changing power

relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.

All in all, as shown by the appli-

cation of Putnam’s ‘‘two level game’’ approach to US–Japanese economic negoti-

ations in the 1980s,

both internal and external pressures can help us to understand

more fully the changing role of Japan in the world.

For Japanese academics such as Kamo Takehiko, however, the asymmetrical nature

of the relationship between Japan and the United States, with Japan naturally in the

weaker position, is viewed as crucial for understanding Japan in the world.

For this

makes Japanese policymakers especially vulnerable to pressures exerted by the United

States, and this in turn constrains their developm ent of an independent Japanese role.

It is such asymmetric interdependence that makes policy-makers vulnerable to US

pressure even in the area of Official Development Assistance (ODA), where Japan is

widely accepted to play a key global role. Building on previous work on ODA policy,

such as that by Robert Orr, who gives weight to external factors, and Dennis

Yasutomo, who emphasizes internal factors, Miy ashita Akitoshi demonstrates how

Japan’s response to US pressure is not due in any sense to a dearth of intelligible

policy, but rather results from a calculated decision.

The question of the degree to

which the nation can pursue an independent role in the world, given the asymmetric

relationship with the United States and the different role of US pressure, remains a

point of debate in Japan’s ODA and other policies. It is certainly a challenge to the

idea of Japan as a reactive state.

Regional Leadership: A Proactive Role in East Asia?

Whether external or internal pressures influence the increasingly proactive role of

Japan, what does seem to gain a certain degree of consensus in the debate on Japan’s

role in the world is in terms of Japanese engagement with a specific geographic

region, East Asia. The identity of this region has bee n controversial, though: on the

one hand, the strong security, political and economic ties with the United States has

given ‘‘Asia-Pacific’’ a particular salience, neatly co-joining the United States (Pacific)

and Japan (Asia) in a common identity. On the other hand, the moves to develop new

regional organizations focused on East Asia, the 1997 East Asian financial and wider

crises, and the increasing domestic salience of Asianist norms, have strengthened the

East Asian identity in recent years. Whether in terms of a Japanese role in Asia Pacific

or in East Asia, however, an issue Japanese policymakers have had to face is how to

JAPAN IN THE WORLD 341

rebuild relations with forme r colonies and neighbors. In particular, a major task for

Japan during the postwar era has been to overcome the historical legacy of imperial

expansion, the war, and the more recent cold war divisions in order to carve out a new

role in the region. In this process, policymakers have used ODA and promoted trade

and investment as a way to contribute to economic development and the longer term

goal of integrating the East Asian political economy.

Thus, even during the cold war period Jap an played a leading role in the economic

development of the Newly Industrializing Economics of Hong Kong, Singapore,

South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as the developing economies of Southeast Asia,

together with the integration of the regional political economy. The change in the

structural features of the international system, as symbolized by the end of the cold

war, however, opened up new opportunities for Japan to play an even greater regional

role. Indeed, Japan’s leade rship role in the region has been more pron ounced in the

wake of the ending of the cold war, with Japanese governmental and non-govern-

mental actors taking a leading role in promoting new multilateral forums for holding

dialogue on economic, political and security issues. This is illustrated by Japanese

efforts to promote the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Association

for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN plus

Three (China, Japan, and South Korea).

As Funabashi Yo

ichi makes clear, Japan worked with Australi a in pushing forward

the creation of APEC at the end of the 1980s.

Although the degree to whi ch Japan

played a supporter role to Australia, or was more proactive when a range of govern-

mental and non-governmental actors are taken into account, has been a point of

debate,

Japan clearly seems to have played a part in promoting this multilateral

institution. Despite a greater role played by the United States in setting the APEC

agenda, as seen in the greater emphasis on security issues in the wake of the Septem-

ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Japanese government still remains a key member of

this forum.

In the case of the proposal to establish the first multilateral forum for security

dialogue in the region, the ARF, in 1991, Japan more clearly played an independent

leadership role. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Nakayama Taro

, put the

proposal forward, reflecting the increasing recognition of the need for Japan to play a

security role in the post-cold-war period, on the one hand, and to overcome the

historical obstacles to strengthening links with its East Asian neighbors, on the

other.

This promotion of security multilateralism in East Asia was not, though, a

rejection of bilateralism centring on the US-Japan Security Treaty, but rather a

supplement to that relationship. In other words, Japan was playing a greater leader-

ship role in East Asia, but this was not a challenge to the hegemonic role played by the

United States.

The leadership role played by Japan in East Asia was again demonstrated at the time

of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. In response to the crisis, Japan proposed the

creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). True, due to US and other objections,

the Japanese withdrew their proposal and instead offered to support the Manila

Framework, as proposed at a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

forum in Manila in November 1997. From the short-term perspective of the AMF

proposal, therefore, the leadership role taken by Japan in seeking to assist the affected

economies of East Asia was squashed by foreign pressures. While over the short-term,

342 GLENN D. HOOK

this may appear as a failure of Japanese policy, over the longer term the government

has played a proactive role in promoting the further integration of the region,

especially financial integ ration, as illustrated by the New Miyazawa Initiative, the

Chiang Mai Initiative, and the cr eation of the ASEAN plus Three.

In short, as

noted above, over the longer term Japan has been playing a proactive role in

promoting the integration of the East Asian regional political economy.

What Kind of Leadership?

The debate about whether Japan is a reactive or proactive state goes hand in hand

with one about the nature of Japanese leadership. The main impetus for the salience

of this debate was the economic rise of Japan to economic superpower status, and the

perceived challenge this posed to the United States during the 1980s. The large trade

surpluses Japan chalked up with the United States, on the one hand, and the

protection of domestic industries and barriers to foreign direct investment, on the

other, meant intense pressure was exerted on Japan to reduce the trade surplus and

open up the domestic market. The debate to emerge over the trade surplus was in

terms of the trade-off between Japan pursuing a mercantilist policy, while relying on

the United States for its security, and the need for it to make a military contribution

to the maintenance of the global order. While focus was at the time placed on Japan’s

mercantilist role in the world,

the longer term interest has been on how this

increased economic power has fed into the Japanese role in the post-cold-war

world. Certainly, during the heyday of the ‘‘bubble economy,’’ when the nation’s

economic might led to Japan being touted as a possible challenger to the United

States, the rise of Japan to economic superpower status caught the imagination of

especially US academics, who were concerned about Japan’s apparent unwillingness

to provide ‘‘public goods’’ and carry out the responsibilities associated with its new

status.

A 1986 article by Erza Vogel, in particular, stimulated the debate on the question

of Japan’s leadership role.

It saw the rise in Japanese economic might as embodying

the potentia l to be transformed into political and perhaps even mil itary leadership in

the world – the provocative possibility of a ‘‘Pax Nipponica.’’ To be fair, Vogel was in

essence suggesting a limited form of hegem ony, but the potential for Japan was clearly

not as a ‘‘reactive’’ state, but as a ‘‘great power’’ playing a leadership role in the

world. While criticism was raised of the idea of a heg emonic Japan in terms of whether

the nation actually sought to play such a role, the fraught question of whether

converting economic power into its political and military equivalent was possible,

given domestic constraints and other potential challengers to the United States , such

as China and India, the future role of Japan in the world was clearly a major point of

concern for scholars at the time. What, indeed, would be Japan’s future role in the

world?

The scenarios painted by Inoguchi Takashi are suggestive of the wider possibilities.

He saw four: pax Americana, phase II, with the United States as the hegemon

continuing to play the key military role and Japan continuing a mainly economic

role in the world; bigemony, with Japan and the United States cooperating together

and Japan’s econo mic power being translated into military power; pax consortis, with

JAPAN IN THE WORLD 343

coalitions built internationally and Japan playing an economic role and promoting

non-military solutions to human problems; and pax Nipponica, with Japan taking on

a hegemonic role in the world, although for Japan to play such a role in the security

field would require de-nuclearization. Writing before the end of the cold war,

Inoguchi envisione d pax Americana phase II and bigemony as the most likely scen-

arios until 2015.

After the end of the cold war, much of the debate has focused on

Japan emerging to play a supplementary role in support of the United States, but

there remains the question of what type of leadership role Japan is actually playing.

Michael Green, for instance, points to the increasingly proactive role of Japan, and

suggests this results from a new ‘‘realism.’’

Others have argu ed instead that Japan-

ese leadership represents a different type of leadership, certainly different to that

practiced by the United States. Alan Rix, for instance, has suggested the idea of

Japan ‘‘leading from behind,’’ as seen in the type of long-term leadership demon-

strated by Japan in shaping the Asia Pacific order through trade, investment, and aid,

not dominant behav ior.

Reinhard Drifte sees Japanese leadership is practiced by

‘‘stealth’’; Terada Takashi talks about ‘‘directional leadership’’; and Glenn Hook et al

speak in terms of ‘‘quiet diplomacy.’’

What all of these authors are seeki ng to add to

the debate is a view of a Japan as a state that practices leadership, but in ways that do

not fit easily with a model of US-style leadership. It is, in other words, a state that

seeks to shape, not simply respond to, the world.

Conclusion

The role of Japan in the world has been elucidated by focusing on a range of issues

related to security and leadership, as these two themes have continued to be of central

concern in both the cold war and post-cold-war periods, despite the radical trans-

formation in the structure of the international system symbolized by the ending of

the cold war. While the choice between unarmed neutralism and a security treaty with

the United States no longer informs the debate about the role of Japan in the post-

cold-war world, the highlighting of the potential to choose one or the other has been

fundamental to the way the debate on the nation’s peace has developed in Japan. In

this sense, the debate is linked to the question of Japan as a proactive or react ive state,

as choice implies the potential for policymakers to shape, not simply be shaped by, the

world. The American debate, in contrast, took a more Hobbesian view of the world as

a state of war of ‘‘all against all,’’ and saw the only option for Japan as to join one

camp or the other in the divided world of the cold war years. While those Japanese

scholars supportive of the Yoshida line were sympathetic to this view of the world,

seeing the members of the PIDG as hopelessly idealistic, the absence of any mean-

ingful debate on Japan joining the socialist, rather than capitalist camp, highlights a

major difference with the debate in the United States. The existence of unarmed

neutralism as an option, even if in the scholarly debate rather than in government

policy, contributed to the indiginization of the constitution and the inculcation of

anti-militarist norms in Japanese society. Whether the constitution will continue as a

constraint or be revised, and whether these norms will continue to influence the

debate on the appropriate military role for Japan in the post-cold-war world, is still to

be seen, but both will remain important in determining the role of Japan in the world.

344 GLENN D. HOOK

The debate on Japan’s leadership role has become intricately linked with the

deployment of military means, and how these will be employed in East Asia and the

wider world. While Japan has practiced leadership in the East Asian region, albeit not

in the same style as the United States and the United Kingdom, the focus has been

placed overwhelmingly on economic development and regional integration, reflect-

ing a wider view of security than simply military security. If Japan’s dispatch of the

SDF to Iraq is illustrative of a move to exploit the full range of power resources,

including the military, whether in support of the United States or in pursuit of

Japanese interests, then Japan’s East Asian neighbors will no doubt continue to

monitor its leadership role. While nuclear weapons can be expected to remain a

marginal issue in the debate over Japan’s future role in the world, how policymaker s

decide to utilize the nation’s military forces will be central to both the region and the

world. Whatever type of leadership role Japan plays, though, the constitution and

antimilitarist norms will prove crucial in its determination.

NOTES

1 Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan.

2 Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization; Igarashi, ‘‘Peace-Making and Party Politics.’’

3 Hook and McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution.

4 Johnson, Okinawa.

5 Cox, ‘‘Social Forces, States, and World Order,’’ p. 87.

6 Johnson and Keehn, ‘‘East Asian Security.’’

7 Asahi shinbun (Nov. 13, 1994).

8 Shimizu, Japan yo, kokka tare.

9 Sakamoto, Kakujidai no kokusai seiji.

10 Nagai, ‘‘Moratoriamu kokka no bo

eiron.’’

11 Kamiya, ‘‘Nuclear Japan.’’

12 Waltz, ‘‘The Emerging Structure,’’ pp. 55, 66.

13 Pharr, ‘‘Japan’s Defense Foreign Policy,’’ pp. 255–6.

14 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Hook, Militarization and Demili-

tarization.

15 Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan.

16 Hook, Gilson, Hughes and Dobson, Japan’s International Relations.

17 Armitage and Nye, ‘‘The United States and Japan.’’

18 Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘‘Japan’s Dual Hedge.’’

19 Ibid., p. 115.

20 Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda.

21 Calder, ‘‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation.’’

22 Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan; Sato

, ‘‘Modeling Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy.’’

23 Pempel, ‘‘From Exporter to Investor.’’

24 Schoppa, ‘‘Two Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes.’’

25 Kamo, ‘‘The Internationalization of the State.’’

26 Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power; Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism ;

Miyashita, ‘‘Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid.’’

27 Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, Japan’s International Relations.

28 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion.

29 Krauss, ‘‘Japan, the U.S., and the Emergence of Multilateralism.’’

30 Midford, ‘‘Japan’s Leadership Role.’’

JAPAN IN THE WORLD 345

31 Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, ‘‘Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis.’’

32 Prestowitz, Trading Places.

33 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations.

34 Vogel, ‘‘Pax Nipponica.’’

35 Inoguchi, ‘‘Four Japanese Scenarios,’’ p. 222.

36 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism.

37 Rix, ‘‘Japan and the Region,’’ p. 65.

38 Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy; Terada, ‘‘Directional Leadership in Institution-Building’’;

Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, Japan’s International Relations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armitage, Richard, and Nye, Joseph. ‘‘The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature

Partnership.’’ Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000. Available at

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SR_Japan.htm> accessed Feb. 28, 2006.

Barshay, Andrew. The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions.

Berkeley: University of Califor nia Press, 2004.

Calder, Kent. ‘‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State.’’

World Politics 40:4 (1988): 517–41.

Cox, Robert. ‘‘Social Forces, States, and World Order’’ (1981). In Robert Cox, with T.

J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Drifte, Reinhard. Japan’s Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century: From Economic Super-

power to What Power?, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan, 1998.

Funabashi Yo

ichi. Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC. Washington DC: Institute for

International Economics, 1995.

Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton Uni-

versity Press, 1987.

Green, Michael. Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenge in an Era of Uncertain

Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Heginbotham, Eric, and Samuels, Richard. ‘‘Japan’s Dual Hedge.’’ Foreign Affairs 81:5

(2002): 110–21.

Hook, Glenn D. Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan. London: Rou-

tledge, 1996.

Hook, Glenn D., and McCormack, Gavan. Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and

Analysis. London: Routledge, 2001.

Hook, Glenn D., Gilson, Julie, Hughes, Christopher, and Dobson, Hugo. Japan’s Inter-

national Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. London: Routledge, 2001.

Hook, Glenn D., Gilson, Julie, Hughes, Christopher, and Dobson, Hugo. ‘‘Japan and the

East Asian Financial Crisis: Patterns, Motivations, and Instrumentalisation of Japanese Re-

gional Economic Diplomacy.’’ European Journal of East Asian Studies 1:2 (2002): 177–98.

Hughes, Christopher. Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Di-

mensions. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Igarashi Takeshi. ‘‘Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-

Policy System in Postwar Japan.’’ Journal of Japanese Studies 11:2 (Summer 1985): 323–56.

Inoguchi Takashi. ‘‘Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future.’’ In Kathleen Newland, ed., The

International Relations of Japan. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990.

Johnson, Chalmers, ed. Okinawa: Cold War Island. Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research

Institute, 1999.

Johnson, Chalmers, and Keehn, E. G. ‘‘East Asian Security: The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy.’’

Foreign Affairs 74:4 (1995): 103–15.

346 GLENN D. HOOK

Kamiya Matake. ‘‘Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?’’ Washington Quarterly 26:1

(Winter 2002–3): 63–75.

Kamo Takehiko. ‘‘The Internationalization of the State: The Case of Japan.’’ In Yoshikazu

Sakamoto, ed., Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System. Tokyo: United Nations

University Press, 1994.

Katzenstein, Peter. Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar

Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Krauss, Ellis. ‘‘Japan, the U.S., and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia.’’ Pacific Review

13:3 (2000): 473–94.

Midford, Paul. ‘‘Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama

Proposal and the Logic of Assurance.’’ Pacific Review 13:3 (2000): 367–98.

Miyashita Akitoshi. ‘‘Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive–Proactive

Debate.’’ International Studies Quarterly 43:4 (Dec. 1999): 695–731.

Nagai Yonosuke. ‘‘Moratoriamu kokka no bo

eiron.’’ Chu

ron (Jan. 1981): 74–108.

Orr, Robert. The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. New York: Columbia University

Press, 1990.

Ozawa Ichiro

. Blueprint for a New Japan. New York: Kodansha, 1994.

Pempel. T. J. ‘‘From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign Economic Policy.’’ In Gerald

Curtis and Michael Blaker, eds., Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with

Change. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.

Pharr, Susan. ‘‘Japan’s Defense Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing.’’ In Gerald

Curtis and Michael Blaker, eds., Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with

Change. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.

Prestowitz, Clyde, Jr. Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead. New York: Basic

Books, 1988.

Rix, Alan. ‘‘Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind.’’ In Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver,

and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? St.

Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993.

Sakamoto Yoshikazu. Kakujidai no kokusai seiji. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982.

Sato

ichiro

. ‘‘Modeling Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy with the United States.’’ In

Miyashita Akitoshi and Sato

ichiro

, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific:

Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration. New York: Palgrave Mac-

millan, 2001.

Schoppa, Leonard. ‘‘Two Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in

Japan in Some Cases and Not Others.’’ International Organization 47:3 (Summer 1993):

353–86.

Schoppa, Leonard. Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Shimizu Ikutaro

. Japan yo, kokka tare

. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1980.

Terada, Takashi. ‘‘Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan’s Approaches to

ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC.’’ Pacific Review 14:2 (2001): 195–220.

Vogel, Ezra. ‘‘Pax Nipponica.’’ Foreign Affairs (Spring 1986): 752–67.

Waltz, Kenneth. ‘‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics.’’ International Security

18:2 (Autumn 1993): 44–79.

Yasutomo, Dennis. The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s,

1995.